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ABSTRACT 
Recent decades have seen an increase in the number of policy-planning 
groups, think tanks, clubs, conferences and retreats whose members and 
participants mainly comprise executives of transnational banks and 
businesses, political leaders and officials from state agencies and international 
organisations. In addition to such exclusive meeting places, there is a variety 
of international media outlets and publications targeting these groups of 
influencers and focusing on issues pertaining to the operation of the global 
economy. This study argues that these forums and media contribute to 
transnational elite formation by bringing elites together across institutional 
and national boundaries and by facilitating the formulation of shared ideas 
and policy objectives in common private and public spaces. Defining these 
institutions and processes for international business-policy interaction as 
transnational elite communication (TEC), the study examines their relevance 
for global economic governance. The specific focus is on the World Economic 
Forum and the Financial Times (FT) as forms of TEC. 
Theoretically, the work carves out a niche at the intersection of elite 
studies, global political economy, and communication and media studies. 
First, the study draws particularly on C. Wright Mills’ concept of the power 
elite, which provides a critical view of how societal transformations and 
institutional connections can pave the way to the concentration of power in 
society and to the formation of an increasingly integrated elite. Second, the 
perspective of global political economy informs that efforts to incorporate 
political and business elites on a transnational basis into a common field of 
global economic governance are an elementary aspect of managing an 
increasingly globalised and financialised capitalism. It also suggests that the 
historical process of integration is deeply rooted in political-economic power 
relations and that it has been shaped most significantly by the US state and 
US-based transnational corporations, which have been in dominant positions 
in the global political economy after World War 2. Finally, the perspective of 
communication and media studies highlights the importance of culture, 
identity and the public sphere – as a domain of associational life and discursive 
practice – in transnational elite formation. The theoretical exploration thus 
develops into an inquiry into the concentration of power in the global political 
economy; into the role of elites from the fields of business, politics and 
administration in shaping the processes of global economic governance; and 
into the efforts of US and western elites to incorporate non-western elites into 
these institutions and collective practices of governance. The study argues that 
observing the forums and media of transnational elites complements analyses 
of political and economic power in the global context as it sheds light on the 
kind of hegemonic processes concerning the ideas, identities and interests that 
inform elite agency in the global political economy. The practices of TEC 
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enhance the potential of elites to bridge divides, formulate common outlooks, 
negotiate shared goals and organise themselves as a collective agent in the 
pursuit of those objectives. 
The theoretical inquiry is followed by an empirical analysis of elite-
formation in TEC, focusing on the FT coverage of the World Economic 
Forum’s annual Davos meetings from 2001 to 2011. The qualitative text 
analysis is informed by the perspective of sociological or discursive 
institutionalism and draws specifically on the notion of epistemic work. The 
latter posits that actors appeal to world-cultural ideas, including ontological 
assumptions, actor identities, and values and ideals, when articulating their 
goals and attempting to convince others of their soundness. Accordingly, the 
analysis observes FT journalism as a form of epistemic work as it takes place 
around various concrete issues that the corporate professionals, political 
decision-makers and international officials debate at the Davos forum. The 
analysis supports three major findings. First, the global economy occupies a 
central place in elite ontology and is discursively constructed as an 
interdependent system and an object of governance, and that financial 
markets appear principally as a functional, even though inherently unstable, 
element in the global economy. Second, FT journalism articulates the 
transnational elite as an actor identity, presents Davos attendees as its 
representatives and supports positive identification with this elite among its 
readers. Third, globalisation emerges in FT-mediated TEC as a prevalent idea 
that informs elite agency and is positively connected to the values of growth 
and liberty. In this way, liberal internationalism is associated with universal 
interest and articulated with the idea of historical purpose that unites 
transnational elites behind a common political project. 
The concluding chapter of the study draws together key theoretical and 
empirical insights and discusses them in light of some recent developments in 
the global political economy, including the global financial crisis of 2007–9, 
the weak economic recovery after the crisis, and the so-called power shift as it 
is articulated in terms of the decline of the west and the rise of emerging 
economies. The study argues that TEC certainly facilitates epistemic work for 
transnational elite integration but the latter is always influenced by the 
historical context in which it takes place. Accordingly, the weakening if not loss 
of US hegemony in the 2010s implies that the neoliberal form of liberal 
internationalism is less capable than in preceding decades of uniting elites 
behind a common policy project and therefore the elites appear to be 
increasingly divided. However, despite the rise of nationalist and mercantilist 
tendencies, transnational elites still tend to share a commitment to an 
integrated global economy characterised by relatively free movement of the 
factors of production. Insofar as the forums and media of TEC are capable of 
incorporating non-western elites as well as alternative economic-policy ideas, 
they have the potential to bridge elite divides and to promote the kind of policy 
shift that addresses the multiple crises of contemporary capitalism. 
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1 INTRODUCTION:  
STUDYING TRANSNATIONAL ELITE 
COMMUNICATION 
Nearly a decade after the outbreak of the global financial crisis, decision-
makers and experts in the world’s most powerful governments, central banks 
and international organisations are grappling with a common conundrum. 
Despite a series of extraordinary policy measures to stimulate the economy, 
recovery from the Great Recession has been weaker than expected, 
unemployment levels remain high in many countries, and there is a general 
lack of investment and demand in the global economy. In tandem, the 
probability of another serious financial market failure is growing. Meanwhile, 
attempts to compensate rising levels of public debt and declining revenues 
with policies of austerity coincide with the inability of governments to lead the 
shift towards a non-carbon-based economy and to adequately address the 
influx of increasing numbers of immigrants from areas stricken by wars and 
poverty, paving the way not only for far-right populism and xenophobic 
nationalism but also towards increasing geopolitical tensions. In other words, 
the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2007–9 has laid bare the world's 
inability to adequately address the unsustainability of the accumulation 
paradigm of contemporary capitalism centred on financialization, rapidly 
mounting debt, widening wealth inequality and continuing dependency on 
carbon-based energy. This collective failure is reflected in a series of global 
problems from runaway climate change to refugee crises, and from general 
social instability to international conflicts. 
In research on the global political economy, a number of perspectives can 
be adopted to analyse the financial crisis and its fallout. Some of the most 
prominent figures of mainstream economics have proposed various 
alternative terms, such as “liquidity trap”, “debt overhang”, “global savings 
glut” and “secular stagnation”, to describe and explain the present conundrum 
of slow economic growth and financial instability. In other social sciences, 
concepts like globalisation, financialization and empire are often employed to 
characterise the current conjuncture of global capitalism and to highlight the 
importance of its historical dynamics when interpreting present crises. 
Alternatively, scholars can draw on more cultural, political and heterodox 
approaches to the economy in order to emphasise the shifts in institutional, 
political and ideological power that lie behind today’s economic and social ills. 
In these accounts, the contemporary crisis is typically explained in terms of 
the growing dominance of capital over the state and labour and the 
corresponding ideological hegemony of neoliberalism.  
Complementing these structural, political and cultural diagnoses, the 
perspective on elites highlights the importance of agency in the global political 
Introduction: Studying transnational elite communication 
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economy. Instead of abstract processes, ideologies or even institutions, the 
notion of the elite refers to actual people making decisions and exerting power. 
When employing the elite as an analytical and theoretical concept in social 
research, the purpose is to demonstrate how powerful individuals and groups 
act to shape structural conditions and lead the changes we make sense of in 
terms of stagnation, globalisation or neoliberalism. In the words of Niilo 
Kauppi and Mikael Madsen (2013, 211), elites are “entrepreneurs of these very 
developments”. At the same time, elites themselves must be understood as 
being shaped by structural processes. They are products of the concentration 
of power, the degree of which changes from one society or historical situation 
to the next. Therefore, to understand how power operates in the contemporary 
world, social research needs to take the notion of the elite seriously (cf. 
Krysmanski 2012, 20). 
Lately, many popular and academic authors have insisted that the nature 
of the elites has changed since World War 2. According to this argument, 
previous decades have witnessed the “globalisation” of elites, or the emergence 
of new transnational elites who are highly integrated and identify with each 
other more than with their respective national communities (Lasch 1995; 
Bauman 1998; Faux 2006; Rothkopf 2008). Underlying this argument, there 
is not only recognition of the rise of powerful new actors and institutions 
outside of the national governments, including intergovernmental 
organisations (IGOs), transnational corporations (TNCs) and informal 
networks and associations specialised in transnational policy-planning. There 
is also an assumption that the social and political sense-making, personal 
lifestyles and beliefs, and the feelings of belonging and solidarity of the most 
powerful individuals have changed with the increasingly global outlooks of 
these people. In other words, arguments about the globalisation of elites point 
not only to a structural shift in the operation of power in the global context, 
but also to a cultural or ideological shift. The developments, arguably, have 
been mutually reinforcing and dependent on each other: the strengthening of 
a global outlook among elites has been intimately connected to changes in 
their practices and material environments. This points to the importance of 
studying the actual sense-making and public discourses of elites in the 
reproduction of globalisation as an ideational and material phenomenon.  
However, many of the arguments about the globalisation of elites lack 
analytical rigour and tend to suffer from hyperbolic claims, occasionally 
drawing from simplistic forms of globalisation theory and claiming the end of 
nation-states while largely dismissing the ways in which state structures and 
national institutions continue to influence societal and cultural processes. 
Taking critical distance from these arguments, this study draws attention to 
the importance of transnational elite integration as a project that is being 
actively pursued by powerful institutions and driven by the recognition that, 
as capitalism is increasingly characterised by transnational production 
networks, there is a simultaneous need to ensure that the global political 
economy is rendered into a seamless and stable playing field for the largest 
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businesses to operate on. Moreover, within the context of the global political 
economy that is characterised by highly uneven power relations and historical 
structures of institutionalised decision-making, transnational elite integration 
should be seen specifically as an attempt of western elites, particularly those 
of the United States, to incorporate non-western elites in order to maintain an 
international policy regime that is friendly to transnational business and 
finance. By the making of a global elite, then, the study refers to a historical 
and ongoing project of liberal-internationalist elites in the west to integrate 
non-western elites behind a common, western-led process of global capitalism. 
The establishment of a global elite thus marks a hypothetical endpoint of these 
efforts, while transnational elite integration is a process that leads towards the 
increasing unification of elites. 
Focusing on what will be defined as transnational elite communication 
(TEC), this work is an effort to connect studies of communication and media 
with questions of the concentration of power in the global political economy 
in the early twenty-first century. When media scholars engage in analyses of 
the political economy, they often examine the media as a culture industry 
which not only adheres to the broader tendencies in contemporary capitalism, 
including globalisation and concentration of ownership, but also occupies a 
strategic position in the global political economy due to its cultural importance 
and close connections with other business sectors and the field of politics (see, 
e.g., Mosco 2009, 6–8). My intention, however, is to take another route and 
look for ways to adapt perspectives on cultural studies, journalism and the 
public sphere to the analyses of the global political economy. More precisely, 
these perspectives have to do with: (a) the nature of communication as a form 
of sharing common cultural beliefs and understandings within a particular 
group or community; (b) the journalistic media as particular forms of 
mediated mass communication that structure and shape the public 
communication between members of a community and potentially reinforce 
the sense of belonging of its audiences to the community; and (c) the public 
sphere as a historical formation that brings people together in communicative 
interaction and enables collective mobilisation around shared concerns.  
The specific interest here is in the way particular, exclusive forms of 
communication and media bring together elites on an international level from 
the fields of business, politics and administration, creating spaces for them to 
network, interact, develop common understandings of reality, share ideas 
about public policies and negotiate differences between competing interests. 
The Financial Times (FT), a traditional newspaper of choice for international 
business leaders and policymakers, and the World Economic Forum (WEF), 
the annual gathering for the executives of the world’s largest corporations, 
international officials, central bankers and government leaders, work in this 
study as the primary examples of such exclusive spaces. The empirical part of 
the study observes the FT coverage of WEFs as a mediated and journalistic 
form of TEC in which a particular set of policy concerns and corresponding 
ideas for political agency are developed. 
Introduction: Studying transnational elite communication 
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Regarding questions of power in the global political economy, the 
perspective outlined here combines literature on globalisation, global 
governance and US empire with elite studies. These two threads of analysis 
amount to an argument about the concentration of power in the global political 
economy and the role of transnational corporate leaders, central bankers and 
government executives of the world’s major economies in shaping its 
structures in the processes of global economic governance. My argument is 
that studying transnational elites and their forums and media complements 
the analyses of political and economic power in the global context as it sheds 
light on the kind of hegemonic processes that concern the dominant ideas, 
political identities and the constitution of interests that inform elite agency in 
the global political economy (cf. Gill 1990, 231). As such, this study is an 
exploration into the role TEC plays in global economic governance, enhancing 
the potential of elites to bridge divides, formulate common outlooks, negotiate 
shared interests and organise themselves as a collective agent. 
1.1 Elites in theory 
Within social studies, the elite is a long-established concept that points to the 
concentration of power, authority and prestige in a given social formation. In 
accordance with common dictionary definitions, which refer to social 
superiority, highest class or quality, as well as to authority, influence and 
power, elites may be identified in all spheres of social life and associated 
broadly with high occupational, educational or cultural status. When it comes 
to analyses of political power, however, a narrower definition usually prevails: 
the elite refers to the governing minority that holds the key posts in society 
and “performs the function of ruling the community” (Aron 1950a, 9). From 
this perspective, elite status tends to be connected to an institutional position 
of leadership in large organisations or movements. Indeed, much of elite 
theorising starts from a Weberian conception of power, in which power is not 
so much an attribute of individuals but social organisations (Dye 2002, 3). 
Elites are “the persons and groups who have the organised capacity to affect 
political outcomes regularly and substantially” (Higley 2007, 251, original 
emphasis). 
Aside from the development of powerful organisations that are 
hierarchically structured, elite theory argues that elite formation is dependent 
on the formulation of shared interests. Accordingly, only when persons at the 
apex of institutions act together as a self-conscious group with shared goals is 
it possible to identify them as an elite (Parry 1969, 31–2; Scott 1990, xi). In 
this regard, even as they are often characterised as “ruling classes” or 
“governing classes”, the notion of the elite should be regarded as conceptually 
distinct from class. As pointed out by Barry Barnes (1999, 83), classes for 
Weber were aggregates of individual persons who have similar economic 
opportunities by virtue of being in similar “class situations”, whereas status 
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groups consisted of social agents “who know each other as members and who 
are able to generate instrumentally oriented collective action through 
communicative interaction with each other”. While similar socioeconomic 
positions and backgrounds certainly contribute to elite formation, it is 
essentially dependent on intentional interaction which enables the collective 
formulation and conscious pursuit of shared interests. Thus, the elite as a 
sociological concept is more akin to a status group than a class (Mills 1956, 11, 
384n5).1  
Given the high level of social differentiation in modern societies, various 
elites representing separate social sectors and with differing power resources 
can be identified in the research on social and political elites (see, e.g., Dye 
2002; Ruostetsaari 2006; Scott 2008). However, while the existence of these 
ruling groups may be self-evident, scholars have differed on the implications 
of such recognition for the operation of power and democracy. Vilfredo Pareto, 
Gaetano Mosca and Robert Michels, the most renowned classical elite 
theorists of the Italian school, argued that governing elites represented an 
essentially anti-democratic tendency in society: instead of majorities ruling 
minorities, organised minorities in fact continued to dominate unorganised 
majorities even in so-called democracies (Etzioni-Halevy 1997, 44; Parry 1969, 
31). The capacity and tendency of governing elites to organise their interests 
against those of the governed was implied, for instance, by Pareto (1997) who 
studied how elites maintained their power through various means, including 
artifice, argument, ideology, bribery and financial manipulation – or simply 
brute force. Against such presumption of elite unity, Raymond Aron (1950a, 
9–10) identified political leaders, government administrators, economic 
directors, military chiefs and “leaders of the masses” as distinct elite groups in 
modern democracies and refuted the claim that they formed a unified clique. 
Instead he described Western democracies as pluralist societies in which 
interest groups openly compete and struggle against each other and in which 
the state is the place for forging compromises between them. 
Aron’s argument about the existence of competing elites can be seen 
behind pluralist, or democratic elitist, theories of power (e.g., Dahl 1966; 
Etzioni-Halevy 1993; see also Dogan 2003; Held 2006, 158–84; Parry 1969, 
64–8). Pluralists disagree with classical elitists about elites being organised 
around common interests and political goals, and they refute the idea that the 
existence of elites is in itself antithetical to democracy. Even as societal interest 
groups can themselves be considered elitist in the sense of being hierarchical 
 
                                                   
1 It should also be noted that classical elite theory was developed in explicit rejection of the 
Marxist view that political power is ultimately subservient to economic power and a mere 
reflection of the dominant class interest of those who control the prevailing means of 
production. According to classical elite theory, it is the struggles over social domination in the 
political sphere that determine history, not the struggle between classes in the sphere of 
production (Engelstad 2007, 2; Parry 1969, 28). 
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and not directly accommodating ordinary citizens as participants in their 
decision-making, the plurality of those groups guarantees the operation of 
democracy, according to the pluralist position, in two ways. First, no single set 
of interests can dominate in society, which guarantees a balance of power and 
an open-ended political process characterised by endless bargaining (Held 
2006, 160–1; Lukes 2005, 4–5). Second, the genuine competition between 
elite groups allows citizens to exert some influence on the negotiation between 
various interests and makes elites more responsive to citizens’ demands 
(Etzioni-Halevy 1997, 45–6). In the view of pluralists, then, the institutions of 
democracy are appropriately placed to give the public power to limit the power 
of elites. 
The pluralist argument obviously rests on two premises: that separate 
sector elites actively pursue competing interests, and that between them there 
are no significant differences in relative power. Analysing the mid-twentieth 
century United States, C. Wright Mills (1956; 1958) refuted both these 
assumptions. On the one hand, he claimed that due to the growth and 
centralisation of economic, administrative and military institutions, power 
was increasingly concentrated on a national level into three structurally 
essential institutional domains: the large business corporations, the executive 
branch of government and the military hierarchy. These three sectors occupied 
the top level in a three-tiered hierarchy of political power. Below them, the 
middle level consisted of the institutions of representative democracy, trade 
unions, small businesses and pressure groups, and the bottom was inhabited 
by citizens, largely disempowered and degenerated into “mass society”. On the 
other hand, Mills (1956; 1958) argued that the persons holding strategic 
positions in the three most powerful sectors increasingly worked in unison and 
towards their perceived common interests. This elite unification was 
manifested in the similar socio-economic backgrounds of corporate leaders, 
political executives and military chiefs, in their educational and career 
trajectories, in their socialising and network-building patterns, and in their 
broadly corresponding political attitudes and ideological views. Observing 
their cohesion on both personal and institutional levels, Mills named these 
interlocking circles as the “power elite” who had effectively relegated other 
political and social forces into the middle and bottom levels of power.2 
Different outlooks on the actual concentration or dispersal of power 
between elites tend to lead to highly contrasting views of the oligarchic versus 
democratic nature of society. Where pluralists point to the processes of 
political bargaining and typically perceive the state as a neutral arbiter 
 
                                                   
2 It should be noted that Mills explicitly warned against reading his argument as a conspiracy 
theory about a small clique of people exercising unlimited control over society (see Mills 1956, 
18, 27, 292). On the contrary, the notion of the power elite acquired its meaning within the 
framework of the different levels of power, which, while hierarchically stratified, all influence 
societal developments. 
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between competing elites, followers of the classical tradition tend to question 
the clear-cut separation of interest groups and emphasise the elites’ tendency 
to identify and work towards common interests. Philosophical and ideological 
differences aside, the disagreements can partly be explained by differing 
research methodologies and scales of observation, as well as differences in the 
underlying conceptions of power. When observing any single policy issue, for 
instance, one can undoubtedly find many players and interests, and the picture 
of the operation of power becomes complex, whereas in a more structural and 
long-term analysis the prevalence of a consistent elite interest may appear 
more evident. Moreover, while the pluralists tend to limit themselves to a 
strictly empiricist methodology, studying observable instances of the official 
political process and adopting an individualist and behaviourist view on power 
(Lukes 2005, 16–9), those following the classical tradition tend to adopt a view 
of power as an institutional capacity and something exercised primarily 
outside the official political process (Dye 2002, 4–5; Mills 1956). For Mills 
(1956, 4, 16–7, 242–6), the pluralists’ concentration on the daily political 
struggles within representative institutions limited their analysis to the middle 
level of power and led them to a false conclusion about the existence of checks 
and balances in society.3 His own notion of the power elite was meant to 
overcome this shortcoming by targeting precisely the circles and cliques that 
exist at the top of social structure between those who occupy key positions in 
the institutional spheres of the economy, government and the military. 
In addition to the conception of a hierarchical organisation of power in 
society, as opposed to a pluralist or balancing view, historical context is of 
central importance to any analysis of the elite’s unity or fragmentation. Mills 
(1956, 7, 39–44, 269–76) himself underlined the historical specificity of his 
notion of the US power elite. Against the balancing argument of his day, which 
he saw overly influenced by Tocqueville’s analyses of US democracy and thus 
clinging to a “romantic” and outdated view of America, Mills presented a 
historical argument according to which a small elite had come to hold a 
disproportionate amount of power as a result of structural and institutional 
changes in society. The United States of the nineteenth-century, in which 
economic and political life had concentrated in small towns and cities, had 
transformed into a society of national markets, national corporations and 
national administration – by the middle of the twentieth century, “local 
society” had turned into national society. The transformation implied that the 
typical institutions of society had grown dramatically in size and become more 
centralised, paving the way for the concentration of power into a few 
 
                                                   
3 According to Mills (1956, 245), the misperception of pluralism was not only a problem in 
empirical power research; the mainstream news media, too, tend to concentrate on the daily 
political struggles of representative politics and interest groups and hence reinforce the 
illusion of a balance of power in society. As a consequence, the top level is able to exercise 
power largely in the background. 
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structurally essential institutions: the large business corporations, the 
executive branch of government, and the military hierarchy.4   
As the historical argument suggests, Mills exercised care to avoid a 
transhistorical interpretation of the elite as a permanent ruling class. The 
concept of the power elite was not meant to be a universalistic notion, and this 
forms the primary difference between Mills’ analysis and the notion of the 
governing elite of the earlier classical elite theory. Mills (1956, 20) explicitly 
acknowledged that the role and power of elites changes historically and from 
one society to another. Accordingly, when Aron (1950a) outlined his 
purportedly universalistic conception of the elite as consisting of separate 
interest groups, he was, in fact, making an argument about the division of 
power in postwar France, where organisations representing the large masses, 
such as the socialist party and trade unions, exerted considerable power, and 
the relationship between leading social groups was one of intense competition. 
Mills, in contrast, analysing the mid-twentieth-century United States, saw a 
relatively united elite and argued that intra- or inter-elite competition had 
been suppressed to a minimum with the interlocked groups working towards 
a common interest. Consequently, the notion of the power elite should be 
understood as a theoretical argument about a particular social condition, 
which is not applicable to every society and historical circumstance. While the 
distribution of power in postwar America could be characterised in terms of a 
power elite, this could not have been applied to postwar France, at least not 
according to Aron’s (1950b, 129) analysis.5 
 
                                                   
4 Mills’ historical argument – as well as his conception of power deriving essentially from 
institutional positions – is a prime example of how elite theories have been influenced by Max 
Weber’s theorisation of the importance of modern bureaucracy as a mode of organising social 
activities. From this point of view, the concentration of power in modern societies is enabled 
by bureaucratic organisation and hierarchy, which make it possible to wield power effectively 
in ever greater organisations and scales in capitalist enterprises, public administration and 
military institutions alike (Weber 1970, 214–5, 221–4, 234; see also Naím 2013, 40–1; Parry 
1969, 16–7). 
5 On the other hand, this may also be as much a question of interpretation as of historical 
contingency. To demonstrate that unions and the Communists had access to power in 1940s 
France, Aron (1950a, 15) observed how “the boards of directors of the nationalised companies 
were full of Communists and trade unionists”. From Mills’ point of view, rather than 
demonstrating a situation of genuine competition between elites, this finding could be 
interpreted as a form of elite interlocking and therefore as potential evidence of the existence 
of a united power elite. 
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1.2 Transnational elites and the global political economy 
Since its inception, elite theory and its empirical application have focused 
almost exclusively on national contexts. Barring some recent exceptions where 
elites have been deliberately studied and theorised in transnational settings 
like the EU (Kauppi and Madsen 2013) or the world of central banking 
(Lebaron 2008; Marcussen 2013), the study of social and political elites has 
tended to reproduce methodological nationalism in taking it for granted that 
its objects of analysis are essentially national categories (see Beck 2002; 2004; 
cf. Chernilo 2006). This is surprising given the wealth of analysis written in 
both popular and academic literature about the internationalisation of 
economic and political processes in recent years and decades. Indeed, outside 
the remit of elite studies, claims about the increasing internationalisation of 
elites and the emergence of transnational elites have become commonplace 
(e.g., Faux 2006; Freeland 2012; Krysmanski 2012; Rothkopf 2008; Wedel 
2009). In this regard, three broad fields of literature appear as particularly 
worthy for the purposes of this study: (1) studies on globalisation, whether 
understood as an economic phenomenon driven by the logic of capitalist 
accumulation or more broadly as a social and cultural phenomenon with 
multiple mutually reinforcing dimensions; (2) scholarship on the global 
political economy; and (3) research on international politics and global 
governance. 
First, a common theme in recent literature on the social consequences of 
globalisation has been the perceived “disembedding” of elites from national 
cultures (e.g., Bauman 1998). The perceived social disconnect of political and 
business elites from other, less mobile social groups takes many forms and is 
reflected, among other things, in their respective living conditions, lifestyles 
and values, their education and wealth, and their use of media.6 While there is 
nothing new in the tendency of elites to be more internationally oriented than 
other social groups, some argue that the postwar processes of globalisation 
mark a significant shift in this regard. Critical scholars of capitalism and 
business, in particular, often argue that economic globalisation gives rise to 
transnational elites who turn away from a national orientation and an interest 
in national development, instead focusing on an interest in global markets, 
production and services (e.g., Barnet and Müller 1974; Robinson 2011, 356). 
Elites connected to the transnational spheres of business and politics develop 
 
                                                   
6 Of course, globalisation only partly explains this perceived social “disembedding” of the 
upper classes in these analyses. Elite disembedding from communal life also results from their 
increasing use of private services instead of public ones, from residential segregation and 
withdrawal to gated communities with private security guards and electronic surveillance, and 
from the growing independence (at least in the short term) of their personal welfare and 
success from the level of general prosperity and social inequality (Lasch 1995, 45; Sklair 2001, 
20–1). 
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increasingly supranational identities and adopt a set of “global” values which 
are not shared by other social groups, at least not to the same extent (Davidson 
et al. 2009; Huntington 2004). Some describe these global values and 
dispositions as “cosmopolitan”, referring to a feeling of belonging to larger 
social entities than the nation-state and to an outlook characterised by 
egalitarian attitudes and openness to difference (e.g., Castells 2000, 415). For 
others, the global nature of the elite is tied to an outlook that supports global 
capitalist economic institutions and free-market policies (e.g., Lasch 1995; 
Sklair 2001).  
Second, scholars of the global political economy tend to emphasise that 
processes of globalisation are driven by powerful institutional actors. 
Globalisation, as a drive towards greater international integration of markets 
and liberalisation of economic activities, does not simply happen but is being 
actively advanced by powerful actors and groups, including corporate 
executives, market-liberal politicians and political parties, international 
bureaucrats and professionals, as well as financial market players and media 
professionals (e.g., Sklair 2001; van der Pijl 1998). Moreover, globalisation has 
been advanced within a world system consisting of states with a highly unequal 
distribution of power between them. After World War 2, western powers, and 
particularly the United States have led the drive towards increasing market 
integration and used their position to impose policies of liberalisation on other 
nations (e.g., Hoogvelt 2001; Panitch and Gindin 2012; Wood 2003). From the 
perspective of the global political economy, liberal globalisation represents a 
particular political project, objective, or even an ideology (Steger 2005), which 
brings together various elite actors and sectors behind a common interest (e.g., 
Gill 1990; van der Pijl 2012). These “globalising elites” have worked through 
western state apparatuses and western-led IGOs to further the liberal-
internationalist project under the rubric of globalisation (Gill 1994; Robinson 
2004). 
Finally, the idea of elites as transnational actors is often included in 
studies of world politics and global governance. It is commonplace in this 
literature to identify supranational centres of power or institutional actors 
whose scope of operation and influence is not limited to the nation-state (e.g., 
Sklair 2001, 2–3). Various actors, from intergovernmental organisations 
(IGOs) and transnational corporations (TNCs), to international civil society 
organizations (CSOs), policy-panning networks and governments of the 
nation-states themselves, are involved in what is called transnational or global 
governance. This refers to the processes of negotiation and decision-making 
that aim to harmonise legislation and regulation, as well as formulate and 
sanction common standards and rules on an international scale (e.g., Avant et 
al. 2010; Keohane and Nye 2001; Pigman 2005; Stone 2008). As institutional 
representatives who have access to the forums of global governance, the formal 
directors and others occupying strategic positions in these organisations may 
hence be identified as members of transnational elites (cf. Richardson et al. 
2011; Rothkopf 2008). However, the institutions and mechanisms of global 
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governance are decisively weak in comparison with state structures and their 
operation relies heavily on voluntary collaboration and consensus between the 
participating actors. In this way, it can be argued that the successful 
governance of the global political economy is dependent on the transnational 
integration of elites behind a certain ideological and policy consensus. 
These ideas and arguments will be more thoroughly developed in 
Chapter 3 of this study. At this point, however, let us briefly discuss how the 
global political economy and the associated institutions that wield power on a 
transnational scope might be addressed from an elite-theoretical perspective. 
As a theoretical notion, transnational elite must refer to the concentration of 
power, in the global political economy, to a relatively small number of 
strategically-positioned individuals in organisations that have the capacity to 
wield power transnationally if not globally and have access to the processes of 
global governance. However, the argument between pluralists and classical 
elitists suggests that transnational elites can be either fragmented and exist in 
a relationship of mutual rivalry and conflict, or they can form a relatively 
coherent group that is capable of recognising the existence of mutual interests 
above inter-elite rivalries and acting on them. Accordingly, when discussing 
transnational elite formation, there is a need, first, to identify various power 
centres in world society and to assess to what extent they come together on a 
consistent basis, hence demonstrating capacities to exercise power in unison, 
and, second, to draw conclusions about the implications of these capabilities 
for the balance of power in world society. On the one hand, power can be 
viewed in the global context along pluralist lines and envision world society as 
inherently plural and multipolar. From this perspective, various transnational 
“interest groups”, be they states and state blocs, transnational companies, 
IGOs or even international CSOs compete politically, economically, 
ideologically and militarily on the global scene and effectively restrict each 
other’s power so that no one elite group comes out on top on a consistent basis. 
In addition, with the absence of an overarching global state apparatus, we 
could argue that the institutional control over world society is nowhere as 
comprehensive as the one provided by the centralisation of power on the 
national level (see Martin et al. 2006, 500). Indeed, it would seem that power 
is very hard both to exercise and to concentrate in a global context, and that 
world society would thus be inherently pluralistic.7  
On the other hand, as suggested by the literature on the global political 
economy, it is also possible to perceive world society as a dynamic but 
hierarchical power structure along the lines of Mills’ analysis of the postwar 
United States. From this perspective, precisely the ability to make decisions 
with wide-ranging global impacts separates the “transnational power elite” of 
 
                                                   
7 Argument along these lines is taken to its extreme by Moises Naím (2013) who makes the 
bold claim that the increasing complexity of the global context and the diversity of actors 
capable of influencing events amounts to the “end of power”. 
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political leaders, TNC executives and directors of international organisations 
from other social forces and enables them to relegate others, whether 
institutional actors confined to the national level, or transnational movements 
without institutional decision-making access, to the middle and bottom levels 
of power in the global context. Therefore, even when the executive power of 
the globally influential institutions is partially curbed by national legislations 
and the public opinion of the transnational civil society – which constitute 
forms of regulation, pressure and public scrutiny – the very absence of a global 
state apparatus, and the relative weakness of representative institutions and 
civil society on the global scale, can be seen as empowering the already 
powerful institutions, which can operate relatively freely in the legal wild west 
of the international space. The ability to divert capital flows away from 
national tax authorities and to various tax havens is an example of the 
possibilities the transnational power elite enjoy in reinforcing their personal 
wealth and economic power over national authorities and the public (e.g., 
Shaxson 2011). World society, then, certainly lacks institutional democracy, as 
well as formalised checks and balances on the power of individual institutions, 
and could therefore be characterised as an inherently oligarchic context of 
power. 
In addition to a global power hierarchy, the classical perspective on 
transnational elites would concentrate on their degree of institutional and 
personal integration. For Mills (1956, 7–8) this integration meant, on the one 
hand, that powerful institutions representing (theoretically) separate societal 
domains exercise influence on each other: corporations hold much sway in 
political decision-making, political administration increasingly affects 
business life, the military and intelligence agencies have access to both 
political and corporate decisions, and so on. On the other hand, this 
institutional integration was reflected in growing personal interaction of elites 
or what Mills (ibid.) referred to as the emergence of an “interlocking 
directorate” of elite individuals. Instead of existing in mutual rivalry and 
pursuing diverging aims and objectives as the pluralists would argue (see Held 
2006, 171), corporate, political and bureaucratic elites could well operate in 
concert and recognise common interests. 
The unification of elites through the integration of political, economic 
and administrative institutions and the simultaneously growing 
interconnection of individuals across these domains has so far been observed 
primarily in national contexts, leading to a host of critical commentaries on 
how especially financial and big business interests increasingly shape public 
policies and how elites interact and swap positions between public and private 
sectors (e.g., Crouch 2004; Freeland 2012; Kaufmann and Vicente 2011; 
Korten 1995; Krysmanski 2012). Campaign contributions to politicians and 
parties are one instrument in the formation of such government-business 
interlocks (Barnet and Müller 1974, 248), paving the way for many bankers 
and corporate lawyers to enter government positions and administrative 
agencies as well as advisory positions to state executives (Krysmanski 2012, 
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182–4). But states and corporations become interlocked in many other ways, 
too. One of the most obvious examples is state ownership in private 
companies, another is the establishment of “public-private partnerships” or 
contracts and co-operative agreements between governments and businesses. 
As a result, the provision of public services is increasingly contracted out to 
non-governmental, private and commercial actors (Crouch 2004; 44–6; 
Jessop 2002, 199). Moreover, government officials typically act in close 
contact with representatives of the private sector when making important 
decisions. As a result, Janine Wedel (2009, 76–7) argues that companies, 
consulting firms, think tanks and other non-government entities are involved 
in all aspects of governing, including policy formation, implementation and 
enforcement (also see Freeman 2000), and Bastiaan van Apeldoorn and Naná 
de Graaff (2014) claim that TNC networks have been highly influential in 
shaping the US foreign policy after the cold war. If the ties between public and 
private centres of power are intimate in Western societies, corporate-political 
interlocking is even more pronounced in such countries as Russia, China and 
India, where private businesses operate in close collaboration with state 
officials and business success is largely dependent on the establishment of 
personal networks inside the government (see Freeland 2012, 198–208). 
Insofar as such interlocking takes place in the world’s leading economic 
and political powers, it has direct relevance to the operation and integration of 
power at the global level as well. Peter Gowan (1999, 55–6), for instance, 
argues that the capacity of private financial institutions to shape US policy in 
international monetary and economic affairs is partly rooted in the close 
personal connections between Wall Street and Washington. The US Treasury 
and the Federal Reserve have been, to a large extent, staffed and led by former 
bankers and speculators, and Wall Street banks have become major campaign 
funders in presidential and congressional elections. But the political influence 
of Wall Street bankers extends to the international stage also directly, without 
the mediating arm of the US government. Instrumental in this regard is the 
Financial Services Forum (FSF), an organisation consisting of the CEOs of the 
18 largest financial services institutions doing business in the United States, 
founded to shape financial and economic policies both nationally and 
internationally. Another key forum for bankers is the Institute of International 
Finance (IIF), a global association of private financial institutions. Both the 
FSF and IIF have personal connections with the Financial Stability Board, an 
international body that monitors and makes recommendations about the 
global banking system (see Freeland 2012, 253–5). International banks are by 
no means the only corporations trying to influence political processes at the 
global level and decision-making in key IGOs. Regarding international trade 
policy, TNCs have arguably played an influential role through their aggressive 
lobbying of and even inclusion into national delegations that have negotiated 
multilateral agreements under the auspices of the GATT and the WTO (Jawara 
and Kwa 2004, 54–5; Kapoor 2004, 530; Korten 1995, 177–9). TNCs have also 
been the primary drivers of international trade disputes within the WTO 
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(Rothkopf 2012, 223–5), and they tend to be major beneficiaries of public-
private partnerships.  
Perhaps the mechanism of elite interlocking that attracts most public 
attention today is the “revolving door” that moves elite individuals back and 
forth between positions in the public and the private sector (Barnet and Müller 
1974, 248–50; Crouch 2011, 168; Faux 2006, 53–4; Plender 2003, 112; 
Rothkopf 2012, 258–60; Wedel 2012, 105–6). The revolving door is a familiar 
phenomenon in much of the world (Dogan 2003; Krysmanski 2012, 182–3; 
Wedel 2012, 132–3), even though there is significant variation between 
countries concerning its prevalence and public acceptability. 8  As a result, 
administrations and government agencies tend to be populated by individuals 
who either have previously worked for private companies or will move to the 
private sector after a stint as civil servants.9 Critical observers maintain that 
the appointment of corporate executives and lawyers in leading positions in 
government and government agencies attributed with functions of supervising 
and regulating business sectors has influence on the policies and actions of 
these agencies, leading to situations in which corporations have effectively 
been awarded the power to set rules by themselves and for themselves. 
Christopher Adolph (2013, 2, 311), for instance, argues that central bank 
policies, from interest rate decisions to the financing of bank bail-outs, cannot 
be understood without acknowledging “the systematic ability of private banks 
to influence central bankers’ future careers”. More generally, the private 
sector’s ability to influence political and bureaucratic decision-making is 
connected to its ability to affect the career paths of politicians and public sector 
officials: individuals in legislative or regulatory positions regularly come from 
the industry or entertain prospects of future careers in the private sector. The 
widening income gap between private and public sector employees only 
exacerbates the revolving door problem. 
An important element in elite interlocking is the eradication of 
boundaries between the “private” and “public” roles of elite individuals, and 
 
                                                   
8  According to Mattei Dogan (2003, 5, 9), there is less circulation between political and 
business elites in Germany than in France, for instance, as German businesses prefer to recruit 
and socialize leaders within companies rather than recruit them from state offices. The United 
States, in turn, is somewhat of an exception among western countries in that, whereas elite 
individuals in other countries tend to primarily move from high administrative or civil service 
positions to managerial positions in business, in the United States the revolving door also 
moves in the opposite direction. 
9 Many politicians, of course, are close to the corporate community themselves, either due to 
extensive fund-raising campaigns or through their own business operations, and a political 
career often works as a path to lucrative private sector positions after leaving office. Almost 
one in two members of the US Congress, for instance, were millionaires in 2010 (Freeland 
2012, 269–70). 
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the formulation of consistent world-views and role perceptions across these 
social domains. While politicians and civil servants come to see their personal 
future in the private sector, corporate executives and private sector 
professionals eye positions in administration, regulatory apparatuses and 
policy planning commissions. Accordingly, Chrystia Freeland (2012, 70–2, 
76–7) argues that CEOs are nowadays increasingly accustomed and willing to 
use political power and pursue social influence: they seek to use their wealth 
and money in order to have “social impact”.10 Moreover, instead of merely 
donating money to charities, the economic elite are nowadays interested in 
influencing much more directly, by creating their own foundations and think 
tanks, or even seeking political offices themselves. At the same time, the 
habitual and apparently effortless movement of elites, between positions in 
government and business, impacts the way they make sense of the relationship 
between the public and the private sector. What outside observers often regard 
as a questionable practice, compromising the autonomy and effectiveness of 
public authority, appears as a perfectly legitimate pursuit of common good to 
those using the revolving door. As Ian Richardson and colleagues (2011, 91–2) 
suggest, the intimate relationship between public and private has become part 
of everyday reality for transnational elites, with the rationale for such 
collaboration rarely being questioned by them.11   
 
                                                   
10 A recent survey by Capgemini and RBC Wealth Management (2014) among the world’s 
“high net worth individuals” (with investable financial assets worth at least 1 million dollars) 
indicates that 92 per cent of the world’s richest individuals consider it important to make “a 
social impact”, principally by investing in social causes, donating to charities or being 
otherwise involved in the community. 
11 In this naturalisation of public-private partnerships and collaboration across the domains, 
elites are supported by other institutions that engage in elite training and consciousness-
raising. The World Economic Forum, for instance, runs two programs for the “next generation 
of world leaders”, Global Leadership Fellows and the Forum for Young Global Leaders, with 
the purpose of preparing elite individuals for leadership positions in both private and public 
sectors (see Chapter 2.2). What such programs suggest is that contemporary elites are 
educated for positions of “global leadership” in which, regardless of their formal position, they 
are expected to reach over the division between public and private sectors and seek pragmatic 
collaboration across social domains. In its statement of purpose, the Global Leadership 
Fellows program refers directly to the decreasing importance of a division between public and 
private sectors: “As the world becomes increasingly interconnected, the once well-defined line 
between the public and private sectors continues to blur, making it difficult for any single 
organization to act effectively in isolation. To succeed in such a fast-changing environment, 
institutions – both private and public – must bring together numerous stakeholders to 
approach problems more efficiently, develop strategies and capitalize on opportunities.” The 
Young Global Leaders program, in turn, brings together a community that is “made up of 
leaders from all walks of life, from every region of the world and every stakeholder group in 
society” and seeks “to transform the next generation of leaders through personal experiences 
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Personal interaction and institutional interlocking are instrumental in 
the blurring of boundaries and divisions between the public and private 
sectors in the lived experience of transnational elites. In tandem, it is to be 
expected that such forms of collaboration lead to growing recognition of 
shared interest between public and private actors (see Crouch 2004, 51–2).12 
Certainly, corporations and governments often share many managerial goals, 
including growth and stability (Barnet and Müller 1974, 74). They also tend to 
exist in a relationship of mutual dependency. TNCs, for instance, usually have 
little military power despite their extensive financial and technological 
resources and therefore must rely on states to maintain security and global 
stability. On the other hand, private corporations have become prominent 
arms in the operations of militaries and intelligence agencies, and the ability 
of states to conduct war is increasingly dependent on the provision of 
equipment and services by corporations. Arms manufacturers, military 
contractors and private intelligence firms represent a powerful sector in many 
economies and they remain among the most profitable businesses in the 
United States (Bennis 2014, 33). In these conditions, the interlocking of 
executives of private defence and security industry and political decision-
makers is extensive (see Rothkopf 2008, 210–4). According to Phyllis Bennis 
(2014, 33–4), defence contractors influence political decision-making through 
their direct links to the Pentagon, as well as through the strategic scattering of 
manufacturing plants around the country, which tends to make political 
representatives from each Congressional district highly attentive to the 
interests of arms manufacturers. The influence of the defence industry 
translates into policies which guarantee continued military spending on new 
weapons projects, escalation of drone wars and the deployment of well-
equipped special forces. This is one illustration of how elites, through their 
personal and institutional connections across political, economic and military 
domains come to increasingly equate private agendas with public interest. 
Under these circumstances, the integration of transnational elites is 
characterised by their ability to combine various forms of power and to cross 
or transcend institutional spheres so that the domains of business and 
government increasingly overlap. At the same time, to argue about the 
existence, and consolidation, of an increasingly unified transnational elite is 
not only to state the (rather obvious) interdependence and mutual influence 
of powerful economic, political and military institutions. The notion also 
 
                                                   
that build knowledge and engender better understanding of global, regional and industry 
agendas.” See http://www.weforum.org/community/global-leadership-fellows (accessed 7 
January 2015) and http://www.weforum.org/community/forum-young-global-leaders 
(accessed 7 January 2015), respectively (see also Richardson et al. 2011, 20–1). 
12 It is precisely through the establishment of interlocking directorates, as Mills (1956) argued, 
that the leading strata may come to recognise their common interests. 
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argues for the significance of the more informal influence that the increasing 
institutional connections between these fields allow. From this perspective, 
transnational elites are characterised by their ability to come together across 
the boundaries of the nation-states, as well as those of business, politics and 
bureaucracy. Far from a small clique of personal acquaintances, however, the 
transnational elite should be characterised as a loose network of individuals 
who come together on the basis of sharing similar positions in the global power 
hierarchy and a shared sense of interests (cf. Froud et al. 2006, 12). While not 
necessarily explicitly coordinating decisions made by its members, the 
network connects elites on a transnational scale and allows them to exercise 
forms of collective agency. 
In sum, the pluralist and classical elitist strands of elite theory allow us 
to make either a “weak” or “strong” claim about the transnational elite. The 
pluralist view would provide reason to speak of elites in the transnational 
sphere only in a weak sense, to merely mean the category of top persons in any 
interest group (see Parry 1969, 68). In contrast, the Millsian perspective on 
elite interlocks and a hierarchy of power in the global political economy would 
favour a strong interpretation of the transnational elite. This view would 
emphasise the capacity of transnational elites to transcend institutional 
domains and wield various forms of power thanks to the interlocking 
institutions. It would also refer to the personal networking of transnational 
elites across the private and public domains of society, as well as to their 
cultural and ideological integration behind a shared global outlook and a 
liberal-internationalist agenda. These institutional and personal forms of 
interlocking would make it possible for the transnational elite to recognise 
themselves as a group, interact to negotiate on political and economic interests 
and act collectively to further their shared goals. 
Overall, any discussion on transnational elites must acknowledge the 
complexity of the question about the global convergence of power, and both 
the enabling and restrictive elements to the elites’ exercise of power in the 
global context must be considered. Even as this study explores and partly 
defends the use of the notion of the transnational elite to describe the global 
dynamics of power in the twenty-first century, the purpose is to avoid 
simplistic arguments about a small group of people dictating world events. The 
ability of transnational elites to exercise power in unison should not be 
overestimated. While the notion of the transnational elite rests on the premise 
about the centralisation of power in society to a relatively small number of 
groups, it simultaneously implies that no one group is in total command (cf. 
Mills 1956, 277). The world is not ruled, for instance, by business interests and 
owners of capital alone, and in this sense the concept of the transnational elite 
differs from some of the interpretations given to the notion of the 
transnational capitalist class (TCC) as the collective agency of global capital 
(see, e.g., Robinson and Harris 2000; Sklair 2001). One must instead consider 
the fragmentation of power along national and other political lines, and 
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acknowledge the, at best, partial interlocking of power on a transnational 
scale.  
In tandem, however, this study takes the arguments of classical elite 
theory seriously, especially as outlined by Mills, regarding the significance of 
the formal and informal cliques that do exist at the top of social structures 
between those who occupy strategic positions in key institutional domains. 
Studying transnational elite interaction and interlocking from a critical 
perspective assumes that the connections and circles formed in the process are 
an essential element in the exercise of power in the world society of the early 
twenty-first century. As will be discussed in subsequent chapters, an essential 
feature of transnational elites is their capacity to both institutionally and 
personally come together and find common interests across purportedly 
separate power domains. These institutional spheres could equally be in 
conflict with one another, and often are – indeed, the coexistence of states in 
the international system is often uneasy and the perceived interests between 
businesses and governments are not always in alignment. Thus, the 
convergence of elites across states and societal domains may or may not take 
place as a consequence of institutional developments and personal interaction, 
but there is nothing inevitable or stable about the transnational elite as a 
unified ruling group. 
1.3 Communication and media in transnational elite 
formation 
As classical elite theory suggests, the notion of the elite entails the 
presumption that the individuals forming an elite group need to develop a 
common group consciousness and sense of shared interests and goals. In this 
regard, elite formation is often explained in sociological terms as resulting 
from similar social backgrounds and educational paths leading to the adoption 
of largely congruent attitudes among individuals occupying similar socio-
economic positions (see, e.g., Bourdieu 1996). But becoming a self-conscious 
group capable of collective agency also requires frequent interaction, bridging 
cleavages between clashing views and active negotiation over shared interests. 
Elite formation should therefore be regarded as an open-ended and 
necessarily ongoing process that is dependent on intentional efforts to 
integrate elite individuals and accommodate contrasting views on issues to 
establish elements of consensus. These aspects in elite theorisation point to 
the relevance of communication and communicative practices when 
explaining the integration of political elites and the relationships between 
them. Moreover, complementing the face-to-face and mediated interpersonal 
communication that takes place among decision-makers and interest groups, 
the various forms and practices of mediated mass communication in modern 
societies should be considered of key importance in enabling interaction, 
cohesion and exchange of ideas among elites. 
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Following these premises, this work emphasises the importance of 
discursive and communicative practices in the formation of elites. In this 
regard, it draws specifically on the American cultural studies tradition in 
communication and media studies in which communication is understood as 
a form of cultural integration and reproduction of the social world. As spelled 
out by James Carey (1989, 18–9), the view of communication as culture 
highlights the role of communication in bringing people together. From this 
perspective, communication is about sharing, participation and cooperation, 
and it involves the formulation of common understandings and beliefs with 
the purpose of shaping and maintaining an ordered and meaningful social 
world. The cultural view of communication draws attention to the ways in 
which communities and entire societies maintain their unity and reproduce 
themselves in communication despite all their inner contradictions, 
differences and conflicts (ibid., 110). Correspondingly, the media are viewed 
not so much as vehicles for the transmission of messages, news and 
information, but rather as forums or platforms that enable members of the 
community to participate in a public representation and affirmation of the 
social world as they know it (ibid., 20–1). Insofar as the existence of elites is 
premised on the successful integration of individuals, the development of 
common group consciousness and the alignment of various interests and 
social purposes behind a certain set of political goals, the cultural perspective 
of communication and the media can be considered essential in the study of 
the formation and maintenance of elites. 
Such cultural considerations indicate that, besides the material and 
institutional ramifications and processes giving rise to transnational elites, 
issues of culture, consciousness and identity are important. There may, 
indeed, be transnational elites who do not recognise themselves as such: 
executives of globally influential institutions may well see themselves as rather 
powerless or do not understand themselves and the consequences of their 
actions in transnational or global terms.13 They may even act towards common 
(objective) interests without recognising the existence of such interests. On the 
other hand, an individual may identify with transnational elites without 
necessarily being a member of them in any “objective” sense. Therefore, the 
institutional definition of transnational elites needs to be separated 
analytically from the self-identification of individuals.  
 
                                                   
13 In a scathing critique of “today’s elite”, New York Times columnist David Brooks (2012) 
makes precisely this case, arguing that contemporary elites make poor decisions and reinforce 
global problems because they refuse to admit that they are the ones in power and responsible 
for the well-being of not just themselves but of everyone else: “These people are brats; they 
have no sense that they are guardians for an institution the world depends on; they have no 
consciousness of their larger social role.” For personal accounts of the transnational elites’ 
sense of impotence, see Naím 2013. 
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The focus of this study on the cultural processes of communication in 
transnational elite formation is motivated by the assumption that the 
transnational influence and scope of operation of the institutions that 
contemporary elites head are reflected at least partially in their personal 
worldviews, beliefs and values. What unites them is a lived experience of being 
“elite” in terms of their personal careers and contacts. In short, transnational 
elites may be increasingly integrated through a common lifestyle. Many of 
them not only travel across the globe, but also increasingly live, work and 
educate their children abroad, and cities such as New York, London, Zürich, 
Monaco, Singapore, Hong Kong and Dubai have a reputation for hosting 
international elite communities (Freeland 2012, 52–3, 62–3; Hurun Report 
2013, 19; Knight Frank Research 2014). 14  International mobility and the 
forming of transnational communities are likely to lead to a congruence in 
living conditions and consumption patterns. A common culture is certainly 
something that those offering services and products to transnational elites 
identify and promote. Credit Suisse, for instance, publishes the annual Global 
Wealth Report. In its 2014 edition, the report emphasises the a-national, 
cosmopolitan character of the bank’s customers, connected not only by similar 
sources of wealth, and particularly financial assets, but also by a common 
lifestyle and participation in a global market of luxury items (Shorrocks et al. 
2014, 26; see also Knight Frank Research 2014). 
There is also another sense in which the cultural element in the definition 
of the elite is important. To the extent that transnational elites operate in 
unison towards perceived common interests, as opposed to being rivals or 
even antagonist opponents to each other, they may be viewed as a clique or a 
club. The metaphor of a club implies a network of informal connections, which 
are actively maintained. Elite individuals do not necessarily have to know all 
other members in the club, but when two of them meet, they are supposed to 
recognise and treat each other as peers. More importantly, the club-like nature 
of the transnational elite implies an existence of (informal) rules of admission 
that have a homogenising cultural and ideological impact on its members (cf. 
Mills 1956, 281–3). 15  It presupposes a certain dominant culture among 
 
                                                   
14 A Knight Frank survey of 600 bankers and wealth advisors for the world’s UHNWIs (ultra-
high-net-worth individuals, or persons with investable assets of $30 million or more) found 
that one in two Asian, African, Russian, Latin American and Middle Eastern super-rich 
expected to send their children to an overseas university, mostly to the United States or Britain 
(Knight Frank Research 2014). In China, 80 per cent of millionaires plan to send their children 
to study overseas at high school or university age (Hurun Report 2013, 19). 
15 Observing the apparent unification of elite culture and values in postwar United States, Mills 
(1956, 281–3) wrote about the homogenising power of “the criteria of admission, of praise, of 
promotion” that characterised the elite clubs. While acknowledging the prevalence of WASPs 
in the US elite, he argued that ethnic and cultural homogeneity were not necessary 
preconditions for the cultural convergence of the elite, and maintained that whenever certain 
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transnational elites, or the sharing of certain world-views, ideas, values and 
interests, which are distinct from those held by those outside the group. At the 
same time, the club-like character of transnational elites implies strong 
exclusivity. Being included in the club presupposes not only the development 
of a consciousness of being part of the elite and a feeling of belonging, but also 
a considerable degree of cultural affinity and ideological unity between its 
members. From this perspective, certain individuals with significant 
institutional power, such as national leaders of “rogue” countries, or heads of 
organised crime, do not necessarily belong to transnational elites insofar as 
they do not identify as part of the group or are not recognised as such by others. 
This might be because they are perceived as not sharing the dominant values 
of transnational elites or because they are considered untrustworthy or 
otherwise awkward company to be seen around with.16  
Transnational elite formation, in other words, presupposes the 
reinforcement of a common culture and criteria of admission. Elites must feel 
mutual trust and a certain fraternity towards each other. The club-like nature 
of an elite suggests that only those who are recognised as being transnational 
elite by other members, and willing to enter into their circle, truly belong to it. 
 
                                                   
social criteria of admission are held within a circle, even people from diverse backgrounds can 
end up creating “a quite homogeneous social type”. 
16  This, of course, precludes neither elite individuals having connections with criminal 
networks and organisations (van der Pijl 1998, 135), nor the fact that elites tend to have 
considerable tolerance for their members crossing the line of legality in their business 
ventures and other activities. On the contrary, elites can often be found to be highly supportive 
of those they consider as peers who have run into trouble with law enforcement or with other 
forms of checks and balances in society (see Wedel 2009). In addition, thanks to the 
complexity of organisational and financial structures, those dealing with illicit goods can 
sometimes exercise their trade in the open and even gain public legitimacy (Naím 2006, 3). In 
fact, loyalty towards one’s elite peers typically overrides considerations of the public good or 
general morality. Conversely, however, if one violates the shared norms or trust, the 
institutional position of power alone may no longer guarantee one’s acceptance among the 
elite – and an elite individual may fail to hold the position for much longer after losing the 
support of peers. Loss of public reputation may also damage one’s position in the eyes of elites, 
at least temporarily, as other members become afraid of being stained by association; 
corporate crime, investment frauds and corruption scandals are cases in point. After the public 
outrage has subsided, the “victim” of such moral scandal may possibly reclaim the lost contacts 
and status among the elite. For an illustrative example, see Richardson and colleagues’ (2011, 
122–32) discussion on the rise and fall of Conrad Moffat Black, former newspaper publisher 
and a well-connected member of a transnational elite, who became “toxic” after his conviction 
of fraud in the United States. 
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This implies an acceptance of transnational elite culture. 17  A common 
educational background serves as one mechanism in integrating elites around 
the world: transnational elites tend to have a background of higher education 
in the fields of finance, economics, law, engineering and physics, often in 
Western elite universities. Accordingly, the incorporation of the non-Atlantic 
elites of the world has partly taken place through education: many prominent 
emerging market economists, central bankers, finance ministers and even 
presidents have been educated in Western universities (Adolph 2013, 145, 
157–8; Faux 2006, 170; Freeland 2012, 61–2). In addition, as will be discussed 
in Chapter 2, various associations, clubs and forums, most notably the World 
Economic Forum’s main summit in Davos, as well as its regional meetings in 
Africa, East Asia, Latin America and the Middle East, create spaces of 
interaction and offer businesspeople and high government officials 
opportunities to recognise members of the transnational elite and be 
recognised by them. 
Aside from the general perspective of communication as a practice in 
which the culture of a particular group is reproduced, this work is informed by 
long-standing research traditions concerned with the complex relationship 
between the media and political power. On these matters, models and theories 
of political agenda-setting, media-state relations, framing and the 
mediatisation of politics are among the more influential approaches in recent 
scholarship. A common feature in all these approaches is their either implicit 
acknowledgment or explicit observation that the mainstream news media tend 
to reproduce and legitimise elite discourses, attitudes and opinions (e.g., 
Bennett et al. 2007; Louw 2010; Robinson 2001). Yet the elite is typically 
marked by its absence as a notion informing the theoretical framework of these 
studies. This is partly because political communication research continues to 
be informed, to a great extent, by what Aeron Davis (2003) calls the 
“traditional mass media paradigm”, which focuses on the effects of media 
publicity on the general audience of the citizenry. Consequently, the role of 
media in the workings of politics and power is typically understood in terms of 
its influence in the definition and shaping of the public opinion. As an 
alternative approach, Davis (2003; 2007a) proposes a more explicit 
concentration on the communicative practices of political actors who make 
important decisions. Indeed, the first step in turning the theoretical focus on 
how the media work within the networks of power is the acknowledgement 
that much of the content in political journalism and the news media is actually 
elites communicating to other elites. 
The role the media and journalism play in the establishment and 
maintenance of political elites and in their exercise of power can be 
approached from a variety of perspectives. Among these, the claim about elite 
 
                                                   
17  For a similar argument, as well as for a discussion on the criteria in the selection of 
Bilderberg attendees, see Richardson et al. (2011, 114–7). 
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dominance of the media, resulting in the mainstream media serving the 
ideological hegemony of dominant groups, is perhaps the most general, and 
for its critics an unsatisfactorily simplistic, argument. John Corner (2011, 25–
6), for instance, criticises broad interpretations of elite dominance over the 
media for lacking analytical precision and assuming a highly unified and 
homogeneous ruling elite. Accordingly, a more pluralist view perceives the 
media and journalism as resources of power or as sites of struggle that takes 
place between competing elite individuals and groups (e.g., Davis 2007a, 60–
1; Kunelius and Reunanen 2012). Another option is to perceive the media as a 
facilitator of debate and deliberation among elites, bringing them together to 
formulate the shared ideational and normative frameworks on which decision-
making, competition and compromises are based. This has been a recurrent 
perspective, particularly in political studies. Maarten Hajer (2009), for 
instance, has described the contemporary policy process in terms of “network 
governance” involving various actors and characterised by often vague and 
shifting relationships of authority. In these circumstances, opportunities and 
capacities for “reasoned elaboration” between “stakeholders” turns into a 
crucial prerequisite for the ability to govern. From this perspective, even as 
much of the actual decision-making and policy-planning is removed from the 
view of the general public, elites make use of exclusive media outlets and 
publications to communicate with their peers. The associated forms of 
specialised journalism thus contribute to pragmatic problem-solving among 
elites and facilitate the establishment of a common ground between clashing 
interests.  
The significance of inter-elite communication has been increasingly 
acknowledged in recent years by scholars working on constructivist 
international relations and the sociology of international politics who have 
pointed to the importance of ideational processes and practices as 
prerequisites for transnational forms of governing (e.g., Alasuutari 2015; 
Schmidt 2008). These fields of study often start with the problem of how and 
why nation-states or other actors with apparently conflicting interests can 
come together and find consensus or capacity to act in unison. In the world-
societal context, which is marked by the absence of formal mechanisms of 
authority, this capacity relies, to a significant degree, on the argumentative 
processes that shape the participants’ perceptions about the nature of the 
situation they are in, about themselves as actors and about their interests. This 
“communicative action” (Risse 2000) has been identified as an elementary 
aspect of world politics, enabling elites to cooperate and develop a sense of 
solidarity across the boundaries of separate social domains. These insights 
from the studies of international politics and sociology suggest another 
possible approach to study the relationship between the media and elites. This 
approach would emphasise the role of the media and journalism in 
constructing and reproducing the social imaginaries and self-understandings 
of elites and elite communities (Anderson 1991; Steger 2009; Taylor 2004). 
Indeed, in the reproduction and dissemination of social imaginaries and 
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collective identities, journalism can be regarded as a key cultural practice 
insofar as it implicitly provides answers to some fundamental questions: who 
are we, what state are we in as a collective, how did we end up where we are 
now, what is to be expected, what is the world outside like, who are our friends 
and enemies, and so on (Schudson 2003, 68–9). When it comes to 
transnational elites, international business journalism has the potential to 
considerably influence the self-perceptions and societal understandings of 
economic, political and bureaucratic decision-makers who form its principal 
audience and who use it as their daily source of news and analysis on what goes 
on in the world (e.g., Kantola 2007; Reilly 1999; Starr 2004). 
Finally, in addition to the view of communication as a cultural practice 
of communal integration and the various research traditions focused on 
questions concerning the media and political power, the present work draws 
inspiration from the concept and theory of the public sphere. While many have 
focused on the normative aspects of the concept and emphasised its critical 
democratic potential (e.g., Dahlgren 2005; Fraser 1990; 2007; Habermas 
2006; Landes 1992), this work pays closer attention to the historical analyses 
and interpretations of the public sphere as a social domain and cultural form 
that enables a particular kind of political discourse and the organisation of 
self-conscious groups – or publics – in pursuit of common societal goals. In 
his historical study of the idea and practice of the public sphere, Jürgen 
Habermas (1989) associated the capacity of the bourgeoisie to generalise their 
interests and to turn state power into the service of those interests with their 
self-organisation through communicative practices. In this regard, Geoff Eley 
(1992, 290–1) and Harry Boyte (1992, 342) have suggested that the public 
sphere was an unintended consequence of various long-term socio-economic 
changes, including growth in long-distance trade and commercialisation, the 
development of a vibrant urban culture, a new infrastructure of information 
(the print media) and the proliferation of voluntary associations. At the same 
time, publicity became an increasingly important aspect of various social 
practices, including politics and business (Koivisto and Väliverronen 1996, 
31). Excluded from the formal positions of political power, the bourgeoisie 
developed principles and practises of public reasoning to defend the private 
sphere of capitalist production from the state’s arbitrary interventions 
(Habermas 1989; Warner 2002, 47). 
Following these insights into the historical formation of the public sphere 
and its importance in the political self-organisation of the bourgeois public, 
the present study addresses the contemporary forms of TEC in close 
connection with capitalist development. Accordingly, Chapters 2 and 3 suggest 
that the globalisation of economic activities after World War 2 has advanced 
in a relationship of mutual dependence with new forms of elite 
communication. On the one hand, globalisation has been conditioned by 
simultaneous advances in global communication technologies. On the other 
hand, global economic integration has created increasing demand for 
practices, institutions and media that bring elites together in order to 
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coordinate and govern economic activities and policies on a transnational 
basis. International elite networks and clubs, such as the World Economic 
Forum, and specialist media, such as the Financial Times, are facilitators for 
the exchange of ideas, public reasoning and collective construction of 
knowledge for these purposes. Therefore they simultaneously foster the 
interaction and self-organisation of transnational elites. Global capitalism, in 
short, supplies the twenty-first century transnational public sphere with its 
primary actors – the international political, business and bureaucratic elites – 
and the main ideas and themes to be debated: the governance of the global 
political economy. 
1.4 Research problem, strategy and structure of the 
study 
This study explores the idea and practice of transnational elite communication 
and its potential in informing collective elite agency. More specifically, the 
study asks how international business and policy-making elites communicate 
in public to each other and how this communication orders the world, fosters 
the self-awareness of elites as global actors and establishes shared policy 
ideas. These topics are explored by combining the perspectives of elite theory, 
global political economy and various research fields within communication 
and media studies. The theoretical part of the work traces the historical 
development and forms of TEC and examines its relevance in global economic 
governance. The empirical part, in turn, focuses on the Financial Times 
coverage of the World Economic Forum in the early 2000s. It analyses some 
of the main features of that communication in terms of the ontological 
understandings, actor identities, and values and ideals that are promoted in 
FT journalism.  
The extent to which the forms of public communication of a small group 
of international elite decision-makers actually matter in the exercise of their 
institutional power can certainly be questioned. First, as much of elite 
decision-making takes place behind closed doors, the very nature of elite 
power may be seen as rooted in secrecy instead of publicity and consisting 
mainly of their ability to make backroom deals outside the scope of public 
organisations and representative institutions (see also Mills 1956, 293–4). 
Second, public communication may be regarded merely as a front that, as a 
form of public relations management that includes justificatory, manipulative 
and even deceptive practices, discloses little about the genuine rationales and 
actual beliefs behind decisions, which are shared only privately and within 
smaller circles (Louw 2010; see also Wedel 2009, 40–5). Third, while public 
communication concentrates on the formal heads of organisations, who serve 
as the public representatives of these organisations, it tends to provide a 
misleading representation of how decisions are actually made. Institutional 
leaders do not make decisions in an organisational vacuum but are typically 
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surrounded by a tightly-knit group of people, an entourage of deputies, 
advisers and consultants who may have significant influence on and over those 
in the actual command posts (Mills 1956, 15).  From this perspective, if one 
wants to understand the ideational factors involved in the decision-making of 
transnational elites, the focus should be turned from their public appearances 
to their private forms of interaction with their closest peers, aides and advisers. 
As far as decision-making processes are concerned, such arguments 
against the focus on the public communication of transnational elites are 
certainly relevant. However, making economic and policy decisions is not the 
only aspect, and not necessarily even the most important one, in the actual 
exercise of power in the global political economy. The conception of 
transnational elites as consisting mainly of individuals occupying the highest 
formal positions in the most powerful institutions of society should not 
mislead us to perceive that making decisions within their respective 
organisations is all there is to their power. Even though elites can certainly be 
identified by their institutional capacity to make influential decisions, their 
actual exercise of power does not limit itself to executing such decisions. A key 
dimension of elite power is their capability of exerting more indirect forms of 
influence, something that could be termed structural power, or capacity to 
influence the material and ideational conditions in which other actors make 
decisions (see Carstensen and Schmidt 2016, 319–20; Lukes 2005). 
Accordingly, the premise informing this study is that, even as important facets 
of the operation of power are hidden from public view, the public spaces of 
international forums and the media are significant facilitators of the elites’ 
exercise of power (see Chapter 3.4). International elite media, such as the FT, 
are not so much about making decision-makers accountable, but about 
catering to the ideational and cultural integration of elites, which makes the 
decision-making in the backrooms possible in the first place. 
As an exploration into the idea and practice of TEC, this study has been 
carried out following a qualitative research strategy and a flexible and 
constantly evolving research design (see Alasuutari 1996, 372–4; Hammersley 
2013, 12–4; Timmermans and Tavory 2012, 173). Accordingly, the work at 
hand does not aim to develop generalizable rules, models or hypotheses of TEC 
that could be tested in empirical observation. Instead the purpose is to shed 
light on the forms and practices of that communication from selected, but 
inevitably limited and partial, perspectives. More specifically, the aim is to use 
elite theory and studies of the global political economy to make interpretations 
concerning the dominant themes and discourses in contemporary elite 
communication, as well as their significance in enabling and guiding elite 
agency and cooperation.  
Methodologically, the study moves deliberately away from a purely 
empiricist, or data-driven strategy to one which recognises the importance of 
theoretical idea development and conceptual work when trying to create new 
knowledge about social reality. In this sense, the research strategy may best be 
characterised in terms of “theorising” (e.g., Alasuutari 1996; Layder 1998, 
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100–32; Swedberg 2012), or as a constant interplay between theoretical ideas 
and “real-world” observations. The approach bridges the gap and refutes the 
somewhat false dichotomy between theoretical and empirical knowledge, 
arguing that all knowledge is created in constant interaction between the two 
(see Jay 1996). This is because observations concerning social reality are 
inevitably shaped by background (“theoretical”) knowledge and 
preconceptions, while all theoretical ideas are to some extent related to real-
life (“empirical”) experiences. Correspondingly, both the purely literature-
based, or “theoretical”, early part of the study and the data-based, or 
“empirical”, analysis in the latter part of the work have been guided by a set of 
concerns which can be characterised as theoretical or conceptual (see 
Timmermans and Tavory 2012, 167, 173). Yet at the same time, the concepts 
and theoretical propositions have been constantly tested via observations 
drawn from both the literature documenting and interpreting social 
phenomena and actors, as well as the case-specific material collected from the 
Financial Times. The literature and empirical observations have thus 
informed the way the original concepts guiding the study have evolved and 
been qualified during the process (cf. Bal 2009). The purpose of this process 
of theorising has been to develop the central concepts that frame the overall 
study and to provide an enlightened and empirically-grounded argument 
about their usefulness and limits to understanding social reality (cf. Sayer 
1992, 79–83).  
Conceptual work has therefore been omnipresent – yet it has taken 
distinct directions during the research process. In the literature-based, or 
“theoretical”, part of the study (Chapters 2 and 3), theorising concerns the 
scrutiny of communication as a practice connected to transnational elite 
formation. Chapter 2 outlines the perspective of TEC on the study of 
international forums and media that specialise on business and politics, and 
introduces the WEF and FT as particular spaces for the interaction and 
communication between international corporate and political elites. Chapter 
3 sets these contemporary forms of TEC against the background of postwar 
developments in the global political economy. Drawing mostly on the work of 
William Robinson, Ellen Meiksins Wood, Leo Panitch, Sam Gindin, Kees van 
der Pijl, Leslie Sklair, Bob Jessop, David Held and Anthony McGrew, the 
chapter traces the dual processes of globalisation and financialization as a 
historical, US-led political project of market liberalisation and integration and 
outlines the institutional forms of global economic governance that bring 
together business leaders, policymakers and international officials to 
coordinate their decision-making and set common rules for the global political 
economy.  
Chapter 3 argues, in this respect, that the observed developments have 
both been advanced by the active agency of transnational elites and reinforced 
their power in the global political economy. The field of global economic 
governance is an important context of elite power where actions, decisions, 
regulations and policies with regard to the global economy are carried out and 
Introduction: Studying transnational elite communication 
38 
 
formulated with major repercussions for the institutional structures and policy 
models that guide policy formation also in the context of nation-states. In this 
way, the transnational elites of global governance exert power on a supra-
national level and shape the rules and available policy alternatives of other 
agents in the global political economy. Subsequently, the latter part of Chapter 
3 explores the forms and practices of TEC that facilitate global economic 
governance. Drawing on the perspectives of communication, media and the 
public sphere – and paying particular attention to the discussions concerning 
Habermas’ analysis of the importance of the public practices of political 
discourse in the rise of the bourgeoisie in the eighteenth and nineteenth-
century Europe – we examine the relevance of the contemporary forms and 
practices of TEC in the formation of transnational elites. 
Underlying the discussion in these early chapters is an argument about a 
dual conception of elites in general and transnational elites in particular. On 
the one hand, elites exist in an “objective” sense, irrespective of the actual self-
awareness of their members. On the other hand, we can understand 
transnational elites in a “subjective” sense, insofar as elite individuals become 
aware of their status and identify with the group. In this latter sense, the 
existence of transnational elites remains contingent and their integration into 
a self-conscious group is not inevitable. Indeed, even if the institutional 
concentration of power in the global political economy and the institutions and 
practices of global governance allow us to make claims about the existence of 
transnational elites in an “objective” sense, their development into self-
conscious historical agents is a highly contingent and context-dependent 
process. At the same time, a key facet in the notion of the elite as a theoretical 
concept, which can “explain” social processes, is their capacity to act 
collectively. In this regard, it is precisely the development of group 
consciousness that defines transnational elites as social and collective 
subjects. This study argues that the capacity for collective agency, and the 
degree thereof, is dependent on transnational elites coming together in 
interaction, negotiation and meaning making as well as in the discursive 
construction of a collective actor identity in terms of global agency. In other 
words, the making of a “global elite” as a collective agent is dependent on what 
the study calls “transnational elite communication”. In this regard, elite 
forums and media constitute a powerful form of self-organising and therefore 
contribute to the formation and reproduction of transnational elites in both 
objective (by reinforcing and legitimising its structural power in the global 
political economy) and subjective (by contributing to group integration and 
consciousness) senses. 
In the empirical part of the study, theorising as a research strategy takes 
another turn. Observing the FT coverage of World Economic Forums, the 
analysis follows the principles of constructivist qualitative methodology (e.g., 
Chesebro and Borisoff 2007; Jackson et al. 2007). According to Pertti 
Alasuutari (1996, 382), qualitative research is characterised by its emphasis 
on how the people studied give meaning to their social reality and how they 
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reach shared understandings of the situations they are in. Yet the researcher 
takes a step away from the studied people’s perspective by exploring how their 
sense making “works in constituting social realities”. For Alasuutari (ibid.), 
theorisation in qualitative research is thus about deconstructing the way in 
which people construct social realities and themselves as subjects in those 
realities.  
As will be discussed in Chapter 4, which describes the empirical 
methodology employed in the latter part of the study in detail, the one step 
away from the actual discourse of the analysed subjects takes place through 
concepts. When theorising with and through an empirical material, naming, 
conceptualising and developing typologies are central activities (Swedberg 
2012, 15). This involves “the ability to think conceptually and analytically” 
when working with the material (Layder 1998, 100). Accordingly, in the final 
analysis presented in Chapters 5 to 7, the focus is on TEC as a form of 
transnational elite integration, or on how the transnational elite as a collective 
agent is “made” in communication. The chosen analytical approach observes 
FT journalism as a form of public “epistemic work” which involves the 
formation of and negotiation on shared understandings of reality, actor 
identities, and values and ideals (Alasuutari and Qadir 2014). The analysis 
explores, on the one hand, to what issues and topics this epistemic work is 
anchored in FT-mediated TEC and, on the other, what are the ontological 
assumptions (Chapter 5), actor (self-)perceptions (Chapter 6), and values, 
ideals and political objectives (Chapter 7) around which transnational elites 
potentially self-organise as collective agents. The final chapter discusses the 
main theoretical and empirical findings, the potential contributions of the 
study to relevant research fields, as well as the role of TEC and the FT in “the 
making of a global elite” and their potential in integrating transnational elites 
and directing them to particular issues, goals and ways of acting.
2 TRANSNATIONAL ELITE 
COMMUNICATION AND MEDIA 
This chapter sketches the contours of transnational elite communication as the 
organised interpersonal and mediated interaction between members of 
transnational elites. The qualification “organised” is significant here in 
pointing out that while interactions between elite individuals constantly take 
place in the “natural” circumstances of work and leisure, interchanges also 
need to be facilitated. Recent decades have seen an increase in the number of 
organisations, policy-planning groups, think tanks, clubs, conferences and 
retreats that bring elites together on a transnational basis and across the 
boundaries of their professions and institutional spheres. Their participants 
and members consist not only of business executives and bankers but also of 
political leaders and of those officials in state departments and international 
organisations who deal with issues pertaining to the operation of the global 
economy.  
Some of the most famous meeting places of the transnational business 
and policy elites include the Bilderberg, Trilateral Commission, World 
Economic Forum and Bohemian Grove. But there are many others, such as the 
World Leadership Alliance–Club de Madrid, the Munich Security Conference, 
the Jackson Hole economic policy symposium, the Clinton Global Initiative, 
the Aspen Ideas Festival, the Boao Forum, the Sun Valley conference, the 
Milken Institute’s Global Conference, Google’s Zeitgeist conference, the 
Fortune conferences and the TED conference. While the primary focus, and 
the leading contingency of these meetings, alternates between politics and 
business, what is common to all of them is that they are determined to be non-
exclusive and open to elites from other walks of life. Therefore, the Club de 
Madrid, the world’s foremost group of former heads of state and government 
from every continent, “partner[s] with governments, inter-governmental 
organisations, civil society, scholars and the business world”, 18  and the 
Munich Security Conference, focusing on geopolitics and international 
conflicts and primarily connecting government representatives with heads of 
IGOs and military leaders, also invites representatives of defence and 
intelligence industries, oil companies, engineering firms, aircraft 
manufacturers and other businesses. At the other end of the spectrum are the 
likes of the Fortune Global Forum and the Sun Valley conference, which are 
first and foremost intended for CEOs of the largest TNCs but strive to include 
a host of policymakers, government officials, academics and celebrities among 
invited speakers and attendees. 
 
                                                   
18 See http://www.clubmadrid.org/en/about (accessed 18 May 2016). 
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In addition to exclusive meeting places, there are a variety of media 
outlets tuned particularly to international elite audiences. Leading US and 
European newspapers, such as the Wall Street Journal, the New York Times 
and the Financial Times, cater to international audiences with regional or 
international editions, and also a number of non-western elite newspapers, 
such as Nihon Keizai Shimbun, in Japan, and The Economic Observer, in 
China, publish English editions for their international readership. A number 
of western business news magazines, such as Bloomberg Businessweek, 
Fortune, Forbes, The Economist and the Harvard Business Review, have a 
strong international presence, and even more exclusive international 
audiences are reached by such titles as Barron’s, the CEOWorld Magazine, the 
CFO magazine and The International Economy. Various 24-hour business 
news channels, most notably CNBC and Bloomberg, reach millions of viewers 
globally. Most of these outlets host popular online business news sites as well. 
Other notable online news sites directed at business and political elite 
audiences include Reuters.com, International Business Times, Business 
Insider and CNNmoney.com. In addition to international business and 
political news, transnational elites are also targeted by a variety of luxury 
journalism, designed to assist them in investment, consumption and travel 
decisions. Prominent titles include Robb Report, Upscale Living, Dolce Vita, 
Unique Homes, Luxos Magazine and the FT’s monthly magazine How to 
Spend It. Some international luxury hotel chains, such as Four Seasons, also 
publish their own magazines. 
This work interprets these various transnational forums and media 
outlets designed for the interchange and dissemination of ideas between 
business executives, investors, political leaders and top officials as platforms 
for transnational elite communication (TEC). It is characterised by the 
following elements: 
? It takes place between international economic, political and 
bureaucratic elites, frequently transcending the boundaries between 
these traditionally separate institutional domains. 
? It is “public” in the sense that it concerns matters of common interest 
between members of these elites and primarily focuses on issues of 
“global” significance. As a whole, TEC constructs the transnational elite 
agenda of economic, geopolitical and social matters. The notion does 
not refer to the kind of “private” and formal communication for the 
exchange of services, sharing of information or decision-making that 
takes place between actors in the marketplace or in a formal political 
body. 
? It is connected to networking, group-formation and the development of 
collective identities. TEC takes place not so much in order to run 
everyday business activities but because the participants see the value 
in the communication of non-private matters and interests with their 
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peers for the benefit of some collective good (e.g., global economic 
growth, liberalisation of trade, curbing climate change). 
? It assumes both public and private (i.e., interpersonal) forms, taking 
place in and at the fringes of official meetings, conferences and private 
clubs, as well as in public speeches and in the media that serve 
transnational elites. 
? There is a considerable degree of exclusivity to it. The interchange of 
ideas in private clubs and official meetings is by definition exclusive to 
their participants and often governed by mutual understanding of 
confidentiality and rules of non-disclosure. But the more public forms 
of interaction, such as the mediated conversations in the newspapers 
and other outlets subscribed by transnational elites, also typically retain 
an exclusive character. These are, in effect, non-inclusive to different 
sectors of society. Communication in elite forums and media is 
primarily directed at other members of transnational elites.  
 
In sum, the concept of transnational elite communication refers to those 
interpersonal and mediated forms of interaction in which members of 
transnational elites address each other on issues of common concern while 
recognising themselves as part of the same group. It is intra-elite or inter-
elite communication on matters of global importance with an international 
scope.  
The chapter begins with a brief historical overview of the institutional 
forms of TEC. In the first section, we take a glance at the most significant 
associations, foundations, clubs and policy-planning groups that have brought 
corporate and policymaking elites together internationally since the early 
twentieth century, and we also discuss the role of the media in facilitating and 
shaping international business and politics. Subsequently, the chapter turns 
to two prominent institutions that facilitate contemporary TEC. The second 
section examines the World Economic Forum as an organiser of TEC, 
providing a brief historical account of the foundation and its operations. We 
pay specific attention to the annual Davos meeting the WEF is mostly known 
for, describe the composition of its attendees and the formation of its agenda, 
and discuss its main purposes and significance, as well as its private and public 
nature as a space for TEC. The third and final section of the chapter describes 
the Financial Times as a newspaper and facilitator of transnational elite 
formation. Here, a historical account of the major phases of the publication, 
founded in 1888, is complemented by a discussion on the FT’s status among 
transnational elites, on its distinctly global outlook, on its influence of elite 
agenda and opinion, as well as on its promotion of a liberal-internationalist 
political program. 
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2.1 Integrating business and political elites 
Economic globalisation is essentially about human transactions, and therefore 
it has always had a social dimension to it. The internationalisation of trade in 
the early modern period corresponded with the emergence of diasporic 
merchant communities linked together in world-wide networks (Helleiner 
1997). An instrumental early form of transnational elite formation was 
Freemasonry, which expanded from Britain to settler colonies and to other 
European nations from the early eighteenth century onwards (Berger 2010; 
van der Pijl 1998, 100–1). In the era of high finance of the late nineteenth 
century and early twentieth century, central bankers and investment bankers 
interacted across the industrialised world (Gill 1990, 123–4; van der Pijl 2012, 
38–40). Businesspeople and professionals established international clubs, 
most notably Rotary International and the Lions Club, both founded in the 
United States, in 1905 and 1917, respectively (van der Pijl 1998, 102–3). The 
intensification of imperial rivalries and the World Wars undermined the 
establishment of transnational business networks, but international 
associations, societies, clubs, leagues, foundations and policy-planning groups 
proliferated after World War 2 (Boli and Thomas 1999b, 22). 
The creation of international peer networks is therefore an intrinsic part 
of the globalisation of business. In tandem with the extension and 
intensification of the international processes of production, trade and 
investment, recent decades have seen a surge in corporate executive 
interaction on an international and global basis. This international interaction 
between business elites takes several forms. First, corporate directorates bring 
members of the transnational business elite together, and the increasingly 
transnational ownership of companies facilitates the internationalisation of 
TNC management and boards of directors. Second, international business 
advocacy groups and trade associations gather managers together to formulate 
common strategies within and across industries in order to shape 
international standards and push legislation and regulation towards common 
interests. Third, such formal and routine interaction that comes with the office 
is complemented by a variety of forms of more informal interaction, both 
private and public. Directing or participating in the activities of foundations, 
charities, societies, think-tanks and cultural institutions is part of the 
associational life of the business elite and offers them opportunities to come 
together with their peers (Sklair 2001, 22), while shared neighbourhoods, 
hotels, restaurants, resorts, sports and arts events provide the most informal 
venues for international elite interaction (Freeland 2012, 57–9).  
Consequently, relationships between corporate managers are not 
characterised by competition alone; there are also elements of solidarity, 
fraternity and collective organisation to the interaction (cf. Faux 2006, 157). 
Indeed, a significant thrust behind transnational business elite networking has 
been the drive to establish common interests and collectively influence public 
policies regarding the regulation of national and international business 
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activities. Besides societies and clubs, the early twentieth century also saw the 
founding of elite groups with more explicit policy-orientation. Most notably, 
the International Chamber of Commerce, founded in 1919, connected 
industrialists, financiers and traders across major economies to formulate 
common interests of businesses internationally and advance these views to 
governments and intergovernmental organisations (ICC 2014; van der Pijl 
2012, 62).19 In the quarter of the century following World War 2, with the US-
based TNCs and banks leading the globalisation of economic activities (see 
Chapter 3), US bankers and business leaders were central drivers in the 
formation of international business organisations. Initially, the primary focus 
was on the consolidation of US-European relations (see van der Pijl 2012), 
which manifested, for instance, in the establishment of a network of American 
Chambers of Commerce across Western Europe. Correspondingly, the Soviet 
economic blockade of Eastern Europe prompted Western European business 
leaders not only to increasingly turn towards the United States for export 
markets, but also to seek US banks and businesses for policy support for the 
liberalisation of national trade and investment policies (Panitch and Gindin 
2012, 90, 114–5).  
Transnational business-policy clubs and networks 
The organisational strategies for promoting international trade and 
investment have also included the incorporation of business leaders, policy 
makers, government officials, academics and professionals into common 
transnational networks. The secret societies and round tables founded by 
influential investment bankers in the late nineteenth century in the United 
States and within the British Empire already connected them with members 
of the political and administrative elites on an Anglo-Saxon basis (Gill 1990, 
123–4; van der Pijl 2012, 38–40; 1998, 109–11, 117–8). After World War 2, the 
interests in strengthening transatlantic connections between business elites, 
policy makers and professionals led to the founding of various new 
associations, including the Atlantic Council, the Atlantic Institute and the 
Ditchley Foundation (Gill 1990, 124, 132).  
However, perhaps the most famous and encompassing group established 
in the early postwar period to connect European and American business and 
policy elites is the Bilderberg. It was founded in 1954, bringing together 
political leaders, high officials, military chiefs and strategists, international 
bankers and business executives, trade unionists, civic and cultural leaders as 
well as prominent opinion leaders in the media and academia on both sides of 
 
                                                   
19 Today, the ICC/World Business Organisation engages in rule setting, dispute resolution, 
and policy advocacy for its hundreds of thousands of mainly corporate members in over 130 
countries, having representation in such international bodies as the UN and the WTO (see 
http://www.iccwbo.org/about-icc/). 
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the ocean with the aim of fostering “Atlantic partnership”, open and 
confidential dialogue and deeper economic, political, military and cultural 
connections (Gill 1990, 126–9; van der Pijl 2012, 183). Today, Bilderberg 
continues to operate as a forum for North American and European leaders to 
deepen the “Atlantic alliance”, and its participants include heads of state and 
other leading politicians, bankers and business leaders, trade unionists, 
diplomats and intellectuals as well as influential representatives of the media 
(Richardson et al. 2011, 51–4). 
Beginning in the late 1960s and early 1970s, as American and European 
political and business interests started to turn increasingly global, a new wave 
of organisation building aimed at integrating non-Western elites into the 
transnational networks. With the growing internationalisation of Japanese 
industries, both North American and European elites created new connections 
across the Pacific. Most notably, the Trilateral Commission, founded in 1973 
by David Rockefeller and Zbigniew Brzezinski, emerged out of the perceived 
need within the Bilderberg circles to include Japanese business and political 
leaders into a common discussion with North American and European elites 
(Gill 1990, 137; van der Pijl 1998, 124). The stated objectives for the Trilateral 
Commission were very similar to those that prompted the establishment of the 
Bilderberg group: it was set up in order to get “significant groups of leaders 
from the three areas” together to discuss “matters of common concern” and to 
develop “shared understandings” on common issues, but also to design policy 
responses and to foster support for these recommendations among the 
governments and private sectors of the areas concerned (Gill 1990, 143). The 
Trilateral Commission proved to be a highly attractive forum for the top 
bankers, financiers and corporate executives: about two-thirds of the world’s 
largest 100 public companies had an affiliation with the Commission through 
an individual membership in the mid-1980s (Gill 1990, 157–8). 
With the advancing globalisation of economic relations of finance and 
production, Western-led transnational associations have continued to expand 
and to incorporate business and policy-making elites from new countries. 
During the 1980s, trilateral meetings between the American, European and 
Japanese elites started to involve representatives from other Pacific countries 
(Gill 1990, 123), and in the 1990s the associations and networks extended 
further to include elites from the former Soviet bloc.20 It was in this post-cold 
 
                                                   
20 A model case for such globalisation of elite networks is the Mont Pèlerin Society (MPS), 
which has been considered one of the most significant elite clubs in the twentieth century due 
to its influence in developing and distributing the ideology of neoliberalism among academic, 
business and political elites (Harvey 2005, 20–2; Mirowski 2013, 38–50; van der Pijl 1998, 
129). While the majority of MPS members are economists, prominent business leaders and 
politicians have customarily been invited to its meetings and funded its operations, and 
members of the society have operated as a close policy adviser to governments ranging from 
Pinochet’s Chile to Thatcher’s Britain (Gill 1990, 98; van der Pijl 1998, 129). At its inception 
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war period that the World Economic Forum rose into prominence, celebrating 
the apparent completion of global economic integration with an annual 
gathering of TNC executives, entrepreneurs, politicians, public officials and 
management professionals from around the world (see the following section). 
Yet the WEF marks only the most conspicuous meeting place for global leaders 
of business and politics. Today, they interact in a plethora of private forums, 
foundations, clubs, councils, policy-planning groups, philanthropic 
associations and think tanks.21  
These transnational dimensions of associational life demonstrate a 
strong interest among business leaders and policy makers in forging 
transnational connections and in engaging with issues that transcend national 
borders. They can be viewed as essential complements to the kind of 
international interaction that comes as part of the daily work of these business 
executives, political leaders and high officials, facilitating both transnational 
elite networking and the establishment of spaces for TEC. At the same time, 
corresponding with the centralised and regionalised nature of much of 
transnational economic activities (see Chapter 3.1), the truly global nature of 
elite forums and networks is questionable to a certain extent. Most 
transnational elite gatherings and associations continue to be regional rather 
than truly global in their membership (Richardson et al. 2011, 215). On the 
 
                                                   
in 1947, the MPS consisted of 17 US members and 22 European members from nine Western 
European countries, but by 1991 it had broadened to include members from Japan, China, 
India, Thailand, Hong Kong, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and eleven Latin American 
countries (Mirowski 2013, 47–8). In addition, a central part of the MPS’s operational logic has 
been the spawning of think tanks, connecting academic economists with international and 
national policymakers and businesspeople in the English speaking world, Europe, South 
America and South East Asia (Mirowski 2013, 44–6). In the 1990s, the MPS increasingly 
incorporated members from the former Soviet bloc as well as from third world countries (van 
der Pijl 1998, 130). 
21  Prominent international clubs and forums connecting members of the corporate and 
political elite include the World Economic Forum, the Clinton Global Initiative, Bilderberg 
and the Trilateral Commission. International associations engaged in philanthropy include 
the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, one of the largest charitable foundations in the world, 
and the Global Philanthropists Circle, which connects some 75 families of the superrich in over 
20 countries (see McConnon 2007; http://www.synergos.org/philanthropistscircle). The 
Open Society Foundation, founded by the Hungarian-American billionaire George Soros, is 
an example of an elite-owned foundation that engages in a broader scope of operations than 
mere philanthropy. The most influential international business and policy think tanks, in turn, 
include the Brookings Institution, Chatham House, Rand Corporation, the Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, Bruegel, Peterson Institute for International Economics, 
the Kiel Institute for the World Economy, and the World Resources Institute (see McGann 
2013). 
47 
other hand, a distinguishing feature of many of the elite associations 
established in recent decades has been their increasingly global nature, not 
only in their organisation and membership, but also in the scope of their 
operation and the issues they address (Bull et al. 2004; Lechner and Boli 2005, 
128–33; McGann 2002; Stone 2008). In this respect, the World Economic 
Forum is, again, a representative example: while having its roots in the 
networks of European and US business leaders, it has been largely successful 
in both establishing transnational non-Western elite networks and in 
incorporating them into a common transnational space of elite 
communication. 
International business media  
While forums and associations carry an important role of bringing corporate 
elites and policymakers together on a transnational scope, TEC is further 
facilitated by means of public communication. As for the networks and 
associations, also the new technologies and practices of mediated 
communication, specialised for transnational and interregional interaction, 
have developed in tandem with the growing interconnectedness of the global 
economy and the corresponding cross-border flows of capital, commodities 
and people (Fairclough 2006, 3–4; Mosco 2009, 14–5). The conduct of 
business and politics has been facilitated by transcontinental dissemination of 
news at least since the early modern period, with handwritten newsletters 
circulating between European cities in the fifteenth century (Espejo 2011, 191). 
Financiers, bankers and traders held a particular interest in the dissemination 
of all kinds of intelligence from exchange rates, prices and bankruptcies to 
general events and even rumours (Williams 2011, 48). In a similar manner, the 
expansion of finance and commerce during the colonial period was closely 
associated with the growth of foreign news as an organised business in Europe, 
and international news agencies developed to respond to the need for rapid 
dissemination of reliable market information (ibid., 49–52). The most recent 
wave of internationalisation of business and trade since the 1960s has been 
accompanied by the emergence of specialised business news agencies and 
television networks, while the increasing size and scope of global financial 
markets has prompted the expansion of financial coverage and the foundation 
of specialised financial publications (Clark et al. 2004; Madrick 2002). 
Accordingly, international political and business news outlets play an 
important role in enabling the actual processes of transnational finance, 
business and politics (Davis 2010, 119–23; Garnham 1992, 371).  
The institutions and media of TEC also structure the informational 
environment of decision makers in various ways. News media, in particular, 
often become players in politics and markets in their own right, shaping the 
prevailing currents of elite opinion and affecting business and political 
processes (Brand 2010; Doyle 2006; Madrick 2002). Indeed, financial and 
business news has often been regarded as one driving factor behind business 
Transnational elite communication and media 
48 
 
cycles of booms and busts, including the inflation of speculative market 
bubbles (Clark et al. 2004; Kleinnijenhuis et al. 2013; Merrill 2012; Tambini 
2010; Thompson 2013). Elites themselves are well aware of the potential of 
TEC to influence the behaviour of other elites (Richardson et al. 2011, 89–90), 
and in pursuit of their commercial or political goals, they try to take advantage 
of the access to the elite public that the forums and specialised media provide.  
In this regard, publicity offered by the elite media, in particular, is used to 
influence competitors in the markets, to turn public attention to particular 
issues and policy solutions, and to garner support for certain ideas among 
other members of the elite (Davis 2000; 2003; 2005; 2007b; Kunelius and 
Reunanen 2012). Therefore, decision makers in the fields of politics and 
business, in particular, are likely to take the news media into account and 
anticipate news coverage in several ways before and after decisions, 
considering their impact on other members of the elite, as well as on the 
general public (Kepplinger 2007; Kunelius and Reunanen 2012). Investors 
and fund managers, for their part, use the financial media as part of their 
investment strategies, but are also affected by the constant scrutiny these 
media exercise on their performance (Davis 2005). 
However, besides providing news and instant market information, 
specialised media are also in place to provide platforms for the exchange of 
ideas between transnational elites. Many of the publications that serve TEC 
commit themselves exclusively to these purposes. Take, for instance, The 
International Economy, which describes itself as a “specialised quarterly 
magazine covering global financial policy, economic trends, and international 
trade”.22 The magazine can best be described as a publication by and for the 
transnational elite of policymakers, regulators and academic experts on the 
global economy. Its founder, editor and publisher is David Smick, CEO of a 
financial market advisory firm, who describes himself as “one of Washington’s 
premier insiders” in economic, financial and trade policy matters,23 and the 
magazine’s editorial advisory board includes a host of former and present 
central bankers, IMF officials, government leaders and finance ministers and 
financial services professionals as well as prominent academic economists, 
mostly from the United States, Germany and the UK, but also from Mexico, 
Peru, Korea and Japan.24 Accordingly, the magazine explicitly positions itself 
as a medium for a small and exclusive international elite: 
The International Economy is unlike virtually any other magazine in 
that it is targeted almost exclusively to the financial policy elite. Today 
there are roughly 10,000–20,000 economic and financial opinion 
 
                                                   
22 See http://www.international-economy.com/AboutTIE.htm (accessed 29 August 2016). 
23 See http://www.davidsmick.com/Smick_Bio.html (accessed 29 August 2016). 
24 See http://www.international-economy.com/MastheadTIE.htm (accessed 29 August 2016). 
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leaders internationally of whom perhaps 3,000–5,000 truly impact 
the global economy as the prime movers in the public and private 
sectors. This is The International Economy’s target audience.25 
The growing number of forums and specialised media outlets suggests that 
corporate and policymaking elites consider it to be increasingly important to 
interact and communicate with their peers on a transnational basis. Both the 
private gatherings and the public media outlets provide spaces for interaction 
between elites, connecting individuals and institutions across national 
boundaries and facilitating the development of shared views and discourses 
(cf. Curran 2005, 121–2).  
This intra-elite or inter-elite communication must be recognised for its 
integrative nature: groups come together through communicative practices 
(Carey 1989). TEC serves to formulate and mediate shared understandings of 
reality within the group, and it brings transnational elites together as an 
“imagined community” (Anderson 1991). Therefore, insofar as transnational 
elites cohere as groups in the first place, they do so through communication 
between elite individuals. At the same time, this culture-defining power to 
formulate, mediate and promulgate ideas and worldviews concentrates 
particularly to the most publicly visible members of the elite. Through their 
public functions, visible roles in international elite forums, and access to the 
elite media as preferred sources, the executives of the most influential banks 
and businesses, the directors of major international organisations, and 
political leaders and central bankers of the largest nations form the 
representative face of the transnational elite and enjoy a privileged position in 
communicating with other members of the elite. Transnational elite 
integration in communication is thus hierarchically structured. 
2.2 World Economic Forum and transnational elite 
integration 
Davos, perhaps more than any other gathering, epitomises the way 
political power and global governance have in recent decades been 
entrenched into a small corporate elite.  
Buxton 2014. 
While the World Economic Forum is often identified as a notorious and 
influential institution in the critical writings of political activists, news 
professionals and academic researchers alike, there is little actual research on 
the organisation. Geoffrey Pigman’s (2007) take on the WEF as an 
 
                                                   
25 See http://www.international-economy.com/AboutTIE.htm (accessed 29 August 2016). 
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institutional form of “multi-stakeholder” global governance is the only study 
exclusively dedicated to the organisation and it is highly sympathetic in its 
approach. In his exploration of the world of the “superclass”, David Rothkopf 
(2008) spends much of his time at the WEF, interviews many of its attendees 
and includes a discussion the history and current relevance of the Davos 
forum. Elizabeth Friesen (2012) offers a more detailed analysis of the WEF, 
tracing its history and the evolution of its public agenda from the perspective 
of the global civil society’s struggles to challenge global finance. Jean-
Christophe Graz (2003) has examined the WEF from the perspective of a 
“social myth”, narrating a story about the forum’s rise in notoriety and prestige 
among transnational elites during the late 1980s and early 1990s and about 
what he sees as its decline in the early 2000s. In the field of media studies, 
Lance Bennett and colleagues (2004) have analysed the role of the WEF in 
shaping the mainstream news agenda on globalisation during the height of 
civil society protests in critique of neoliberal globalisation. In addition to these 
studies, a number of scholars of more critical traditions, such as Gramscian 
international relations and global political economy, often emphasise the 
significance of the Davos forum and characterise it as a vehicle of global 
neoliberal governance but have neglected a more substantial analysis. 
Otherwise, much of what is known of the WEF has been written by journalists 
covering the event. 
Organisational roots 
The World Economic Forum (WEF) is a private non-profit foundation with 
over 400 employees. It aims to influence the international political and 
business agenda by engaging corporate, political and academic leaders and by 
facilitating community- and network-building among them. Among its many 
activities, the WEF conducts research and publishes reports and policy 
initiatives on a variety of themes, including competitiveness, trade, 
environmental sustainability, security, health, agriculture and gender 
inequalities. The WEF also establishes transnational networks, task forces and 
councils to work on the reports and initiatives, and it offers educational 
programs to young entrepreneurs. Most notoriously, the WEF organises 
international conferences for executives of large corporations, investors, 
bankers, top politicians, and high-ranking officials of intergovernmental 
organisations, as well as editors and columnists of international media. In 
addition to its flagship conference held annually at the end of January in 
Davos, Switzerland, the WEF organises regional meetings in East Asia, Latin 
America, Africa and the Middle East, as well as conferences on more specific 
issues or with a more restricted scope of participants. One of these is the 
Annual Meeting of the New Champions, which is held in China and includes 
some 1,500 business representatives of what the organisation classifies as 
“global growth companies”, primarily from emerging markets. The range of 
meetings also includes the Summit on the Global agenda, which seeks to 
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prepare agendas and bring more focus to the debates of the annual 
conference.26 
The WEF has its roots in the Centre d’Etudes Industrielles (CEI) of 
Geneva, a business school founded in 1946 by a Canadian aluminium firm 
Alcan as a training centre for its international managers (Graz 2003, 328–9). 
For the 25th anniversary of the school, Klaus Schwab, a German-born 
academic who had joined the CEI staff in 1969, was charged to lead the 
organisation of a professional conference. Thanks to his personal and family 
connections, the international reputation of the CEI, and the support by the 
European Commission as well as European industrial associations, Schwab 
succeeded in attracting a number of high profile European industrialists and 
academics from American business schools to participate. Ultimately some 
440 European business leaders convened in the European Management 
Symposium in Davos in 1971.27 Schwab, operating as the chair of the meeting, 
went on to establish the European Management Forum to organise 
subsequent events and activities (Pigman 2007, 6–9). 
Having studied at the Harvard Business School in the 1960s, Schwab 
perceived the foundation as a vehicle to introduce US management techniques 
and practices to European companies at a time when European managers saw 
the need to respond to the perceived threats posed by the increasingly 
competitive challenge of US companies (Pigman 2007, 7–8, 93; Sassen 2001). 
However, in subsequent years, the scope of the meeting’s agenda quickly 
expanded to include more general economic, social and international issues: 
besides mere management techniques, the United States provided European 
executives another model for the structuring of the relationships between 
business, government and labour. At the same time, European businesses’ 
international scope of operation created an interest to extend personal 
networks beyond Europe, and already since the mid-1970s the forum has 
invited non-European business leaders as well as policymakers and officials to 
its annual meeting. Besides the flagship Davos meeting, the foundation also 
rapidly extended its activities, organising business roundtables and 
international symposia in various locations in and outside Europe and 
publishing reports and studies on the relevant topics.  
Both the activities of the foundation and the international scope of 
attendants to its annual meeting continued to expand in the 1980s, 
culminating in the renaming of the foundation as the World Economic Forum 
in 1987. Managers of large TNCs were invited to become members and lifted 
to the directing board of the WEF, increasing its prestige and international 
reach (Graz 2003, 330). In the 1990s and 2000s, the WEF continued to extend 
 
                                                   
26  See WEF (2014) and http://www.weforum.org/world-economic-forum (accessed 4 
November 2014). 
27 See http://www.weforum.org/history (accessed 4 November 2014). 
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its operations and to include corporate managers from different parts of the 
world as well as to incorporate internationally oriented professionals from the 
fields of media, culture, religion, politics and civil society to its network.28 Co-
operation with other international organisations, including many UN agencies 
and IFIs, has tied the foundation closer to international political processes. 
The WEF has also increasingly focused on enhancing the networking 
opportunities and “knowledge creation” among its members by designing new 
communication channels and platforms, by establishing industry- and issue-
specific sub-groups of its members, and by connecting them with experts from 
private, public and third sectors (Pigman 2007, 16–8, 139).  
Since 1976, the WEF has been a membership organisation with strict 
criteria of admission. Members are essentially large TNCs, described by the 
WEF as “global enterprises usually with more than US$ 5 billion in turnover”. 
They are “top companies within their industry and play a leading role in 
shaping the future of their industry and region”. 29 Only representatives of 
these member firms, in addition to individuals specifically invited by the WEF, 
may attend the annual forum. Member firms, the number of which the WEF 
has limited to 1000 since 1994, are divided into several categories with distinct 
membership fees and privileges.30 Strategic Partners, for instance, are an elite 
group of top 100 companies, selected by the managing board and participating 
in the organisation and planning of the annual and regional conferences. Other 
membership categories include Industry Partners, Regional Partners, Global 
Growth Companies, and Technology Pioneers. In addition to involving paying 
corporate members, the WEF has formed several “multi-stakeholder 
communities”, which bring corporate managers together with political leaders, 
academics, media representatives and cultural leaders. These communities 
and networks carry such labels as the Global Shapers Community, the Forum 
of Young Global Leaders, Global Agenda Councils, the Schwab Foundation for 
Social Entrepreneurs and Community of Chairmen, which is a peer group of 
corporate chairs working on issues of corporate governance (WEF 2014a). The 
Centre for the Global Agenda and the Centre for Global Strategies are 
coordinating bodies for the planning work in these several working groups, 
networks and communities (ibid.). 
 
                                                   
28 See also http://www.weforum.org/history (accessed 4 November 2014). 
29 See http://www.weforum.org/our-members (accessed 4 November 2014). 
30 The annual membership in the WEF cost to companies between 45,000 US dollars (lowest 
level of membership) to 530,000 US dollars (Strategic Partnership) in 2013 (Becker 2013; 
Walsh 2012). As a rule, the more a member pays, the more say it has on the WEF’s agenda, 
the more attendees it can send to the annual meeting in Davos, and the more visibility it gains 
in the panels and working groups set up by the foundation (see Pigman 2007, 23–30; Graz 
2009, 1181). 
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The WEF’s size, organisational structure and scope of operation suggest 
that the organisation has grown to be a significant facilitator of transnational 
networks and interaction between business, political, bureaucratic and 
academic elites. Accordingly, the rationale behind the WEF has evolved far 
beyond the original aim of disseminating American business management 
techniques to European firms. From being trained by business school 
educators, corporate executives have become central engines of the 
foundation’s operation, allowing them to create connections and to share their 
own world-views with business-minded political leaders, high-ranking 
officials and academic scholars, as well as editors and columnists of 
international media (Graz 2003, 330–1; Rothkopf 2008, 267).  
The Davos forum 
Nowhere has the purpose of the WEF to create international elite networks 
been more visibly manifested than in the annual Davos forum. It brings some 
1500 of the most powerful investors, bankers and corporate executives 
together with a host of political leaders, ministers, central bank governors and 
high-ranking officials of IGOs and research foundations from nearly one 
hundred countries. The Davos guest list also includes media leaders, trade 
union representatives, corporate and independent economists, heads of non-
governmental organisations and prominent academics, as well as religious 
leaders and cultural celebrities. The number of invited participants has grown 
over the years, presently standing around 2500.31 The Davos program consists 
of some 250 events over the four-day conference, including plenary sessions, 
panel discussions, workshops, keynote addresses, interviews and press 
conferences (WEF 2014b). 
In addition to the official program of the annual forum, a number of 
businesses typically organise invitation-only lunch events, dinners and 
cocktail parties. The Davos conference is also a venue for a number of informal 
and secretive meetings behind closed doors. An entity named the International 
Business Council, for instance, is said to be a group of some 100 leaders of the 
biggest global TNCs from different areas of business who convene at the 
fringes of the Davos forum (Rothkopf 2008, 274). The Informal Gathering of 
World Economic Leaders and the Governors’ Meetings, in turn, are openly 
recognised by the WEF itself. The former is a closed-door meeting among 
senior ministers, presidents and prime ministers, discussing informally and 
without the presence of their entourages, while the latter are a series of 
gatherings among executives of particular sectors who get together to discuss 
their industry-specific issues (Friesen 2012, 95–6). 
 
                                                   
31 With spouses, personal assistants and media crews covering the event for the international 
business and political media, the WEF hosts over 4,000 guests during the annual conference 
(Pigman 2007, 47). 
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The conference is designed particularly to allow informal interaction and 
exchange of ideas between its participants. The multitude of private meetings, 
parties, dinners and other informal events outside the official forum program 
offer many opportunities and spaces for people to mingle and meet (Rothkopf 
2008, 269). In these off-program meetings, as well as in the panel discussions 
held at the actual Congress Centre, the intention is to offer an opportunity for 
participants to meet on an individual and personal level, get familiar with each 
other’s backgrounds and to gain a greater understanding of the views they hold 
on issues of common concern (Pigman 2007, 47–8). This requires that 
attendees speak their minds directly, without the presence of their aides and 
assistants, and avoid expressing “official” positions and talking points. In 
other words, the WEF, like many other elite gatherings, aims to set an agenda, 
and turn the focus of its attendees, on broad and long-term issues concerning 
the economy and politics, so as to encourage participants to transcend their 
own immediate material interests (see also Gill 1990, 202). The Davos forum 
also joins other elite gatherings in their promotion of a certain behavioural 
code or mode of discourse, which dictates that participants must demonstrate 
an ability to transcend the “conceptual limitations of their office and 
constituencies”, drop the liturgy and official agenda of their institution, 
address each other as individuals, present their views directly, disagree in a 
respectful manner, and be open to other points of view (Richardson et al. 2011, 
55, 120, 143–4). The behavioural code is facilitated by the strict restrictions 
that the WEF imposes on the publicity of the proceedings. Indeed, while much 
of the Davos debates are open to the news media and nowadays even 
livestreamed on the internet, the forum has also retained its private character. 
Only part of the official program is open to the media, and many of the 
discussions are held under the Chatham House rules or take place entirely 
behind closed doors.  
Even with such restrictions on the publicity of the proceedings, the WEF 
also engages willingly with the international media in order to shape the public 
agenda (Bennett et al. 2004). Despite being a private non-profit organisation 
without legal obligations for public disclosure of its activities, the WEF 
attempts to give an impression of itself as transparent and promotes 
international media attention for the Davos meeting. To these ends, the WEF 
streams forum debates online, facilitates press and television coverage of 
events, provides reports on the discussions, publishes a weblog and 
encourages social media use by the delegates. 32  The Davos forum is of 
 
                                                   
32 Media activities are carefully managed by the WEF in order to achieve a positive public 
image for the forum and its participants. Media accreditation allows for the selection of 
desired outlets to cover the forum, reporters gain access to only certain events outside the 
official program of public panels, and filming crews and photographers are escorted by the 
organisation staff. Detailed media guidelines set rules for the reporting on off-the-record 
discussions, and even photography is tightly controlled (WEF 2013a; Coy 2014). Moreover, 
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particular interest to those sections of the media that presumably interest the 
Davos elite the most, including both general elite newspapers and specialised 
business media, such as The Wall Street Journal, International Business 
Times, Bloomberg, CNBC, and the FT. Overall, the WEF’s PR efforts have been 
rather successful, and the Davos forum can be regarded not only the biggest 
but also the most visible and publicised gathering of international corporate 
and policymaking elites (see Rothkopf 2008, 266). As such the Davos forum 
includes both public and private forms of elite communication, offering 
delegates opportunities both to have private and confidential discussions as 
well as to gain easy access to the international elite media should they desire 
to make public announcements (Pigman 2007, 70, 78). 
From this perspective, the Davos forum not only facilitates elite 
networking and exchange of ideas – as a major news event for the international 
media, it also serves as a platform for the building of public recognition and 
prestige to its participants. The celebrity status of Davos attendees is 
reinforced by the attending media corps who tend to focus on the executives 
of the largest corporations and the most well-known names in the 
international policy community (cf. Doyle 2006; Davis 2007a, 177). From the 
forum, the news media typically cover the keynote addresses by national 
leaders, as well as the occasional press conferences by celebrity philanthropists 
and investors, and business journalists publish reports on the public panels 
which include the top CEOs, central bankers and most well-known 
economists. Reporters also take advantage of their access to the influential 
individuals in the corporate elite community by conducting personal 
interviews for some important background knowledge on developing events in 
the world of business. Consequently, media focus in Davos is highly unevenly 
distributed among the over 2,000 participants to the forum, serving to direct 
attention only to a small number of individuals and increasing their public 
importance and prestige.33 
 
                                                   
the reports provided by the WEF itself often merely summarise the main talking points and 
moods of the discussions and do not directly cite speakers without their consent (Friesen 2012, 
97). 
33 Accordingly, the publicity of the annual Davos forum is dominated by a selection of elite 
“celebrities”. They fall into several categories. First, there are heads of state with generally 
acknowledged global clout, such as Angela Merkel, Wen Jiabao, Vladimir Putin and Nicolas 
Sarkozy, who typically give a keynote speech at the forum. A second group of Davos celebrities, 
who normally feature at reports on industry-specific panel discussions, consists of CEOs and 
presidents of Wall Street and the City, such as Lloyd Blankfein, Jamie Dimon and Peter 
Sutherland, as well as of managers of large TNCs. Debates on more general economic matters, 
particularly those concerning the global economy, are typically featured by directors and 
governors of major IGOs and central banks, such as Christine Lagarde and Mario Draghi, who 
constitute the category of international “celebrity bureaucrats”. They are often joined in the 
debates by influential economists, particularly chief economists of investment banks, such as 
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As it comes to its public profile, the WEF went through a challenging 
period at the turn of the millennium.  With its rising popularity among global 
business and political elites in the 1990s, the Davos forum started to attract 
increased international media attention (Pigman 2007, 17–8). At the same 
time, it became subject to more serious social scrutiny and critique. On the one 
hand, the transnational civil society critical of neoliberal globalisation 
identified the Davos forum as one of their primary targets of dissent and 
protest (Graz 2003, 333; Pigman 2007, 125–8; see also Chapter 6.3). On the 
other hand, the rapid growth and success of the organisation attracted the 
interest of some critical journalists in the international elite media. Ahead of 
the Davos meeting in 2000, The Wall Street Journal ran an investigative 
report on the WEF’s lack of transparency, on the apparently for-profit business 
activities of the purportedly non-profit foundation, and on Schwab’s personal 
dealings with private companies, implying personal conflicts of interest (see 
Flynn and Stecklow 2000). The story was picked up by other elite outlets, 
including The Washington Post and the New York Times (Pigman 2007, 133; 
Graz 2003, 332). Moreover, reporters covering the proceeding in Davos 
started to publish more critical stories and commentaries about the forum and 
its celebrity-filled parties (Pigman 2007, 76–7). Amid this rising public 
critique and negative publicity, some members and reporters raised doubts as 
to whether the Davos forum would continue to attract high-level interest 
among major global businesses (Graz 2003, 333). In retrospect, however, 
damages to the WEF’s public reputation remained limited, and the perceived 
decline in the Davos forum’s popularity turned out to be temporary if not non-
existent. Executives from global investment banks and TNCs continue to flock 
into Davos each year, being joined by several heads of state, government 
ministers and high-ranking officials from international organisations. And if 
anything, the annual meeting attracts even more attention in the mainstream 
media today compared to the turn of the millennium, summoning several 
hundreds of journalists from leading news providers from all over the world to 
Davos each January.  
While the WEF has introduced more dynamic working practices among 
the participants to its networks and communities since the early 2000s, 
producing a series of initiatives and reports on various public-private 
partnerships to tackle a multitude of global issues, the annual Davos forum 
essentially remains a site for networking, dialogue and discussion as well as a 
venue for making private deals among its business participants. Accordingly, 
 
                                                   
Jim O’Neill and Stephen Roach, who form the group of “celebrity experts”. The fifth group 
consist of “celebrity investors and philanthropists”, such as George Soros, Bill Gates and Bill 
Clinton. Besides participating in panels, they sometimes use the Davos forum to launch a 
particular fund-raising campaign or initiative in support of their philanthropic causes. Similar 
aims are occasionally pursued by the cultural celebrities who get invited at Davos, including 
Bono and Angelina Jolie. They form the sixth and the final category of Davos celebrities. 
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one of the principal attractions of the Davos forum is the networking 
opportunities it offers to its participants. The WEF has been successful in 
involving many of the largest global companies with its activities, and TNC 
managers pay for the membership in the WEF to take advantage of the 
network the foundation connects them with (Graz 2003, 330; Pigman 2007, 
96; Rothkopf 2008, 274–5). With numerous prominent CEOs, bankers and 
investors in one place at the same time, business managers and state 
representatives find the WEF an ideal venue for meeting with possible lenders, 
and lenders on the other hand can look for new investment opportunities (see 
also Friesen 2012, 100). 
Setting the global agenda 
The continued popularity of the Davos forum among business and political 
elites is often attributed to its special club-like atmosphere (Graz 2009): the 
small ski resort town in a remote location forms a venue which reinforces the 
sense of exclusiveness to the meeting and camaraderie among its participants. 
By concentrating on incumbent business leaders, politicians and international 
officials, and not usually inviting senior politicians and executives who no 
longer hold office, the WEF, unlike many smaller and more exclusive elite 
clubs, prevents the Davos forum from becoming an “old-boy network” and 
maintains a sense of freshness to its image (Richardson et al. 2011, 182–3). As 
such, the Davos forum has been able to sustain a “social myth” of itself as an 
important meeting-place for powerful people (Graz 2003), which is why a 
sizable proportion of the most powerful business leaders attend the conference 
every year.34 Attendees also often refer to the opportunity at Davos to gain a 
general sense of important global events and developing trends that influence 
the business and political environment (Faux 2006, 164; Friesen 2012, 100): 
they come to Davos keep up to date with the current conversation among their 
peers and to gauge the zeitgeist of the moment. The forum does not so much 
provide business leaders with concrete advice on management, but instead 
offers them greater understanding of the environment in which they are 
running their businesses. 
As for the broader significance of such inter-elite conferring, organisers 
and observers alike often point to its political and economic agenda setting 
power (Faux 2006, 179–80; Pigman 2007, 151; Rothkopf 2008, 276, 303; 
Friesen 2012, 105–7): without any formal decision-making mechanisms, the 
impact of Davos debates remains indirect in nature and related to the setting 
of the agenda and the construction of consensus on and common 
understanding of global issues among its participants. Thus, the Davos forum 
 
                                                   
34 Rothkopf (2008, 275) estimates that up to 1,000 members of what he calls the “global 
superclass” of the 6,000 most powerful individuals in the world attend the Davos forum every 
year, being the largest gathering of that class. 
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defines key issues, identifies major trends and outlines relevant perspectives 
in the international political and business debate. The impact of the debates 
extends beyond Davos as global investors, corporate executives and heads of 
public institutions as central agents in the global economy use these insights 
as part of their daily activities to make sense of political and market events and 
respond accordingly. The forum’s impact carries even further because, as a big 
media event, Davos debates attract the attention of international news media, 
and their reporting on the discussions at the forum serve to disseminate some 
of the issues discussed and increase the perceived importance of the debates 
among the broader business and political community. 
When it comes to the formulation of the agenda for and in the Davos 
conference, the WEF’s directing board and managerial staff have a key role, 
and Klaus Schwab himself is often considered as the primary shaper of the 
Davos program (Pigman 2007, 134–5; Friesen 2012, 106). Under his 
leadership, the staff design the event program, invite guests and allot 
participants into the various panels and discussion groups. The selection of 
forum participants and the allocation of individual speakers in the various 
panels obviously largely determines the scope of different views represented 
at the debates and decisively shapes and limits the agenda. As for the themes 
discussed at the forum, since 2008 the WEF has tasked its network of more 
than 80 issue-specific expert groups, or Global Agenda Councils, to identify 
“the global trends, regional challenges, leadership crises, and emerging issues 
which will shape the next 12-18 months”.35 The annual Global Agenda Summit, 
held in each November in Dubai, brings these groups together to provide 
recommendations and set specific issues for the Davos forum. The councils 
involve more than 900 individuals from business, academia, government and 
civil society, again exemplifying the “multi-stakeholder” approach to 
international politics the WEF purports to advance. In practice, however, as 
Friesen (2012, 98) points out, the WEF essentially remains an organisation of 
the business community, and its corporate members hold considerable sway 
on the proceedings (Friesen 2012, 98; Rothkopf 2008, 303). Particularly 
significant, due to their close involvement in the activities of the WEF, are the 
Strategic Partners, the one hundred most privileged and highest-paying 
corporate members. Not only can they exert influence in designing the 
program and nominating panellists of the annual forum, they also tend to have 
a highly visible presence at the meeting. While ordinary corporate members 
are permitted to register one representative to the annual forum, the highest-
paying companies often send fleets of five to eight executives and board 
members to the conference. 
The roster of Davos attendees, therefore, has the ultimate impact on the 
Davos agenda as the discussions shape during the actual conference. The list 
 
                                                   
35 See http://www.weforum.org/community/global-agenda-councils (accessed 7 November 
2016). 
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of attendees changes yearly, and from year to year companies hold varying 
interest in decreasing or increasing their presence at the forum. However, big 
western banks and financial institutions have typically sent sizable delegations 
to the meeting, as have consulting and other professional services firms.36 A 
number of leading companies from the IT and media sectors also tend to be 
well represented. As for the geographical distribution of participants, 
European and North American executives tend to dominate the debates 
(Pigman 2007, 64–6; Schmitt 2014). While several non-western TNCs also 
send multiple representatives to participate in the discussions,37 they remain 
in the minority. Consequently, the WEF and the Davos forum have often been 
considered instrumental in promoting and disseminating the agenda and 
interests of European and US banks and TNCs (e.g., Pigman 2007, 94; Sassen 
2001). 
While most attendees are representatives of business, many 
governments also send sizable delegations to the Davos forum.38 Together 
with central bankers and officials from international organisations, 
governments are important shapers of the Davos agenda. As the incorporation 
of non-business elites has progressed, both the range of topics and the 
 
                                                   
36 Quartz, an online business magazine of the Atlantic Media Group, has published searchable 
lists of the participants to the 2013 and 2014 Davos forums (Yanofsky 2013 and Yanofsky 
2014a, respectively), and the 2013 list of participants can also be downloaded from the WEF 
website (WEF 2013b). According to the 2014 data, Goldman Sachs led the financial 
institutions with eight top managers attending Davos, followed by Citi and HSBC with seven 
representatives each. Barclays, JPMorgan, Lazard, Morgan Stanley and Standard Chartered 
sent six managers each, while Bank of America, Deutsche Bank, Itaú Unibanco, UBS, Zurich 
Insurance Group and Abraaj Group had five representatives each at the conference. Among 
professional services firms, Boston Consulting Group (11 representatives), Bain & Company 
(9), PwC (8), Deloitte (7), Accenture (7), KPMG (6), Ernst&Young (5), McKinsey (5), HIS (5) 
and Wipro (5) all had sizable delegations at Davos. Among highly-represented IT and internet 
companies were Cisco, Google, Huawei, Microsoft, Qualcomm, Salesforce.com and Yahoo! 
with 5 delegates each. Among other companies with big Davos delegations were Dow Chemical 
Company, DuPont, Nestlé, Novartis, PepsiCo, Renault, Takeda Pharmaceutical and 
Volkswagen. 
37 At the 2014 forum, non-western TNCs and conglomerates with five or more representatives 
at Davos included Huawei, Mitsubishi, Takeda Pharmaceutical, the Abraaj Group, the 
Hanwha Group and the Olayan Group (Yanofsky 2014a). 
38  With political leaders, ministers and high government officials from up to a hundred 
countries, the overall number of government representatives at the 2014 meeting reached 288 
(Schmitt 2014). The largest governmental delegations came from the United States (with 21 
government representatives), Switzerland (20), Russia (12), South Africa (12), India (9), 
Japan (9), Nigeria (9), UAE (8), UK (8), Mexico (7), Brazil (6), Indonesia (6) and Ukraine (6) 
(Yanofsky 2014b). 
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diversity of perspectives present at the Davos forum have presumably 
broadened. This implies not only that the political decision-making of major 
economies, including fiscal policy, monetary policy and regulatory measures, 
are typically at the centre of attention in Davos discussions. It also means that 
the talks frequently touch upon broader questions concerning international 
economic relations and global problems. Based on an analysis of newspaper 
reports and WEF documents, Friesen (2012) argues that the WEF debates 
evolved from a meeting focused on the “needs and interests of the business 
community in the developed world” in the 1970s and 1980s, to more globally 
oriented forum in the 1990s and 2000s in which “the business agenda, while 
still important shared space with a substantial social and ethical focus” (ibid., 
101). Since the mid-to-late 1990s, the Davos agenda has increasingly involved 
development issues and other social problems around the world, probing the 
respective roles of the public sector and business in responding to them. 39 
Schwab himself has described the purpose of the foundation in terms of 
engaging transnational companies in the solution of global issues through the 
creation of various public-private partnership initiatives (see Rothkopf 2008, 
270–2). According to Schwab’s rationale, the foundation’s relevance lies in the 
broader transformation taking place in world society whereby national 
institutions and structures are increasingly inadequate in responding to 
contemporary global problems. This creates the need for incorporating both 
state and non-state agents into global networks of “multi-stakeholder 
governance”, which is the foundation’s principle reason of existence and forms 
a central part of the agenda that the Davos forum promotes (Pigman 2007, 9–
10, 55–6, 93–4). 
Aside from its perceived influence in the setting of the contemporary 
agenda among the corporate and political elite, observers have attributed the 
Davos forum and the WEF with more long-term relevance. Since its inception 
as a forum for western European managers, it has served to generate 
transnational connections and exchange of ideas among its participants. From 
early stages, non-European and non-western executives and professionals 
were invited to the meetings, and this expansion and internationalisation of 
 
                                                   
39 The direct influence of such elite debates on businesses, governments and IGOs concerning 
the actual policies, practices and rules of the global economy and society is obviously all but 
impossible to pinpoint. Discussing the relevance of the Davos discussions on third world debt, 
Friesen (2012, 151–2) suggests that shifts in conventional wisdom and elite opinion, which 
were observable at the Davos forum in the early 2000s, may have influenced heads of state 
and regulators in international financial institutions and, together with the pressure exercised 
by CSOs, prompted political leaders to become more favourable to the idea and policy of debt 
amnesty. Friesen argues that the Davos forum operated as one of the important venues to 
channel that pressure on central decision-makers. 
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the network has continued ever since.40 The regional conferences organised 
since the 1990s in South America, Africa, the Middle East and East Asia have 
been particularly important in this respect, serving to incorporate non-
western business leaders and officials into the network (Graz 2003, 331; van 
der Pijl 1998, 133–4). As for the annual forum, the 1990s saw the rising 
prominence of US managers (Graz 2003, 331; Sassen 2001), constituting by 
the end of the decade the second major contingency at the meeting alongside 
Europeans. The 2000s, in turn, has seen an increase in the Asian presence at 
Davos. Accordingly, while less than 8 per cent of the little less than 2000 forum 
participants came from Asia in 2002, they represented 24 per cent of all 2600 
Davos attendees in 2014.41  
Through the years, European business and political leaders have 
maintained their position as the biggest geographical contingency in Davos 
and with the high number of US participants, western elites remain at the core 
of the activities. European and North American executives and professionals 
still constitute two thirds of all the participants at the annual meeting (down 
from 75 per cent in 2002), and they continue to prevail in the various councils 
and planning groups, as well as in the managing and directing boards of the 
WEF. But the decline in their proportional representation manifests the 
intention and success of the forum to incorporate corporate and professional 
elites from major non-western economic powers to their activities and 
networks, especially after the fall of the Socialist bloc. Accordingly, van der Pijl 
(1998, 132–3) considers the WEF to be unprecedented in its scope and “the 
most comprehensive transnational planning body” of the business elite in the 
post-cold war world. 
Finally, the significance of the Davos forum can be understood in terms 
of its impact on the general worldviews and self-perception of its participants: 
the WEF as an organisation has historically been instrumental in shaping and 
strengthening the sense of belonging among transnational elites (Pigman 
2007, 98). On the one hand, Davos meetings encourage participants to 
develop a broader understanding of the global nature of capitalism and its 
challenges while bolstering their sense of being proud and conscientious 
members of a global community (Friesen 2012, 153). In the words of Saskia 
Sassen (2001), the forum “brings together corporate, government and media 
elites in a denationalized space where national passions can be put on the back 
burner for a few days and global issues can be confronted”. On the other hand, 
the Davos meeting may reinforce the group consciousness of the delegates as 
 
                                                   
40 To the 2002 annual forum, exceptionally organised in New York City, participants came 
from 95 countries (Public Citizen 2002). In 2014, the delegates included over a hundred 
nationalities (Yanofsky 2014a). 
41 For the geographical break-down of Davos attendees’ region of origin in 2002 and 2014 see 
Public Citizen (2002) and Yanofsky (2014b), respectively. 
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members of a transnational elite. The notion of the “Davos Man” was coined 
already in 1996 by Samuel Huntington in direct reference to the gathering, 
which he saw as emblematic of a particular community of the business and 
political elite that share certain political and cultural beliefs and values 
characterised by market-liberal, cosmopolitan, neoliberal and globalising 
tendencies (Huntington 1996; 2004). Moreover, Gramscian scholars have 
described the Davos forum and other elite clubs as spaces in which business 
managers can transcend their inter-capitalist rivalries, to bring state and non-
state actors together and to develop a consciousness of themselves as a group 
(Graz 2003, 323–4). For these purposes, the WEF, according to Graz’s (2003, 
326) interpretation, builds on a “social myth” of itself as a meeting for 
individuals “vested with the capacity to bring about change in society at large”. 
The WEF, for its part, habitually addresses its constituent members and 
participants to its various networks by such labels as “global leaders”, “global 
shapers” and “leading global companies”, promoting the idea and ethos of 
“leadership” among them and reinforcing their self-perception as “select” 
members of world society. 
2.3 Financial Times as a transnational elite publication 
The Financial Times is a UK daily newspaper founded in 1888 with an 
emphasis on international business and financial news. In addition to the 
specialised coverage of international companies and markets, the paper 
reports extensively on international politics and the global economy. Other 
focus areas include management and technology, as well as sections on 
lifestyle and the arts. Today, the FT claims to be a “global publication” (Barber 
2013), distributed all over the world and published in print and online in 
separate UK, Europe, US and Asia editions which share some of their contents. 
The FT can be considered as one of the most prestigious and widely 
known media brands among transnational elites. The global circulation of the 
printed FT in October 2014 was 220,000, of which the UK edition covered 
some 71,000, the European edition a little over 70,000, the US edition 45,000 
and the Asian edition 32,000 (ABC 2014). The readership of the printed 
editions has diminished considerably in recent years; statistics provided by the 
International Federation of Audit Bureaux of Circulations indicate that the 
paper lost some 80,000 paying readers between 2008 and 2011 (IFABC 2013), 
and a further 15 per cent of its circulation from January 2013 to January 2014 
(Sweney 2014). Despite these setbacks, the FT is boasting record figures and 
claims to have increased its paid digital subscriptions dramatically in recent 
years, totalling a circulation of 677,000 across print and online in July 2014 
(Greenslade 2014). Altogether, the FT claims to reach 1.8 million unique 
readers each day across the print and digital platforms (FT 2013). 
More than the number, however, the FT likes to emphasise the quality of 
its readership. The paper is primarily targeted to international corporate 
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managers and financiers as well as politicians and government officials, 
reaching out to those “who make or seek to influence decisions in business, 
finance and public affairs around the world” (Barber 2013). It has also tried to 
make the most out of this focus group when seeking corporate funders. By 
touting its “quality readership”, the FT has always been able to attract 
advertisers of luxury services and items, but especially after World War 2, the 
FT managed to broaden its advertiser base, selling itself to industrial 
companies as a prime medium for their advertising and claiming that the 
paper successfully reached the “top management” who authorise corporate 
expenditure (Kynaston 1988, 62, 195, 212). Contemporary slogans are no less 
grandiose. Today, the FT markets its readership to potential advertisers as “the 
global elite making the biggest decisions in the political and corporate world, 
and high-net-worth, discerning consumers who seek out the best life has to 
offer”.42 
Due to its prestige, the FT often enjoys a privileged position among 
international news media in terms of access to powerful institutions, which 
helps it to break exclusive stories and to shape the international policy agenda. 
Particularly in Europe the FT has been able to build on its status and secure 
preferential treatment by EU officials (Rayemaeckers et al. 2007). European 
policymakers tend to favour the FT when giving interviews or leaking new 
information precisely because they see the paper as a vehicle through which to 
reach a wider and more influential international audience than through other 
media (Corcoran and Fahy 2009, 105). In addition, journalists of other 
national and international media often rely on the FT in their reporting as a 
source of important background information and significant topics. As a result 
the FT is generally regarded among the EU press corps as the most influential 
newspaper, having considerable impact on the overall press agenda of the EU 
(Raeymaeckers et al. 2007, 115–6; Corcoran and Fahy 2009, 108). 
From national to international relevance 
The FT can be regarded simultaneously as a characteristically UK, European 
and global newspaper. Its roots lie in the golden age of the British Empire, and 
it is owned by Pearson, a UK-based transnational publishing company. In his 
history of the first hundred years of the FT, David Kynaston (1988, 1) points 
out that the very founding of the FT coincided with the growing trading power 
of Britain, the development of integrated financial markets within the empire, 
and the adoption of the gold standard in many parts of the world after 1870, 
 
                                                   
42 See http://fttoolkit.co.uk/d/ (accessed 25 November 2014). At least according to FT’s own 
surveys, there is some support to the claim: of its readers, over two thirds report to work for 
an international company, over 40 per cent in a company of more than a thousand employees, 
and one third are highest-level executives in senior management. See 
http://fttoolkit.co.uk/d/#nav-audience/1 (accessed 25 November 2014). 
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with London being the largest market for gold. All of these developments 
contributed to the rise in importance of the City as an imperial and global 
financial centre (Barber 2013). To respond to the increasing demand of 
bankers and investors for information on local, national and international 
markets, the FT emerged as a newspaper of choice for the financial community 
of the City of London, competing with the Financial News until 1945, when the 
two papers merged. After the merger, the FT grew to national prominence, 
helped by its essentially monopolistic position in financial and business news 
during a period marked by two decades of almost continued economic growth, 
as well as by a cultural shift that gave increasing value to economic expertise 
in public and political affairs (Kynaston 1988, 193, 207, 302). As a result, the 
FT became an authoritative voice in the national policy debate of the UK. 
Despite its close proximity to the City community and the imperial 
project, the FT has never remained a purely local or national item. Since its 
conception, it reached far beyond the perimeters of the City and the British 
Empire, and issues of the paper were sighted in clubs from China to Shanghai 
and Turkey to Siberia already in the first years of the twentieth century 
(Kynaston 1988, 61). A more significant geographical expansion of readership 
began in the late 1960s. Having experienced nationwide success in the UK, the 
FT’s leadership now adopted an increasingly global vision to become, in the 
words of Charles Moore, the then managing director, an international paper 
“read widely by the leading businesses throughout the world” (cited in 
Kynaston 1988, 373). To increase international circulation and to appeal to US, 
Japanese and Swiss advertisers, which were already providing a notable share 
of total revenues, the FT further expanded its international business and 
market coverage. It also established co-operative ventures with foreign 
newspapers in the publication of country- and industry-specific surveys, 
opened a number of foreign offices and extended its network of foreign 
correspondents. By the mid-1970s the FT boasted a total of one hundred 
stringers and almost 30 full-time foreign correspondents, more than any other 
paper at the time with the exception of the New York Times. (Ibid., 261, 332, 
373–6, 395, 451.) This strategy culminated in 1979 with the launch of an 
international edition, printed in Frankfurt and shipped across Europe, as well 
as to the United States and Asia (ibid., 441–3). A separate US edition was 
launched in 1997, and an Asia edition followed in 2003. Despite notable 
setbacks, such as the failed experiment with the German-language Financial 
Times Deutschland, 43  the FT’s strategy of internationalisation may be 
considered relatively successful. Since 1998, the paper’s international 
circulation sales have superseded UK sales (FT 2014), and in 2009 the FT 
 
                                                   
43 Financial Times Deutschland, launched in 2000, was a joint venture by Pearson with the 
German publishing firm Gruner + Jahr. After failed attempts to make the paper profitable, 
Pearson sold its 50 per cent share to its German partner in 2008. The paper was eventually 
terminated in 2012. (Wiesmann 2012.) 
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claimed to have the largest editorial staff of any international newspaper, 
employing a network of 400 journalists in more than 50 locations 
worldwide.44 
Even as the worldwide audience has grown, the paper seems to have built 
a reputation as a distinctly European newspaper and gained influence 
particularly among European elites. The FT had recognised, early on, the 
significance of continental Europe as a source of both readers and advertisers 
and started to serve this market in 1950 with a special edition (Kynaston 1988, 
210–3). Consequently, as the strategy to internationalise was pursued in the 
1970s, the initial focus was on gaining more readers and advertisers in Europe. 
To achieve this goal, successive editors in the 1970s and 1980s acknowledged 
the need not only to extend the coverage of European businesses and markets, 
but also to detach from a narrow national focus and to adopt an increasingly 
European point of view in the reporting of financial, economic, political and 
social matters (ibid., 378–9, 483–4). The FT even adopted a new marketing 
slogan for continental use, billing itself as “Europe’s business newspaper” 
(ibid., 374–5). These efforts to Europeanise the FT have been met with notable 
results. Already in 1968, a British Market Research Bureau concluded that 
almost 40 per cent of the surveyed European (non-UK) chairmen and 
managing directors read the FT, making it the most popular English language 
publication among them (ibid., 375). Similarly, the FT has scored high in 
successive European Opinion Leaders Surveys in the 2000s. In the 2011 survey, 
the FT was considered the most “influential” and “respected” of all 
international media titles, reaching 40 per cent of this highly selective 
“opinion leader” population across the continent (FT 2011; see also Kantola 
2007, 194).  In studies assessing the media-related practices of both the City 
and the EU political apparatus, the FT has been found to be a practically 
ubiquitous item on the desks of the central office-holders (see Davis 2007a, 
156; Corcoran and Fahy 2009). In Brussels, the FT is considered by EU 
officials and correspondents alike as a daily that simply must be read 
(Corcoran and Fahy 2009, 103). 
The international focus of the FT has not derived solely from 
opportunistic marketing strategies. Since its inception, the FT realised that the 
world is the context in which investors and bankers in highly integrated 
financial markets operate. Thus, the FT’s very first issues included not only 
daily information about transactions at the London Stock Exchange and local 
shipping news, but also reports and analyses of Russia’s political diplomacy 
concerning the Balkans, of the industrial utilisation of Niagara Falls and of the 
nitrate mining companies in South America (Kynaston 1988, 18, 23). These 
were all matters of crucial importance to “a City man” which the paper 
purported to serve (ibid., 37). Through its reporting and commentary, the FT 
 
                                                   
44 See https://www.financialtimes.net/cgi-
bin/eudev.cgi/fess/dummyHtmlPage?pagecode=FAQS (accessed 14 August 2014). 
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thus presented the world as the natural sphere of operation to its readers, but 
it also made them aware of how distant events might have impact on their own 
activities and opportunities at home. Such a global outlook developed into a 
more conscious journalistic strategy in the 1980s under the foreign editorship 
of Nicholas Colchester who outlined the task of the FT’s foreign 
correspondents and regional specialists as one of bringing an international 
perspective to practically all topics covered by the newspaper (ibid., 486–7). 
Such practice of bringing together alternative points of view from various 
locations in the world and demonstrating the interconnectedness between 
local and distant phenomena can be regarded as a particular reporting style, 
“global journalism” (Berglez 2013; Ojala 2011). Today, as the readership has 
extended beyond the City, the FT increasingly distances itself from any local 
or national point of view. This applies also to its European coverage (see 
Preston 2009, 153–4). Instead of covering the “internal machinations” of the 
EU apparatus to the officials, politicians and lobbyists of Brussels, FT’s EU 
correspondence sees itself in the business of distilling a broad range of issues 
that are relevant in EU politics for “the international business elite” (Corcoran 
and Fahy 2009, 105). It is a global, yet a highly particular and even parochial, 
point of view. 
All these characteristics, from the highly exclusive readership to its stated 
rationale and international scope, make the FT an ideal platform for elite-to-
elite communication and one that in many ways contributes to transnational 
elite formation. As such, the FT establishes an international public space 
inhabited by leading politicians, high officials of governments and 
international organisations, senior executives in public and private 
corporations, investors and fund managers, as well as a host of corporate 
consultants, economists, market analysts and other professionals servicing 
finance and industry.45 The FT not only serves to inform globally-oriented 
elites, mediate debates between them and reflect their views on the world, but 
it also plays the crucial role of facilitating the transnational dissemination of 
this inter-elite discourse. The extensive network of stringers and foreign 
correspondents integrate elite voices from all corners of the world, and the 
overlapping contents between the four regional editions help to incorporate 
both western and non-western audiences into the same transnational agenda. 
FT and the international business and policy agenda 
As a medium for the dissemination of information and as a space for TEC, the 
FT has facilitated many key processes and activities that elites engage in, 
 
                                                   
45 While mainstream news media generally (and by definition) tend to favour official sources 
(e.g., Schudson 2003; Bennett et al. 2007), the FT is particularly exclusive in this regard: in 
its pages one does not even accidentally bump into a private citizen, consumer or man-on-the-
street. 
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including the operation of markets and their governance. Provision of 
accurate, actual and relevant market information has, obviously, been at the 
core of the FT’s mission as a newspaper serving the financial community, 
complemented by the publishing of prospectuses and government bond issues 
out of which the paper drew most of its advertisement revenue in the early 
decades (Kynaston 1988, 62, 257). Another key feature of the paper has been 
the regular surveys focusing on a particular industry, market sector, country 
or region, with the purpose of helping investors develop a general overview of 
the markets and key developments in the global economy. Accordingly, the 
FT’s financial coverage has evolved over the years with the shifts in the 
economy and changes in the financial markets. The rapid growth of the 
Eurodollar and Eurobond markets, for instance, prompted extensive coverage 
of European financial markets in the early 1970s and contributed to the FT’s 
decision to internationalise and transform into an increasingly “European” 
paper (ibid., 377–9). The FT has also published stock market indices since 
1945 to help investors monitor the performance of stock portfolios. Such 
innovations as the FT 500 surveys on the largest publicly listed European 
companies in 1982, as well as the FT Actuaries World Share Index in 1986 as 
a benchmark against which fund manager performance could be judged (ibid., 
454, 508), further highlight the paper’s role as part of the information 
apparatus that supports the operation of financial markets.  
At the same time, the FT has facilitated elite communication for the 
management of markets and the economy. Particularly after World War 2, the 
FT broadened its agenda to increasingly cover macro-economic matters as it 
sought to increase its appeal beyond the traditional readership consisting of 
bankers and investors to include corporate managers, professional advisers 
and public officials (Kynaston 1988, 151–3, 234). At a time when the 
“prevailing spirit of the age” put detailed economic planning by state 
institutions into the heart of political and public life, the FT embraced this 
broader economic policy agenda (ibid., 302) and thus provided a public space 
for elites to get informed and debate over questions of labour, employment, 
inflation, foreign trade, interest rates and monetary and finance policies. 
Significantly, the FT did not limit this idea and practice of economic 
management to the national level. On the contrary, international markets and 
the global economy, as a whole, became focuses of increasing concern in the 
paper. Accordingly, in the 1980s the FT frequently called for international 
macro-economic coordination between governments (ibid., 515–6). With its 
global scope of coverage and the ability to incorporate international elites into 
the same public space through its various editions and extensive foreign 
correspondence networks, the FT evolved to facilitate elite communication on 
global economic governance. 
Being one of the most important and widely used international media for 
the business and political elites around the world, and one that is also closely 
followed by other elite media, gives the FT considerable sway to influence the 
transnational elite agenda. In addition to having the capacity to break 
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exclusive stories due to a privileged access to influential sources, the FT can 
both bring up new issues or raise or quell existing topics in TEC thus playing a 
part in regulating what enters and gains prominence the elite consciousness. 
An historical example of the FT’s active role as an international agenda-setter 
was the way it promoted the rise of management techniques as a trend in the 
international business discourse. Early on in the 1960s the FT recognised the 
importance of business education and welcomed the fledgling boom of 
management consulting and computer experts, and to promote this more 
“professional” outlook on management practices, the FT started running a 
regular column on management, “World of Management”, in 1965 (Kynaston 
1988, 330–1). The FT also sponsored a conference on “New Techniques in 
Management” in London in December 1964, featuring lectures mostly by 
American business leaders (ibid.). More than six years before the first 
European Management Symposium out of which grew the World Economic 
Forum, the symposium can be regarded as an early example of the active 
promotion of US management practices in Europe.46 
In addition to a role in the setting of international business and political 
agenda, the FT also features prominent voices that have sway over elite 
opinion. By using the FT as a megaphone, these individual contributors can 
impose their political views and opinions on the elite public discourse in an 
effort to affect a certain policy process or the elite opinion on a particular issue. 
The potential of individual journalists to act as international opinion leaders 
is supported by the tendency of members of the political and business elite to 
closely follow the writings of journalists and columnists that they consider to 
be of key importance (see Davis 2007a, 175–6; 2007b, 192). In this regard, the 
FT has been home to a host of authoritative writers commenting on economics 
and economic policy, including Paul Einzig, Samuel Brittan and Martin Wolf, 
as well as the Lex column which has grown into a legendary daily feature of 
the paper commenting on corporate and financial matters. 47  Especially 
 
                                                   
46 As another clear precursor to the kind of transatlantic business and political networking 
later professed by the WEF, the FT organised a symposium on the “Challenge of Europe” in 
the Waldorf-Astoria hotel in New York in December 1970. The conference gathered 600 
representatives of US finance and industry who attended to hear speeches of a host of 
European industrial and political leaders. (Kynaston 1988, 374–5.) 
47 In addition to explicit commentary, FT journalists may also intentionally seek to influence 
the political agenda through their news reporting. In the aftermath of the 2007–9 financial 
crisis, for instance, Gillian Tett, the then finance editor of the paper, expressed her concerns 
about the damaging practices on Wall Street in a book (see Tett 2009). At the same time, in 
her reporting for the FT, she quite aggressively promoted the idea that there was a need for 
more substantial regulation of the financial markets than what was being pursued by 
politicians and officials across the western world and that the influence of Wall Street and City 
banks were blocking meaningful reforms. In highlighting the banks’ lobbying efforts, for 
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Brittan’s influence in popularising and legitimising neoclassical economic 
models among policymakers and business executives should not be 
underestimated. Since the late 1960s, and throughout the 1970s, Brittan used 
his “Economic Viewpoint” column for disseminating Milton Friedman’s ideas, 
which underpinned increasingly popular neoliberal economic policy doctrines, 
and did much “to lay the intellectual groundwork for the market approach of 
Thatcherism” (Kynaston 1988, 368, 457). 
Nevertheless, the role of the FT as an elite agenda setter and opinion 
shaper should not be exaggerated. On the one hand, the FT’s centrality as a 
source of news and market information for the international business and 
policy community is compromised not only by the competition it faces from 
other legacy media such as the Wall Street Journal and the New York Times, 
but also increasingly because of the emergence of new specialist subscription 
news services and information terminals, such as those offered by Thomson 
Reuters and Bloomberg (Williams 2011, 80–1). On the other hand, one may 
question the amount of independent distance that the FT is willing and able to 
take from the agendas and views driven by those the paper’s journalists report 
on. Certainly, as Gillian Doyle (2006, 445) argues, financial and business 
journalists do not simply act in the interests of businesses, and there are 
critical elements to financial journalism. Reporters know that investors expect 
them to monitor the performance of companies critically and pride themselves 
for doing a good job at that. Furthermore, these publications frequently 
publish weighty stories on such matters as corporate governance and 
environmental issues. FT journalists, in particular, are helped in their critical 
reporting by the papers high status in business and financial journalism, which 
renders it a space of strategic significance to many market players. Thus, while 
financial and business journalists generally tend to be highly dependent on 
their sources (Grünberg and Pallas 2013), the FT’s journalists have 
considerable leverage in their relations with sources (Manning 2013, 181). At 
the same time, however, the FT does not differ from other news media in that 
its ability to create critical distance from the corporations and financial 
institutions it reports on is seriously undermined by the difficulty of getting 
information of the private operations of businesses, as well as by the ability of 
large TNCs to raise extended legal campaigns by, for instance, appealing to 
defamation legislation (Tambini 2010, 170; Tett 2012). Moreover, FT 
reporters are no different from other journalists in that they habitually rely on 
private sector analysts for information on, and interpretation of, market and 
political developments, and are therefore likely to reproduce the agendas, 
points-of-view and discourses of market agents in their reporting on 
businesses and the economy (see Doyle 2006; Thompson 2013, 214). FT 
journalists, in other words, tend to reflect the views of market players back to 
 
                                                   
instance, in her reporting from the 2010 Davos forum (see Chapter 5.2), Tett may well have 
attempted to turn elite opinion in favour of more fundamental regulatory reform. 
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them rather than acting as independent shapers of the agenda or showing 
actual opinion leadership (see Kynaston 1988, 516). In fact, as Davis (2007a, 
176) points out, policymakers and business executives typically pay attention 
to select columnists of the elite press, not for the individual opinion of these 
authors, but precisely because they are considered to be reflective of a certain 
consensus within a broader community: journalists of elite publications act as 
“crystallisers of elite opinion” rather being the ones who lead it. 
Ideological commitments 
Yet, regarding opinions and attitudes, it is obvious that elites are not of a single 
mould and they hold many and varied viewpoints on matters of policy and the 
global economy. Both intentionally and inadvertently, the FT like any other 
publication is bound to take sides, frame debates from a particular viewpoint, 
lend support to a particular political program and represent only a handful of 
policy alternatives in its reporting and commentary. Historically, its double 
position of being both a UK paper and the medium of choice for the City’s 
financial community has been reflected in its simultaneously national and 
purportedly global perspective. On the one hand, since its inception the FT has 
identified closely with the national interests of Britain. It has, for instance, 
hailed the Empire’s cause openly in the Second Boer War at the turn of the 
twentieth century and supported the government’s position during the 
Falklands conflict in 1982 (Kynaston 1988, 49–50, 463–6). Therefore, while 
in the domestically controversial decision to enter the Iraq war in 2003 the 
paper “firmly opposed” the military campaign (Barber 2013), it is evident that 
the adoption of a British and/or western point-of-view on geopolitical matters 
is hardly questioned by the FT’s editors, despite their claim of being a “global 
publication” (ibid.).  
On the other hand, perhaps more significant than the partisan and 
nationalistic approach to geopolitics, has been the FT’s editorial policy on 
matters of business and economics, which tend to manifest apparently more 
non-patriotic and even global perspectives. Indeed, the paper is a self-declared 
defender of a “liberal international outlook” (Barber 2013), consisting of 
principles and ideas that favour the internationalisation of business and trade, 
the opening of national economies to foreign investments and opposition to 
all forms of economic nationalism. 48  But as Frank Durham (2007) 
demonstrates in his analysis of the FT coverage of the Thai currency crisis in 
1997, such an apparently liberal and global outlook has nothing to do with 
impartiality. On the contrary, by endorsing IMF-led reforms in its editorials 
 
                                                   
48  The FT has also been a traditional supporter of European integration generally, and 
Britain’s accession to the European Economic Community particularly (Kynaston 1988, 287, 
321–2, 403), even though the paper has adopted much more sceptical views on further 
economic and political integration in recent years (Barber 2013). 
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and lending authority and credibility in its reporting to the free-market 
liberalisation program advocated by the international financial community, 
the FT effectively affirmed its position among the global financial elite vis-á-
vis the small emerging state and the national sovereignty of Thailand. This 
tendency of the FT to adopt the views and side with the interests of global 
investors, as opposed to defending the popular self-determination expressed 
in democratic elections, was also discovered by Kantola (2007) who analysed 
the FT’s coverage of national elections in 26 countries between 2000 and 2005. 
More often than not, the FT’s “liberal international outlook” has proven out to 
be rather parochial and biased in favour of a particular interest group in the 
global economy. Indeed, the FT has for decades been regarded by critical 
observers as subservient to the City, being “not in the business of upsetting its 
readers” (Kynaston 1988, 396, 516). 
Finally, in addition to the more general ideological outlooks, the FT can 
similarly be regarded as both an autonomous shaper and careful follower of 
elite opinion on more concrete economic policies. After World War 2, the FT 
gradually softened its initially rigid resistance to the expansion of public 
expenditure and adapted itself to the emerging elite consensus in the UK 
regarding the “mixed economy”, consisting of both private and state-owned 
enterprises and a sizable welfare state (Kynaston 1988, 176–7, 189, 229). In 
the late 1950s and early 1960s, the FT lent support to the ideas and institutions 
of economic planning, full employment and labour standards as 
modernisation, rationalisation and technological advance became the basic 
tenets in FT’s progressive credo (ibid., 266–7, 284-5, 316). In the late 1960s, 
however, the tide started to shift against Keynesian notions of demand 
management, and by the 1970s, the FT had turned into a vocal proponent of 
non-inflationary fiscal and monetary policies (ibid., 368, 385–6, 429–34). As 
ardent supporters of neoliberal economic policies, and with little regard to the 
social pain they caused, the FT’s commentators generally commended the 
Thatcher governments’ programs of reducing taxes, cutting public expenditure 
and loosening regulations in the 1980s (ibid., 404–5, 437, 456–7). Perhaps 
tellingly, the absence of “social welfare” issues in the FT’s editorial agenda was 
spotted already in 1974 by the statistical comparison of the British national 
newspapers’ editorial content by the third postwar Royal Commission (ibid., 
397-8). 
Rather than manifesting a straightforward adherence to neoliberal 
orthodoxy, however, the FT’s outlook on the global economy has traditionally 
implied a more complex economic policy line. The (slow) growth of the global 
economy has been a routine staple of the FT’s editorial agenda at least since 
the 1980s, and this has prompted concerned analysis and commentary on the 
prospects and conditions of global economic growth ever since. In line with its 
acceptance, in principle, of economic planning, the FT has realised that the 
stability and sustainable growth of the global economy requires international 
macro-economic coordination. Therefore, the FT supported the IMF’s role as 
the stabiliser of the exchange rate system, and supported the project of trade 
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liberalisation under GATT in the 1980s. But it also criticised West Germany 
for its beggar-thy-neighbour policies and urged it to adopt a more 
expansionary macro-economic stance. (Kynaston 1988, 515.) More 
significantly, the adoption of a global outlook on the economy led the FT to 
realise, already in 1986, that “supply-side structural reforms”, while 
“necessary and beneficial”, are not necessarily enough to address 
unemployment, global poverty and “external imbalances”. To respond to such 
problems may require measures to increase demand in the rich creditor 
countries. (Ibid., 516.) This combination of calling for both neoliberal and 
Keynesian prescriptions to boost economic growth is today echoed, almost 
word for word, by Martin Wolf, the FT’s leading economic policy commentator. 
From this perspective, the FT could be seen as one precursor to the “neo-
Keynesian” consensus that prevails in the economics community as 
demonstrated by conspicuous expert commentators such as Paul Krugman of 
the New York Times. 
3 GLOBAL ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE AND 
TRANSNATIONAL ELITE FORMATION 
From an elite-theoretical perspective that focuses on institutional positions of 
leadership (see Chapter 1.1), the existence of transnational elites in the global 
political economy is premised upon the historical emergence of organisations 
capable of wielding political and economic power over large areas. In this 
sense, elites with transnational reach have certainly existed for a long time. 
Political relations and trade between city-states, empires and nations have 
been conducted for millennia, and since at least the great trading companies 
of the sixteenth century, merchants have established worldwide operations. 
More recently, banks and oil companies have operated internationally at least 
since the early twentieth century. What this study intends to explore, however, 
is a slightly more ambitious proposition: that there has been a significant 
extension and integration of powerful institutions in the global political 
economy over the past decades, hence meriting us to speak of transnational 
elites in the more Millsian sense, referring to the concentration of institutional 
power on a global level and the simultaneous rapprochement of those at the 
top. 49  From this perspective, the emergence of an increasingly united 
transnational elite capable of collective agency becomes a historical possibility 
– but not inevitability – only with the expansion of the power and 
organisational effectiveness of modern institutions.  
What reasons are there to speak about transnational elite integration 
particularly in the twenty-first century? What makes the contemporary elites 
in the global political economy more transnational and powerful than they 
were previously? To appreciate the growing power and integration of elites 
after World War 2, we must pay attention to major developments that have 
 
                                                   
49 In this respect, Mills (1956, 274–6) outlined three structural and cultural trends that paved 
the way for the emergence and consolidation of an interlocked national elite in the postwar 
United States: the rise of “the permanent war economy” that characterised the economic order 
of the cold war and aligned corporate, political and military interests; the deepening 
involvement of business with politics particularly in the executive branch, which consolidated 
power in elite cliques and relegated representative institutions into the middle-levels of power; 
and the domination of a certain cultural and discursive order in which “virtually all political 
and economic actions [were] judged in terms of military definitions of reality”. Besides these 
shifts, Mills (ibid., 278–9) also emphasised that the national integration of the elite rested on 
the similarities of socioeconomic backgrounds and cultural practices of these individuals, with 
most of them having an upper class, white, Protestant and – with the exception of the military 
academies – Ivy League education. This, in turn, produced psychological and ideological 
affinities between them. 
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taken place in the global economy and that relate to international elite 
interaction. These can be summarised in terms of globalisation and 
financialization which have largely proceeded under US leadership. With the 
incorporation of ever new countries and regions into the liberal economic 
order of global markets, these processes have paved the way to an increasingly 
integrated global economy and the rise of institutions whose operations and 
outlooks are increasingly global. In tandem with the growth and integration of 
the global economy, the postwar period has seen the coming together of 
transnational corporations and financial institutions with governments, 
central banks and inter-governmental organisations in order to manage and 
regulate economic activities. Resulting from this institutional rapprochement 
is the field of global economic governance in which business and politics 
become increasingly enmeshed and where the executives of large TNCs, 
institutional investors, government leaders, central bankers and IGO directors 
are active players.  
The coming together of these transnational elites to address major issues 
concerning the global economy and markets, as well as other global 
phenomena, such as climate change, does not mean that other societal actors 
are stripped of power to shape world-societal processes. However, the highly 
exclusive nature of global economic governance implies that non-elites are not 
included in the interaction and policy-formation regarding the global political 
economy and therefore their influence on these issues tends to remain 
marginal. Moreover, insofar as the setting of global agendas disciplines all 
actors of the global political economy, the elite players of global governance 
have significant power over everyone else. 
This chapter presents a brief account of the important structural and 
institutional trends since World War 2 that have not only increased and 
extended the power of elite individuals on a transnational scale, but also 
brought them closer together as a group. The first section argues that behind 
the rise of transnational elites, we need to appreciate the significance of the 
global integration and financialization of the economy under US leadership. 
These processes are closely associated with the greater empowerment of 
market-dominant TNCs, which along with the United States and other major 
states have emerged as key actors in the global political economy. The second 
section discusses how the need to manage transnational economic activities in 
the increasingly integrated global markets has given rise to global economic 
governance as a field of co-operation, coordination and power in which 
political representatives of major states, central bankers, international 
officials and TNC professionals interact, largely informally, across 
institutional domains while relegating national representative institutions into 
second-tier powers. Accordingly, postwar advances in globalisation and global 
economic governance have paved the way to greater transnational elite 
integration. 
The final three sections of the chapter adopt the perspective of 
communication and media studies on these developments in the global 
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political economy by highlighting how transnational elite formation is 
dependent on their cultural integration. Instrumental in this regard has been 
the multiplication of the kind of elite communicative spaces, or associations, 
networks and media that were introduced in Chapter 2. Here the discussion 
moves to the significance, nature and purpose of these forms of elite 
communication for both global governance and the integration of elites, and 
in doing so it draws various analogies with the historical accounts of the 
European bourgeois press and associational life (e.g., Calhoun 1992; Eley 
1992; Habermas 1989). Accordingly, the third section of the chapter observes 
how the forums and media of TEC facilitate global governance by providing 
“private” spaces for elites to deliberation on “public” issues concerning the 
global economy. The subsequent section discusses the structural, ideological 
or agency-constitutive power of TEC, arguing that both the forums and media 
are closely involved in shaping the ideational environment in which 
transnational elites make decisions. The final section of the chapter discusses 
TEC as a practice of self-organisation of the elites, its potential for developing 
group consciousness among its participants, as well as the practical problems 
of transnational elite formation from a communicative point of view. 
3.1 Globalisation and the concentration of power in the 
global political economy 
Global economic integration, or globalisation, should be understood as the re-
organisation of activities and institutions in the global economy (Dicken 2011, 
14; Robinson 2004, 2, 10). The notion of the global economy refers to the 
totality of economic activities and institutions which can be organised in 
various ways. In globalisation, organisation based on national economies is 
loosened: the share and importance of cross-border transactions and 
supranational institutions grows in relation to economic and regulatory 
activities that take place within a nationally bordered economy. Concrete 
manifestations of globalisation include the extension of business operations 
which increase economic exchange flows between localities and regions across 
national borders, the formation and extension of institutional forms of 
international economic governance and regional economic blocs, as well as the 
adoption of global standards and norms (Jessop 2002, 115–6). 
There is a long history to economic globalisation, and no self-evident 
starting point to the phenomenon (see McGrew 2003, 342). Certainly, cross-
border trade and financial transactions, as well as political coordination of 
economic relations, are as old as the international system of states itself. 
Already the earliest merchant banks in Europe engaged in international 
lending (Graeber 2011), and private corporations have established 
transnational business networks at least since the creation of the first trading 
companies in the fifteenth century (Dicken 1998, 20). The final decades of the 
nineteenth century witnessed the rapid growth of international finance and, in 
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more modest proportions, of production (Bairoch and Kozul-Wright 1996). 
The two world wars in the early part of the twentieth century, however, halted 
this process, and it was only after the 1950s that companies have built 
extensive transnational production networks (Hoogvelt 2001, 46, 132; Jessop 
2002, 97–9; Sklair 2002a, 69–70). Indeed, with the internationalisation of 
their business operations, companies started to make a growing share of their 
profits outside their country of origin (Jessop 2002, 81). In addition, hand in 
hand with manufacturing industries, banks have rapidly extended their global 
operations since the 1960s (Dicken 2011, 383–4). Indicators of this business-
led globalisation include the almost continuous growth, between 1960 and 
2008, of international trade (mostly at a faster rate than the global GDP), of 
foreign direct investments (FDI) and of international capital flows other than 
FDI (see Dicken 2011, 17–22; Hoogvelt 2001, 68–70, 77–83; UNCTAD 2014a; 
2014b). 
For the past three decades, finance has played a major part in economic 
globalisation and developed arguably into the most globalised sphere of 
economic activity. The most conspicuous indication of the role of finance in 
globalisation is the enormous growth of the world’s financial markets: in early 
2012, global financial assets were 19 times as large as in 1980 (McKinsey 
Global Institute 2013, 2). Whereas global financial markets grew mostly at a 
similar rate to the overall economy for the first eight decades of the twentieth 
century, since 1980 they have far outpaced GDP growth (Hoogvelt 2001, 83; 
McKinsey Global Institute 2009, 8).50 However, besides their sheer growth, 
the composition and role of financial markets in the global economy has also 
changed significantly since the 1970s. According to Gowan (1999, 23), the 
demise of the Bretton Woods system of managed currencies, the inflation of 
global financial markets and the liberation of private banking from strict 
controls has had the effect of lifting private banks to a newly influential 
position in the global monetary order. Indeed, for Sklair (2002a, 45), the 
fundamental difference in the post-1960s era in comparison to the preceding 
period in the global economy is to be found in the dominant position of finance. 
In recent years, the recognition of the increasing importance of finance has 
been captured by the notion of financialization, referring to the involvement 
of financial markets, financial institutions and financial actors in practically 
every aspect of the global economy and its governance (see Epstein 2005, 3). 
The extending scope of finance is deeply intertwined with the 
globalisation of TNC and banking activities. Since the 1980s, large TNCs have 
 
                                                   
50 According to McKinsey Global Institute (2013, 2), the value of global financial assets relative 
to global GDP was 120 percent in 1980. By 1990, it had risen to 263 percent, and in 2000 to 
310 percent. In 2007, just before the financial crisis, global financial assets stood at 355 
percent relative to global GDP. However, since the financial crisis, the growth rate of the 
financial markets has fallen below that of the global economy, so that in early 2012 the value 
of global assets relative to global GDP was back at 312 percent. 
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increasingly funded their operations by no longer borrowing from banks but 
by employing their own revenues or by issuing their own debt obligations in 
the financial markets (Sinclair 1994, 136–7; Plender 2003, 59; Locke 2014). At 
the same time, engaging in financial ventures has become a popular way of 
boosting profits for companies besides making productive investments 
(Toporowski 2010; van der Pijl 2012, 264). Meanwhile, banks, losing much of 
their business of lending to companies, have turned to private households and 
extended lending through the practice of securitisation, or the packaging of 
loans as new kinds of financial products to be sold to investors (Hoogvelt 2001, 
87; Varoufakis 2013, 127–31). Banks and investment funds have also 
developed other types of financial assets, including derivatives, the markets of 
which ballooned after the late 1980s (Plender 2003, 59; Crouch 2011; 98–9; 
Dicken 2011, 375–6). Moreover, new types of financial institutions have 
emerged to take advantage of the new profit opportunities, further inflating 
securities markets.51 These include pension funds, which have emerged since 
the 1970s as several countries have moved from pay-as-you-go pension 
schemes to funded pensions (Plender 2003, 142; Toporowski 2010). Other 
significant financial players are hedge funds, which are typically off-shoots of 
the largest investment banks and mutual funds and specialise in particularly 
high-risk and short-term speculative investments, aimed at taking advantage 
of price differences between markets, as well as price movements over time 
(Gowan 1999, 54).52 All these shifts have contributed to the expansion of global 
financial markets, and the new investment opportunities partly explain why 
investors often regard speculative investment as more attractive than 
investments in productive businesses. As a result, the proportion of financial 
and other services out of all international investment has grown substantially 
since the 1970s (Dicken 1998, 50–3). 
Financialization also entails several important changes in the way agents 
in the global economy operate. One of them is the rising importance of the 
trade in securities, or speculation, as a form of doing business. The growth of 
securities markets has created huge opportunities for creating profits out of 
interest-seeking and speculation, and trade in securities has become an 
increasingly prominent way of maintaining high rates of return on investment 
(Shutt 1998, 124). Rather than making earnings out of investments in the form 
of dividends or interest, financial institutions have increasingly turned 
towards risk-taking and risk-creating transactions (Gowan 1999, 11–2). The 
 
                                                   
51 These are markets for the trading of stocks and bonds, as well as futures, derivatives and 
various other securitised instruments. 
52 Many financial institutions specialising in speculative investments, such as hedge funds, 
venture capital and private equity businesses, were introduced already in the 1940s and 1950s 
(Freeland 2012, 120). However, they have radically grown only in the past three decades in 
tandem with the overall process of financial globalisation. 
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rise of securities markets as a source of profits, in turn, have signalled 
significant changes to business managers. Companies and their shares have 
become one of the principal items to be traded and speculated on in financial 
markets by professional fund managers who often engage in aggressive short-
term trading in the service of institutional investors (Locke 2014, 75). At the 
same time, stock options have become more prominent as a form of executive 
compensation: CEOs increasingly make their personal earnings not so much 
through salaries but through holdings of shares in their corporations (Barnet 
and Müller 1974, 246; Brennan 2016, 20–1; Plender 2003, 150–1). As a result, 
the attention of managers has partly shifted away from producing and selling 
products and non-financial services towards seeking returns from such 
financial activities that tend to raise the short-term profitability and share 
value of the company, such as corporate takeovers and spending cuts (Locke 
2014, 74; Plender 2003, 150–2). According to John Plender (2003, 232–4), 
corporate decision-makers have increasingly defined their task as one in the 
service of investment bankers instead of concentrating on the core 
performance of their companies. Therefore, financialization marks a shift from 
regarding a company as a vehicle for earning “returns on investment ... based 
on the value created by productive enterprise” to viewing a business “as assets 
to be bought and sold for maximising profits through financial strategies” 
(Batt and Appelbaum 2013, 3). 
The power of big business 
Globalisation and financialization have marked the rise of TNCs in the past 
four decades: due to the integration of markets and advances in technology, 
the transnational company has become an ever more prevalent institution in 
the global economy.53 But the proliferation of TNCs has not necessarily meant 
that global markets have become increasingly competitive. On the contrary, 
studies of transnational corporate networks suggest that a very small number 
of corporations control directly, or indirectly through share ownership in other 
companies, major parts of global wealth (see Vitali et al. 2011; George 2014).54 
 
                                                   
53 The number of TNCs in the world grew from 7000 in 1970 to 35,000 in 1990, 65,000 in 
2000 and 82,000 in 2009 (UNCTAD 2002; Dicken 2011, 20). 
54 In their network analysis of 43,060 TNCs in 2007, Vitali and colleagues (2011) found that 
1318 of them had interlocking ownerships, being connected on average to twenty other 
companies. Collectively these 1318 companies represented 20 percent of global revenues, and 
through their share ownerships in other companies they controlled about 60 percent of global 
revenues. Moreover, within this core there were 147 tightly interconnected TNCs, the 
ownership of which was totally held by the other 146 companies. These core 147 companies 
controlled a whopping 40 percent of the total wealth in the network of the 1318 companies. Of 
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Brian Roach (2005, 27–8, 32–3) assessed in 2005 that, while global market 
concentration has not progressed linearly, the concentration of productive 
assets in the hands of a small number of the largest TNCs had been the general 
trend over the past fifty years, and was particularly significant between 1983 
and 2001. During the 1990s and early 2000s, the largest TNCs in the world 
gained a growing proportion of the global economy in terms of output and 
share of productive assets. In many market sectors, a small number of 
companies control major shares of global markets.55  
The distinction between large, market-dominating TNCs and the rest is 
important, because, due to the accumulation of assets, the largest companies 
and banks operating on a transnational scope exert ever more economic and 
political power in world society. The largest TNCs control sizable resources 
including capital, land, technology and infrastructure. Therefore, they have a 
potential impact on a great number of people and institutions, including their 
(and their suppliers’ and distributors’) employees, customers, shareholders 
and competitors, as well as the communities in which they have operations 
(Rothkopf 2012, 309–10). Besides the obvious economies of scale, large TNCs 
hold the capacity to raise capital in financial markets, acquire other companies, 
sustain losses, and invest in research and development.  
Large TNCs typically create complex networks between research and 
development, production and finance operations. These networks are founded 
both within different divisions of the TNC and with other businesses. Indeed, 
for the purposes of research, finance, manufacturing, distribution, marketing, 
risk sharing and other activities, TNCs often engage in joint ventures, strategic 
alliances and other forms of collaboration with firms that may even sometimes 
be their direct competitors (Dicken 2011, 155–7). These “strategic alliances” 
tend to strengthen the power of a small number of TNCs over the global 
markets while limiting competition between them and driving out smaller 
competitors (Held 1995, 130–1; Sklair 2002a, 65). Richard Barnet and Ronald 
Müller (1974, 233–8) describe how particularly the largest banks, due to their 
capacity to manage great financial resources and move them rapidly, have 
been successful in the creation of such strategic alliances and networks across 
 
                                                   
the top fifty most interconnected companies, 48 were banks, hedge funds or other companies 
offering financial services. 
55 In the oil industry, for instance, the biggest ten companies accounted for around 40 percent 
of total oil production in the world in 2007, and the ten largest metal mining companies 
produced around one-third of the total output. Similarly, a small number of TNCs have risen 
to dominate in several agricultural and food industries, including seeds, pesticides and food 
and beverage manufacture. Concentration is high also in many business services including 
banking, accountancy and recruitment services. (See Dicken 2011, 260, 262, 289–90, 380–1.) 
The same applies for the global military industry: a dozen leading firms control most of the 
revenues (Rothkopf 2008, 205–7). 
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various business sectors. Bankers exert control over the banking and 
nonbanking sectors through the ownership of stocks, which they translate into 
positions of decision-making in other banks, manufacturing, communications, 
transportation and services companies, thus creating extensive and powerful 
corporate interlocks which they can use for mutual benefit and to repress 
competition. The establishment of bank holding companies further 
consolidates the ability of banks to own companies in various sectors of the 
economy, achieve economies of scale and drive smaller enterprises out of 
business.  
The power of today’s giant firms is rather different from their historical 
predecessors due to their improved transnational mobility. It grants them 
increased ability to move globally in search of cheaper materials and lower 
costs of production (Held 1995, 128; Roach 2005, 19), circumvent “harmful” 
regulations (Richardson et al. 2011, 44) and use transfer pricing to minimise 
tax liabilities (Dicken 2011, 229–31). Moving to escape national regulations is 
one way for large TNCs to take advantage of their global production networks 
(Barnet and Müller 1974, 214; Crouch 2004, 32–3), cutting deals with 
governments is another: as TNCs have grown bigger and gained more 
capacities to move capital and operations across the globe, they have become 
increasingly capable of negotiating concessions with governments to the 
obligations that bind companies to certain social and environmental standards 
(Korten 1995, 75–7, 91–2, 128–30). As a result, instead of being reflected in 
the prices of the products that corporations manufacture, social and 
environmental costs have increasingly become “externalities” that the public 
sector is intended to take care of (Jessop 2002, 82). Large TNCs may even use 
their access to governments to gain legislative and regulative protections from 
foreign competition. Accordingly, Plender (2003, 109–12) notes how Wall 
Street banks, despite their free market rhetoric, are in many ways shielded 
from international competition and foreign takeovers.56 
Therefore, while their power over markets is significant, large TNCs also 
increasingly exert political influence to shape the legislative and regulative 
environment in their favour. This political influence takes place in various 
 
                                                   
56 Not only do TNCs enjoy special privileges, such as the ability to negotiate over competition-
rigging subsidies with governments in secret, when these practices are exposed, they are being 
defended by the very same governments. A recent debacle over the European Commission‘s 
taxation inquiry targeting major TNCs is an illustrative case (see, e.g., Traynor 2014). Faced 
with investigations on the tax deals with individual European governments, Amazon, Apple 
and Starbucks, have not only been backed by their “home country” (with a US government 
official raising “concerns” about the fact that the majority of scrutinised companies are US-
based), but also by the governments suspected of granting these companies hidden subsidies: 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Ireland, the three countries in question, are expected to 
challenge the possible ruling by the Commission, even if by being found guilty they would 
benefit financially in the form of delayed tax payments from these companies. 
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ways and through multiple channels. On the one hand, large TNCs employ 
their financial resources by spending vast amounts of money in lobbying, 
campaign contributions, grants for think tanks, fellowships in universities and 
newspapers, and other purposes (Faux 2006, 55–7). On the other hand, TNCs 
also establish industry groups, councils and associations which typically 
inform and advise governmental agencies (George 2014). Daniel Kaufmann 
and Pedro Vicente (2011) have described these TNC practices as forms of “legal 
corruption”, referring to the abuse of political power for private gain. In 
addition to illegal corruption, as would be the case of a company paying direct 
bribes to gain contracts or a permit for doing business abroad, big TNCs may 
also try to secure government contracts by promising future employment for 
public officials. Such activities constitute legal forms of corrupting political 
and bureaucratic decision-making. With the extending scope of their business 
operations, it is likely that TNCs engage in both illegal and legal activities to 
influence public officials and politicians increasingly on a transnational basis 
(see Freeland 2012, 226–8). One such example is the manner in which 
Western oil companies, including Shell, ExxonMobil, Chevron, Texaco and 
Total, have used their influence in Nigeria to thwart legislation that would 
impose a higher tax on their profits in order to distribute part of the wealth 
created to local communities (Oxfam 2016, 22). 
The power of large TNCs may extend beyond the realms of markets and 
politics to security and intelligence matters and even to the use of military 
force. Large firms specialising in online services often collaborate with 
national intelligence agencies (Greenwald 2014), and particularly the US 
banks and corporations have been intimately involved in many US military 
operations since World War 2 (Barnet and Müller 1974, 81–3, 142). Today, 
approximately half of the annual expenditure of the US Defence Department, 
which governs the world’s largest military budget, is channelled to private 
contractors (including non-military services) (SIPRI 2011), and military 
technology is highly dependent on TNCs and their transnational circuits of 
production (Held 2006, 299–300). But TNCs operating outside the military 
sector can also command coercive power. Especially TNCs operating in 
extractive industries, often doing business in hot conflict zones, are known to 
hire private forces and members of the local military in defence of their assets 
and interests. There have been many controversies and law suits surrounding 
the alleged human rights abuses by private armies in service of TNCs (see 
UNCTAD 2007, 152–3; Rothkopf 2012, 315). 
In sum, economic globalisation and financialization are associated with 
the growing power of TNCs and their top managers.57 The rise of giant TNCs, 
 
                                                   
57 Modern firms can be seen as quintessential cases of a hierarchical organisation in which 
power is heavily concentrated on a small number of top managers (Weber 1970, 214–5; see 
also Mills 1956, 126). In this regard, Crouch (2004, 43) argues that the Anglo-American model 
of capitalism grants centrality to the firm as an organisational model that concentrates “all 
Global economic governance and transnational elite formation 
82 
 
particularly since the 1970s, has manifested itself in the concentration of 
capital, economic assets and the increased capacity of these corporations to 
influence markets. In step with the increasingly global scope of their operation, 
large TNCs have been active in policy-making, promoting policies that have 
advanced liberalisation, labour market reform, free trade and the creation of 
more integrated transnational markets (Crouch 2011, 67–8; Sklair 2002a, 67; 
van Apeldoorn 2000). Such policies have obviously coincided with the 
interests of TNCs looking to minimise the operation costs of their global 
production networks and to open new markets for their products. More 
generally, the policies have helped the further growth of TNCs and their power 
over markets and economies. Moreover, their increasingly central role as 
providers of funding through donations and sponsorships has extended the 
influence of big business on a diverse range of sectors in world society from 
medical research to social services (Crouch 2004, 44–5). 
States and globalisation 
Due to the impact of their operations on the financial and material flows in the 
global economy, executives and directors of large corporations and financial 
institutions can be regarded as key drivers of globalisation and 
financialization. But the growth of international trade, transnational 
 
                                                   
power on the chief executive responsible only to shareholders”. Thus, the power of executives 
as managers of capital grows as the Anglo-American model of firms is adopted around the 
world. Certainly, a constant theme in the debates on corporate governance for decades has 
been the “managerial revolution”, or the purportedly growing independence and power of 
managers vis-à-vis corporate boards and owners (see Mills 1956, 118–9; cf. Chandler 1977; 
Shaner 2010). In principle, the two instances are of course meant to fulfil different roles in the 
company. The board of directors, elected by shareholders, is tasked with corporate governance, 
investor relations, corporate planning and development, or guiding the business strategically, 
whereas the managerial level takes care of the day-to-day operations. The CEO needs the 
board’s acceptance in major decisions, and her position is dependent on the board’s 
satisfaction in the CEO’s job performance. In this sense, the directorate have power over the 
CEO. In practice, however, the balance of power between the top management and the board 
of directors varies widely from company to company, and it is also influenced by the patterns 
of ownership and financial market structure within the overall economy (see Scott 2003, 160–
1). The chair of the board, for instance, may be active and highly involved running the company, 
thus becoming the actual decision-maker, side-lining the CEO. Most CEOs, however, have 
quite a lot of leeway in their operations, and in many cases they can also affect the composition 
of the board of directors which is supposed to oversee them (Plender 2003, 138). Ultimately, 
a strict separation between the managerial and directorate level may not be that relevant. Not 
altogether uncommonly, the Chairman of Board and the CEO in large businesses is the same 
person (Schwartz 2012), which of course further blurs the line between management and 
directorate.  
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production networks and global finance also results from international 
agreements by governments to lower barriers to cross-border trade, 
investment and capital flows (see Hoogvelt 2001, 68–70, 132). Accordingly, 
the postwar globalisation of production and finance is intimately connected to 
gradual shifts in economic policies around the world. If the first two decades 
after World War 2 were characterised by the prevalence of policy models which 
emphasised the continuous expansion of domestic markets with such means 
as Keynesian demand management policies (see Crouch 2011, 11–5; Jessop 
2002, 71–6), the 1970s marked a turn towards the active internationalisation 
of markets (Simmons and Elkins 2004). The new economic policy model 
consisted largely of opening trade, liberalising cross-border investment and 
adopting other measures that made it easier for foreign companies to enter 
domestic markets, including the reduction of support for domestic companies 
against foreign competitors. According to this logic, states attempt to attract 
FDI by creating institutional conditions for the accumulation of capital and 
adopting non-discriminatory legislation and regulation with regard to 
investments, ownership and production. 
Similarly, the liberalisation of cross-border capital flows by governments 
since the 1970s is one of the central factors behind the global integration of 
financial markets. Financial markets and institutions had been under strict 
state supervision in much of the world after the great crash of the New York 
Stock Exchange in 1929, and the Bretton Woods system of international 
regulation had been put in place in the wake of World War 2 (Dicken 2011, 
538–9; Gowan 1999, 16–7; Helleiner 2011, 218–24). These regulations not 
only limited the scope of operation of individual financial institutions to only 
certain services, but they also restricted the entry of foreign firms into 
domestic financial markets, as well as enabled state control over cross-border 
capital movements. During the 1970s and 1980s, however, governments in 
North America, Europe and East Asia started to loosen capital controls and 
other regulations, 58  gradually liberating financial markets and promoting 
their internationalisation (Dicken 2011, 377–9; Gowan 1999, 40). The 
international wave of liberalisation of cross-border capital flows continued in 
the 1990s (see Plender 2003), turning separate national financial systems into 
an increasingly integrated and borderless whole. 
Governments have supported the globalisation of finance simply by 
ceasing to intervene in cross-border transactions; but further, they have also 
been active in the establishment of new international regulatory regimes 
designed to prevent insider trading, standardise accounting practices, and 
enhance transparency and disclosure (Levy 2006, 379). Thus lawmakers and 
 
                                                   
58 The US government abandoned capital controls in 1974, and the UK followed suit in 1979. 
Holland removed controls on cross-border financial movements in 1981 and Germany in 1982, 
with Denmark, Italy and France joining the liberalisation wave in the late 1980s. Japan also 
took measures to free financial flows during the 1980s. (Gowan 1999, 40.) 
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regulators are supporting investors to make international investments with 
confidence. Concurrently, governments have created “offshore economies” for 
the operation of transnational finance, or spaces outside the common law in 
which financial flows can move independent of state control (Cameron and 
Palan 2004, 98–100). Finally, states have obviously contributed to the growth 
of global financial markets with particular economic policies. These include 
the creation of large pension funds which invest in equity markets (Shutt 1998, 
127–8; Toporowski 2010), as well as various tax breaks and other incentives 
to those who invest in shares and other securities (Shutt 1998, 128–9). By 
providing a safety net to investors and banks by acting as the lender of last 
resort, and by bailing out failed banks, states have further contributed to the 
expansion of investors’ and bankers’ activities. 
The globalisation and financialization of the economy, in other words, 
results from corporate decisions of resource allocation and re-organisation of 
business activities, but, crucially, these decisions are dependent on the 
liberalisation of cross-border economic activities and flows. This makes 
globalisation both a process that follows a certain “market logic”, resulting 
from decisions market actors make based on their perception of profitable 
activities, and a highly policy-dependent phenomenon, tied to the experience 
among policymakers about the powerful economic and political incentives to 
liberalise cross-border economic activities.  
If globalisation and financialization have paved the way for the growth of 
TNCs and their power in the global political economy, these developments 
have often been associated with the simultaneous decline in state power. The 
very problem of economic globalisation in social sciences has largely to do with 
the idea that the internationalisation of material and financial flows 
transforms the nation-state as a site of sovereign power (see Amoore et al. 
2000). According to the argument, national sovereignty is being eroded 
because of the diminishing capacities of states to fulfil some of their central 
economic functions, including the regulation of the national economy through 
macroeconomic policies and the efficient collection of taxes (Jessop 2002, 82, 
175–6; see also Pensky in Habermas 2001). The ability of states to control 
interest and exchange rates, for instance, or to maintain economic stability 
have been compromised by the concentration of vast amounts of capital into 
the hands of financial market speculators and by the pace with which they can 
move capital around the world (Strange 1996, 73–6). 
Some of this alleged loss of state capacities can be directly attributed to 
the growth of TNCs and financial institutions. Their increased size and 
complex organisational structures, for instance, make it difficult for state 
agencies to obtain sufficient and reliable information for macroeconomic 
management, and their ability to shift locations and circumvent national laws 
and regulations undermine the efficiency of economic policy instruments 
(Barnet and Müller 1974, 256, 262–4). Moreover, TNCs and banks are often 
seen to be able to set countries in a position of competition for the most 
favourable regulatory and taxing environment (Roach 2005, 35), which strips 
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governments from independent regulatory and fiscal policy power. Moreover, 
as financial markets expand, as companies and banks move capital across 
borders, and as financial instruments grow increasingly complex, the impact 
of state monetary policies is compromised and central banks lose much of their 
supervisory capacity over financial institutions (Jessop 2002, 106; Plender 
2003, 59–60). In conditions of freely floating cross-border capital, the 
sovereignty of states to set independent policy objects and to implement 
economic and social policies of their own choosing is further compromised by 
the constant disciplining power of financial markets. Such commentary has 
been widespread since the early 1990s in the wake of large speculative attacks 
on major national currencies such as the British pound, the French franc, the 
Italian lira and the Mexican peso. The fluctuations of government bonds yields 
of many eurozone member states in the early 2010s can be read as a similar 
indication of the power of investors and speculators over states and the 
diminished capacity of individual governments to control key dimensions of 
the economy. 
These readings, however, represent only one side of the story. The global 
financial crisis demonstrated the dependence of the largest financial 
institutions on governments and central banks. And far from having 
withdrawn from the economic sphere, governments are constantly intervening 
in it. To appreciate the significant role of the state, we must first consider the 
ways in which it is directly involved in shaping global economic processes and 
transactions. Government leaders and central bankers direct markets by 
controlling interest rates, money supply, taxes, resource allocation, prices and 
wages, and by making decisions to rescue businesses. They also set tariffs and 
non-tariff barriers on imported goods, subsidise export industries, sign 
international trade agreements and design regulations for capital movements 
(see Barnet and Müller 1974, 74; Dicken 2011, 179–86). More generally, states 
perform functions that are necessary for the very operability of markets and 
the global economy: by building and maintaining infrastructure, educating 
workers, enforcing property rights, overseeing contracts, stabilising 
currencies, providing safe investment opportunities to financial markets and 
managing capital flows, governments and central bankers perform the 
reproductive, administrative, regulative and coercive functions required to 
sustain private property and operative markets (Dicken 2011, 223–4; Panitch 
and Gindin 2012, 1–3; Plender 2003, 69–70; Streeck 2011, 22; Wood 2003, 
16–7, 141). In addition, governments engage in large-scale steering of the 
economy by, for instance, developing industrial strategies, entering wars, 
blockading other nations or signing multilateral agreements on reducing 
carbon dioxide emissions. Historically, the state has been a key site of action 
in transforming entire economies in the shift from Fordism to more flexible 
and globalised mode of accumulation, facilitating not just the acceleration of 
cross-border movements of capital but also the growth of the “knowledge-
based” economy, including the ICT sector, biotechnology and electronics 
(Jessop 2002, 126–31). 
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More direct ways for governments to influence the economy and market 
are investment and production. States are prominent owners and investors in 
the global economy in their own right: today, state-owned or state-controlled 
enterprises (SOEs and SCEs, respectively) are expanding in major industries 
(see Chavez 2014). In the Forbes 2000 list of the largest public companies, 
more than one in ten companies are either entirely state-owned or a state 
controls 50 percent or more of its shares (Kowalski et al. 2013).59 For instance, 
six of the world’s ten largest oil companies in terms of production in 2012 were 
SOEs or SCEs (Forbes 2013). At the same time, state-controlled investment 
funds, also known as sovereign wealth funds (SWFs), have become major 
players in global financial markets.60 Through their transnational investments 
in sectors such as financial services, natural resources, real estate and 
infrastructure, states are key contributors to the processes of financialization 
and creating deep linkages with financial and non-financial corporations 
(Chavez 2014; Hall 2014).  
There are thus several ways in which states exercise economic agency, 
and the projection of their economic power is also not confined to their own 
national territory. Through such practices as financial aid and loan programs, 
as well as ownership in TNCs, governments shape economies and markets 
beyond their borders, thereby resembling transnational organisations in the 
way they penetrate societies (see Huntington 1973). Foreign economic policy 
shifts in such areas as foreign trade, cross-border capital flows and monetary 
policy in one nation alter the international environment in which economic 
agents make decisions and often induce similar policy shifts in other states 
(Simmons and Elkins 2004). What these examples indicate is that, despite 
increased difficulties to centrally control economies and markets, the power of 
states over economic processes remains strong and there is little reason to 
think that it has overall been declining. It is therefore simplistic to argue that 
the growing power of TNCs in the conditions of globalisation and 
financialization is matched by a simultaneous decline in state power (see 
 
                                                   
59 In France, for instance, the State Assets Agency (Agence des Participations de l’Etat, APE) 
manages a large portfolio of strategic companies in such areas as defence, infrastructure, 
transport, energy, real estate and financial services. In Latin America, five of the ten largest 
firms in the region are SOEs or SCEs, all of them major oil companies: Brazil’s Petrobras and 
Petrobras Distribuidora, Venezuela’s PDVSA, Mexico’s Pemex and Colombia’s Ecopetrol. 
Most notably, China’s central government owns or controls some of the biggest companies in 
the world. (Chavez 2014.) 
60 Among the world’s largest SWFs are the China Investment Corporation, the Norwegian 
Government Pension Fund Global, and those managed by several oil- and gas-rich Gulf states. 
The Abu Dhabi Investment Authority, for instance, was founded in 1976 by the government of 
the United Arab Emirates, and commanded an estimated 773 billion dollars in assets in 
January 2015 (SWFI 2015). 
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Gowan 1999, 5). TNCs and other private actors remain deeply dependent on 
states to provide them with labour, stability, regularity and predictability, as 
well as infrastructural and legal order; all essential requirements for the 
operation of markets. However, while capitalism in general, and TNCs in 
particular, are essentially dependent on the state, state autonomy is also 
limited by its dependence on capital accumulation, and the TNCs embody the 
promise to create wealth and employment within the economy (Dicken 2011, 
223; Held 2006, 176–7; Panitch and Gindin 2012, 3–4). In this way, private 
institutions and the state exist in a relationship of mutual dependency in the 
global economy. 
Uneven globalisation 
Even with the apparent successes of globalisation, global economic integration 
is far from complete. A major part of international trade, for instance, takes 
place between companies in neighbouring countries or countries within the 
same region, and, rather than creating truly global networks of production, 
TNCs mostly tend to regionalise them (Dicken 2011, 18–9, 164–6). Similarly, 
the sharp decline of cross-border equity purchases and bank lending, and the 
large-scale repatriation of funds all over the world in the wake of the global 
financial crisis of 2007–2009 demonstrated the tendency of investors and 
bankers to favour local markets over foreign ones (McKinsey Global Institute 
2009, 15–7). More generally, as Wood (2003, 135–6) points out, global 
economic integration in terms of the harmonisation of markets into a single 
global market with homogeneous production conditions and costs all over the 
globe has not progressed very far: markets and economies remain still very 
much separated from one another. In fact, the division of the global economy 
into markets and economies with price differences is the very condition for the 
ability of global capital to seek greater profits through re-allocation and 
speculation. 
The incomplete nature of economic globalisation is also reflected in the 
geographical unevenness of global capitalism. Even as practically the whole 
world has been integrated into the camp of capitalist market economies since 
the collapse of communism, much of the world’s economic activities, including 
manufacturing, trade and FDI, are highly concentrated into a small number of 
countries (see Dicken 2011, 15–6, 25). Almost half of global manufacturing 
production, for instance, took place in just five countries in 2007 – the United 
States, China, Japan, Germany, and the UK – and a further 25 per cent in the 
next ten countries – Italy, France, Korea, Russia, Brazil, Canada, Spain, 
Mexico, India and Turkey (see Dicken 2011, 36). Global services production 
was even more concentrated, with almost 30 per cent located in the United 
States, and in agriculture, 80 per cent of global production takes place in the 
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top 15 countries (ibid., 37–8).61 Similarly, financial services have concentrated 
in a small number of global finance capitals, particularly London and New 
York, but also Paris, Frankfurt, Zürich and Tokyo. They are complemented by 
a series of “offshore” financial centres, including Cayman Islands, Jersey, 
Singapore, Luxembourg, Liechtenstein, Bahrain and Virgin Islands, the 
significance of which has increased with the growing interest of TNCs and 
investors in taking advantage of the low tax level and lax regulation they 
provide (Dicken 2011, 396; Shaxson 2011). 
On par with the national shares of production, the headquarters of the 
world’s largest corporations are distributed across national economies in a 
highly uneven fashion. Sean Starrs’ (2014) analysis based on the Forbes Global 
2000 annual list of the world’s top 2000 publicly traded companies shows that, 
together, US-based TNCs held leading market shares in 18 out of 25 major 
market sectors in 2013, including retail, financial services, insurance, media, 
computer hardware and software, aerospace and defence, food and beverages, 
and pharmaceuticals. Of the remaining seven sectors analysed by Starrs, 
Chinese TNCs held a leading position in three sectors (banking, construction, 
forestry and mining), Hong Kongese in two (real estate, telecommunications), 
and German (auto industry) and Japanese (trading companies) TNCs in one 
each. Other countries that have headquarters of a significant number of major 
TNCs in individual sectors include France, the UK, Russia, South Korea, the 
Netherlands, Switzerland and Australia. 
The various dimensions of the geographic concentration of 
contemporary capitalism reflects the historical conditions and path 
dependencies of globalisation. In the wake of World War 2, US corporations 
were in a privileged position to take advantage of opportunities in new markets. 
The war itself had been beneficial to their global position: it not only made US 
banks the world’s principal creditors (Varoufakis 2013, 57), it also helped US 
companies to emerge out of the Great Depression, whereas their major 
international competitors, most notably in Germany and Britain, had 
collapsed or weakened considerably (Anderson 2013, 22, 42). In these 
circumstances, powerful factions in the US corporate elite succeeded in 
shaping US foreign policy establishment to support their international 
aspirations and assume the role as the primary driver of globalisation. 
Working actively both with the federal administration, as well as in the Council 
of Foreign Relations (CFR) and other influential policy-planning groups, 
prominent corporate leaders were instrumental in shaping this new foreign 
policy consensus among the business and policy-making elite (Anderson 2013, 
 
                                                   
61 Besides differences between countries and regions, within them TNCs also operate in a 
highly-concentrated manner, producing primarily in urban centres and special economic 
zones deliberately set up by governments for the purposes of attracting FDI (Dicken 2011, 
192–3). China is a good example of a government’s widespread use of special economic zones 
in the direction of FDI into selected locations (ibid., 197–8). 
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42; Panitch and Gindin 2012, 67–8; van der Pijl 2012, 111–2). This postwar 
liberal-internationalist doctrine posited that the national interests of the 
United States as the dominant superpower would best be served by forging a 
global economic order that would be as open as possible to international trade 
and capital flows. In the decades after World War 2, the primary objective of 
the liberal internationalists among the US corporate and political 
establishment was to persuade other parts of the capitalist world to embrace 
the project of global economic integration. 
Yet, while the liberalisation of international trade and investment was an 
underlying policy goal for US banks and businesses, the more immediate aim 
for US foreign policy after the war was to support the reconstruction and 
economic development of the war-torn capitalist world in the hopes of 
shielding these them from the threat of communism and rendering them into 
lucrative markets for US products and services. Thus, even as Western 
European states and Japan protected their national industries with high trade 
barriers and practiced strong forms of central planning and government 
intervention in the markets (Anderson 2013, 44–6, 109–10), the US 
government actively aided these countries to develop industries and large 
corporations that could compete internationally with US companies, 
extending cheap loans, facilitating the transfer of US technology and 
managerial knowhow, and providing these countries with a market for exports 
(Panitch and Gindin 2012, 98–102, 106–7). Thus, by the time US TNCs began 
to rapidly expand their production networks overseas in the 1960s, Western 
European, Japanese and South Korean corporations had already had time to 
grow without being undermined by their US competitors and were soon able 
to enter international markets and to compete with US TNCs. The same holds 
true for China, which gradually integrated into the global capitalist economy 
after 1978 but developed its industries under strong state protection. The rise 
of Chinese TNCs to the top of several global market sectors has been the most 
dramatic geographical shift in corporate power in the 2000s (Starrs 2014). 
The United States as the dominant state power 
Just as is the case with giant TNCs having significantly more power than 
smaller companies to shape markets and the political economy in general, the 
international system of nation-states is not a level playing field. Despite the 
formal sovereignty of each nation state, some states have more capacities than 
others to exert power both internally and internationally (Jessop 2002, 195; 
Keohane and Nye 2001, 269–70).62 After World War 2, the United States, in 
 
                                                   
62 Some states also have more sovereignty than others. Many states have surrendered their 
monetary sovereignty, for instance. This is the case particularly with the euro area member 
states, as well as with those nations that have pegged their currency to the US dollar or even 
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particular, has been in a primary position among states to project global power 
economically, politically and militarily (Anderson 2013; Panitch and Gindin 
2012; Wood 2003). The position is partly based on military dominance with 
the US defence expenditure far outnumbering other nations and its armed 
forces being the single most active and capable military force in the world. The 
role of the military in the projection of US power differs in significant ways 
from the British-led era of European empires. The US policy of the “informal 
empire” has not typically sought territorial expansion but to secure the 
maintenance of open borders for capital accumulation and the removal of 
barriers to global capital flows (Panitch and Gindin 2012, 11). Yet the capacity 
to exercise “unrestricted and open-ended” military power has been a key 
dimension in this policy as the US has increasingly taken the role of the world’s 
police (Wood 2003, 159–66), securing naval routes and energy infrastructure 
and intervening militarily where the global economy is threatened with 
disintegration. The war on terrorism, declared by Bush in 2001 and continued 
by the Obama administration can be considered an indispensable dimension 
in this project as the US military and intelligence agencies have pursued their 
surveillance programs and military operations on a global scale (Scahill 2013). 
In addition to securing the international political and economic order 
with coercive power, much of the US state’s power in the global economy has 
focused on shaping the institutions and infrastructures regulating global 
economic activities in a way that maximises its political control. Accordingly, 
in the Bretton Woods conference in 1944, the US government secured the 
privileged status of the US dollar as the basis of the international exchange 
change regime (the “Bretton Woods system”) and as the primary reserve 
currency used in international trade (Mozaffari 2002, 44–7; Varoufakis 2013, 
60). Later, as the US economy was threatened by the rapidly rising trade and 
public deficits, caused by the Vietnam war and US industries being 
increasingly outcompeted by Western European and Japanese companies, as 
well as growing speculation on the US dollar, the US government used its 
power to reshape the global financial architecture. In 1971, the Nixon 
administration suspended the dollar’s convertibility into gold, unilaterally 
abolishing the Bretton Woods system of interlinked currencies. The Nixon 
shock had the effect of giving the US Federal Reserve and the federal 
government increasing space for designing economic policy: with the link to 
gold abolished, the US government was free to take advantage of the privileged 
role of the dollar as the dominant currency of international trade so as to create 
as much currency as it saw fit to finance its public and private consumption 
(Agnew 2009, 228; Anderson 2013, 69; Gowan 1999, 24–5; van der Pijl 2012, 
257–8). In addition, the decision institutionalised an asymmetry of power 
between the United States and the rest of the world and helped maintain the 
 
                                                   
using the dollar as their currency. Such Latin American and Pacific countries as Ecuador, El 
Salvador and East Timor are cases in point. 
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dominant position of the US government and financial institutions in the 
international monetary system (Vermeiren 2013). Other economies were now 
deeply tied to a currency the control of which was solely in the hands of US 
institutions (Gowan 1999, 19–24; Varoufakis 2013, 101–2). 
In addition to shaping the global financial and economic infrastructure, 
the US elite has used its influence to promote its preferred economic models 
throughout the capitalist world. After World War 2, the Fordist model of mass 
production and consumption and Keynesian macroeconomic policies focused 
on national demand management and full employment suited the interests of 
US financial and industrial community and were actively promoted 
throughout the capitalist world (Hirschman 1989; Hoogvelt 2001, 147). After 
the 1970s, however, the US elite has pushed a completely different economic 
model, based on the conception of efficient and self-regulated markets and 
focused on deregulation, privatisation and competition for foreign 
investments, as well as the overall preference of policies that favoured 
financial institutions and investor interests at the cost of productive sectors 
(e.g., Crouch 2011; Gowan 1999; Martinelli 2011). Meanwhile, the US elite’s 
drive to unite the world under a global capitalist order was, to a certain extent, 
completed after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Yet the US-led project of 
securing an integrated area of liberalised trade and investment has not 
stopped in its tracks. Accordingly, the subsequent US administrations from 
Clinton to Obama have been active drivers of international free trade 
agreements and the opening of financial markets (e.g., Anderson 2013, 85, 
105–6; van Apeldoorn and de Graaff 2014; Madrick 2002, 250). 
In sum, as the most dynamic economy and predominant military might 
in the postwar period, the United States works as a primary example of how a 
single state may project power globally. Indeed, the popular notions in both 
political and academic discourse of an American empire and a unipolar world 
order suggest that the United States has been able to relegate all other states 
to a secondary position when it comes to influencing world affairs, and indeed, 
is the only state in the world with global interests and operational capacity. 
Still, the ability of the United States to exert control over other states is limited 
in many ways. While the project of US foreign policy to integrate practically all 
regions in the world into a global capitalist economy has been largely 
successful (Anderson 2013), it has depended on the active agency and capacity 
of the globalising fractions of corporate and political elites in each of the other 
states to turn their governments onto the path of liberalisation (Gill 1990; van 
der Pijl 2012). Similarly, while the United States has been able, to a great 
extent, to shape the institutional structure of the global political economy and 
promote the overall financialization of the economy around the world (Panitch 
and Gindin 2012), not all countries have wholly embraced the Anglo-American 
model of capitalism. Instead, many countries have retained much of their 
national characteristics, thus expressing multiple “varieties” of capitalism and 
forms of capitalist governance (Buzan and Lawson 2014; Hall and Soskice 
2001; Held 1995, 132–3; Rothkopf 2012, 349–60). In this respect, a small 
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number of major economic powers, including China, Germany, Japan and the 
UK, as well as certain associations of states, such as the EU, OPEC and BRIC, 
have considerable autonomy in policy formulation and may be regarded as 
influential shapers of the global political economy, as their monetary and fiscal 
policies, regulations and the setting of standards, wages and prices potentially 
carries significant impacts for producers, investors, workers and consumers in 
the rest of the world. In comparison, smaller states tend to have both less 
autonomy in economic policy and smaller global impact. 
Overall, then, while not necessarily marking a decline of the state, 
globalisation and financialization have certainly transformed both the 
institutions and hierarchy of power in the global economy. Corporate power 
and political power have been increasingly concentrated in the hands of a 
small number of players, which can project their influence across the three 
central power domains in the global political economy. Just as the 
governments and central banks of the most powerful states can shape the 
playing field for globally operating banks and TNCs, giant TNCs are often able 
to exert strong pressure on individual states: when large companies seek to 
influence national economic policies and regulations, small states in particular 
tend to be in a weak bargaining position (see Held 1995, 131; Dicken 2011, 233). 
In the case of poor countries, governments often have few resources at their 
disposal to enforce standards and laws; hence a large TNC, in the words of 
Crouch (2011, 133), is likely to be able, to a large degree, “to pick and choose 
which local laws it obeys and which it ignores”. 
3.2 Global economic governance 
As the global economy grows more integrated and economic activities 
increasingly transcend state borders, it has become increasingly difficult to 
secure stable conditions for markets and the overall global economy. The 
stability of the global economy requires that the reach of “extra-economic” 
powers, traditionally commanded by the state, extends beyond the national 
context: governing power needs to be projected globally to secure stability. 
With its assumption of the roles of “the world’s police”, the issuer of the most 
widely-used international reserve currency, and the “consumer of last resort”, 
the United States has contributed to the sustainability of global capitalism 
since World War 2 (Panitch and Gindin 2012; Varoufakis 2013; Wood 2003). 
On the whole, however, the capacity of any individual government to provide 
the necessary stability and predictability required by economic accumulation 
has become increasingly dependent on its ability coordinate its actions with 
other actors, both private and public, in the global economy (see Jessop 2002, 
232–5). 
The need for mechanisms and institutions to manage an integrated 
global economy dawned on the US foreign policy elite already before World 
War 2. The Wall Street crash in 1929 and the subsequent banking crisis in both 
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the United States and Europe revealed the deep interconnections between 
banks operating in global financial markets (Anderson 2013, 11–2). 
Accordingly, the liberalisation of economic activities would have to be 
embedded in international institutions (ibid., 17). The Bretton Woods system 
responded to the perceived risks of global financial flows by establishing strict 
capital controls and fixed currency exchange rates (Gowan 1999, 16–7; Dicken 
2011, 538–9). When the system collapsed in 1971, the United States convened 
the heads of major economies to coordinate their monetary and fiscal policies 
in order to prevent another global financial meltdown in the order of 
magnitude of the 1930s (Panitch and Gindin 2012, 153–5).  
The globalisation of economic activities, in other words, creates the need 
for forms of global economic governance, or the establishment of practices, 
institutions and organisations of international coordination of state functions 
that are necessary for the operation of global economic activities (Held and 
McGrew 2002, 8; Robinson 2011, 357–8). On one level, governments of major 
states form the core of global governance, and they organise themselves into 
various international groupings, including the G7, G20, EU, APEC and ASEAN 
(see Dicken 2011, 55–6). On another level, global economic integration has 
been accompanied by a dramatic growth in the number of IGOs (Volgy et al. 
2008). Among the most notable IGOs are the World Bank, the IMF, the WTO, 
and the UN. These and other international institutions, such as the Bank for 
International Settlements (BIS), increasingly engage in regulatory activities, 
make decisions and set standards, rules and conventions concerning, for 
instance, private property and resource allocation (Crouch 2011, 128; Dicken 
2011, 55–6; Held 1995, 108–9). They are complemented by bilateral and 
multilateral government networks and international parliamentary 
assemblies and associations, the number of which has grown considerably 
since the mid-1970s (Šabic 2008; Slaughter 2004). 
Instead of signalling a diminishing power of the state as such, the 
multiplication of international forums and organisations has marked a 
reordering of the state and its role within this emergent global governance 
regime. According to Jessop (2002, 202–3, 253), the state continues to act as 
an all-important “nodal point” in the expanding network of intergovernmental 
and inter-parliamentary organisations and associations, regulating and 
overseeing the fulfilment of governance tasks. However, it is the supranational 
institutions and bodies, such as the EU, the G7 or the OECD, that increasingly 
design and coordinate these policies (see Robinson 2004, 88). Moreover, the 
strengthening global governance regime impacts the way power is distributed 
within the state. Cox (1996, 302) argues that, as a result of the 
“internationalisation of the state”, “power within the state has been 
concentrated in those agencies in closest touch with the global economy”. 
These include, most notably, the private offices of prime ministers or 
presidents, finance and economic ministries, as well as central banks. 
Meanwhile, state agencies “more closely identified with domestic clients”, 
including ministries of labour, welfare and industry, are subordinated (see also 
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Gill 1990, 94). As the planning and formulation of economic policies is 
increasingly conditioned by the needs of global economic governance and 
takes place in close coordination with other government and IGO leaders, the 
power of key government executives tends to grow in relation to other agencies 
and institutions of the state. The continuous growth of executive power at the 
cost of representative institutions has been marked, for instance, in the United 
States. The dramatic growth of White House staff, the enlargement of the 
National Security Council, the exponential growth of the CIA and its operation 
as “a private army at the disposal of the president”, as well as the president’s 
increased capacities to use unilateral power in defiance of the congress and 
federal law, are all reflections of the increasing power of the US president since 
World War 2 (Anderson 2013, 99, 107–8). 
However, even as international forums of major states and IGOs 
constitute the two key levels of global governance, political and bureaucratic 
elites are not the only actors involved in transnational policy-formation. Since 
the 1980s, global governance has been increasingly guided by a “multi-
stakeholder” paradigm, according to which a legitimate and efficient way to 
formulate and implement policies is to ensure that various societal interest 
groups are represented (see Gleckman 2012). Within this paradigm, IGOs and 
their agencies typically incorporate various civil society representatives, 
including trade and labour organisations, environmental, development and 
human rights organisations, scientists and other professionals, into policy-
formulation processes (Dicken 2011, 537–8; ILO 2004, 77). Perhaps the most 
notable non-governmental constituency in global governance, however, 
comprises the TNCs and other private sector institutions. Business 
representatives have an increasing presence in intergovernmental and IGO-
led processes of global governance, operating alongside government and IGO 
officials in setting international standards for the operation of the global 
economy (Bull et al. 2004; Crouch 2011, 130; Levy and Prakash 2003).63 The 
multi-stakeholder paradigm has also given rise to what might be termed as the 
 
                                                   
63 There are many ways for TNC leaders to get involved in the processes of global governance. 
One is the creation of transnational industry groups (Levy and Prakash 2003). Transatlantic 
Business Dialogue, for instance, is an industrial advisory group comprising US and European 
business executives. It formulates joint policy recommendations to US and European 
governments and advises officials on standards and regulatory issues, trade, investment, and 
international relations. Another way to include TNC executives in processes of global 
governance is the establishment of transnational public-private groups that design common 
standards for industries and thus promote international trade. One such commission is Codex 
Alimentarius, which negotiates international standards for nutrition, sanitation and 
consumer safety. Founded by the FAO, the various Codex working committees bring together 
representatives from food and agribusiness industries, including both industry associations 
and TNCs alongside representatives of governments, IGOs, NGOs and academic organisations 
(Sklair 2002b). 
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third level of global governance, consisting of a plurality of forums, networks, 
planning groups and committees that bring together public and private agents 
on specific issues but work outside the auspices of the intergovernmental 
forums and organisations. Moreover, within the global governance regime, the 
overall tendency has been towards forms of self-regulation and self-
organisation by market actors in various sectors of the economy (Held and 
McGrew 2002, 10; Jessop 2002, 229, 236, 252; ILO 2004, 77). Many 
government tasks have thus been reallocated in the past few decades to non-
governmental, private and commercial actors, effectively granting large 
corporations powers to regulate, set standards and formulate policies largely 
by themselves (Sogge 2014; Jessop 2002, 199; Mayer and Gereffi 2010). In 
addition to large TNCs, consultancies, law firms and credit rating agencies are 
key actors in designing and establishing such private regulatory systems 
(Sinclair 1994; van der Pijl 1998, 162).  
As pointed out by Jessop (2002, 196–7, 235; see also Jessop 2012), while 
this field of global political and economic governance signals a partial 
delegation of power from states to international and transnational 
institutions, it does not mark the creation of a world state. State functions in 
the global economy have been reorganised into a supranational system which 
comprises international, transnational and regional organisations whose 
number and functions are increasing. Instead of an integrated system, global 
governance is characterised by a certain networked and informal nature (Held 
2006, 304; Slaughter 2004; Stone 2008): various bodies and groupings that 
typically lack any formal authority over their participants interact with one 
another to enhance the coordination of policies and activities (Dicken 2011, 
539). As a result, the field of global governance is complex, and its processes 
and institutions are strengthened only to a certain extent: instead of 
enforceable laws and binding agreements, multi-stakeholder governance is 
mostly premised on voluntarism, codes of conduct and other kinds of “soft 
law” (Keohane and Nye 2001, 266; Sogge 2014, 16–7).  This relative weakness 
of the institutions, forms and practices of global governance results partly 
from governments’ unwillingness to devolve formal powers to supranational 
organisations (see Rothkopf 2008, 171–2). But TNC leaders also face a 
dilemma with regard to global governance: while they have an interest in 
setting global rules for the promotion of corporate and financial activities, they 
simultaneously look to secure maximised “corporate investor freedom” (Faux 
2006, 169–70).64 
At the heart of global governance, therefore, is a contradiction between 
the perceived need for enhanced global coordination of policies and the 
establishment of a stable and predictable playing field to support cross-border 
 
                                                   
64 Such approach is evident, for instance, in the management of global financial markets: big 
banks have not wanted the governments to implement strict regulations on financial 
operations and instead have successfully pleaded for self-regulation (Rothkopf 2008, 171). 
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economic activities, on the one hand, and the interests of keeping such 
arrangements decisively weak and making agreements only on a voluntary 
basis, on the other. Accordingly, there is considerable ambivalence towards 
global governance among TNC leaders: while being deeply involved in many 
of these processes, they have often opposed the institution of strong 
coordinative institutions on a transnational or global level and instead tended 
to support state-based regulation (Levy and Prakash 2003; Gleckman 2012). 
For Dicken (2011, 225), this is due to the perceived advantages that such a 
fragmented regulatory landscape brings to TNCs, allowing them to play states 
against each other and negotiate privileged treatment for themselves (see also 
Jessop 2012, 210).65 Such fragmentation, however, reduces the likelyhood that 
the stability that capitalism requires can be maintained in the global economy 
(see Rosenau 2002). 
The club model of governance 
In the relative absence of formal structures and protocols, global governance 
is largely characterised by informal exchanges, coordination and collaboration 
between groups and institutions engaged in economic and monetary matters 
from both public and private sectors. On the one hand, some of the institutions 
that are nowadays considered central in global governance, particularly the 
G7/G8 and G20 meetings of government leaders, are nothing more than 
unofficial elite get-togethers lacking formal statutes or charters to govern their 
operations (see Richardson et al. 2011, 38–9; Slaughter 2015, 385–6). On the 
other hand, even in those institutions which officially have formal structures, 
such as the OECD, World Bank and the IMF, decision-making is typically 
preconditioned by informal backroom conversations (van der Pijl 1998, 77). 
These informal practices of elite interaction are often considered important 
precisely because of the perceived weakness, inefficiency and incapability of 
the international institutional framework for global governance (Cox 1996, 
301; Rothkopf 2008, 171, 315–6). But the emphasis on informality in global 
governance may also be a deliberate policy preference by those engaged in 
global rule setting and policy formation. Whereas the elite tend to be 
suspicious of supra-national authority structures associated with loss of 
sovereignty and burdened by formal (and uncomfortable) mechanisms of 
transparency and accountability, informal gatherings, in contrast, are 
regarded as flexible and efficient as they allow private negotiation and deal-
making without the need to “lock positions” that comes with publicity and 
transparency (Richardson et al. 2011, 19). The “weakness” of the institutions 
of global governance can thus be regarded as an outcome of transnational 
 
                                                   
65 The growth of the global business service industry is partly due to the increased need for 
legal, accountancy and other services by TNCs operating within the context of differing 
national rules and regulations (Dicken 2011, 372). 
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elites’ preferred manner of conducting policy making. As the principal driver 
of the institutionalisation of the international order since World War 2, the US 
foreign policy establishment, in particular, has been seen to favour a secretive 
nature of international agreements and decision-making dependent on 
informal policy preparation instead of pushing towards more transparent and 
public procedures (see van der Pijl 1998, 77). 
Governance can thus be understood as a way to coordinate action among 
participants on the basis of traditional norms and habits, informal agreements 
and shared premises that lead actors to comply with the rulings (Rosenau 
2002, 72). One example of such a networked and informal nature is the way 
that global financial markets are governed. With no central political authority 
that could regulate financial markets globally, the governance of global 
financial markets relies on the collaboration of various governmental and 
intergovernmental bodies, including finance ministries, treasuries, regulatory 
agencies, central banks and multilateral financial institutions, most notably 
the IMF. Several international forums, such as the Financial Stability Board, 
the International Organization of Securities Commissions and the 
International Accounting Standards Board, have been founded to facilitate 
and institutionalise this collaboration. One key element in this global financial 
architecture is the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), in itself a prime 
example of the networked and informal character of global governance. 
Designed to “foster international cooperation” between central banks “in their 
pursuit of monetary and financial stability”, the BIS organises regular 
meetings between world’s top central bankers. Without any formal authority 
over central banks the BIS’s capacity in coordinating central bank policies 
across the world is restricted to facilitating discussion among central bankers 
as well as “supporting dialogue with other authorities” which are key to global 
financial stability.  
In this way, the stability of the global financial system rests, to a 
significant degree, on the informal coordination and voluntary cooperation 
among central bankers, national regulators and finance ministries of major 
economies, and on their ability to monitor and supervise the conduct of large 
institutional investors, represented by such bodies as the Global Financial 
Forum and Institute of International Finance. In his interview with Timothy 
Geithner, former US treasury secretary, Rothkopf (2008, 174–5) provides an 
interesting illustration of this informal and networked nature of global 
financial governance. Geithner, also former president of the Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York, describes the importance of BIS meetings between the 
world’s foremost central bankers and the strong personal interconnections 
between them (for an analysis of central bankers as a closely-knit club, see 
Marcussen 2013). In the same interview, Geithner also suggests that the 
management of financial markets relies heavily on work done “in conjunction” 
with leading corporate executives. He particularly recounts a crisis situation 
in derivatives markets, when he, as the president of New York’s Federal 
Reserve, invited the heads of fourteen major financial firms from the US and 
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Europe to work out a plan to get out of the crisis. Together with officials from 
the US Federal Reserve, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and 
Britain’s Financial Services Authority (FSA), the bankers ran a series of 
conference calls over the following months. In this “borderless, collaborative 
process”, there was “nothing written, no guidance, no regulation, no formal 
process”, Geithner notes. 
As Geithner’s account suggests, global governance processes often rely 
on informal networks which transcend institutional and national boundaries, 
bringing together actors from public and private sectors. What has also been 
referred to as “club governance” (Tsingou 2015; see also Keohane and Nye 
2001), the institutional interlocking of elites across societal domains and 
national boundaries can be considered to be a concrete manifestation of this 
relationship of mutual dependence between states and transnational 
businesses. Rather than being based on competition and bargaining between 
the state and the private corporations, issues of global governance brings them 
together to discuss and solve “common problems” in a club-like atmosphere 
of confidentiality.  
But while there is a certain networked and horizontal nature to global 
governance, this interaction is also hierarchically structured: power is very 
unevenly distributed in this field of global political and economic governance 
characterised by “elite rule and lack of participation” (Stone 2008, 22). As 
noted in a 2004 ILO report by an international commission consisting of 
representatives from government, business, trade unions, civil society and 
academia, power in global governance is very unequally distributed among 
nation-states with the economically most powerful countries being in a 
dominant position to define the rules of global governance (ILO 2004, 76–8, 
88): in addition to creating exclusive institutions, such as the various G 
groupings and the OECD, major economic powers also tend to dominate in the 
more multilateral IGOs, and especially in the international financial 
institutions (IFIs). Smaller and poorer countries have not only been largely 
excluded or marginalised when defining common rules, they have also been 
subjected to the imposition of those rules by the IMF, World Bank and other 
IGOs (Held 1995, 110–1). As result, while all states are important in the 
regulation and ordering of the global economy, most governments have little 
say in designing the rules governing the global political economy and little 
leeway in pursuing autonomous policies. Oftentimes, IGOs have considerable 
power in dictating policy decisions over ostensibly sovereign governments, 
with debt typically serving as the disciplinary mechanism to enforce 
conformity to the dictates of supranational rule.66  
 
                                                   
66 The case has often been made of how the World Bank and the IMF, in the 1980s, set strict 
policy reform conditions on indebted non-western low-income countries (see Dicken 2011, 
539–40; Hoogvelt 2001, 152–3; Wood 2003, 21–2). However, in the wake of the global 
financial crisis, which dramatically increased the public indebtedness of many countries, 
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In addition to the economically most powerful states, large TNCs and 
banks have a powerful position in this system of self-regulative and multi-
stakeholder governance. TNCs are often capable of harnessing IGOs to further 
their individual and collective goals, and particularly the WTO has been an 
organisation that has served the interests of TNCs in liberalising trade and 
lowering barriers to new markets (see Keohane and Nye 2001, 268). In 
addition, the WTO plays an important role in international trade disputes. 
While only countries can bring trade disputes to the WTO, most cases are 
driven by corporations: corporations hire law firms to persuade a government 
to bring a new dispute to the WTO, and they also work with governments at 
every stage of the legal process (Rothkopf 2012, 223–5). The rise of large TNCs 
as power-holders in global governance has taken place, on the one hand, at the 
expense of smaller TNCs and domestic companies which compete against 
foreign imports. Giant firms increasingly use political power and influence 
policies directly as representatives of large TNCs often sit in the tables of global 
governance driving the agenda. Meanwhile, smaller companies remain 
dependent on business associations to further their interests and can mainly 
try to externally exert political pressure on governments (Crouch 2011, 131–3; 
Keohane and Nye 2001, 268). Nonetheless, due to their greater resources and 
access, large TNCs are often in a better position to shape international policy 
processes than small and low-income states. While the bargaining power of 
developing countries has grown in some respects since the 1990s, thanks to 
their increasing ability to form alliances and collectively challenge the western 
powers, small states still tend to have less power than many TNCs in effecting 
outcomes of global governance (Keohane and Nye 2001).67  
In the elite sphere of global governance, the traditional division between 
the state and corporations, or public and private spheres, is losing its 
relevance. The active involvement of TNC executives, consultants and other 
representatives of the corporate sector in transnational political processes 
alongside government leaders and IGO officials implies that economic power 
and political power are increasingly enmeshed (see Crouch 2011, 68–70). 
Globalisation and financialization, in other words, advance the evolution and 
 
                                                   
similar conditions have also been imposed on a number of western governments. At the same 
time, it has become evident how crucial public debt is as a disciplining mechanism in global 
governance. In the case of Ireland, for instance, the IMF, ECB and the European Commission 
not only conditioned their loans for the country on heavy austerity measures, they also exerted 
strong pressure on the Irish government to make it consent to the multilateral bail-out to 
prevent it from defaulting on its debt (Richardson et al. 2011, 189–93). 
67  In this regard, Rothkopf (2012, 31) presents illuminating rhetorical questions: “Whom 
would you pick in one-on-one contest to influence, say, global climate talks—ExxonMobil or 
Morocco? Who has more clout in an effort to impact global financial markets—JPMorgan 
Chase or the Central Bank of Thailand?” 
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significance of the global political economy as a domain in which private and 
public actors co-operate in various “public-private partnerships” for the 
governance of economic processes (Bull et al. 2004; Rothkopf 2008, 171). The 
domain brings together a particular transnational elite composed of three 
types of actors: government leaders, regulators and other public sector 
officials; international civil servants working for IGOs; and private sector 
professionals, including business leaders, foundation officers, consultants and 
scientific experts, and individuals may increasingly build their careers by 
moving between the three realms (Stone 2008, 30–1).  
Whereas a focus on institutional arrangements and authority structures 
may lead to a misleading understanding about the “weakness” (and thus 
practical irrelevance) of global governance, a perspective on agency in the 
global political economy points to the ability of elites to wield power on a 
transnational level. In global economic governance, transnational elites 
establish a particular field of planning, coordination and power (cf. Levy and 
Prakash 2003). Without formal authorities and mechanisms of public 
representation and accountability, the agencies, informal planning groups and 
networks engaged in global governance enable elites to design policies and 
make joint decisions over which citizens have practically no control (Held 
1995, 139). At the same time, the involvement of a plurality of actors makes it 
obvious that global governance is involved with issues that have significant 
consequences for all actors in the global economy and is therefore a matter of 
great economic and political interest. Far from dealing simply with supposedly 
technical matters enhancing global economic integration and stability, such as 
setting market standards, regulating financial flows or coordinating monetary 
policies, global economic governance is about exerting power over 
fundamental aspects of the global political economy. Transnational elites can 
thus be understood as “global governors” who “exercise power across borders 
for purposes of affecting policy […] and create issues, set agendas, establish 
and implement rules or programs, and evaluate and/or adjudicate outcomes” 
(Avant et al. 2010, 2). 
Global economic governance and communicative agency 
The coming together of corporate, political and bureaucratic elites for global 
economic governance signals a relatively explicit acknowledgment of their 
common interests in managing global capitalism and protecting it from its 
destabilising tendencies. Yet this partial recognition in no way precludes the 
existence of deep disagreements over the management of the global economy, 
the power to shape its outcomes, or clashes of institutional cultures and 
interests between transnational elites. Nor does it rule out that, on specific 
issues, elite groups constantly try to gain advantage over other elites and 
institutions. Times of crises, in particular, tend to bring out differences 
between elites and elite institutions. In his discussion of central bankers as a 
specific transnational elite group with its own distinct culture, Martin 
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Marcussen (2013, 27–8) offers an illuminating example. In 2009, in the midst 
of the global financial crisis, the German chancellor Angela Merkel gave a 
conference speech in which she criticised central banks of their policy of 
pumping the financial markets with liquidity (see Benoit and Atkins 2009a; 
2009b). This was consistent with the private views of many German politicians 
at the time who saw such unorthodox measures as threatening, potentially 
leading sooner or later to another financial market bubble. Yet the remarks, 
picked up by the FT online and from there spreading quickly in the 
international business media, stirred considerable interest not so much due to 
their content but because Merkel broke an unwritten rule in the German 
political culture about top politicians not presenting critique against European 
monetary authorities publicly. Two days later, Jean-Claude Trichet, the ECB 
governor, called Merkel personally to ensure that the German government was 
not about to challenge or threaten the ECB’s “independence” (Atkins 2009). 
There are three important insights we should draw from the event 
recounted by Marcussen. First, the global political economy with its complex 
processes, relations of interdependence and feedback loops is recognised by 
transnational elites as a key environment in which they operate. This 
environment is constantly altered by various kinds of institutional activities, 
from investment decisions and financial speculation to regulative measures 
and monetary policy. Most of these elite activities are either intentionally 
focused on or have the non-intended effect of shaping the rules, regulations, 
policies and structural conditions that affect how all agents in the global 
political economy operate. Following the argument of Avant and colleagues 
(2010), all these efforts can be understood as agency in global economic 
governance. Irrespective of the purported weakness of the actual institutions 
global governance, the actor perspective emphasises that actual efforts to 
formulate and implement rules and policies for the global economy take place 
all the time, and in this sense, transnational elites can be described as global 
governors.  
Second, various actors with different institutional resources, mandates 
and objectives are involved in the process of governing the global economy. 
Thus, there is a need for transnational elites to try to influence each others’ 
actions and to establish collective practices and principles. Yet there are 
constant differences on matters of policy, and these contradictions are likely 
to both grow and surface during global economic crises, when something has 
gone wrong and there is less consensus on what to do next. With no central 
authority and formal decision-making structures, constant negotiations and 
efforts to build consent and consensus are needed between transnational elites, 
which makes intra- or inter-elite communication of utmost importance for 
global economic governance (see Avant et al. 2010, 2; Hajer 2009, 180). 
Third, the example illustrates how, to interact with other members and 
groups, elites use both interpersonal and public forms of communication. 
Merkel, obviously, could have followed the unwritten rules of the German 
political culture and presented her critique in private or otherwise let the ECB 
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and other central bankers know about her views on proper monetary policy. 
Instead, she decided to air the critique in a public manner, speaking at an 
economic policy conference in Berlin. The motive behind such a move may 
well have been to let the public know that the central bankers’ common global 
policy was not unquestioned by all international policymakers at the time. The 
intervention may even have been an effort to mobilise broader international 
support on her views in order to indirectly apply pressure on central bankers 
to rethink their monetary policy. 68  However, the act only became 
consequential after the critical remarks were picked up by FT reporters and 
disseminated to international elite audiences. 69  Mediated communication 
therefore plays an important role in global governance (cf. Hajer 2009), and 
the specialised media catering transnational elite audiences often influence 
these processes, mediating various views, highlighting conflicts and 
prompting reactions from decision-makers. 
3.3 Economic governance and private-public 
communication 
Evidently, much of the TEC in both forums and media are aimed at informing 
and influencing key decision-makers in the global political economy. For their 
part, staying on top of the discussions and currents of thought among their 
peers is an essential motivation for transnational elites to attend elite forums 
and clubs (Richardson et al. 2011, 89–90; Tsingou 2015, 237). Getting a sense 
of what their fellow business leaders, regulators and legislators have in mind 
helps them understand their own environment and make inferences of likely 
future developments. Clubs, conferences and the elite media allow them to 
both get a reading of the political and business climate and communicate their 
ideas and intentions to the elite public, thus affecting and potentially directing 
the market and policy behaviour of others. 
TEC, therefore, facilitates the daily decision making of transnational 
elites by contributing an essential element to the cognitive environment in 
which they exercise power. This ideational landscape consists of detailed 
market data, official communiques and political news, but it also includes 
general beliefs about the ontology of the global economy, ideas about the 
nature of markets, states and other institutional spheres affecting the 
 
                                                   
68 In this sense, central bank independence from political authorities as stated in the national 
legislations of the majority of western countries exists only de jure and is always challenged in 
practice, albeit to varying degrees (Marcussen 2013). 
69  Apparently, the German newspapers that were present at the conference did not even 
mention Merkel’s critique of central bank policies in their news coverage (see Eurointelligence 
2009). 
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economy, theoretical and practical conceptions about policy alternatives, as 
well as values and normative premises concerning the governance of the global 
economy and the role of various actors participating in economic processes.  
Indeed, TEC has not merely to do with the facilitation of everyday 
decision-making. It is also an essential part of the solution to the problem of 
the governance of the global economy. As the public, private and public-
private institutions and agents of global governance have proliferated, the 
forums and media of TEC emerge partly in response to these needs to facilitate 
improved coordination of activities for the governance of the global economy 
(Garnham 1992, 361–2). Accordingly, scholars often make sense of the various 
elite clubs, associations and planning groups in terms of their contribution to 
global governance (e.g., Richardson et al. 2011; Rothkopf 2008; Sogge 2014; 
Tsingou 2015). International macroeconomic coordination and other 
problems of global economic governance have been found to form a central 
part of the agenda of such groups as the Trilateral Commission and World 
Economic Forum (Friesen 2012, 108, 134; Gill 1990, 174–9, 188–97; Pigman 
2007, 68–72).  
Similarly, elite news media, and particularly international business and 
political journalism facilitate international policy coordination in various 
ways, thus playing a key role in the governance of businesses and the overall 
economy (Madrick 2002; Tambini 2010). First, public reporting on banks, 
businesses and government activities serves not simply investors in their daily 
decisions, but also other agents, such as regulators, legislators and the courts 
which have a role in supervising the activities of businesses and the operation 
of markets. Second, elite media and journalism reproduce and disseminate 
common ideas and interpretative frameworks, contributing to the 
reproduction of a “transnational language” on which global policy 
coordination depends (Blichner 2007). From this perspective, what makes 
global governance possible in the first place is the development of concepts 
and ideas that transcend linguistic borders.  
Third, the media directed to transnational business and political elites 
provide spaces for the horizontal discourse between elites, connecting 
individuals and institutions across national boundaries (cf. Curran 2005, 121–
2). This purpose is explicitly recognised by the aforementioned The 
International Economy, which describes itself as a “specialised quarterly 
magazine covering global financial policy, economic trends, and international 
trade” and uses the notion of “international economic statecraft” to epitomise 
its mission.70 Rather than presenting itself in traditional journalistic terms of 
acting as a watchdog of the powerful, or facilitating all-inclusive democratic 
debate by informing a predetermined constituency of citizens, the magazine 
explains its purpose and objective in terms of being part of and supporting the 
 
                                                   
70 See http://www.international-economy.com/AboutTIE.htm (accessed 29 August 2016). 
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emergent global economic governance apparatus, established and directed by 
“the international community” of mostly unelected elites: 
One reason the publication has endured is that the international 
community has seen over the last two decades the emergence of an 
international economic statecraft of sorts. This statecraft now sits side 
by side with the statecraft long established during the Cold War in the 
field of foreign policy and defense. That latter statecraft of course 
enjoys the benefit of important publications such as Foreign Affairs and 
Foreign Policy. After more than twenty years of existence, The 
International Economy finds itself in a uniquely exclusive role as part 
of the new international economic statecraft.71 
Whether taking place in forum debates or being disseminated by the media, 
the practices of TEC are thus at the heart of global governance. As Richardson 
and colleagues (2011, 10, 70–3) argue, in the absence of formal procedures and 
authorities at the international level, the legitimacy (and thus success) of a 
policy initiative in world politics rests on the perception of the collaboration 
and consensus that has produced it. Informal elite interactions, and the 
various institutions, associations and forums that facilitate it, represent just 
the kind of cooperation and search for consensus needed to reach collective 
rules and decisions, and thereby they become essential sources of authority 
and legitimacy of decisions and the contemporary international order in 
general. This is also why elite gatherings, such as the Bilderberg and the World 
Economic Forum, are often understood by critical observers and many 
participants alike in terms of engaging in consensus formation (e.g., Korten 
1995, 133–4; Richardson et al. 2011, 101–4; Sassen 2001). The significance of 
TEC thus derives from its impact on the actual decisions and policies it gives 
rise to. For Richardson and colleagues (2011, 7) the consensuses that are 
formed and disseminated by elite forums, clubs and networks “are a critical 
mechanism for resisting and facilitating change in world politics”. 
Private spaces for deliberation 
A notable trait of elite associations, forums and exclusive media outlets is their 
capacity to facilitate “public” deliberation in a “private” space. In this sense, 
the emergence of transnational forums and media can be viewed as part of a 
more general transformation of the public sphere since the early twentieth 
century, which has seen the formation of exclusive expert publics in tandem 
with the degeneration of an inclusive general public sphere (Habermas 1989; 
see also Eriksen 2005). With the establishment of exclusive platforms for TEC, 
there is a move away from general public spaces and the limits of mass 
democracy and mass publics by those who exert power on a global level, and a 
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simultaneous attempt to confine the all-important political discussions to 
small circles of learned and influential elites. 
Privacy, in the sense of non-publicness and non-transparency, is 
obviously a core characteristic of much of the activities in international 
business, politics and administration. The “informal” interaction in elite clubs 
and forums is essentially private in nature, even when it involves public 
officials, political representatives and touches upon matters of global public 
interest. Many elite gatherings, such as Bilderberg and the Trilateral 
Commission, are held in almost total media blackout, while others tend to 
combine meetings behind closed doors with carefully managed press 
conferences and public panel discussions. The privacy and confidentiality of 
many of these meetings with their rules of non-disclosure of the issues 
discussed is typically regarded by the participants as designed to allow open 
debates and an earnest exchange of ideas and opinions (Richardson et al. 2011, 
151–2). Members of transnational elites come together in the private spaces to 
discuss matters of public interest to avoid being constrained in their 
expression by the constant media attention and public scrutiny their offices 
are accompanied by. Accordingly, what characterises these debates, by many 
participant accounts, is their openness, frankness, lack of posturing and the 
more personal nature of interactions (Gill 1990, 148; Richardson et al. 2011, 
171–3).  
There is more to the private nature of TEC, however, than just non-
transparency and confidentiality. The favourable characterisations of 
openness and frankness of the debates in elite clubs and forums suggest that, 
in addition to limiting what the politicians, executives and central bankers can 
safely utter without risking negative publicity – let alone political scandals and 
market turmoil –, the elites perceive the general public sphere as a space in 
which serious, open and constructive deliberation is all but impossible. Indeed, 
given the conditions whereby public debate appears to be beset by a whole 
range of problems, including the media’s short attention span and incoherent 
agenda, as well as the prevalence of populist rhetoric and participation of 
laypeople with little understanding of complex issues, the rationale behind the 
flight of elites into enclosed communicative spaces consists not only of a desire 
to make important decisions in secrecy. Limiting the scope of participants to 
those that “truly matter” in the world of politics and the economy can also be 
understood as an attempt to improve the quality of debate. Educated expert 
elites seek spaces in which focused, serious discussion in an informed and 
“civilised” manner becomes possible without the limitations and distractions 
of the mass media and their tendencies to “dumb down” arguments. Private 
clubs and forums, as well as the specialised media, effectively serve these goals 
of insulating transnational elites from distractive noise and an endless range 
of opinions and perspectives that inhabit the broader public sphere. They also 
allow the focusing of the agenda and limitation of perspectives on those issues 
of global political economy that the owners and managers of private capital, as 
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well as the heads of international organisations and political institutions, 
consider relevant (cf. Tsingou 2015, 231). 
To enhance the quality and relevance of debate, TEC is typically 
regulated by implicit norms and criteria. While being carefully vetted on the 
basis of wealth, institutional position, perceived influence, the soundness of 
political attitudes and views and other such criteria, participants of elite 
forums are encouraged to transcend the “conceptual limitations of their office 
and constituencies” (Richardson et al. 2011, 55, 119–20). Discourse, in other 
words, is not meant to degenerate into bargaining or arguments between 
competing interests with each participant representing only themselves or 
their interest group. Instead, discussants are expected to present more general 
arguments and justify their positions by resorting to goals and values relating 
to the general good. These implicit norms thus echo the Kantian principles of 
enlightened public deliberation, in which participants are expected to enter 
the debate on public matters as “private” persons, presenting arguments 
independent of their occupations, professions or positions in the relations of 
production (Kant 1991 [1784]; see also Koivisto and Väliverronen 1996, 21). 
Moreover, demonstration of respect despite differences in opinion is one of 
the key norms in the behavioural code of these forums, as is the ability to 
present one’s views in a constructive, non-confrontational manner 
(Richardson et al. 2011, 55, 118). As a result, differences in views are being 
openly explored and confronted rather than swept under the carpet, which 
paves the way for, if not necessarily consensus, then at least mutual 
understanding of the grounds for disagreement (Gill 1990, 148). In this way, 
elite forums and media can be regarded as institutional forms of TEC that 
promote practices of “rational-critical debate” in which arguments are 
supposed to rise above particular interests and avoid the kind of promotional 
language of the public relations strategies by which the organisations seek to 
legitimise their private interests in the general public sphere (Habermas 
1989).72 
Mediated elite communication 
Yet, in addition to the various ways in which exclusivity and privacy 
characterises TEC, it also has various “public” dimensions. Both the forums 
and the elite media operate as platforms of communication that serve to 
 
                                                   
72 As Fraser (1990) has pointed out, the setting of norms on communication, which effectively 
serve to delimit participation, is a key element in the ideological function of any public sphere. 
Accordingly, participation in transnational elite communication is restricted not only by 
wealth, institutional position and status, but also by communicative norms that privilege 
certain cultural groups and socioeconomic classes. In this respect, the ideological nature of 
TEC is particularly evident in the (self-)representation of transnational elites at the World 
Economic Forum, as will be discussed in Chapter 6. 
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establish a common, or public, agenda among the elite concerning the 
management and control of the global economy. The shaping of the cognitive 
environment of the decision making in the global political economy takes place 
through such processes as agenda setting and framing (cf. Sassen 2001). Elite 
forums and media are spaces in which elites negotiate and develop shared 
views, which not only are likely to be introduced in the businesses, 
governments and other institutions they control but which also tend to become 
disseminated in the media of the general public and affect the agendas of those 
who compete with them or try to emulate them (cf. Rothkopf 2008, 303). The 
issues brought up and defined in elite interaction increase in salience in the 
minds of decision-makers and may consequently emerge, and carry the same 
framing, into more formal political and business agendas (Richardson et al. 
2011, 103). Through their ability to formulate policy agendas and disseminate 
them through the international media, transnational elites can therefore shape 
the meaning of central political concepts in the political debates around the 
management of the global economy and, increasingly, national economies 
(Robinson 2011). In tandem, elite individuals compete for influence and 
authority in the discussions over the global economy, attempting to take 
advantage of the higher visibility and credibility offered by the media outlets 
in order to gain acceptance for their views on policy measures and to control 
the political and economic agenda.  
The inevitable consequence of the use of elite media as a means of 
communication is heightened public exposure. Indeed, those belonging to the 
transnational elite are the focus of attention for reporters, journalists and 
editors in the international media. Besides the reinforcement of a hierarchy of 
visibility among elites, the publicity generated by international business and 
political journalism also creates a form of elite accountability (Tambini 2010). 
Indeed, much of TEC is directed at selected elite groups or institutions that are 
recognised as “authorities” in the field of global governance (Crack 2007, 349). 
Elite journalism provides a medium, or a platform, that can be used not just 
by journalists themselves but also by other elites to present justifications for 
certain policies or to question their legitimacy, as well as to make normative 
claims and demands on decision-makers. In this way, despite the absence of 
formal mechanisms of accountability in much of international politics, 
publicity generated by the elite media influences elite activities by creating a 
sense that “someone is paying attention” (Ettema 2007, 145–6). 
There is a consequent tension between the elites’ interest in the use of 
public channels of communication, and their preference to interact privately 
or to keep operations shrouded in secrecy. As Mills (1956, 91) pointed out, 
much of the exercise of power takes place behind closed doors, and those in 
power often see it convenient to keep out of the limelight.73 However, instead 
 
                                                   
73 Corporations, for instance, have been happy to exert their influence on the negotiations over 
regional trade agreements without any public exposure. This partly explains why information 
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of being content with quiet networking, backroom lobbying and gatherings in 
exclusive private clubs, transnational elites also get together in the open at 
places like Davos, and they employ the international elite media to gain 
visibility for their operations and political claims. One explanation to these 
apparently contradicting interests may lie in the way that prestige, reputation 
and status relate to power and authority and serve elite interests. As Mills 
(1956, 83–9) noted, media publicity not only increases the visibility of the 
message, but it also tends to increase personal status and build reputation. 
Elites often seek wide recognition and try to build a favourable reputation, not 
necessarily among the general public, but more so in the eyes of their peers. 
When successful, they gain status or prestige among elites, which often serves 
to increase their authority and influence. Therefore, the interest in turning 
power into authority by way of status and prestige is one way to understand 
why business executives, central bankers, officials and politicians seek global 
media attention and public recognition in the platforms of TEC. 
3.4 Elite communication and collective agency 
Transnational elite forums and media are not formal policy-making or 
decision-making institutions endowed with legislative, executive, regulatory 
or juridical powers. Their primary purpose is to participate in the processes of 
transnational policy formation and influence the eventual decision making in 
governments, central banks, inter-governmental organisations and TNCs.74 
Through associations and the media, transnational elites thus exert in the 
political economy a particular form of what Steven Lukes (2005) has called 
structural power, referring to an actor’s capacity to shape the parameters 
 
                                                   
on highly secretive trade negotiation processes, including the TPP and TTIP, have largely been 
gained through leaks (see, e.g., Carter 2012; EurActiv 2014). 
74 Elite forums and media can be located within a complex process of policy-formation in 
which the actual legislation, implementation, regulation and judicial proceedings represent 
only the final phase. Gill (1990, 162–3, based on Dye 1979, 212) has described the institutional 
matrix of the US policy-making process in which the activities of formal state institutions are 
preceded and complemented by a diverse combination of government commissions, councils 
and policy-planning groups but also by foundations, universities, corporations and influential 
individuals, as well as the media. This institutional nexus creates a complex web of influences, 
contacts, grants, endowments, interlocking directorates, contracts, policy recommendations, 
research reports and news items, all aiming at influencing the formal institutions of decision-
making. Within this assemblage, transnational elite forums and media can be seen as 
occupying key positions in the way they create connections between corporate, financial, 
university, civic, intellectual, and political leaders on matters of economic policy and 
international relations, both within and between nation-states. 
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within which others make decisions. Transnational elites obviously can wield 
structural power in various ways, including their financial, productive, 
legislative and military decisions (Pigman 2005; Rothkopf 2008, 304; Strange 
1996). The structural power exerted in TEC is analytically distinct from these 
other forms as it relates to the capacity of an actor to shape the normative and 
cognitive beliefs of other actors and thus the ideational terms on which 
political and economic decisions are made (cf. Carstensen and Schmidt 2016). 
In this sense, TEC is at the heart of global governance, insofar the latter is 
understood as a “transformational and innovative” practice that consists of 
“offering attractive new ideas, formulating new strategies, and persuading 
people of the importance of new social goals” (Avant et al. 2010, 9). Yet this 
communicative form of power also contributes to the capacity of political and 
business leaders to maintain their financial, productive and military forms of 
power at national and global levels (cf. Carstensen and Schmidt 2016, 326; 
Corcoran and Fahy 2009, 100). 
As Sassen (2001) has argued, the almost ubiquitous turn of governments 
all over the world towards the opening of markets and the liberalisation of 
trade in the 1990s can be regarded as one of the most dramatic consequences 
of the ability of transnational elites to exert power through ideas: 
[I]n the past decade many of the world's governments turned 180 
degrees in their policies regarding foreign investors, privatization, 
deregulation and opening up to global markets. We cannot simply 
assume that they all suddenly decided the global market is better […] 
or that it is the result of the United States and the IMF exercising raw 
power. It entailed persuasion and resocialisation of government 
officials, an education about what it meant to adequately run a 
national economy. A whole new culture of government had to be 
produced, one that drastically redefined the desirable relation between 
states, global firms and global markets. In brief, it took “cultural 
work.” 
Sassen 2001. 
In the quote, Sassen refers specifically to the World Economic Forum, 
describing it as one of the spaces in which such persuasive and socialising 
“cultural work” gets done. But the same case can be made of other informal 
forums, as well as the media, that reproduced, shaped and disseminated the 
views of transnational elites and thus facilitated the international turn to a 
liberalising agenda of globalisation in the 1990s. 75  In a similar manner, 
 
                                                   
75 Obviously, the influence transnational elites exert through forums and the media should not 
be solely credited with the almost universal turn towards policies of market liberalisation in 
the 1980s and 1990s. It was surely a result of a complex set of converging forces, including the 
capacity of the United States government, the IMF and other creditor institutions to impose 
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Robinson (2011) argues that transnational elites connected to the capitalist 
global economy have been instrumental in shifting political and economic 
discourse in the past three decades. TEC, in other words, is considered to be 
closely connected to the interests of the globalising elite who seek new avenues 
to move and allocate capital and look to bring down the boundaries that hinder 
the free movement of commodities and capital. What happens in the global 
economy is of central importance to investors, managers of TNCs, 
international officials and political leaders, and much of the agenda of 
transnational elite forums and media revolves around the issues of economic 
governance and the global markets. For their part, business and financial 
journalists, particularly in those media outlets not directed to general 
audiences, tend to position themselves in the service of investors and other 
parties that need market relevant information (Allen and Savigny 2012, 281; 
Tambini 2010, 160; Doyle 2006; Davis 2007a, 64–5). 
Elite forums and media, obviously, do not dictate any collective will that 
their members and audiences adopt. Instead, the influence that these groups 
and media exert is more subtle, relating to the way they promote certain ideas, 
values and ways of seeing the world among the elite. (Cf. Richardson et al. 
2011, 204–5.) Accordingly, as much as it integrates transnational elites into 
common communicative spaces (see Chapter 2.1), TEC also contributes to the 
shaping of the discursive forces that structure their decisions and actions as 
individuals and groups, as well as their relations with non-elite groups in 
society (cf. Carstensen and Schmidt 2016, 329–31). It is, in other words, deeply 
connected to the operation of ideology as a key element in the transnational 
elites’ exercise of power in world society. 
Ideology and elite agency 
Regarding the ideological dimensions of communication in the exercise of 
power, we can roughly distinguish between two relevant perspectives. The first 
relates to the relationship between the elite and subordinate groups and to 
ideology’s function as a way of maintaining relations of domination. From this 
perspective, ideology refers to those ideas and beliefs that are held by a 
“dominant social power”, that promote and legitimize this power’s interests 
and that help it sustain a certain political and social order in the face of 
opposing interests by “securing the complicity of subordinated classes and 
groups” (Eagleton 2007, 29–30). Due to the institutional power of 
 
                                                   
the Washington Consensus on debtor countries of the developing world (e.g., Panitch and 
Gindin 2012), as well as the demise of opposing political ideologies after the collapse of the 
socialist countries. Yet the capacity of transnational elite forums and media to incorporate 
business and political elites from the non-Western world and to disseminate the liberal 
internationalist agenda among them was arguably a key element in the concerted move 
towards a more integrated global economy, especially in the decade after the cold war. 
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transnational elites in world society, the ideology formulated in TEC, and 
enacted in their actions and practices, shapes and reproduces the hegemonic 
order of social relations in the global economy and world society. However, as 
Lukes (2005, 7–9) points out, such elite hegemony is based not only on an 
ideological basis of ideas, values and beliefs, but also on a “material basis” in 
the sense that elites secure their position through compromises with the 
interests of other groups. The idea of hegemony as a constant need for appeal, 
negotiation and compromise to secure legitimacy of a particular order serves 
as an important reminder about the limits of the elites’ power. Even as 
transnational elites make and coordinate decisions, which may have global 
consequences, they do not form a clique that has control over historical events 
(cf. Mills 1956, 20–2). To maintain their position of power and exert their 
influence over the global economy, elites need to both develop shared 
meanings, ideas, beliefs and values, which justify their position and interests, 
and to seek compromises with other groups.  Other social forces and groups 
may thus always challenge transnational elites and force them to re-direct 
political agendas. 
There is also a second dimension to ideology, however, which Terry 
Eagleton (2007, 222) identifies – and rejects – as the “sociological” view. From 
this perspective, ideology operates as a “’cognitive map’ which orientates its 
agents to action”. This dimension, in other words, refers not so much to the 
dynamics between dominant and subordinate groups, but rather to the 
operation of ideology within a certain group itself. From this point-of-view, 
TEC contributes to the making of the elite as a collective agent and provides 
its members rationales for action. Regarding the notion of collective agency, 
we may approach it in at least two ways. On one hand, the notion refers to a 
group whose members are consciously engaged in a concerted effort to realise 
a shared objective (see Roth 2016). Accordingly, philosophy of agency often 
posits that collective agency presumes collective intentionality: individuals 
who engage in joint action, or consciously share a belief, desire or intention, 
express collective intentionality (Searle 2003, 198). Margaret Gilbert (2003) 
has described the basis of this collective intentionality, action and belief in 
terms of joint commitments. In her view, collective agency entails actors who 
jointly commit to an action or belief as a collective, as well as an explicit 
expression of this commitment between the members of the group. Thereby 
committing to a joint action creates a normative obligation to follow such 
commitment (ibid., 56; see also Tuomela 2003, 103).  
On the other hand, the notion of collective agency describes the way in 
which human agency is always related to social interaction. As Barry Barnes 
(2000, 51) argues, individuals are susceptible to social influences and 
pressures, and these influences are mediated in communicative interaction. In 
action, individuals make use of knowledge, which is collectively generated and 
which the individuals trust as the knowledge of their social reality. From this 
latter perspective, therefore, individual agency does not in fact exist in the 
sense of perfectly “voluntary” action prompted by “independent” mind or will. 
Global economic governance and transnational elite formation 
112 
 
All human agency is social in nature, and individuals always act, whether 
consciously or not, in relationship with other people, as members of groups – 
i.e. “collectively”. The notion of collective agency thus points to the character 
of humans as essentially social agents who have an inclination towards 
agreement and co-ordination and who constantly adjust and align in 
interaction with other agents (Barnes 2000, 56). In this sense, all action 
manifests collective, rather than individual action. 
The former interpretation of “collective agency” can perhaps be regarded 
as the common sense understanding of the term while the latter is a rather 
abstract and even counter-intuitive proposition. Even if we may accept that 
pure individual action in the sense of independent voluntarism does not exist 
but that all action takes place in interaction with others so that others 
inevitably influence the actions of an individual, it does seem far-fetched to 
argue that all action is thereby realised by a collective. Moreover, some actions 
clearly are more collective than others in the sense that the members of the 
group consciously commit to a collective objective and act in concordance with 
others to achieve it – consider, for instance the way a football team operates 
collectively (see Roth 2016). Buying a company share in the stock market with 
the purpose of private gain, in contrast, must be considered to be a much more 
individual effort, even if we acknowledge that such operation is dependent on 
other people and influenced by shared knowledge of the market environment.  
We can perhaps regard the operation of a team as an ideal type of 
collective agency – collectively acting for a shared goal – and acknowledge that 
in practice social groups typically do not act in such collectively coordinated 
manner. This, however, does not mean that groups seize to influence the 
actions of their members. Moreover, at times, the actions of a group may 
become “more collective” in character, as when its members become more 
aware of the group, identify more strongly with it, negotiate collective goals 
and commit to them in their own action. Jennifer Mitzen (2011, 59–60) 
emphasises the significance of publicity in creating the normative pull of 
honouring such commitments. This is because collective intentionality 
requires shared knowledge of the intention and of the commitment to it by 
each participant. In the context of international relations, Mitzen (ibid., 60) 
specifically emphasises the significance of elite forums as spaces in which 
participants appear, meet face-to-face, adopt certain discourses and make 
known their joint commitments in the process of problem solving. They 
therefore “draw individual behaviour under common rubrics, steering 
collective behaviours towards their goals and projects”. 
Communication is thus essential for collective agency. Already the 
abstract notion of human agency as inherently social or collective underlines 
the influence of the social interaction and communication within a group on 
the actions of its members. But more importantly, communication is the 
prerequisite for a group potentially developing more concerted forms of 
action, or becoming a “more collective” agent. Collective goals and projects are 
defined via communication, and they influence individual action in terms of 
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creating obligation, potentially shaping a person’s intentions, objectives and 
even values. Communication also creates new collective goals and interests, 
steering future action. This development into a more coherent collective may 
lead to a more concerted action by its individual members.  
Speaking of the transnational elite as a collective agent thus refers, first 
and foremost, to the idea that human agency is not purely individual; actions 
do not arise from any independent powers and capacities of the individual. 
Moreover, without arguing that transnational elites act concertedly for a 
common purpose, the notion suggests that for those belonging to a 
transnational elite, the knowledge and social influence exerted in 
communication with their fellow elites forms a significant part of the cultural, 
normative and ideological context in which they decide upon their action. 
Much of the knowledge, normative ideas and values that transnational elites 
resort to in order to make sense of their actions derives from the intra- and 
inter-elite communication with their peers. The communicative interaction 
between elites, therefore, constructs shared understandings and can, in time, 
potentially lead to more concerted collective agency. 
Ideology in the sense of a cognitive map that informs agency entails both 
ontological beliefs about the nature of reality and normative ideas, values and 
principles. However, from this perspective transnational elite forums and 
media are not so much about the formulation and promotion of ideas and 
values with the intention of serving the individual and collective interests of 
the elite, let alone about disingenuous rationalisations and intentional 
obfuscations of an unjust social reality, as they are about helping the elites to 
navigate in the social world. Along these lines, Mills (1956, 13–5) argued that 
“the moral conception of the elite”, which he considered to be prevalent in the 
US public discourse of his day and concerned the purportedly virtuous values 
and moral character of the powerful social groups, was not mere rhetoric to 
legitimise elite power and privileges. It was part of the upbringing and 
socialisation of the members of the elite themselves, and thus it had the 
capacity to direct their actual behaviour and social practices. 
As this study focuses on the intra-elite communication of transitional 
elites, it primarily deals with the agency-constructive dimension of ideology. 
It is important to note, however, that this does not preclude the recognition of 
the importance of the hegemonic and legitimising dimension of ideology. In 
fact, Mills’ allusion to the “moral conception of the elite” works as a useful link 
between the two dimensions. The idea of the powerful as intellectually or 
morally superior to the underprivileged, and therefore deserving of their status 
and power, is often used to legitimise the prevailing social order, but such 
notions of moral character also place expectations and exigencies on the 
behaviour of the powerful. The popular practice of philanthropy among the 
elite, as well as their public concerns about the environmental costs of 
business, are good examples of such expectations directed at the elite to 
address social needs and problems. In the case of TEC, therefore, studying the 
operation of the elites’ ideological power involves two directions: observing 
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how it shapes the elites as moral agents and how it justifies their power as 
moral agents. 
Elite media and ideology 
When it comes specifically to the elite media, they can be regarded as key 
operatives in both dimensions of ideology. As a cultural practice, journalism 
can be considered ideological in the basic sense that it represents the world in 
language and thus constructively patterns this representation by certain kinds 
of values (Fowler 1991, 4). In this regard, there are several elements in 
mainstream journalism generally and the international elite publications 
specifically, which tend to make them supportive of the attitudes and 
worldviews held by the business and political elites, thereby reproducing the 
hegemony-constituting dimension of ideology. Already the commercial basis 
of much of global media prompts them to align with the interests of their elite 
funders, and the similar educational backgrounds journalists share with the 
business and political elites often leads them to adopt rather homogeneous 
assumptions about the economy and markets (Merrill 2012). More 
significantly, the very professional culture of journalists is imbued with 
practices that favour the points-of-view and sense-making of elites. These 
include the practices of selection and representation, the privileging of elites 
as sources and their simultaneous legitimation as powerholders, and the 
adoption of elite frames of reference through being deeply embedded in their 
worlds of operation (Fowler 1991, 18–20; Grünberg and Pallas 2013). 
Accordingly, Fowler (1991, 23–4) concludes that the institutional elite sources 
favoured by journalists provide them “with modes of discourse which already 
encode the attitudes of the powerful elite” so that the media largely end up 
adopting the language and reproducing the attitudes of the elite. 
Overall, journalists working for publications and outlets focusing on 
international business and politics can be considered as part of transnational 
elites, articulating and reproducing dominant ideologies either unwittingly or 
fully aware of their position (cf. van Dijk 1988a, x; Allen and Savigny 2012). 
This is why scholars have indicated that business journalism not only defends 
prevailing economic interests of investors and corporations by generally 
failing to represent views and interests of the non-business community or to 
report on the longer-term societal impacts of financial markets and businesses 
(Allen and Savigny 2012; Davis 2000; Merrill 2012); it also tends to support 
and legitimise the policies of dominant international organisations (Durham 
2007). Jeff Madrick (2002), for instance, argues that the failure of the 
financial media to challenge the conventional wisdom about the beneficial 
nature of neoliberal reforms and the liberalisation of financial markets, let 
alone presenting alternatives to those policies, led to highly narrow and one-
sided reporting on globalisation and contributed to failures in international 
economic policy making in the 1990s.  Even more broadly, the news media 
have been regarded as a cultural force that both drives and naturalises the 
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processes of globalisation and financialization (Fairclough 2006; Greenfield 
and Williams 2007). 
Aside from their contribution to legitimising the social order and 
hegemonic power relations by reproducing and disseminating elite ideas, 
worldviews and attitudes, the international elite media are also significant for 
the agency-enabling dimensions of ideology. This can be witnessed already in 
the eagerness of elite forums and clubs to integrate members of the media 
sector. Despite being typically held in confidentiality and closed to the news 
media, elite gatherings from the Munich Security Conference and Sun Valley 
to Bilderberg and Trilateral Commission tend to include a host of media 
owners and executives as well as prominent journalists, columnists and editors 
of the elite news media (e.g., De La Merced 2014; Gill 1990, 158).76 According 
to Richardson and colleagues (2011, 167–9), media executives and prominent 
columnists are valued in these gatherings partly for their presumed touch and 
influence on the “state of opinion”: journalists can contribute to the elite 
activities with a reference to a broader context and common sense in which the 
discussions take place, and, they also go on to disseminate the participants’ 
views to wider elite and non-elite audiences. Accordingly, as journalists 
essentially reflect elite opinion back to the elite, their operation as 
intermediates between elites is valued as much as, if not more than, their 
instrumentality in disseminating elite views to mass audiences. 
Certainly, journalists are not simply passive carriers of messages 
between members of the elite but contribute to the generation of ideas and 
policy proposals. Editors and columnists of elite publications seek to impact 
international political and business agendas themselves, often with the intent 
of shifting policy and elite opinion. Accordingly, members of the elite often pay 
attention to the opinions of journalists that they consider influential (Davis 
2007b). On the whole, however, many empirical studies suggest that 
columnists and editors of elite publications tend to follow elite opinion rather 
than challenge it (e.g., Durham 2007; Habel 2012; Madrick 2002; Robinson 
2001; Trenz 2007). Specifically addressing economic, business and financial 
journalism, Gary Merrill (2012) argues that, even in the wake of the market 
failure of catastrophic magnitude witnessed in 2008–9, the industry has 
remained a staunch supporter of “pro-market ideologies”, continuing to 
disseminate assumptions about efficient markets and market-based solutions 
to social problems (see also Nederveen Pieterse 2009).  
Overall, what studies of elite journalism often indicate is that while 
editors and prominent columnists actively participate in the framing and 
opinion formation of policy issues, they tend to legitimise and corroborate the 
fundamental beliefs and values that prevail among transnational elites. The 
 
                                                   
76 See also https://www.securityconference.de/en/activities/munich-security-
conference/msc-2014/participants/ and http://bilderbergmeetings.co.uk/media-lobby/ 
(both accessed 14 November 2015). 
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ideological nature of international elite media manifests, therefore, especially 
in the way these publications address the elite and their individual and 
collective concerns. Based on her analysis of the globalisation narratives of The 
Economist, Martha Starr (2004) observes that the publication not only offers 
relevant information but also provides other gratifications to its international 
readership of corporate and political elites. Most significantly, the publication 
produces meanings that resonate with the life circumstances of its readers. As 
globalisation touches the everyday life and work of transnational elites, The 
Economist’s coverage helps them to orientate in the world that requires 
business decisions, investments and policy-making in international settings. 
According to Starr, this orientation is not only about knowledge and “staying 
informed” but more broadly about positioning oneself in the world of 
“uncertainties”. International elite media, in other words, help the elites map 
their place in the world and to come up with ways to operate in it. This agency-
constructive role of the media carries significant implications for the ability of 
transnational elites to act collectively. 
3.5 Becoming transnational elite 
The top corporations are not a set of splendidly isolated giants. They 
have been knit together by explicit associations … These associations 
organize a unity among the managerial elite and other members of the 
corporate rich. They translate narrow economic powers into industry-
wide and class-wide powers; and they use these powers, first, on the 
economic front, for example with reference to labour and its 
organizations; and second, on the political front, for example in their 
large role in the political sphere. And they infuse into the ranks of 
smaller businessmen the views of big business.  
Mills 1956, 122. 
Forums, media and other forms of associational life are powerful vehicles for 
self-organising of groups. The transnational forums and associations 
connecting business executives, national policy makers and international 
officials are testament to their perceived need to transcend both narrow 
industry and specific national interests and to articulate common goals on a 
transnational scale. Accordingly, the establishment of a growing number of 
platforms for TEC suggests the potential capacity of those connected by shared 
public spaces to formulate and disseminate collective interests and mobilise 
these interests in social organisation. 
Historical precedents and parallels to the contemporary mobilisation of 
collective interests in TEC can be traced to the development of new 
communicative forms and associational practices by the seventeenth and 
eighteenth century bourgeoisie in Europe (see Calhoun 1992; Eley 1992; 
Habermas 1989). In his historical study of the idea and practice of the public 
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sphere, Habermas (1989) associated the capacity of the bourgeoisie to 
generalise their interests and to turn state power into the service of those 
interests with their self-organisation through communicative practices (see 
also Habermas 1992, 431). During this period, industrialisation, as well as the 
expansion of capitalist forms of production and social relationships, paved the 
way for the growing class of urban merchants, bankers, industrialists, 
manufacturers, artisans and other professionals who owned their means of 
production. Being excluded from formal positions of state power controlled by 
the absolutist monarch and the nobility, the bourgeoisie established informal 
clubs and associations for the purposes of networking, interaction, sharing of 
information and debating public affairs regarding the economic life and 
activities of the state. Their coming together as groups of engaged civic agents 
to challenge the political authorities was also facilitated by the press, which 
grew out of the increasing need for news and information prompted by the 
expanding commodity markets. These modes of interaction and 
communication marked a new social, cultural and political discourse, 
concerning matters of “public interest” but taking place outside the formal 
state apparatus and among the propertied, managerial and professional 
groups. 
When assessing the nature and significance of the contemporary forms 
of association and communication among transnational elites in light of 
historical precedents and parallels, Geoff Eley’s (1992) critical and 
complementary analysis of Habermas’s original thesis is particularly useful. 
Concentrating on the organisation of the German bourgeoisie, Eley adopts a 
Gramscian perspective on bourgeois class formation and emphasises the 
significance of associational life and public communication in the 
development of bourgeois collective identity. Several facets in this account 
appear highly relevant when considering the contemporary networking and 
group formation of transnationally-oriented business executives, officials and 
political leaders. First, according to Eley (1992, 297) the clubs and associations 
were highly exclusive spaces of elite communication: they included only “the 
most prestigious pillars of local society”, consisting of the most successful 
businessmen, merchants, lawyers, doctors and civil servants. Second, the 
clubs and associations provided members of the bourgeoisie opportunities to 
forge personal relationships with their peers and spaces for setting aside the 
competitive behaviour and utilitarian interchange governing the marketplace, 
thus facilitating more amicable interchange and feelings of fraternity among 
their members (ibid.; see also van der Pijl 1998, 102–3). Third, through the 
associations the bourgeoisie engaged in public activities such as participating 
in charitable or philanthropic committees and public projects, patronising 
arts, promoting education, organising public festivals and commemorating 
historical events (Eley 1992, 297). Fourth, by facilitating communication on 
public matters, the newspapers and associations helped the bourgeoisie to 
transcend their particularistic interests as individuals and entrepreneurs and 
were thus instrumental in the ability of the bourgeoisie to formulate and 
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negotiate a common interest and a political project based on the idea of 
national interest (ibid., 302; see also Calhoun 1992, 35). Fifth, the press and 
the clubs and associations of the bourgeoisie facilitated their growing self-
awareness as an elite group. They constituted spaces for the self-reflection of 
their increasing political strength and offered the context for the expression of 
their aspiration for general social leadership (Eley 1992, 298). In this way, 
associational life and mediated communication were elementary to the self-
organisation of the bourgeoisie as a social class. 
If the associational life and communicative practice of modern 
bourgeoisie contributed to its formation and growing self-realisation as a class, 
similar arguments have floated in recent decades relating to the transnational 
business and political elite (e.g., Faux 2006, 120; van der Pijl 1998, 121–3). As 
a precursor to contemporary debates, Mills (1956, 281–3) emphasised the 
importance of elite clubs, associations and newspapers in the creation of 
mutual recognition and “class consciousness”; and despite his focus on the 
institutional and cultural integration of the US American elite on a national 
level, he also witnessed how elites had the capacity to form close ties on an 
international basis – even across the borders of countries at war. In a similar 
manner, Barnet and Müller (1974, 48–9) argued that as businesses 
internationalised their operations and started to create global markets, 
corporate executives simultaneously developed ideas to rationalise their 
operations and the historical role they played in the integration of the global 
economy. Elite forums were significant in promoting these ideas. As executives 
gathered in seminars to map the future of the corporate environment, they 
simultaneously “buil[t] class consciousness”, or “a shared sense of goals and 
means for achieving those goals, a common awareness of problems and 
opportunities”.  
Stephen Gill (1990, 50), in another application of Gramscian vocabulary, 
has interpreted international organisations, councils, policy-planning groups 
and philanthropic associations as places where a “transnational capitalist 
class” develops its consciousness and solidarity. In this respect, particularly 
important individuals are what Gill (1994, 182) calls “globalising elites”, 
referring to the “organic intellectuals” who occupy “positions in key strategic 
locations in transnational companies, banks, universities, think tanks, media 
companies, governments, and international organizations”. Their purpose, in 
Gill’s account is to “seek to make transnational capital a class ‘for itself’ by 
theorising the world order and by synthesising strategy” (see also Robinson 
and Harris 2000). Today, the G7 and G20 meetings of political leaders and 
central bankers, the central IGOs, and the policy forums connecting decision 
makers in international business and politics have been described as spaces 
for the elite’s recognition and expression of its “global leadership” (Gill 2012). 
In sum, the physical and mediated spaces of TEC can be understood as 
sites for the making of the transnational elite as a collective agent. In these 
spaces, elites engage in the formation of group consciousness, shared 
understandings and negotiation over common interests, thereby emulating 
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the historical experiences and practices of the European bourgeoisie during 
early capitalism and potentially coming together as a self-conscious “class”. It 
is evident that the secluded and exclusive nature that characterises 
institutional and mediated forms of TEC serves the purpose of strengthening 
the sense of cohesion among participants. The forums are typically designed 
as private spaces outside the realms of work and production, and the inclusion 
is strictly controlled and limited by the criteria of wealth, institutional position 
and perceived influence. In such surroundings, as Mills (1956, 11) points out, 
members of elite clubs tend to develop a sense of friendship, loyalty and “a 
kind of mutual attraction” towards each other, which may lead them to accept 
each other and treat one another differently than people who do not belong to 
the group. Consequently, through their membership in associations, 
participants can develop their identity as members of the elite. A sense of elite 
membership is attractive to many individuals in the realms of business and 
politics, and participation in transnational elite networks tends to reinforce 
one’s sense of power and influence (Richardson et al. 2011, 133–5, 142–3, 179). 
Elite clubs thus play a central part in the generation of a sense of collectivity: 
they are places to recognise and be recognised by other participants as 
members of a privileged group (Mills 1956, 281–3; Tsingou 2015, 230–2). In 
the same way, specialist media can reinforce transnational elite identification 
among its readership (Starr 2004). 
Problems of transnational elite formation 
Despite evident similarities between the rise of the bourgeois public as 
theorised by Habermas and Eley and the contemporary forms of self-
organisation among transnational elites, there are also significant differences 
in the character of these two phenomena. Indeed, while many practices of 
transnational elite interaction are analogous to those of the bourgeoisie, the 
societal contexts of the two historical groups are different in some essential 
aspects. First, even if the European bourgeoisie may have expressed forms of 
transnational solidarity and even global consciousness (Koselleck 1988), the 
bourgeois public spheres were characteristically national in nature, oriented 
in the articulation of “national interests” and mobilised to express political 
demands from the bourgeois class on the national sovereign (Eley 1992; 
Habermas 1989). Not only is the national orientation less pronounced in TEC 
that focuses on issues of “global” concern, there is no single site of 
transnational authority from which the transnational elites would be excluded 
from and which it would address with its demands.  
Second, and relatedly, TEC is not marked by the kind of fundamental 
contradiction between the state and civil society that was arguably the case 
with the early bourgeois public sphere. Instead of positioning itself in 
separation from and opposition to the state, the transnational elite is 
characterised by the constant intertwining of the domains of business and 
politics, or state and market, in institutional capacities, personal interaction 
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and individual identities (see Chapter 1.2). Hence TEC incorporates members 
from various domains of society, including those exerting political and 
bureaucratic powers within state apparatuses.77  
Third, the absence of a sovereign locus of power in world society alters 
the “political functions” of public communication. Whereas the early capitalist 
public sphere aimed at rendering the state into a channel for bourgeois 
interests (Habermas 1989; Koselleck 1988), the construction of collective 
agency in TEC cannot be simply articulated in terms of a societal upheaval in 
which a certain group comes to dominate a single centre of power. The very 
significance of a political project, when understood in terms of a quest for 
power, is questionable as far as transnational elites are concerned, because 
they, by definition, already hold most of the institutional positions of power in 
the global political economy. Alternatively, we may conceive of the elite’s 
political project in different terms. On one hand, instead of a hegemonic 
project challenging existing power structures or aiming at the assumption of 
power, the political project can be articulated in terms of exercising that power 
towards certain purposes.  
On the other hand, we might argue that the very absence of a central 
locus of power in world society creates the need for the explicit articulation of 
a common project and coordination of interests within the elite. Thus, the 
transnational elite’s political project can also be conceived of as an attempt to 
create a way of integrating power on a global scale. From this perspective, 
contemporary elite communication over global issues aims at influencing the 
decision making of influential people in the spheres of politics, business and 
public administration, and this can be seen as an attempted re-introduction of 
the “public sphere” as a powerful factor in politics, only this time on a 
transnational realm. Therefore, as an analogy to what Habermas (1989) 
described as the political functions of the bourgeois public sphere in terms of 
its ability to bring public issues under the supervision of the critical public, the 
formation of spaces for TEC can be interpreted as an attempt to solve the 
problem of governing the global economy by reinforcing its collective control 
through the means of public deliberation, or so that the use of unilateral power 
can be surpassed in favour of rule by “general will” based on critical reason (cf. 
Koselleck 1988).78  
 
                                                   
77 It should be noted, however, that even bourgeois associations and clubs historically included 
a significant number of members of state bureaucracy (see Calhoun 1992, 48n56). The 
bourgeois public sphere, in other words, did not consist only of businessmen, and the very 
notion of “bourgeois” was quite broad, referring often to civilised and learned men. Therefore, 
transnational elites in the global political economy may largely reflect the early bourgeois 
publics in their constitution – not least for remaining highly male-dominated (see Fraser 
1990). 
78 The irony is, of course, that the access to this public deliberation is carefully managed and 
restricted to a small and exclusive elite of experts, the powerful and the wealthy, and tuned to 
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Fourth, taking place outside the scope of the formal institutions of any 
particular state or society, TEC forms an essentially “private” sphere consisting 
of autonomous individuals deliberating on public matters, thereby 
reproducing the public-private dialectic of the early bourgeois public sphere. 
However, whereas the bourgeois public sphere mediated between the state, 
understood as the national political system, and civil society, conceived as the 
sphere of activities for free individuals and market agents, TEC mediates 
relations between what might be termed the spheres of the “global economy” 
and the “transnational state apparatus” that makes up the institutions and 
practices of global governance (see Robinson 2004; 2011). In these spaces, 
businesspeople engage with the representatives of legislative and regulative 
decision makers in an essentially private and unofficial manner beyond the 
bounds of any formal authority or political process. 
Finally, a sense of common interest and class consciousness develops in 
a complex historical context influenced by material and ideological forces and 
are by no means inevitable outcomes of group interaction and communication. 
For Habermas (1989), the “political function” of the bourgeois public sphere 
was closely tied to the economic interests of the class, and he attributed the 
liberalisation of trade and markets and the legislative guarantees of private 
ownership in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries partly to the successful 
rendering of the public sphere into service of the political and economic 
interests of industrial and finance capitalism. Similarly, the bankers, business 
leaders, politicians and international officials, who come together in 
transnational elite forums and are most closely tied to the operations of the 
global economy, have often been characterised by their conscious promotion 
of “liberal internationalist” views in economic policy and international 
relations (Gill 1990, 143–4; 1994, 189; Panitch and Gindin 2012, 163, van der 
Pijl 2012, 9–13, 28–9). For Gill (1990, 53–4), the Trilateral Commission marks 
an attempt to develop a “universalist ideology of common global interests” that 
would at least partly reflect the policy preferences of the transnational banks 
and corporations centrally involved in its proceedings. 
However, as Eley (1992) emphasised, the common interests and class 
consciousness of the bourgeoisie were not predetermined, and they did not 
arise naturally from the objective socioeconomic position that its members 
occupied. Instead, they needed to be negotiated, and this was the actual 
cultural and political function of the bourgeois public sphere; it provided the 
institutional and discursive forms with which to articulate a shared identity 
 
                                                   
advancing the particular set of interests of this group of people (see Richardson et al. 2011, 
217). In his critique of the bourgeois ideal of the public sphere, Habermas (1989) alluded to a 
similar paradox: for him, the ideological nature of the bourgeois public was manifested in the 
illusion that it represented the general interests of the people while in reality advancing the 
particular interests of the bourgeoisie. In this same contradiction lies the ultimately 
ideological nature of transnational elite communication. 
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and idea of a common good (see also Calhoun 1992, 34–5). Correspondingly, 
the common interests and group consciousness of transnational elites cannot 
be simply inferred from the material circumstances and institutional positions 
of its members. Insofar as such class formation takes place on a transnational 
level, it is dependent on the ability of the elites to overcome rivalries and 
divisions and to create “communities of interests” (cf. Mills 1956, 283). 
Successful articulation of common interests is therefore a key condition to the 
power that elites can collectively exercise.  
In TEC, attempts to formulate a sense of a shared set of interests are 
partly offset by the simultaneous objectives of incorporation, inclusion and co-
optation. As the history of international elite forums and media suggests, US 
and European elite networks have extended to non-western parts of the world 
after World War 2, in step with the globalisation of relations of finance, 
production and trade. Simultaneously, the goal has been to influence the 
opinions, attitudes, dominant ideas and frames of reference among business 
and political elites in both western and non-western societies. Accordingly, the 
integration of Japanese elites into western elite networks was the general 
reason for the establishment of the Trilateral Commission, but the forum has 
had a more particular reason for existence: to shift the economic and foreign 
policy orientations of the major powers and to “internationalise” the outlook 
of the policymakers in the participant countries (Gill 1990, 143–4). Moreover, 
transnational elites have sought to include elements from various sectors of 
society in many of their forums in order to prevent social conflicts and to 
overcome divisions, including those between productive and financial capital, 
between industry and labour, and between the public and private sectors (van 
der Pijl 1998, 159; Richardson et al. 2011, 160–3). 
There are obvious limits to such incorporation of new elites and groups 
into TEC, however, as well as there are limits to the capacity of binding them 
together behind a collective political project. With successful inclusion of 
various societal groups, increased differences of economic interests, political 
orientations and cultural perspectives may easily start to erode the sense of 
commonality and solidarity among the elites. Therefore, acting collectively 
and wielding power effectively in the global political economy may become 
increasingly difficult (see also Naím 2013, 18). There is an obvious tension 
within the two goals in TEC of trying to simultaneously promote group 
cohesion and the incorporation of new elements. 
A group consciousness and the articulation of common interests and 
political projects, therefore, are by no means inevitable consequences of the 
social interaction between members of the elite. The shared identities and 
ideological projects cannot be taken as pre-existing but need to be understood 
as contingent entities that need to be actively negotiated and continuously 
constructed. In this respect, exclusive forums and clubs can play an important 
role in such efforts of incorporation and co-optation, as they encourage 
informal association between the participants and promote a sense of 
cohesiveness and solidarity. Similarly, international elite media can tie the 
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elite together as an imagined collective by facilitating the articulation of and 
negotiation over shared ideas, common interests and political programs. What 
the successful formation of transnational elite agency ultimately comes down 
to is their capacity in TEC to articulate shared conceptions of reality (a 
knowledge environment or ontology); a collective identity (the moral 
conception and an imagined community of the transnational elite); and a 
political project (common ideas, values and a policy agenda). 
4 NOTES ON EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY 
The primary research problem guiding this study is to inquire into the 
potential of contemporary forms of transnational elite communication to 
facilitate the integration and self-organisation of elites into a group capable of 
and enacting collective agency. The preceding chapters have discussed the 
importance of the institutions and practices of TEC for the governance of 
global capitalism and argued that, to the extent to which we can speak of an 
integrated transnational elite capable of collective agency, it realises itself in 
TEC that brings its members together in exclusive communicative spaces. In 
TEC, the transnational elite may potentially self-organise itself by formulating 
shared policy agendas and constructing a self-conception of itself as a 
historical agent. The conception of the transnational elite as a collective agent 
has thus emphasised the culturally constructed nature of agency. Deep-rooted 
cultural beliefs and conventions normalise and legitimise individuals, 
organisations and states as actors in modern society and make collective 
agency both possible and meaningful (Meyer and Jepperson 2000). The 
cultural scripts of actorhood also guide and discipline the agents in many ways 
(Hopf 2009).  
When applied to transnational elites as individuals and a collective, the 
idea of the cultural construction of agency points to the importance of 
observing real-world TEC. It is precisely in the interactions with their peers 
that transnational elites potentially create and shape an understanding of 
themselves as agents. In this regard, the study focuses particularly on 
international elite media and journalism as a form of this inter- or intra-elite 
communication. What makes elite journalism an interesting object of study is 
its relevance as part of the daily sense-making environment of transnational 
elites. Journalism disseminates certain ideas and beliefs within the 
international elite public, and it grants them legitimacy and authority. Elite 
media may also reinforce a sense of transnational elite identity by facilitating 
the creation of an imagined community of their readers and audiences. These 
facets of the media can be regarded as integral elements in the potential 
cultural construction of transnational elite agency. Accordingly, the empirical 
part of the study analyses the Financial Times coverage of the World Economic 
Forums with an intention of exploring the actual discursive processes of 
transnational elite agency formation in TEC.  
Before moving on to the analysis, this chapter discusses the 
methodological choices and describes the methods that guided the empirical 
analysis. The first section outlines the motives and rationales for selecting the 
FT coverage of the World Economic Forums as the site of analysis. It also 
describes the steps taken in the collection and selection of the data which 
consists of 532 newspaper articles. The second section opens the process of 
data analysis. It connects the qualitative analysis to the earlier discussion on 
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theorising as a research strategy (see Chapter 1.4) by explaining how both 
theoretical concepts and the empirical material were made use of in order to 
draw analytical observations. The section also presents the notion of 
“epistemic work” (Alasuutari and Qadir 2014), which helped to organise the 
observations and to connect them with the research problem of transnational 
elite formation. The third section discusses how the texts of the FT can be 
interpreted as representative of the elites’ epistemic work while also 
acknowledging the agency of the paper and its journalists as significant users 
and shapers of inter-elite interaction. Finally, the fourth section outlines the 
questions that guide the analysis of the material. 
4.1 Data collection, selection and classification 
As one of the most high-profile annual gatherings that bring together 
transnational elites, and perhaps the most internationally publicised media 
event of its kind, the World Economic Forum in Davos is of specific interest 
for the purposes of the study. At the end of each January, political leaders, 
business executives, heads of international organisations, central bankers, top 
economists from the private and public sectors and other experts discuss 
world affairs with a view on the year ahead. The agenda is broad, including 
issues related to various business sectors, regional markets, international 
relations, environmental concerns, philanthropy and even spiritual 
development, but overall it is tuned towards addressing the present state and 
future developments in the global economy. The WEF agenda thus directs the 
elites’ attention mostly away from narrow national and business-specific 
interests to a set of common or “public” concerns relating to the global 
economy and world society. Meanwhile, the repetitiveness of the annual 
meeting and its familiar form make it possible to trace continuities and 
changes over time in the actual agenda and ideational content in TEC. 
There are various alternatives available to analyse the Davos debates, 
even if the researcher fails to gain accreditation to the site itself. For a “direct” 
access, the forum publishes a great amount of content online for anyone to 
read and watch from the annual Davos meeting, including summaries, live 
streams and recorded videos of the main panels. The WEF also has 
considerable social media presence with almost 3 million followers on Twitter 
and nearly as many likes of its Facebook page (as of January 2017). However, 
in addition to the WEF’s own communications, the international media also 
follow the forum closely, providing a multitude of reports, participant 
observations and quotes from the site. This work has opted to focus on the 
journalistic reporting from the forum as a particularly impactful form of TEC. 
Indeed, while many of the WEF debates can be accessed on the forum’s online 
platforms, elite news media remain key in condensing and disseminating the 
discussions to broader audiences. Journalism also structures the ongoing 
debates within and between elites, and it facilitates the construction of an 
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imagined community that consists of the readership or audience of the 
medium. As important sources of information and news, international elite 
journalism also forms a significant element of the everyday knowledge and 
sense-making environment in which members of the elite act and make 
decisions. Through their daily repetition of a limited set of ideas, sources and 
discourses, the news media thus help to normalise certain outlooks and ways 
of reasoning. 
As discussed in Chapter 2.3, the Financial Times can be regarded as an 
important public space for TEC. The FT is not only a source of information and 
elite views for its readers, but also a useful tool for inter-elite communication 
and an important space to show up and build reputation among elites. Overall, 
the FT may be considered more effective than the WEF’s online site in 
mediating the discussions to the international business and political elite 
community and bringing attention to specific issues. Due to its global reach, 
the FT facilitates the formulation and transnational dissemination of common 
concepts, ideas and frames of reference on the issues of global politics and the 
economy. The FT is thus an integral part in the reproduction and 
dissemination of what Lars Blichner (2007) has termed the “meta-lingual 
language” of international politics, a necessary condition for policy formation 
and coordination on the supra-national level. Moreover, being a part of the 
everyday media practices and forming an important element of the knowledge 
environment of many individuals that belong to transnational elites, the FT 
may have a more profound and lasting impact on how the elites make sense of 
the world than the annual four-day talk fest at Davos. And finally, in contrast 
to the diverse and anonymous internet users watching the debates online, the 
FT’s readership mostly consist of business leaders and policy makers who are 
quite aware of the exclusive nature of the paper. 79 Compared to the WEF’s 
online platforms which often strive for an image of transparency and openness, 
address the general public and have an air of PR and public outreach about 
them, the FT has cultivated an image of exclusivity and therefore has the 
advantage of facilitating the creation of an imagined elite community. 
The FT itself has a close relationship with the Davos forum. The paper is 
in no way part of the “official” communications infrastructure of the WEF, but 
it is closely related to the organisation by participating in the proceedings of 
the annual meeting in many ways. In addition to sending a sizable troop of 
reporters to cover the Davos event, the FT’s editors sometimes participate as 
experts in the panel discussions of the forum, and Martin Wolf, the paper's 
chief economics commentator, has chaired the high-profile session on the 
Global Economic Outlook for several years. Given this intimate relationship 
with the forum, it is no wonder that the FT goes to great lengths in promoting 
 
                                                   
79 Indeed, highlighting the exclusivity, wealth and elite nature of its readership is an essential 
selling point for the paper to advertisers and a key element in its commercial publicity 
campaigns. 
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the annual meeting with special reports and appendices that are published 
before and during the annual meeting (see below for the description of the 
material). 80 
Concentrating on the FT as the sole source of empirical material was a 
decision dictated by both research interests and research-economic 
limitations. The purpose was to collect material over an extended time frame 
– a decade or so – so as to be able to follow continuities and shifts in elite 
debates and to specifically observe the impact of the global financial crisis of 
2007–9 on elite discourse. The FT, with its reliably constant annual coverage 
of the Davos event, provided an attractive object of study in this regard. 
However, combining this longitudinal interest with a qualitative analytical 
orientation, focused on the discovery of deeper meanings and discursive 
constructions in TEC, had the consequence of making the textual analysis 
highly time-consuming and limited the amount of material that could be 
covered in the analysis. Therefore, while the collection of material from several 
sources would certainly have improved the generalisability of the findings and 
thus given more validity to the analysis, I eventually had to settle for a single 
journalistic source. However, what was lost in sacrificing the breadth of data 
will hopefully be compensated by the depth of observation facilitated by a 
limited set of material. 
Collection and selection of material 
In order to facilitate the handling of the data with a qualitative data analysis 
software (see below), I decided to collect the material in digital form, taking 
advantage of the free access provided by my institution to the digital archive 
of the Financial Times on the ProQuest academic database. At the time of the 
original data collection in November to December 2011, the FT archive on the 
ProQuest database covered all issues from January 2001 up to October 2011. 
During this period, the World Economic Forum took place each year at the end 
of January in Davos, Switzerland (with the exception of 2002 when the 
meeting was exceptionally held in New York City), and lasted 4 to 5 days. 
Accordingly, I took 2001 as my starting point, and conducted searches in the 
database for all articles related to the World Economic Forum within a period 
starting 7 days before the first day of the forum and ending 7 days after the last 
day of the forum each year.81 Depending on the exact length of the forum, the 
search period thus amounted to 18 or 19 days each year. 
 
                                                   
80 The close personal relationships between FT journalists and the WEF organisation is a 
reminder of the way in which the FT, while being in principle independent and autonomous 
in its reporting, effectively serves transnational elites in close cooperation and relationship of 
mutual interest and benefit. 
81 The search string used was ‘davos OR “world economic forum”’. 
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The search produced a high number of hits, with the total number of 
articles over the 11 years exceeding 1500. I noted from the outset that the 
search results included many duplicates, as well as articles that were published 
in the FT’s various international editions in slightly differing versions, and 
articles which appeared to have been published online only. To make matters 
more straightforward, I decided to concentrate on articles that were published 
in the UK edition of the paper, leaving out articles that only appeared in the 
Asian, European or US editions.82 I also discarded articles, such as the weekly 
agenda of important events, which did not have any journalistic content. Even 
so, the number of articles seemed too large for any meaningful qualitative 
analysis, and because I wanted to retain a relatively long timeframe, I needed 
to further cut down the amount of data.83 
To work out a way to distinguish relevant articles from irrelevant ones, I 
consulted the microfilm archive of the UK edition of the FT, which was 
available through my institution. “Leafing” through the physical issues as they 
had been recorded on the microfilm allowed me to get a sense of how the Davos 
articles collected online had actually been organised and presented in the 
paper. (This also worked as a good way to confirm that the articles collected 
through the online database had in fact been published in print.84) I soon 
noticed approximately a third to two fifths of the articles on covering the forum 
appeared in the section of the paper that was alternatively titled 
 
                                                   
82 The decision to exclude articles that appeared in the Asian, European or US edition of the 
FT, but not in the UK edition, was based on the observation that the ProQuest database 
appeared to be inconsistent in its inclusion of FT’s international editions from year to year, 
and I had no way to check whether articles, other than those published in the UK edition, had 
actually appeared in print. Limiting the data to those articles that had been published in the 
UK edition, however, does not mean that the international editions were altogether ignored. 
In fact, based on the amount of duplicates provided by the online search, the majority of the 
articles written by FT correspondents from Davos were most probably included in all 
international editions–although, again, I have no way to confirm this assessment. 
83 An obvious way to narrow the scope of newspaper material is to include only certain types 
of articles. I reckoned, however, that concentrating only on news articles, for instance, would 
leave out many interesting columns in which, due to their argumentative tone, many 
important ideas and world views are often spelled out. On the other hand, focusing on the 
argumentative journalistic genres, including editorials, columns and opinion pieces, would 
limit the scope of topics and views too much and lead to an overemphasis on the importance 
of FT’s editorial team and house columnists as actors in transnational elite communication. 
84 According to my observations, the articles collected through the online database matched 
entirely with the print versions of the articles in the vast majority of cases. Occasionally, 
however, the electronic version might have minor alterations – a little more length, a different 
headline, etc. – resulting most probably from slight changes made in the layout phase from 
one UK edition to another. Such minor differences are not significant for the following analysis. 
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International/World Economy, International Politics, or simply World News 
(normally pages 6–9 in the UK edition). These articles dealt specifically with 
the proceedings of the forum, reporting on the panel discussions, noteworthy 
keynote talks and other happenings at Davos. Oftentimes, a whole page in this 
section was devoted to the forum and was labelled accordingly with a “Davos” 
in the top banner (see Figure 4.1). These articles were clearly indicated as 
providing an overview of the key issues of the forum, representing what might 
be seen as the “public” agenda of transnational elites. They were thus 
particularly interesting for my purposes, so I decided to include all these 
articles in the material. Another highly interesting set of articles, due to their 
argumentative tone, consisted of columns touching upon the Davos forum in 
the various sections and supplements of the paper, including the Lex column, 
as well as of editorials and opinion pieces by readers. These were included in 
the analysed data. 
 
Figure 4.1 Daily Davos coverage 
Source: Financial Times 25 January 2008, p. 8. 
In contrast, roughly a quarter to a third of the articles each year appeared in 
the Business and Markets section of the paper and were typically brief news 
reports focusing on an individual business. Oftentimes these articles did not 
make any reference to the conference and included the search word Davos only 
in the byline, indicating that a correspondent in Davos had written or 
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contributed to the report. I reckoned that pure business news about individual 
companies or markets were primarily meant to serve investors and thus 
represented the “private” dimension of the FT as TEC. I thus regarded these 
articles as relatively insignificant and uninteresting for the purposes of the 
analysis and decided to leave them out of the data. Similarly, a small 
proportion of the articles appeared in the UK Politics section of the paper, 
typically mentioning a UK decision maker appearing or speaking at Davos but 
focusing on a current topic in the domestic political debate. As their principal 
addressees seemed to be confined to the UK national elite, I considered these 
articles of little interest for my analysis and excluded them from the data. 
Two further sets of articles caught my attention when browsing through 
the microfilms. One of them comprised articles that were published in the 
“Guide to Davos” supplements, which started to appear yearly from 2008 
onwards, a day or two before the start of the conference.85 These supplements 
typically contain an introductory article, which presents the Davos forum to 
the readers and discusses its nature and history, followed by a collection of 
articles that anticipate some of the major topics that will be discussed at the 
forum. Because of their explicit focus on the forum, the Davos participants and 
the “global agenda”, these articles were an obvious addition to the material. 
Finally, throughout the data collection period, the FT published an 
annual special section on the global outlook for the year ahead in anticipation 
of the Davos forum. This special section, typically labelled as “The World in 
[year]”, consisted of a collection of analyses covering major topics, such as 
trade, investment, international conflicts, climate change and, most 
importantly, general economic outlooks for the world, as well as its major 
regions and most important individual economies. While most of the articles 
in this section made no reference to the Davos forum, the section as a whole 
was clearly published with a view of setting the agenda for its participants: the 
leading story of the section explicitly referred to the upcoming Davos meeting 
almost without exception, and it often included the logo of the World 
Economic Forum to symbolise the special section’s close connection with the 
official Davos agenda.86 Because of their apparent purpose of providing an 
encompassing “global view” on the major developments their readers should 
take into consideration, and hence informing what the elite agenda of major 
issues is likely to be for the year ahead, these articles appeared to be highly 
relevant for my analytical purposes. I thus decided to include all the articles in 
 
                                                   
85 The first “Guide to Davos” appeared as an article written by John Gapper in the FT Magazine 
– a weekly supplement published on Saturdays – in anticipation of the 2006 meeting. 
86 The first sentence of the 2004 edition represents a typical example of how the “World 
outlook” section was framed: “As leaders gather this week for the World Economic Forum, 
there are increasing hopes that the global economy is heading for a sustained recovery over 
the long term.” 
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the section in the data irrespective of whether, or not, they contained the 
original search words.87 Because these articles did not mention the Davos 
forum, I went back to the ProQuest database and searched for them 
individually to include them in the digital data set. 
Genres and topics 
In the end, the material included 532 articles collected online and confirmed 
to have appeared in print in the UK edition of the FT. Of the total, a significant 
number of articles (156) did not, in the end, include an explicit mention of the 
Davos forum. The selection procedure thus extended significantly from the 
original results provided by the online database search. Table 4.1 breaks down 
the data year by year and by article type.  
Table 4.1 Article types and total number of articles per year  
ARTICLE 
TYPE 
2001 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 TOT 
Analysis 1 1 - 1 1 - 3 1 2 3 2 15 
Column 4 2 3 2 11 6 8 8 12 13 13 82 
Davos 
guide 
- - - - - 2 - 6 5 8 9 30 
Editorial 4 3 2 1 1 1 1 1 3 1 2 20 
News 
report 
21 21 16 14 16 23 26 18 22 15 15 207 
Letter 1 1 - 1 1 - - 1 2 1 1 9 
World 
outlook 
12 7 11 15 20 18 17 22 14 18 15 169 
Total 43 35 32 34 50 50 55 57 60 59 57 532 
As the table indicates, the largest portion of the selected articles (207 or 39%) 
consisted of news reports. These were reports that concentrated on the events 
of the forum and appeared primarily on the World News or International 
Economy section of the paper, on a page often dedicated for news from the 
 
                                                   
87 For a few years in the data-collection period, I ended up discarding a small number of 
articles from the “World outlook” section. These concerned rather marginal topics, such as 
occasional articles on innovations in medicine, sports marketing etc., which did not appear in 
other years’ sections. 
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Davos forum. The second-largest group comprised articles published in the 
annual “World outlook” special section: 169 articles were collected from that 
section (32% of the total). Columns and comments, usually by staff writers 
amounted to 82 articles (15%); in addition, there were 20 editorials and 9 
letters to the editor. Guide to Davos articles amounted to 30 articles. Finally, 
I defined 15 articles as analyses. These appeared in the International Economy 
section of the paper but differed from usual news reports due to their extended 
length and investigative and analytical quality, focusing on a broader 
phenomenon than a news report, such as shadow banking or the problems of 
the European Economic and Monetary Union. 
The number of articles from any given year varies between the 2003 low 
of 32 to the 2009 peak of 60 articles. The annual variation roughly reflects 
changes in the actual volume of coverage. Indeed, while FT correspondents 
reported daily from the scene throughout the data-collection period, there was 
a considerable increase in the FT’s attention to the forum from 2005 onwards. 
Towards the end of the data-collection period, the increased focus on the 
meeting manifested itself particularly in the amount of pre-forum coverage 
and commentary. The anticipatory articles published in the “Davos guide” 
supplement contributed to the yearly number of articles especially from 2008 
onwards. Moreover, while the number of news reports mainly remained 
constant throughout the period (varying between 14 and 26 articles), there 
were considerably more columns and commentaries by FT’s journalists 
towards the end of the data-collection period. This reflects the partial shift by 
FT reporters towards more personal and opinionated form of coverage in the 
latter years of the period. 
To get an overall sense of the coverage, I coded each article according to 
the principal topic it addressed. As Table 4.2 indicates, I ended up with 14 
separate categories.88 The four major categories were WEF/Davos Elite (86 
articles), Regional/National Economy (68), Global Economy (67) and 
Financial Markets (67). First, the largest category consisted of a variety of 
stories in which the World Economic Forum meeting itself was the main 
theme. These included articles written before the start of the forum, 
anticipating its upcoming themes and the most prestigious attendees, or 
interviewing the organisers. Another typical article in this category was a 
correspondent report or column, which described the general atmosphere and 
 
                                                   
88 I came up with the topic categories inductively, but I was also guided by the ways in which 
the FT categorised articles by marking them with such kickers as Global Economy, Global 
Trade, Energy, or, for instance, Latin America. Much of the time assigning the primary topic 
was relatively straightforward. However, at time the articles touched on two or several issues 
and working out the principal topic was more difficult. In addition, the boundaries between 
categories are not clearly marked at all times, particularly when it comes to issues of global 
economy, globalisation and global trade. Still, the categories work to provide a rough overview 
of the main topics and shifts in the coverage. 
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talking points at the forum, without focusing on a particular political or 
economic topic. It could also comment on the arrangements at the forum, or 
relate a specific occurrence. Finally, the category also included articles that 
concentrated on the forum participants as a group, explicitly naming it as the 
Davos elite or “Davos Man”. These articles tended to be columns that 
commented on global developments from the perspective of the business and 
political elites, often speculating on the fate of the “Davos Man” – its present 
and future prosperity, status, position and legitimacy – in the winds of 
historical political and economic changes. As Table 4.2 indicates, the number 
of WEF/Davos Elite articles slightly increased towards the end of the data-
collection period. This reflects, primarily, the introduction of the “Davos 
guide” supplements in 2008, and, secondarily, the increase of the number of 
columns, which concentrated on the “Davos Man” after the global financial 
crisis, speculating on its apparent decline as a status group. 
Table 4.2 Principal topic of articles per year. 
MAIN TOPIC 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 T 
Business 7 2 5 4 5 6 5 4 3 3 2 46 
Climate - 1 - - 2 1 4 2 - 1 - 11 
Development 4 1 1 1 6 4 1 2 3 - 1 24 
Energy 2 1 - - 1 1 1 2 1 - - 9 
Financial markets 1 - 2 2 2 1 11 15 9 9 15 67 
Global economy 4 5 3 5 2 6 6 8 8 11 9 67 
Globalisation 6 7 3 2 1 4 2 1 3 4 - 33 
International politics - 1 6 5 5 3 5 5 6 6 1 43 
International trade 8 2 1 3 4 4 5 - 4 - 1 32 
Reg/Nat economy 3 2 4 6 5 9 5 2 7 13 12 68 
Reg/Nat politics - - 1 2 5 - 3 3 - 4 3 21 
WEF/Davos elite 4 5 6 3 8 8 7 10 16 8 11 86 
WSF/Civil society 3 8 - - 1 1 - - - - - 13 
Other 1 - - 1 3 2 - 3 - - 2 12 
Total 43 35 32 34 50 50 55 57 60 59 57 532 
The second and third most numerous categories of articles consisted of 
economic analyses and debates, concentrating either on regional and national 
economies or the whole global economy. The regional/national category 
included economic forecasts and analyses of economic trends and 
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developments with regard to the largest national and regional economies 
(mainly the US, the EU, China, Japan and Latin America). These articles 
typically appeared in the “World outlook” section (35 out of 68 articles in this 
category), in which national and regional economic analyses were a staple 
feature. At times, however, a particular national or regional economy came 
into focus in the FT’s news reports from the forum (25 articles), as in the 2006 
forum when several articles were written about the Indian delegates’ efforts to 
promote the country at Davos to international investors. The category of 
articles focusing on the global economy, in contrast, did not focus on a single 
region or national economy but addressed economic trends and developments 
in the general context of the world economy. The global perspective did not 
mean, however, that the sight of national and regional economies was entirely 
lost. In fact, global economic growth trends and forecasts were often presented 
by comparing and contrasting the outlooks of the most important regional and 
national economies. Therefore, the global, regional and national levels of 
analysis were closely intertwined in the articles focusing on the economy.  
Together, the two categories of articles concentrating on the economy 
comprise a quarter of all analysed articles. As Table 4.2 indicates, the number 
of economy articles remained relatively constant from year to year, reflecting 
that economic outlooks and debates were a staple feature of the FT coverage 
of the Davos forum. Debates on the looming Greek debt crisis in 2010 and the 
problems of the eurozone in 2011 explain much of the notable increase in the 
amount of Regional/National Economy articles in the final two years of the 
data-collection period. The increase of Global Economy articles in the latter 
years of the data-collection period partly resulted from the introduction the 
“Davos Guide” supplements, which always included at least one article in this 
category, as well as from the general increase of concerns over global economic 
development after the financial crisis. Chris Giles, the Economics editor of the 
FT, authored 23 of all Global Economy articles in the data, and together with 
Martin Wolf (11 articles under the category), they penned half of the articles in 
this category.  
The fourth main category of articles concentrated on the financial 
markets. These included stories on banks and other financial institutions, as 
well as analyses of general trends in stock markets, capital markets and 
currency markets. The category also included articles on financial regulation 
and financial products as well as on political efforts to both protect financial 
institutions from collapse and to rein in their harmful practices. Overall, 
finance rarely attracted attention in the FT’s coverage of the WEFs before 2007, 
when the focus suddenly turned to a set of worrying developments in the 
financial markets in anticipation of the dramatic events later that year. After 
the turning point, financial institutions remained under close inspection for 
the rest of the data-collection period. Over a third of these articles (23) was 
written by Gillian Tett. 
Behind the four major categories of articles, there were a further four 
topics that attracted continuous attention in the FT coverage. The Business 
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and Companies category includes stories (46 in total) that typically focused on 
the companies and businesses collectively, discussing, for instance, 
management trends, business moods or the public trust in companies. These 
articles, obviously, concentrated on the issues close to the business 
contingency of the Davos delegates. Company and business topics formed a 
rather stable part of the coverage, although their share slightly dropped 
towards the end of the data-collection period. International Politics and 
Security was another recurring topic in the coverage. This category consisted 
of articles focusing on international relations, international conflicts and 
global security concerns, including analyses of international terrorism, Middle 
East, US foreign policy and the military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
Most of the International Politics and Security articles (30 out of 43) appeared 
in the “World outlook” special section, thus forming an essential part of the 
global agenda as it was annually constructed by the FT. A related category of a 
narrower focus is Regional and National Politics, which concentrated on 
analyses of political processes, including elections, changes in leadership and 
political conflicts (21 articles in total). In this regard, the focus was primarily 
in the EU and US politics, but also Chinese, Russian and Latin American 
political events and processes were occasionally analysed, again primarily in 
the annual “World outlook” sections. 
Another notable category of articles concentrated on globalisation (33 
articles). Globalisation emerged as a prevalent topic especially in the first two 
years of the coverage, as global civil society movements prompted debates at 
the Davos forum on the merits and threats of economic globalisation. The 
category of Globalisation includes various issues and phenomena connected 
to this overall concern, including global economic governance, threats of 
protectionist policies, global inequality and the effects to developed economies 
from offshoring practices of firms. After 2002, the FT’s interest in 
globalisation decreased, but issues related to global economic integration still 
remained in the agenda. A third of these articles (11) was published in the 
“World outlook” special section, and another third of them were columns (8), 
editorials (2) or letters-to-the-editor (1), highlighting the analytical and 
argumentative nature of most of the articles in this category. 
A highly focused category, which is nevertheless closely related to both 
the issues of globalisation and the global economy, consisted of articles dealing 
with International Trade. Most of the 32 trade articles focused on 
international efforts to advance the WTO’s Doha round of talks on a new global 
trade agreement. A customary part of the World Economic Forum programs 
were informal meetings between the trade ministers of major countries. The 
FT followed closely on their efforts to bridge divides between countries on the 
rules of international trade and investments and to pave the way for more 
formal negotiations throughout the data-collection period, until their eventual 
breakdown in 2008. Two FT journalists, Guy de Jonquières (12 articles 
between 2001 and 2006) and Alan Beattie (16 articles between 2001 and 2009) 
provided the vast majority of the coverage and analysis of international trade 
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talks, appearing primarily in news reports from the forum (20 articles) and in 
the “World outlook” special section (9 articles). 
The remaining five categories of articles appeared with less frequency 
and consistency in substance. Of these, Development and Global South was 
the most prominent category with 24 articles through the data-collection 
period. These primarily concerned news reports (16 out of the 24) on the Davos 
forum discussions regarding various “global South” issues, especially poverty, 
development aid and HIV/Aids, and the efforts of Western businesses and 
political elites to address these issues. The topic of African development was a 
visible part of the 2001 coverage, and HIV/Aids were prevalent issues in 2005 
and 2006. The Climate Change and Environment category (11 articles) 
consists of articles that mapped the international efforts to curb climate 
change and to increase environmental sustainability. As Table 4.2 indicates, 
the FT’s attention to climate change was largely limited to the period between 
2005 and 2008; before and afterwards, the paper hardly raised the issue to the 
top of the agenda. 
The two previous categories represent topics that many global civil 
society movements closely campaign on. Their inclusion in the Davos debates 
and the FT coverage thereof may thus be regarded, at least in part, as a 
reflection of these movements’ success in indirectly influencing the 
transnational elite agenda (see Chapter 6). This impression was reinforced by 
the fact that 13 articles in the data explicitly concentrated on global civil society 
movements. The WSF and Civil Society category mostly consists of FT 
correspondents’ reports from the World Social Forums of 2001, 2002, 2005 
and 2006, as well as of interviews of NGO leaders in New York before the 2002 
World Economic Forum. 
Finally, the Energy category includes 9 articles which focused on energy 
markets, production and technologies. Issues related to the energy sector were 
typically addressed in articles under the broader categories of the Global 
Economy and Regional or National economy. As an independent topic it 
mainly appeared in the “World outlook” special sections, though not every year. 
The category Other consists of 12 articles that were difficult to include in any 
other categories. These range from analyses of world demographics to a 
column that discussed problems of using GDP as a measurement of welfare. 
Prolific writers 
As the preceding discussion suggested, the work of a select group of FT 
journalists made up a significant share of the collected data. Hence, while 
dozens of reporters overall contributed to the WEF coverage over the studied 
period, most only penned one or few articles. In contrast, a handful of FT 
journalists frequently appeared in the data. More specifically, six top 
journalists are credited for 25 or more articles in the collected material (see 
Table 4.3). These are typically journalists who reported from Davos and 
commented on the forum events over several years and who also contributed 
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to the analyses that make up the “World outlook” sections and “Guide to 
Davos” supplements.  
Table 4.3 Most prolific FT journalists in the data and their two most frequent topics* 
Journalist N Most frequent topics 
Chris Giles 45 global economy (23), regional/national economy (7) 
Gillian Tett 44 financial markets (23), WEF/Davos elite (7) 
Alan Beattie 39 international trade (16), global economy (5) 
Guy de Jonquières 33 international trade (12), international politics (4) 
Gideon Rachman 27 WEF/Davos elite (11), global economy (8) 
Martin Wolf 25 global economy (11), globalisation (6) 
Andrew Edgecliffe-
Johnson 
22 business and companies (7), WEF/Davos elite (6) 
John Gapper 17 WEF/Davos elite (7), business and companies (4) 
Peter Thal Larsen 13 financial markets (4), WEF/Davos elite (4) 
Raymond Colitt 12 WSF/civil society (7), globalisation (3) 
Patrick Jenkins 11 financial markets (7), global economy (2) 
Quentin Peel 11 global economy (6), regional/national politics (3) 
Ed Crooks 10 global economy (5), energy (3) 
Francesco Guerrera 10 financial markets (6), business and companies (3) 
Krishna Guha 10 regional/national economy (4), development/South (3) 
Lionel Barber 9 regional/national economy (4) 
Hugh Carnegy 8 development/South (4), WEF/Davos elite (2) 
Geoff Dyer 7 regional/national economy (3) 
David Pilling 7 regional/national economy (4), global economy (2) 
Haig Simonian 7 WEF/Davos elite (7) 
George Parker 6 regional/national economy (3), regional/national politics (2) 
Holly Yeager 6 WEF/Davos elite (2), WSF/civil society (2) 
Gerard Baker 5 global economy (2) 
Brian Groom 5 international politics (3), regional/national economy (2) 
Victor Mallet 5 regional/national economy (3), development/South (2) 
Philip Stephens 5 international politics (3) 
John Thornhill 5 regional/national economy (2) 
* The figures indicate the number of articles for which the journalist is credited as author or 
co-author in the byline. 
Overall, while most of these most prolific journalists wrote on multiple topics, 
they tended to have specific focus areas. Hence, Chris Giles, the Economics 
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editor, who topped the list with 45 articles written since 2005, mostly wrote 
analyses and news reports on the global economy (23 articles), 
regional/national economies (7) and the financial markets (6). On the other 
hand, of Gillian Tett’s 44 articles since her first in 2007, 23 concentrated on 
the financial markets and a further 10 on global, regional or national 
economies. Yet she also focused, in 7 articles, on the forum and the Davos elite, 
especially in many of her columns. International trade, in turn, was the 
principal focus of Alan Beattie (16 out of 39 articles) and Guy de Jonquières 
(12 out of 33 articles), the latter being the most visible FT journalist in the early 
part of the data-collection period with 32 of his 33 articles appearing between 
2001 and 2004. Gideon Rachman penned a significant number of columns on 
the forum and the Davos elite (11 articles) beginning from 2007, but he also 
wrote several times about the global economy (8 articles). Finally, Martin 
Wolf, the FT’s chief economics commentator, provided a steady stream of 
columns and analyses, mostly on the global economy (11) and globalisation 
(6), throughout the data-collection period. 
4.2 Working with concepts 
The analysis of the collected newspaper material was not initially informed by 
a particular theory, model or hypothesis that would have provided it with an 
elaborate analytical framework in the form of existing categories into which to 
fit empirical observations or against which to test them. In other words, while 
the general idea of transnational elite formation through communicative 
practices guided my interest in studying the Financial Times coverage of the 
World Economic Forums, I had not developed these theoretical notions and 
perspectives into a set of arguments, hypotheses or concepts that could be 
operationalised deductively in textual analysis. Therefore, I reckoned that the 
analysis itself would have to shed light into these phenomena by aiming to 
formulate certain concepts to both draw observations and make sense of them 
(cf. Bal 2009; Layder 1998, 100–16). The concepts would have to be developed 
in connection with both the theoretical framework of the study and the close 
observation of the material. 
Data and theory-driven analysis 
The premise behind a conceptually-informed analysis of the data is that 
empirical observations are always “saturated with theoretical ideas” (Layder 
1998, 113). In this sense, the approach to empirical analysis adopted here 
differs from the purely “inductive” starting point of grounded theory, which, 
at least in its original formulation, advocates approaching the material without 
any theoretical preconceptions (Glaser and Strauss 1967; see also 
Timmermans and Tavory 2012, 168). Indeed, the absence of an elaborated 
theoretical framework against which to observe the material did not mean that 
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I had no idea of what I was trying to observe in the data, or that I was not 
sensitised to “see” certain things in the articles. Having previously familiarised 
myself with literature on globalisation and global governance, social 
constructionism and social imaginaries, ideology and neoliberalism, as well as 
the sociology of elites and the public sphere, I had various “assumptions” and 
was highly sensitised to find “evidence” of the workings of the following 
phenomena in elite discourse: 
? Language as partly constitutive of all institutional reality (Searle 
2003, 203). Linguistic devices, including the names for things, 
are needed to make them part of reality. For the global economy, 
the transnational elite, or globalisation to “exist”, they must be 
named and “constructed” in discourse. 
? The essentially “imagined” character of social domains, including 
the economy (Cameron and Palan 2004; Taylor 2004). To enable 
individual and collective action, the nature of the global economy 
must be agreed upon in social interaction, including questions 
regarding its organisation, functions, actors and problems. 
? The formation of collective identities in discourse (Berger and 
Luckmann 1967; Risse 2010). The collective identity of 
transnational elites must be constructed in the representations 
of its “moral character”, including the ideas, values and 
objectives that define it as a group. 
? Communication and discourse as deeply affected by ideology 
(Eagleton 2007). The elite and journalistic discourses of the FT 
make claims about consensus and common sense, conceal social 
struggles, contain unrecognised particularisms, and make 
assumptions and claims about elite interests as the general 
interest. 
? Journalism as a space where political struggles over meaning are 
fought in public (Macgilchrist 2011). Even as it is deeply 
ideological in the above sense, journalism makes partly visible 
the limits of consensus and creates opportunities for 
oppositional reading.  Studying the FT is interesting precisely 
because it may provide insight into the areas of agreement and 
disagreement among transnational elites which may both enable 
and limit their integration. 
? Globalisation as a political and ideological project, which 
generates both various problems and conflicts in the global 
political economy and attempts to resolve them (Steger 2009; 
Panitch and Gindin 2012). TEC is marked with efforts to 
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negotiate over conflicts of interest and in search of common 
interests in order to mobilise collective action to address 
problems of the global economy. 
? The contradictory character of the global financial crisis of 2007–
9, which, on the one hand, was widely perceived as a shock to 
some of the assumptions regarding the operation and 
functioning of the global economy in general and the financial 
markets in particular (Solty 2012; Tett 2009), but, on the other 
hand, led to little change in the institutions and ideas of 
governing the global political economy (Crouch 2011; Mirowski 
2013; Streeck 2011). The FT sheds light on this apparent 
contradiction, providing a public arena in which the 
transnational elites make sense of the financial crisis, negotiate 
over appropriate political reactions to it, and “normalise” the 
epistemic shock imposed by the crisis. 
My overall analytical process can be characterised as an interpretive dialogue 
between the theoretical perspectives and the material, and it combines 
elements of both data-driven (“inductive”), and theory-driven (“deductive”) 
research. I started the analysis process by reading the material one article at a 
time to get acquainted with what is being talked about. Working with the 
Atlas.ti software specifically developed for qualitative data analysis (see Friese 
2013), I took advantage of the open coding technique it facilitates. Besides the 
general topics, article types and authors reviewed in the previous section, I 
coded passages that seemed to relate to some of the theoretical issues I was 
grappling with, coding recurring issues, themes, talking points and arguments 
in the articles (e.g., crisis, recession, economic growth, globalisation, 
liberalisation, financial markets, poverty, development, US power, the rise of 
China). I also started to look for ways to group the coded observations under 
broader categories and to develop associated concepts to explain them.  
This methodological practice of “working with concepts” entails the 
development and use of concepts as tools for analysis to facilitate close reading 
(Bal 2009). The search for suitable concepts is a creative process in at least 
two senses. First, the concepts are not so much waiting to be discovered but 
have to be actively constructed by the researcher (Layder 1998, 107). Second, 
the particular meaning or substance of the concepts in relation to the subject 
at hand must be established in the course of analysis. As Derek Layder (1998, 
110–2) points out, applying concepts in the coding of the data imposes, in a 
sense, categories on the studied reality, suggesting certain ideas and 
interpretations. This is done, however, to test conceptual schemes to trigger 
the analytical-theoretical imagination. The concepts are not meant to 
represent a final solution that forces theory on the data. Instead, it is possible 
to come to a realisation that some of the early concepts are ill-fitted to the 
material or do not seem to reveal anything meaningful. In this regard, Layder 
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(1998, 108) suggests that the concepts used in early analysis should be 
regarded as orienting concepts or as “provisional means of ordering data”, 
which can be discarded if necessary and replaced by better ones. At the same 
time, the conscious development of orienting concepts renders the inevitably 
theory-influenced nature of empirical observation more explicit and 
systematic. 
In the context of the present study, the open coding of the data and 
several efforts to build larger categories of the codes gradually led to the 
development of an extensive but limited set of orienting concepts that fell 
within three main categories. First, the category Economy comprised various 
observations that related to the way the economy was discursively constituted 
in the material. These included ideas about the “global economy” as a single 
whole, about its main geographic sub-systems (“components”) and power 
relations between them (“world order”), about its core dynamics (“functions”), 
about the nature and position of financial markets in the economy (“finance”), 
as well as references to activities that were assumed to influence the world 
economy (“economic agency”). Second, the category of Elite consisted of codes 
that marked passages in which the transnational elite as a group was identified 
or addressed (“elite identification”), in which Davos participants were 
represented, either in a positive or negative manner (“elite representation”) 
and in which certain principles and ideals, such as leadership or 
multilateralism, were associated with the Davos delegates or the transnational 
elite more generally (“elite norms”). Third, the category of Politics consisted of 
a number of codes that marked passages in which seemingly significant policy 
issues were highlighted and around which various interest conflicts were 
negotiated. These included references to elite agreement (“consensus”), 
disagreement (“dissensus”) and conflicts (“interests”), but also allusions to 
political goals (e.g., “liberalisation”) and efforts to manage the global economy 
(“governance”) in the face of various problems, risks and threats (e.g., “global 
imbalances”). 
Encounters with epistemic work 
Working with the orienting concepts had thus provided me with an early 
categorisation of observations. Reading and coding the material, however, had 
not resulted in ideas about how to connect these observations with the general 
theoretical problem of the study concerning the potential of transnational elite 
formation and their collective agency. The process of systematic coding had 
established that there certainly were frequent indications in the material of 
discursive construction of the transnational elite as a group and of the various 
ways in which they were brought together around issues and shared ideas and 
political goals. Yet such observations themselves clarify little about 
transnational elite integration and collective agency. After an extended period 
of reading and coding the data, I therefore chose to return to the research 
literature to relate my observations to similar findings in earlier studies and to 
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theoretical arguments about their significance. I specifically sought to 
determine how questions of collective or social identity and collective agency 
had been theorised in literature and how they might be operationalised and 
connected to each other in empirical research (e.g., Abdelal et al. 2009; Barnes 
2000; Kantner 2006; Risse 2010; Tajfel 1981; Turner 1999). The return 
towards the theoretical literature was made, in other words, in the hopes of 
allowing a more coherent ordering of the observations and their “theorising” 
(see Alasuutari 1996; Layder 1998; Swedberg 2012). 
At around this time, I came across Pertti Alasuutari and Ali Qadir’s 
(2014) discussion of epistemic governance as an approach to studying policy 
making. According to this view, power in politics is wielded through the 
shaping of actors’ perceptions of the world and its current challenges. More 
specifically, power works by influencing the perceptions of actors concerning 
the situation at hand so that they come to believe that a certain course of action 
is in their interest, feasible and acceptable. At the same time, the very potential 
for actors to negotiate, agree and convince each other about a policy idea is 
dependent on shared epistemic assumptions about the social world and about 
themselves as agents in it. Therefore, the purpose of the epistemic governance 
perspective is to draw attention to how “actors are socially embedded and how 
they employ (even if implicitly) that position in influencing others” (Alasuutari 
and Qadir 2014, 71). 
The notion of epistemic governance is connected to the perspectives of 
sociological and discursive institutionalism, which are focused on analysing 
political phenomena in terms of the power that is wielded through, over and 
by ideas that shape political agency (see Alasuutari 2015; Alasuutari and Qadir 
2016; Carstensen and Schmidt 2016; Schmidt 2008). The study of ideational 
factors in policy-making is particularly appealing in international settings in 
which formal mechanisms of policy making and relationships of legal 
authority are often absent (see Chapter 3.2). In these contexts, concerted 
action is based not so much on force and sanctions but on the capacity of an 
actor to persuade others about a certain course of action and the willingness 
of the participating actors to reach an agreement and follow its dictates. In 
these processes of negotiation, “world cultural ideas and ideals form the 
premises that actors appeal to” when they attempt to outline their goals and 
convince others of their soundness (Alasuutari and Qadir 2014, 78). 
Following the perspective of epistemic governance, we can view 
transnational elites as consisting of individual decision-makers whose capacity 
to agree on matters of policy is a key precondition for a collective governance 
of the global economy. Collective agency in the global political economy, in 
other words, is dependent on the elite’s capacity to formulate and promote 
shared assumptions regarding the nature and challenges of the economy so 
that they become convinced that a certain line of action is in their interest. The 
related notion of epistemic work provides a way to analyse the actual means 
by which actors come to shared understandings concerning available policy 
alternatives, courses of action and themselves as agents in the social world 
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(Alasuutari and Qadir 2014, 70). Production of knowledge and promotion of 
ideas as well as the employment of rhetoric and argumentation to persuade 
others are key elements in epistemic work (cf. Risse 2000). Accordingly, the 
forums and media that bring transnational elites together are in place to 
facilitate communication to prevent these decision-makers from going it alone 
and to convince them that the pursuit of joint policy objectives is in their 
interest. Epistemic work thus operates as an analytical and methodological 
tool for studying the formation of the transnational elite as a collective agent 
on the level of shared perceptions of and knowledge claims on reality.89 
For analytical purposes, Alasuutari and Qadir (2014) make a workable 
distinction between three dimensions or “objects” in epistemic work: 
ontological premises, actor identifications, and norms and ideals. First, 
ontological claims present general understandings of the nature of the 
environment in which the actors operate as well as specific diagnoses about 
the situation they are in. Creating such shared perceptions of social reality is 
obviously an essential precondition for any collective agency. Therefore, elite 
communication on the global economy, for instance, can be regarded as a way 
to render the economy an object of collective governance. Second, actor 
identification includes both individual and collective agents and contributes 
to their self-understanding by telling them who they are, what communities 
they belong to and how they exist in relation to other actors. Indeed, while 
actors are often constituted by institutions, their decisions are guided by the 
way they understand themselves, pointing to the significance of the 
simultaneous discursive constitution of actors. Identification and definition of 
actors also enables a general sense of agency in the world, and it informs what 
kind of motives or traits these collective or individual actors have. As will be 
discussed in Chapter 6, discourse in the FT entails a variety of actors in the 
global political economy, including the “global elite”. While it is but one 
available actor identity in TEC, the particular ways in which the “global elite” 
is discursively constructed offers insights into its appeal as an object of 
identification for decision makers. Finally, epistemic work concentrates on the 
 
                                                   
89 An emphasis on epistemic work as a technique of governing the global political economy is 
not intended as a suggestion that the production and dissemination of knowledge alone 
explains policy making and the capacity of certain actors to convince others that a given course 
of action is in their interest. There are obviously other means to drive international conformity 
in the policies of global integration and socio-economic governance. Policy conditions tied to 
the extension of credit and investment, or the threat or use of military force, are examples of 
the inducing and coercive powers in global political economy. As discussed in Chapter 3, US 
governments, as well as large TNCs and banks, have often used such strategies to influence 
the decision making of other states and businesses. Yet even these perceivably non-
communicative means of exerting pressure work through affecting the actors’ conceptions of 
the situation and must be discursively and cognitively processed by the decision makers in 
question (see Alasuutari 2015, 169; 176). 
Notes on empirical methodology 
144 
 
norms and ideals that inform social agency. These normative elements of 
epistemic work create shared perceptions of what is good and desirable and 
what constitutes acceptable conduct under certain circumstances. As we will 
see in Chapter 7, growth, freedom and global consciousness are among 
recurrent values and ideals that circulate in the FT-mediated TEC, 
contributing to the definition and justification of desirable lines of action on 
the part of transnational elites. 
In sum, the perspective of epistemic governance, and the notion of 
epistemic work as an analytical tool, served a double purpose. On the one 
hand, it provided a way to connect an analysis of text and discourse with the 
abstract notion of collective agency and thus to bridge the gap between the 
observation of TEC and the theoretical concept of the transnational elite. This 
is because shared perceptions of reality, self-understandings of actors, and 
common values operate as epistemic pre-requisites for collective action, and 
thus their definition in TEC contributes to the making of “a global elite” as a 
collective agent. On the other hand, the three distinct objects of epistemic work 
offered a good way to organise the empirical findings and to interpret their 
significance. Accordingly, the following chapters will analyse the epistemic 
foundations of transnational elite formation: What are the ontological 
assumptions, actor (self-)perceptions and values and ideals around which 
transnational elites potentially self-organise as a collective agent? 
4.3 FT as a window to transnational elites’ epistemic 
work 
As a journalistic medium, the Financial Times contributes to the making of a 
global elite in two senses: as a platform, it brings transnational elites into a 
common space of communication; as journalism, it reproduces elite 
discourses, or the ideational elements of transnational elite formation (see 
Chapter 3.4). Due to its origins and traditional self-understandings, it would 
be tempting to approach the FT as a mouthpiece for the UK and western 
financial sector (see Chapter 2.3). From this perspective, the FT could be 
regarded as a vehicle for the legitimation of finance capital’s interests and for 
the undermining of the interests of national producers and other 
representatives of “fixed” capital (cf. van der Pijl 1998, 50). Yet such 
interpretation would seem overly narrow for at least three reasons. First, on a 
practical level, there seems to be much more going on in the FT-mediated TEC 
than the mere legitimation of the views of finance; as will be discussed in the 
upcoming chapters, the international political and economic agenda is not 
simply preoccupied with the financial sector’s interests. Even if there was a 
conscious but hidden agenda of promoting finance, to be relevant for the 
global policy making elite, the FT needs to address and include other fractions 
of transnational elites and give them a sense of importance as well. Therefore, 
discourses of other groups, and simultaneously their “interests” and sense-
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making, inevitably seep into the FT agenda as well, and so the publication does 
not operate solely as a megaphone for bankers and investors. 
Second, the FT may be particularly well shielded from the influence of 
private interests. In his critical interpretation of the historical demise of the 
public sphere, Habermas (1989) makes an argument about the increasingly 
prevalent role of private interests and promotional language in the news media, 
resulting partly from the advancing commercialisation of the media and their 
resulting commercial pressures as business corporations. These structural 
conditions certainly shape the character of the FT as public space for TEC. Due 
to the FT’s nature as a private, profit-seeking corporation, and because of its 
reliance on advertising, private interests are prominently present in the FT, 
and transnational corporations and firms, often offering finance-related 
services, are likely to provide a major part of the advertising revenues of the 
FT. Yet the very presence of such private interests of its own readership, 
somewhat paradoxically, may render the FT more capable than many national 
newspapers of separating individual advertiser interests from the more 
“general” interests of its elite readership. This is because, unlike in many 
national newspapers that aim to represent the whole nation, the social struggle 
played out within the FT is not characteristically between the capital and the 
working class. Given that the class dimension has been largely bracketed from 
the debate, the message of the advertiser as a call for consumerism may not be 
so clearly part of it. Consequently, rather than being merely in service of 
“manufacturing consent” (Herman and Chomsky 2002), the FT may be 
capable of functioning, to some extent, as a platform and an amplifier for 
“rational-critical” debate of the transnational elite public (see Chapter 3.3). 
Third, the elites’ public discourse can certainly be considered strategic in 
the sense that they often aim to use the media publicity in order to influence 
other elites or constituencies. However, TEC encompasses more than public 
promotion of individual interests and political framing contests over issues. It 
also involves genuine argumentation and deliberation over deep-seated 
assumptions, beliefs and values (cf. Risse 2000). As Alasuutari and Qadir 
(2014) point out, beliefs and normative claims are expressed, consciously or 
unwittingly, by the participants of a debate in support or critique of certain 
lines of action. This epistemic work takes place in interaction, it reproduces 
shared understandings of reality, and it can be analysed as processes and 
outcomes that manifest the power of the collective rather than the power of 
any individual. Accordingly, the FT-mediated TEC can be studied as epistemic 
work in which ontological claims, actor identifications and normative beliefs 
are jointly formulated, and which governs and constitutes the elites as much 
as it is constituted by them. This actor-constituting element of TEC is 
particularly relevant when speaking of the transnational elite as a collective 
actor. Whereas the power of agency of transnational elite individuals, as 
politicians, business leaders and officials, is constituted institutionally (see 
Chapter 1), the transnational elite as a form of collective agency can only be 
constituted in epistemic work. 
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This study thus approaches the material as the epistemic work of 
transnational elites, organised by the FT. This means understanding the 
analysed text as produced as much by transnational elites (as individuals and 
as a collective) as by the FT and its journalists. Transnational elites may be 
regarded as the primary agents as they operate as sources of information, 
claims-makers, actors, speakers and agenda setters for FT journalism, and as 
they communicate to each other on the pages of the FT. Nonetheless, FT 
journalists operate as gatekeepers, agenda setters, opinion makers and 
shapers, interpreters – perhaps occasionally even as critics and watchdogs (see 
Chapter 6.4). The journalists also select the words from an interview or speech 
of a given elite source and direct the interpretation of the words by embedding 
them inside the frame of the whole article.90 In this way, both journalists and 
transnational elites have “agency” and influence over the textual material.  
Following the recognition of the studied texts as produced in a 
“cooperative” effort by both transnational elites and FT journalists, I also take 
the material as representative of not simply the FT’s and its journalists 
representations of the world but of more general elite discourses (see Fürsich 
2009, 247–9; van Dijk 1988b, 179–82). Writing from a critical linguist’s 
perspective, Roger Fowler (1991, 41–2) makes the case that language is not 
entirely under the control of its user. The newspaper or the journalist, when 
linguistically constructing a representation of the world, does not entirely 
deliberately choose a certain form and way of representation. On the one hand, 
the journalistic processes of selection and presentation are as much habitual 
and conventional as they are deliberate and controlled. On the other hand, 
language and its conventions are themselves already value-laden. Thus, even 
as the journalist adopts a chosen discourse or discourses, the decision is not 
entirely free in any practical sense; and as much as she employs discourses, 
“the writer is constituted by the discourse” (Fowler 1991, 42). 
Journalists, in other words, operate in a certain political and cultural 
context, picking elements for their stories from a limited pool of available ideas, 
cognitive frameworks and narratives. In the case of FT journalists, it is the 
 
                                                   
90 Indeed, on the level of individual articles, journalists can often be regarded as the main 
actors: they pick the sources they interview for the story, choose the passages they quote and, 
most of all, weave them into a narrative of their choosing. Accordingly, even as news reports 
comprise the largest individual genre of articles in the material (see Table 4.1), many of them 
cannot be regarded as strongly source-led items dominated by a single source. (This would be 
the case, for instance, in a report of the public remarks of a political leader or a study released 
by an international organisation.) Instead, a major share of these articles consists of reports 
of Davos debates that feature several participants, which gives the reporter considerable 
leeway in picking arguments and organising them in the story. Similarly, as the table indicates, 
a large number of articles are analyses and columns in which the journalist weighs in on a 
particular topic or phenomenon, typically presenting various positions with the help of 
quotations from selected experts and commentators. 
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organisational context of the newspaper, the broader professional context of 
financial and business journalism and, most notably, the daily interaction with 
business professionals, officials and politicians, coupled with the statistical, 
PR, survey and other material produced by businesses, government agencies 
and international organisations, which shapes, to a great extent, the discursive 
environment in which they write their stories. FT journalists are thus 
embedded in TEC, circulating and reproducing its dominant discourses. This 
is, however, not meant as a disregard of journalists as unquestioning dupes 
who mindlessly reproduce elite discourses. Even as the main interest of the 
study is in the exploration of transnational elite discourse and not of the 
“individual” agency of any of its participants, at times the analysis highlights 
the role of the FT or its journalists in their capacity to make normative claims 
or emphasise certain views and interpretations over others. Most importantly, 
the FT and its journalists operate as agents when addressing their readership 
and “managing” the relationship between the readers and the Davos elite. 
From the choice of words to the use of irony, and from legitimation and 
critique of individuals to the selection of sources and quotes, the journalist 
potentially affects how their readers perceive the objects of reporting and how 
they relate to the people at Davos (see Fowler 1991; Reilly 1999, 217–8). 
Examining the journalistic practices of representing the Davos elite is 
thus relevant when observing the construction of transnational elite identity 
and the potential identification of the readers with it (see Chapter 6.4). Yet the 
underlying premise in the study is that, even when FT journalists are making 
a conscious effort to disagree with the consensus and shape elite opinions, they 
need to resort to shared perceptions of reality and to values and ideals they 
presume to have some currency among transnational elites. Because of the 
dependence of what an individual actor can express on the collective, both due 
to the cultural origin of discourses and due to the speaker’s need to consider 
what is publicly acceptable and appropriate (Alasuutari and Qadir 2014; 
Campbell 1998; Risse 2000; Schmidt 2008), it is thus rarely meaningful to 
regard the FT or its individual journalists as ideologically independent or 
separate from transnational elites. It is in this sense that the analysis takes the 
material as representative of broader elite discourse and not simply of the FT’s 
line of thinking.91 
 
                                                   
91 Obviously, the global elite consume a variety of different publications and media outlets, 
including other economic, business and financial journalism, as well as characteristically 
national newspapers and media. The FT can inevitably provide only a partial window to global 
elite communication, and it would be misleading to suggest that, by studying only one media 
outlet, no matter how influential it might be, one can make definite generalisations about elite 
perceptions and understandings of the world. In this sense, the study should therefore be 
understood only as a partial and exploratory look into the public epistemic work of the global 
elites, one that is constructed and structured by the FT. 
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In light of the preceding discussion, the FT coverage of the World 
Economic Forums can be understood in two ways. First, from the perspective 
of international politics, the newspaper coverage is part of the (discursive) 
process of global governance: the FT both reports to a wider audience of 
businesspeople and decision-makers on the themes and most relevant debates 
at the Davos forum that concern global issues; and the newspaper also 
participates in those discussions to shape elite opinion and understandings of 
common problems. Second, from the perspective of sociological or discursive 
institutionalism (e.g., Alasuutari and Qadir 2014; Carstensen and Schmidt 
2016; Schmidt 2008), the FT coverage can be seen as a process of formulating, 
negotiating and arguing over the shared cultural assumptions and beliefs of 
transnational elites. This is because in its coverage, the newspaper follows the 
agendas of the annual WEFs and reports on the elite’s debates in Davos using 
the participants themselves as the main sources of their coverage, while elite 
gatherings themselves are primarily occasions for the dispersion and 
articulation of consensus based on the ideas that already circulate among the 
elite and in the elite media. Both forum interchanges and elite media stories 
are embedded within a broader elite discourse on the global economy and 
world society. As an influential outlet for news and opinion for the business 
and governmental elites, the ideas and discourses that appear on the pages of 
the FT can be regarded as having certain clout and considerable acceptance 
among transnational elites. This renders the FT’s coverage of the Davos forum 
and interesting indicator of the political and economic sense-making of 
transnational elites. 
4.4 Questions of analysis 
In public communication, epistemic premises regarding social ontology, actor 
identifications and values and ideas do not necessarily emerge as objects of 
debate as such. Policy discourse, for instance, is mostly aimed at practical 
targets and addresses concrete questions, such as “what needs to be done”, and 
the epistemic premises are reproduced in the background and often 
unconsciously (Alasuutari and Qadir 2014, 72; Carstensen ad Schmidt 2016, 
329). Epistemic work, in other words, may be far from intentional or 
“strategic”. Actors in a debate do not aim to change each others’ fundamental 
premises concerning the social world, their view of themselves or basic values, 
but instead tend to take them for granted, as something that is shared by all 
participants. Their attempts to convince others of a certain interpretation of 
the situation rests on a tacit assumption that such basic premises are 
collectively shared. For instance, when transnational elites discuss what 
should be done about “global imbalances”, referring to the gaping current 
account deficits of the United States and the corresponding surpluses in China 
and other rapidly growing economies, they implicitly reproduce a shared 
ontology of the global economy as an increasingly integrated system of 
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interdependent economies in which such “imbalances” inevitably lead to 
greater instability. Such paradigmatic assumptions are seldom voiced and 
even more rarely questioned in public discourse. 
Understanding that epistemic “work” is not necessarily intentional or 
consciously “done” by any particular actor also helps alleviate the concerns 
regarding the public character of the FT-mediated communication. One could, 
after all, question whether analysing the media discourse is meaningful as it 
may not represent the true attitudes and views of its participants (Sylvan and 
Metskas 2009, 89). Indeed, it is certainly important to recognise the nature of 
much of the FT material, including the quotes of Davos forum speakers and 
other interviewees, as “public transcripts” in the sense James Scott (1990) 
distinguishes them from the views and beliefs that are expressed in private. 
Yet, even acknowledging that an individual’s public speech does not 
necessarily reflect her true personal views should not mean that discourse 
itself does not participate in the reproduction of collective perceptions and 
beliefs. 
Public transcripts certainly differ from private communication, so that 
certain opinions and beliefs held by individuals may be self-censored in public 
performances. Transnational elites, for instance, may articulate their views of 
their adversaries somewhat differently in public and private. Chapter 6 argues 
that the global civil society comprised an important reference group for the 
transnational elite in the early 2000s, and the conceptions they had of the 
alter-globalisation activists, which explicitly positioned itself in confrontation 
with the Davos forum, informed, in turn, the way the elites understood 
themselves. Yet even as the “true” sentiments of transnational elites with 
regard to their civil society adversaries might have been expressed in private 
conversations, also the public representations of and discourses about 
altermondialists mediated by the elite media such as the FT certainly 
impacted this dimension of collective identity formation.  
More generally, while all parties involved in TEC are aware that public 
pronouncements are qualitatively different from private views, the public 
transcripts do not become meaningless or insignificant. When studying 
epistemic work, the focus is not on the views of an individual but on the 
elements that may compose collective perceptions. Indeed, analysing texts and 
discourse when studying epistemic work becomes meaningful only if 
ontologies, identities and values are understood as social phenomena. From 
this perspective, ways of seeing the world and oneself are not regarded as 
subjective perceptions but as “intersubjective structures” reproduced in 
communication and interaction with others. As Ted Hopf (2009, 279) argues, 
intersubjectivity is “the reality generated within a community, society, or a 
group, of shared understandings of the world out there”. In this sense, such 
social phenomena as ontological premises and collective identities are not 
strictly tied to the actual purpose and intention of the speaker because they are 
manifest in the “deeper” levels of what is being said and how: behind even 
intentional, or strategic, communication lie shared assumptions. Public 
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speech acts thus reflect the understanding of the speaker of what is publicly 
acceptable and what is regarded as believable and valid by one’s peers, and 
thus ontological assumptions are both socially established and publicly 
regulated (Alasuutari and Qadir 2014, 74). Public discourse is therefore a good 
object when studying politically powerful, ideological and agency-constructing 
discourses. 
It should be noted, however, that, even as intentionality is not an 
essential feature of epistemic work, a significant part of the studied material 
worked on what appeared rather unequivocally to be key epistemic premises 
in TEC: many articles set out to analyse the state of the world and the global 
economy, and a number of columns focused openly on the Davos people, or 
“the global elite”, as a distinct group. Even as ideals and values tended to be 
less explicitly spelled out and were mostly taken for granted, certain social and 
political objectives were so prevalent in the studied material that it often left 
little doubt about the more intrinsic assumptions of what is good and 
desirable.  
Many of the journalistic genres in elite publications can hence be 
perceived as conscious efforts to work on the epistemic premises on which the 
transnational elites perform their everyday work. As a form of quality 
journalism, the Financial Times is not content with simply reporting elite 
views to elite audiences, but it instead strives to provide additional value to its 
readership by offering stories that include detailed explanations, context, and 
meaning. By going beyond “descriptive, fact-focused, and source-driven 
journalism” and providing the readers with explanations and 
contextualisation (Carpenter et al. 2015), FT journalists regularly expanded 
their role as reporters from “disseminators” to “interpreters” and even to 
“advocates” who attempt to raise awareness of certain problems and affect the 
readers’ political attitudes (see, e.g., Donsbach and Patterson 2004; Mellado 
2015; Statham 2007). Overall, then, the studied material often manifested 
distinctly conscious efforts to shape shared ontologies and identities among 
the elite readership. 
Analytical research questions 
The analysis focuses on three themes that continuously re-emerged in the 
material and onto which the epistemic work in TEC is most visibly anchored. 
Based on these three areas of debate and the previous discussion on epistemic 
work and its three objects, three simple research questions for the analysis of 
the material can be formulated. First, economic developments and the state of 
the global economy are topics that occupy a central place in the studied 
material. In this debate, the “global economy” emerges as a social domain that 
is socially constructed in discourse. It thus informs the articulation of the 
social ontology of transnational elites. The ways in which the economy is 
articulated as an object of governance and a domain of agency will, in turn, 
inform the actions and agency of transnational elites.  
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Research question 1: How is the “global economy” constituted as a 
transnational elite ontology in the FT coverage of the World Economic 
Forums? (Chapter 5) 
Second, the Davos event and its participants are a recurring subject of 
discussion and observation in the FT, and the “global elite” also occasionally 
appears as an explicit point of reference in the material. These themes can be 
approached as discourses that identify actors and promote distinct actor 
identifications. The analysis focuses on the representations and self-
representations of Davos participants and discusses what their implications 
are for a broader identification with the transnational elite. 
Research question 2: What kind of representations of transnational 
elites are being constructed in the FTs discourse on the World 
Economic Forum? (Chapter 6) 
Third, globalisation and global governance comprise a broad and recurring 
area of debate around which central political problems are articulated in the 
material. These policy debates thus work as a window into the negotiation of 
dominant values and ideals through which a common policy project is 
promoted in TEC. The analysis explores the development of these value-laden 
policy debates and their significance for the collective agency of transnational 
elites. 
Research question 3: What shared values and ideals concerning the 
global economy are promoted in the FT-mediated TEC and how do 
they inform elite agency? (Chapter 7) 
Consensus and contradictions 
When doing qualitative analysis of texts, the researcher is constantly grappling 
with the problem of looking for and articulating dominant meanings as 
opposed to giving salience to differences, contradictions and exceptions to the 
norm within the material. Newspaper texts can be approached as articulations 
of hegemonic views in support of dominant power relations but also as 
essentially contested and inherently polysemic representations which allow 
for multiple interpretations (Orgad 2012, 33–4; Saukko 2003, 83, 91–3). On 
the one hand, according to Fowler (1991, 47–8), the habitual writing style of 
the newspaper, or its “mode of address”, is the newspaper’s version of the 
language of the part of the public that the paper sees itself as primarily 
addressing. This habitual style “allows the unnoticed expression of familiar 
thoughts” and so promotes an assumption that there exists no disagreement 
among reasonable people over the matters discussed. Thus, building an 
assumption of consensus is one of the ideological practices of newspapers (see 
Hartley 1982, 81–3). On the other hand, as Felicitas Macgilchrist (2011, xi–xii) 
points out, the newspaper is a public space where the fundamentally 
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contested, or “political”, nature of issues and representations can become 
visible. It becomes visible, for instance, in the plurality of stories and their 
contradictory positions and framings. According to Macgilchrist (2011, 7–8), 
these shifting frames are an implication of the contingency and undecidability 
of the contemporary social order, reminding the readers of the essentially 
political institution of the social.  
Macgilchrist’s preference for an analysis of journalism as a site of 
discursive construction and contestation over ideological hegemony is 
certainly laudable. However, this study does not wholly share her optimistic 
interpretation of the institutional role of journalism, according to which 
journalism necessarily opens the political dimension of society to public 
discussion. Much of the time journalism seems to rather conceal the political 
nature of issues and effectively brackets out truly “political” arguments – those 
that question the hegemonic institution of society – from the public debate. 
Nevertheless, it is true that even commonsensical discourses involve 
contradictions, paradoxes and gaps that often reveal the shakiness of the 
purported consensus over political understandings and their epistemic 
premises.  
The issue of one dominant discourse versus a plurality of meanings is 
particularly crucial for this study addressing the epistemic foundations of the 
potential making of a unified global elite as a collective agent. Indeed, an 
analysis focusing on “shared” identities and understandings of reality could 
easily be criticised for arguing about the existence of a global conspiracy, or for 
conducting a highly selective analysis to “show” that the elites are in general 
agreement over policy. Accordingly, the broader the apparent “consensus” on 
these issues is, the greater appears to be the elites’ capacity for collective 
agency. Alternatively, pointing to apparent disagreements over the nature of 
the world, actor identities and values and ideals would necessarily seem to 
erode the potential of transnational elites for collective agency. 
Indeed, the prevalence of consensus among transnational elites should 
not be over-estimated. It is clear that we can find elements of disagreement 
and ideological conflict in any group on one level or area of debate (Hall 1985, 
97), but also elements of consensus on another. This study concentrates 
primarily on those levels of debate, such as ontological understandings and 
perceptions of self and one’s reference group, which deal with more 
fundamental beliefs than individual policy issues. These are areas which are 
more susceptible to collective consensus and where disagreements and 
conflicts tend to be less apparent. The interest of this study is on assessing the 
extent that such consensus among elites reaches: how fundamental, and how 
superficial or particular, are the areas and issues of consensus when it comes 
to aspects of the global economy and the ideas and values that underpin 
transnational elite agency. 
In this regard, Alasuutari and Qadir (2014, 72–3, 78) propose making an 
analytical distinction between two dimensions of epistemic work, the 
paradigmatic and the practical. The paradigmatic dimension refers to the 
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“pre-conceptual”, “broad” and “amorphous” basis on which the further 
understandings of the social situation, actors and ideals and values are based, 
whereas the practical dimension concerns “narrower” and more “focused” 
premises about the nature of the situation, the character of actors and the 
substance of ideals and values that legitimise certain lines of action. 
Paradigmatic ontological premises, for instance, are basic ontological 
categories such as “economy” and “society”, referring to the level of social 
imaginary (Taylor 2004). Practical ontological premises, in contrast, concern 
facts about and definitions of the situation, including scientific data and 
statistics. Both dimensions are typically present in argumentation. Yet, even 
as the paradigmatic notions of the social world can certainly be brought into 
the level of the conscious in communication and challenged by actors, the 
potential contestation on epistemic premises mostly takes place at the 
practical level of the debate. 
The distinction between the two dimensions is far from evident, and it 
seems that there are no exhaustive and well-established categories of issues 
which belong to each of them. Accordingly, this study argues that what is 
paradigmatic and what is practical in epistemic work must be seen as context-
dependent and as a matter of empirical observation. Starting from the notion 
that struggles over epistemic premises more often take place on the practical 
level while the paradigmatic elements are taken for granted and shared, the 
analysis tries to make use of this distinction in order to shed light on areas of 
consensus and disagreement in TEC. The aim is to identify areas of apparent 
consensus, or unquestionable truths and implicit assumptions that do not 
necessarily even have to be mentioned, that might hence be considered as 
paradigmatic. Yet the analysis also seeks to locate areas of apparent dissensus 
and struggle, which could be regarded as practical objects of epistemic work. 
Following Macgilchrist’s (2011) example, the analysis hopes to demonstrate 
that even as there are certain dominant understandings broadly shared in 
TEC, there is also inevitable contingency, contradiction and undecidedness in 
the elites’ public epistemic work and in the epistemological premises it 
formulates, with potential implications for transnational elite formation and 
collective agency. 
The three lines of inquiry outlined above are carried out in the following 
chapters through three principal modes of observation or textual analysis. 
First, based on the close reading and coding of the data, the analysis provides 
descriptions of the data in the form of direct quotations, which are meant to 
illustrate and concretise individual analytical observations. Second, 
observations are organised into categories to demonstrate how certain notions 
or issues are articulated in the data in alternative ways. This will hopefully both 
help in bringing further depth to the analysis and give testament to the 
multivocal nature of the data. Third, the analysis describes the frequency of 
certain words and terms in the data to complement qualitative observations. 
These numerical findings are used to give further insight into recurring 
patterns and discursive conventions, as well as into relevant shifts in the data 
Notes on empirical methodology 
154 
 
over time. These three modes often become mixed in the analysis, alternating 
between purely descriptive, categorising and numerical observations to 
investigate the particular object of attention. In this way, the three methodical 
approaches and modes of presentation can also be understood as forms of 
methodical triangulation in which the same data are approached from 
alternative angles to provide a more complete view of the data and, hopefully, 
to make the analytical observations both more reliable and convincing. 
5 ECONOMY AND FINANCE IN ELITE 
ONTOLOGY 
This chapter examines how transnational elites communicate their 
perceptions of the world in terms of the global economy. The first section of 
the chapter analyses what is interpreted mostly as the paradigmatic dimension 
of the elites’ ontology. It focuses on how the economy is discursively 
established as a specific domain of the social world, which not only has 
systemic characteristics but also space for human agency. The second section 
turns to the more practical level of epistemic work, observing elite debates on 
the global financial crisis which began in 2007. Here the focus is on the 
practical negotiations over what should be done in the wake of the crisis as 
well as on the more paradigmatic sense-making over the nature and role of 
finance in the global political economy.  
When observing elite discussions on matters of the global economy, it is 
necessary to realise that there is nothing self-evident about the meaning of the 
economy; rather, “the economy” and “the economic” are always discursively 
constructed by social agents (Jessop and Oosterlynck 2008, 1156–7). As 
Jessop (2002, 7) argues, any particular discourse provides only a partial and 
simplified understanding of the economy, its constitution and its basic 
dynamics. This also means that such issues as what is thought of as economic 
and what counts as belonging to the economy, in relation to the “non-
economic” and “non-economy”, can be defined in various ways and the answer 
to them is necessarily context-bound and not a universal one (see also 
Cameron and Palan 2004). As David Ruccio (2008) illustrates, 
representations of the economy are diverse and being produced by a multitude 
of actors and institutions within and outside the academy, from economists to 
non-economist academics and from activists to artists. “These different 
conceptions ... comprise different understandings ... of the economy: what it 
is, where it exists, how it operates, how it is constituted, how it is related to 
other aspects of the natural and social world, what problems might exist and 
how they can be solved, what the goals of economic activity are, and much, 
much more” (Ruccio 2008, 899).  
However, even as there is neither self-evidence nor “fixity” to the 
economy (cf. Mitchell 1998), the economy and the economic have arguably 
shown some stability in the way they are generally conceived in the modern 
era. According to Charles Taylor (2004), western modernity sees the 
emergence of widely shared accounts of the economy as a distinct sphere or 
domain in society. This “imaginary” of an economy entails a particular way of 
understanding how individuals are linked together in a perceived spontaneous 
order. Imagining society as an economy thus entails perceiving society as an 
“interlocking set of activities of production, exchange and consumption, which 
form a system with its own laws and its own dynamic” (ibid., 76). To perceive 
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the economy as a relatively autonomous domain which is separated from the 
state was an elementary feature of liberalism (Jessop 2002, 218–9). Since the 
1930s, the development of econometrics to measure and model “economic” 
activities has further reinforced such a perception of the economy “as a self-
contained sphere, distinct from the social, the cultural, and other spheres” 
(Mitchell 1998, 91). Accordingly, the economy is increasingly consolidated as 
a domain that is somehow “disembedded” from social relations (Grossberg 
2010, 142). Moreover, Lawrence Grossberg (2010, 109–10) argues that the 
economy has been granted primacy in the modern western social imaginary: 
the conception of society as a set of economic relations enjoys a privileged 
position in societal discourses in comparison to other ways of imagining 
societal order and social co-existence. 
Arguably, then, observing the production of shared meanings and 
understandings of the economy in TEC is a key element when trying to 
describe and explain the conduct of elite actors (cf. Jessop and Oosterlynck 
2008, 1156). This does not imply, however, a presumption that discursive 
constructions of the economic directly lead to particular ways of acting. Actual 
practices and policies that are articulated publicly within a certain ontology of 
the economy should not be understood as direct manifestations of discourses 
or being products thereof. Nevertheless, as Ruccio (2008, 898–9) maintains, 
it is possible to examine a certain set of economic discourses which entail 
particular ways of representing social reality and point to certain courses of 
decisions and actions with regard to the social world. Therefore, the premise 
behind the following analysis is that elite discourses of the economy and the 
economic present transnational elites ways to make sense of their own 
practices and institutions, while also providing a framework, or a set of 
alternatives, for future action. The discursive construction of the economy as 
an elite ontology, in other words, enables and directs transnational elite 
agency. 
5.1 Foundations of the global economy 
Judging by the numbers, the economy is an essential object of the elite’s 
epistemic work. Aside from being frequently used as a layout element or kicker 
to articles and whole sections of the paper, the word economy appears 720 
times in 259 of the 532 articles in the data, or, on average, 1.35 times per 
article. When the plural form economies is added to the count, the word 
appears in one or the other form on average twice per article (2.00 times per 
article, or 1065 times in 304 articles). The concern with the economy is 
complemented by frequent allusions to the market, markets or marketplace, 
which together appear on average 1.96 times per article. In comparison, state 
or states (when not denoting a condition, as in: “the fragile state of the 
economy”) appears 0.45 times per article, and other comparative substantives, 
such as society/societies (0.10) and polity/polities (0.002) are even more 
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uncommon. As elements of ontology, then, economy and market seem to be 
key notions that inform transnational elites about the nature of the social 
world and how people inhabiting it relate to each other. Apart from those two, 
only system (0.48) emerges as a frequently-used alternative when grasping the 
ontology of social coexistence. 
The overall dominance of the economy as a basis of social ontology is 
complemented by the prevalence of economic as an adjective and attribute, 
being present 936 times in the data (not including mentions of World 
Economic Forum), or on average 1.76 times per article. However, political also 
appears quite often (0.86 times per article), suggesting that the economy-
centred ontology does not entirely discard the political aspects of the social 
order. Indeed, the higher number of occurrences of political, compared to the 
relative infrequency of state and society indicates that the political is not 
restricted to those alternative ontologies but is also addressed as an 
elementary part of the economy.92 Similarly, even as society hardly exists as a 
relevant category in elite ontology, social and societal as adjectives appear 
0.43 times per article, suggesting that social aspects, too, are embedded within 
the overall ontology of the economy. 
Imagining economies 
If the notion of the economy holds a central position in elite ontology, what 
does it refer to? Certainly, there is the economy (115 mentions or 0.22 
mentions per article) as a self-standing notion, referring to a particular social 
domain as opposed to some other, such as the state or the polity. But more 
commonly, the notion is qualified by an attribute, suggesting that the economy 
in question exists in relation to other economies. There is much talk about a 
US/American economy (0.16), in particular, and less so about a Chinese 
economy (0.04), European economy (0.04), Russian economy (0.01), 
German economy (0.01) or Japanese economy (0.01). This suggests that the 
economy is something that brings a certain group of people together, possibly 
even within determined geographic boundaries: the Americans have their own 
economy, as do the Europeans. Thus, even as it is evident that what today is 
referred to as the Chinese economy, for instance, entails many actors that are 
not Chinese by their nationality, as well as activities that do not take place 
within the geographic territory of the People’s Republic of China, the notion of 
a Chinese economy is an unquestioned element of the ontology.  
The validity of the national or regional account of the economy primarily 
derives from the possibility of quantifying them mostly in terms of various 
statistical measures, including the size and growth rate of the gross domestic 
product, the balance of external trade or the rate of productivity growth. Such 
 
                                                   
92 Even so, the notion of ”political economy” as an explicit acknowledgment of the political 
nature of all matters economic only appears twice in the material. 
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statistical conventions thus allow for the identification of distinct economies 
as areas of economic activities which somehow relate to each other and 
contribute to a single (national or regional) whole (but not to other economies) 
and which can therefore be analysed and observed in separation from the 
others. According to Jessop (2002, 7), such representation of economies as 
bounded entities is a necessary fiction, because “any activity oriented towards 
[the economy] requires some discursive simplification”. The economy as an 
“imaginatively narrated system” with specific boundaries (ibid.) can hence be 
regarded as a key element of social ontology with which transnational elites 
organise the social world and reduce its infinite complexity by including 
certain elements and excluding others, thereby making it possible for them to 
design interventions, governance and management of economic activities (see 
also Jessop 2009, 344–6; Jessop and Oosterlynck 2008, 1157–8). 
The separation and measurement of distinct economies also makes it 
possible to not only rank them within a hierarchy of economies but also to 
define them by certain characteristics. As a result, we have largest economies 
(0.04 mentions per article), leading economies (0.02), major economies 
(0.01) and significant economies (0.004), but also advanced economies 
(0.06), growing economies (0.01), dynamic economies (0.01), weakening 
economies (0.004), competitive economies (0.002), flawed economies 
(0.002) and, most notably, emerging economies (0.15). Such normative 
characterisations illustrate how the economies are habitually assessed in 
terms of performance. Indeed, this way of imagining the economy as an object 
of performance, regulation and governance may be part of what makes the 
elite stand out from other social groups. Taylor (2004, 72–3) notes how, in the 
shift to modernity and the rise of capitalism, governing elites gradually 
adopted the view that increasing production and exchange were key to political 
and military power. Similarly, Grossberg (2010, 130–2) emphasises the 
importance of the discourses and representations of the economy that are 
being produced by “the institutions of policy, law, and business”. These “self-
reflective economic agents” in the domains of policy and business make use of 
economic theories, logics and calculations and adapt them to their everyday 
practices. Transnational elites, in other words, discursively construct the social 
world in a way that makes sense of their own activities that take the economy 
as a reference point and an object of intervention. 
From this perspective, it is notable that the most prevalent attributes of 
the economy in TEC are “world” and “global”: world economy appears 156 
times in the data (0.29 times per article) and global economy 112 times (0.21 
times per article). The popularity of these two words in the immediate 
connection to economy indicates a tacit recognition of the boundless nature of 
the economy and the artificialness of its national and regional 
“compartmentalisations”. Indeed, even while “the economy” has been deeply 
rooted within the space of the nation or state in modern social imaginaries, the 
border-transcending nature of economic activities has always meant that it is 
possible to imagine them within a more extensive space of organisation (see 
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Taylor 2004, 178–9). As a result, the economy becomes one way of imagining 
a geopolitical order (cf. Mitchell 1998, 90). 
Defining the economy in terms of its world-encompassing character can 
be considered a manifestation of what has been called the “rise of the global 
imaginary” (Patomäki and Steger 2010; Steger 2009). According to Manfred 
Steger (2009), the major political ideologies of the nineteenth century –
liberalism, conservatism and socialism – were articulated in essentially 
national terms, prescribing political projects that would be realised in national 
contexts and by state institutions. In contrast, the political-ideological 
development after World War 2 has increasingly been articulated in a 
boundless global framework. Neoliberal market globalism, leftist justice 
globalism, imperialist globalism and jihadist globalism are examples of these 
contesting ideologies of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. 
Accordingly, even as the border-transcending nature of economic activities 
would seem to naturally call for an adoption of a global framework when 
thinking about the economy, only after World War 2 have major political ideas 
and ideologies articulated their projects in relation to an essentially global 
economy and society. 
  
Figure 5.1 Visualising the global imaginary 
Sources: Financial Times 1 February 2002 and 28 January 2009. 
Global imaginary enables the conception of the social world as an essentially 
boundless and a single whole. The strength of this “global consciousness” 
(Robertson 1992) is evident in TEC. Indeed, if there are two words more 
prevalent than economy and market(s) in the material, they are global, which 
appears no less than 1127 times in the data, or 2.12 times per article, and 
world, which is mentioned (in lowercase, to exclude references to the World 
Economic Forum) even more frequently, 1633 times (3.1 times per article). 
Aside from being a ubiquitous verbal reference point, the world is also a 
popular visual symbol in the FT’s images and illustrations (see Figure 5.1). The 
figure of the globe may be regarded as the most powerful visual embodiment 
of the global imaginary: as Heikki Patomäki and Steger (2010, 1057) point out, 
social imaginaries are typically anchored on certain textual and visual 
prototypes, metaphors and symbols. In FT illustrations, the globe appears 
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particularly in conjunction with articles and columns that address the Davos 
forum. In fact, the world often takes the form of a snowball in reference to the 
Alpine environment of the Davos conference. Through such imagery, the globe 
and the participants of the forum become closely interlinked. Accordingly, the 
globe in these illustrations can be seen as referring either to a geographic 
space, thus including the whole planet in its scope, or to the Davos crowd as a 
“global” community. 
The global economy’s ten articulations 
The economy, in other words, is primarily articulated in the epistemic work of 
transnational elites within the broader global imaginary which perceives the 
world as a single whole. Indeed, to treat the economy as global, or something 
that encompasses the whole world, is a ubiquitous practice in the FT. Yet, as 
the previous discussion about the ambivalence of the idea of the economy 
suggests, the global economy is also an essentially discursive construct. Even 
as the basic existence of a global economy is seemingly taken for granted in 
TEC, there is no apparent consensus on what exactly it is, what it entails and 
how it operates. Even a quick look at the way the phrases “world economy” and 
“global economy” are employed in the FT makes it clear that the notion is 
attributed with multiple and partly even contradicting features and modes of 
existence. Accordingly, Table 5.1 differentiates between no less than ten 
different ways the idea of the global economy is articulated in the material. 
Table 5.1 Articulations of “global economy” and “world economy” in transnational 
elite communication 
1. Global economy as an all-
encompassing form of 
societal coexistence 
The world economy, including even the profligate North 
American part of it, is gradually learning to use a little less 
energy as it grows. (A4/2001, DB.)93 ; There is far too 
great a tendency to think that what is good for big 
business (rightly understood) is also good for the global 
economy and the people who toil in it. (A40/2001, 
Editorial.) ; Setting out the evidence for global warming, 
Mr Blair said that while the issue was “still disputed”, 
global leaders had a responsibility to act on the majority 
view that it posed a real threat. … “Business and the 
global economy need to know this is not an issue that is 
going to go away”, Mr Blair said. (A179/2005, RC/KG/JT.) 
 
                                                   
93  The articles cited in the analysis are identified using the following formula: (article 
number/year, author/co-authors). For a list of authors cited and their initials, see Appendix 1. 
For the list of articles cited in the analysis, see Appendix 2. 
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2. Global economy as a 
historically evolving social 
system 
Larry Summers, president of Harvard University and a 
former US Treasury secretary, said that the world was 
probably experiencing the third biggest economic 
revolution of the past millennium alongside the 
Renaissance and the Industrial Revolution. The 
resurgence of China and India and the impact of 
disruptive new technologies were revolutionising the 
global economy. (A242/2006, JT.) ; The world economy 
appears to be rebalancing to where it was in earlier 
centuries. (A494/2011, JL.) 
3. Global economy as a 
distinct domain in world 
society 
The world's economy is in excellent shape, but its politics 
is disturbing. (A297/2007, MW.) 
4. Global economy as a 
closed or exclusive system
  
Encouragingly, globalisation has proved resilient to 
shocks. Despite the financial crises in the developing 
world, no country has chosen to turn its back on the world 
economy. (A70/2002, Editorial.) ; The integration of China 
and India into the world economy at a moment when 
technology is digitising and disaggregating old business 
models offers companies huge opportunities to cut costs 
and increase efficiency. (A239/2006, Editorial.) 
5. Global economy as a 
capitalist system 
One of the critical questions is whether countries such as 
India and China can create millions of new high-spending 
consumers, boosting the world economy. (A220/2006, 
AB/CG/KG) ; The economic impact of China and now 
India, with a combined population of close to 2.4bn 
people, is already evident. … If one adds in the remaining 
population of east and south Asian developing countries, 
one has more than half of humanity. The overall effect … 
is at least a four-fold increase in the number of workers 
available to the world economy. The potential still 
untapped is bigger than anything that has happened so 
far. (A243/2006, MW.) 
6. Global economy as an 
indispensable system 
This year’s World Economic Forum has been thick with 
warnings that a slowdown of the global economy could 
start a slide into protectionism and warring trade blocs. 
(A35/2001, Editorial.) ; A revival in the global economy 
over the coming year would help ease some of the 
economic and political tensions that currently preoccupy 
the Davos delegates. (A499/2011, GR.) 
7. Global economy as an 
integrated system of 
The world economy is starting to fire on multiple 
cylinders, with decent prospects for growth in Japan and 
the eurozone, and China promising to generate more 
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(interdependent) 
subsystems 
domestic consumption. (A239/2006, Editorial.) ; China, 
then, is not just being changed by the world economy but, 
in turn, changing it greatly. (A317/2008, MW.) ; So, the 
world economy is growing at the sort of rate it was 
growing before the financial crisis, but it's even more 
dominated by emerging markets – China, India, Brazil, 
Russia – and less by the advanced economies, although 
just recently we've even seen a little bit more optimism in 
two of the other world's biggest economies, the US and 
Germany. (A484/2011, RE/CG/PJ/GR.) 
8. Global economy as a 
hierarchically organised 
system 
The impressive line-up of chief executives from China 
and India [at the Davos forum] also underlines where the 
real future leaders of the world economy are likely to 
come from. (A145/2005, AB.) 
9. Global economy as a 
fragile social system 
Fears about the effect on the oil price of an attack on Iraq 
are seen as the biggest danger to the world economy. 
(A101/2003, EC/NJ.) ; There are many causes for 
concern over the global economy this year but experts 
are confident that the world can weather them. 
(A199/2006, CG.) ; A debate on “globalisation at the 
crossroads” considered three main threats to the world 
economy – failed trade talks, financial regulation and 
global economic imbalances. (A295/2007, GR.) ; [I]t is the 
collapsing national and global economy that has become 
the US's overwhelming public concern. (A370/2009, CF.) 
; The world economy survived the heart attack in the 
financial system. (A474/2010, MW.) 
10. Global economy as a 
closely monitored system 
The best informed forecasts about the world economy 
and global political system are shrouded in uncertainty. 
(A9/2001, GB.) ; The IMF said it believed the world 
economy would grow by 3.9 per cent in 2010, an upward 
revision of 0.8 percentage points, and the recovery would 
accelerate in 2011 to 4.3 per cent. (A442/2010, CG.) 
As Table 5.1 indicates, at its broadest, the notion of the global economy alludes 
to nothing less than the whole of the planet and its population acting in concert 
(Articulation 1). This way of using the term evokes a global economy which 
“gradually learns” new things, making it appear as an organism or a historical 
agent in its own right (cf. Alasuutari and Qadir 2016, 5). Of course, notions 
that attribute the global economy with agency are ubiquitous in economic talk 
(the global economy “grows”, “falls into recession”, “recovers” and so on) – 
although it remains unclear who exactly are the actors when the global 
economy does things (see Chapter 6 on actor identities). Yet this first 
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articulation stands out from the more mundane attribution of 
anthropomorphic qualities to an abstract category in that it refers more 
directly to the economy as a form of social coexistence. It implies that the 
global economy consists of the world’s population as a whole: it is “the people 
who toil in it” whose fates are at stake in the global economy. It is also 
something to be addressed by global leaders, as suggested by the remarks of 
Tony Blair. Such uses of the term come extremely close to the idea of world 
society – indeed, one could easily replace the word “economy” with “society” 
in these passages without significantly altering their meaning. 
The intimate connection between the global economy and the people of 
the world is less apparent in other uses of the term. In fact, most of the 
accounts in Table 5.1 attribute the global economy with a systemic character, 
which at best vaguely refers to an idea of economy as a certain domain of social 
life. Yet most of them continue to associate the global economy with an idea of 
an inclusive social system or domain of social life – one that develops through 
historical time (Articulation 2) and exists in relationship with other systems or 
domains, such as politics (Articulation 3). The allusion here to a social system, 
which essentially involves all the people of the world, is in stark contrast with 
an idea of the global economy as something into which countries and peoples 
need to be integrated and which a country can “turn its back on”, as suggested 
by some accounts (Articulation 4).  
The idea of the global economy as closed or exclusive system, in other 
words, implies that all the world’s people and their (economic) activities do 
not, by definition, form part of the global economy. In such allusions it may be 
implied, for instance, that a “domestic economy” necessarily exists outside the 
global economy, or that only cross-border economic transactions are to be 
counted as activities of the global economy. Alternatively, this use of the term 
may imply that only capitalist, “free-market”, economies are part of the true 
global economy. At times, associating the global economy with capitalism is 
even more clearly made (Articulation 5). These uses of the term include 
explicit references to consumption as an essential factor “boosting” the global 
economy, as well as to the need to feed the global economy with new armies of 
labour and, specifically, to Asian workers as a huge potential that can still be 
“tapped” into. 
Aside from an occasional ambiguity concerning its inclusiveness, as 
implied by the contradictions between the first five articulations, the prevalent 
talk concerning the global economy seems to address it as a system of capitalist 
production, accumulation and market-based interchange on a global scale 
(Articulations 4–10). In this sense, there are three notable elements in the 
discourse on the global economy as a capitalist system: its indispensability, its 
nature as a system of interdependent parts and its vulnerability. First, as the 
global economy often appears as a crucial system which fundamentally shapes 
and affects other developments in world society (Articulation 6). Accordingly, 
a “slowdown of the global economy” (understood as a decrease in the rate of 
capitalist accumulation) would spell trouble in the form of the dangerous 
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economic policies such a downturn would potentially prompt. A “revival in the 
global economy”, on the other hand, helps ease tensions in the world.  
Second, there is deep understanding of the global economy as a system 
of interdependent parts (Articulation 7). Typically, analyses concerning the 
state and direction of the global economy are carried out by making individual 
assessments about national and regional economies that are presumed to form 
a united system. Particularly the frequent association of growth (695 
mentions, or 1.3 times per article) – and its less frequently-used antonyms 
recession (0.33), downturn (0.16), slowdown (0.14), depression (0.06) and 
slump (0.06) – with the world economy is a good example of how this global 
unity is naturalised by referring to market cycles that purportedly touch the 
whole world at the same time. In this imaginary of an interdependent system, 
individual economies are represented not just as parts of a larger whole, but 
as interdependent subsystems: changes taking place in one economy will affect 
others – particularly when the world’s largest economies are concerned – and 
all economies are affected by the global economy as a whole.  
The relations of influence and interdependence are not necessarily 
assumed to be symmetrical, however: while developments in the Chinese 
economy, for instance, are often represented as having consequences for every 
other region in the world, economies in the “developing world” are mostly 
represented as dependent on the developments in the largest economies 
without having much or any influence on these developments, and hence on 
their own economic future. The primary interest when considering the global 
economy is hence directed at the economies considered systemically 
influential, and the global economy is seen as being dependent on the sound 
functioning of each of its major components. The view of the global economy 
as being composed of interdependent subsystems is thus intimately tied to a 
conception of a hierarchically organised system (Articulation 8) (cf. Alasuutari 
and Qadir 2016, 10). As noted above, the global economy has its leading 
economies, and the number of references to the US economy, in relation to 
other national or regional economies, leaves little doubt where that leadership 
is primarily located in TEC.94  
 
                                                   
94 In this regard, the apparent rise of China to the status of a leading economy is conspicuous 
in the studied material. In the early years of the 2000s, the global economy in the FT’s analyses 
is primarily outlined by observing the outlook of only three economies: the United States, 
Europe and Japan. From 2005 onwards, however, practically no analysis or report on the 
global economy fails to include a reference to China, and starting from 2007, India is also 
included in many of these analyses. Around this time, the focus and interest in Japan notably 
decreases in the FT’s reports on the global economy. In sum, during the first decade of the 
twenty-first century, transnational elites learn to regard China as an elementary part of the 
global economy, while other economies, particularly the Japanese economy, seems to attract 
less attention in transnational elite communication. 
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The aspects of the global economy reviewed so far have been 
characterised by their appearance as implicit and taken-for-granted 
assumptions. In other words, the implied ideas about the nature of the global 
economy are not explicitly addressed and are assumed to be shared by all 
participants in the communication. Accordingly, most of the talk on the nature 
of the global economy seems to take place on the paradigmatic level of 
epistemic work, reproducing the ontology of the social world in the 
background level of discourse (see Chapter 4.4). However, when it comes to 
understanding the global economy as a united system of interdependent parts, 
there are occasional hints in the material of a partial crumbling of the illusion 
of a self-evident and universally shared ontology. This becomes apparent, for 
instance, in the following passage from Alan Beattie’s 2002 article, which 
traces the impacts of the “global downturn” on the “growth of worldwide 
trade”.  
Trade often takes the brunt of a global downturn. It is dominated by 
manufactured goods - $6,253bn of the $7,746bn total last year - whose 
production is more volatile than services, generating more variance than 
its small share in output would warrant. Some highly traded services, such 
as tourism, are also early victims when consumers cut back. […] Moreover, 
as Janet Henry at HSBC points out, much world trade - 47 per cent of US 
exports in 2000, for example - is now carried out within companies rather 
than between them. With many of these companies headquartered in rich 
countries, it means that shocks from the industrialised world are swiftly 
transmitted to subsidiaries around the globe. The large crossholdings 
between the US and the eurozone may also explain why the latter has 
suffered more than many of its policymakers expected, and why it has so 
far shown little sign of being able to take over from the US as the importer 
of last resort. In theory, the synchronisation of the downturn also means 
that the recovery - with the exception of Japan, which has home-grown 
problems - will see a rapid resumption of trade growth. But if this fails to 
materialise, the disquiet with the downside of an integrated global 
economy could grow, possibly even threatening the medium-term upward 
trend in world trade. (A52/2002, AB.) 
The passage begins with the idea of a “global downturn”, thus manifestly 
reproducing the belief in the global economy as a united system. After 
describing various reasons why such a global phenomenon affects “trade” – 
meaning, of course, transnational trade in which capital moves across national 
borders – Beattie goes on to explain how economic “shocks” are “swiftly 
transmitted” by TNCs from the “industrialised world” across the globe. Here, 
in other words, we find a version of the popular narrative of an interconnected 
global economy in which developments in one system affect other systems. 
The subsequent two sentences, then, refer to the “large crossholdings between 
the US and the eurozone” and to the “synchronisation of the downturn”, 
apparently further reinforcing the idea of an interconnected and united 
system. Yet the two sentences also importantly cast doubts about the 
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obviousness of this narrative as well as its validity. First, Beattie suggests that 
many “policymakers” in the eurozone had not anticipated that the currency 
area would be so much affected from problems in the United States. The 
implication here is that the corporate crossholdings, which purportedly create 
the deep interconnection between the US and eurozone economies, were 
perhaps unknown or, alternatively, that their significance was poorly 
understood. The acknowledgment of the deep interconnectedness of the two 
economies, in other words, seems to be something that is not uniformly shared 
by all decision makers. Second, Beattie seems to suggest in the latter sentence 
that market cycles are synchronised across economies only “in theory”. Yet a 
simultaneous “recovery” will most probably exclude at least Japan (because its 
“home-grown problems” have apparently disconnected it from other 
economies) and can just as well fail “to materialise”. The very 
interconnectedness, in terms of transmitting phenomena across economies, is 
explicitly qualified (by excluding Japan) and put in doubt by referring to its 
status as a theoretical idea. 
As a further sign of the partial instability of the global economy as elite 
ontology, the interdependence of national and regional economies emerges as 
a matter of explicit debate in the FT’s 2008 coverage of the Davos forum, which 
raises the question of the decoupling of the global economy. This notion refers 
to a suggestion made during the global financial crisis of 2007–2009 that 
some parts of the global economy, namely the emerging economies, could 
remain “effectively immune to the effects of a US recession” (A344/2008, 
JA/GT). However, FT journalists present this argument as controversial, and 
in 2009 the idea is directly debunked: “A year ago … many analysts expected 
a form of ‘decoupling’ … That has not happened” (A386/2009, QP). The notion 
of decoupling receives no further mentions after that. While the whole debate 
thus serves as a way to ultimately reproduce the idea of an interdependent 
global economy, it is notable that the frequent allusions to the success of the 
emerging economies after the financial crisis actually seem to give some 
credibility to the original decoupling hypothesis according to which many non-
western economies have been able to maintain high rates of growth despite the 
downturn in the United States and Europe. In fact, Martin Wolf ends up 
referring to “a divided world” in which “emerging countries are proving able 
to generate self-sustained growth, despite the frailties of the high-income 
countries” (A489/2011, MW).95 
 
                                                   
95 This acknowledgement, however, does not prevent Wolf from reproducing the notion of the 
global economy as a systemic whole consisting of interdependent parts in the very same article. 
“Among the reasons for the dynamism of the emerging countries is the spillover effects of 
policies adopted by the crisis-afflicted high-income countries, particularly the US”, Wolf 
writes, also noting that “in the world economy as a whole, we see buoyant commodity prices 
and inflationary pressures” (A489/2011, MW). 
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Returning to the various articulations of the global economy as a system 
(see Table 5.1), the third notable element in this discourse – besides frequent 
allusions to its indispensability and interconnectedness – are the multiple 
references to the vulnerability of the global economy (Articulation 9). This is 
perhaps the most defining feature of the way the global economy is addressed 
in TEC. According to this pervasive understanding, the global economy is in 
constant danger of weakening, collapsing or disintegrating. Potential threats 
and dangers, from oil shocks to international military conflicts and from failed 
trade talks to financial regulation, loom large for the global economy. The 
health of the global economy is thus of constant “concern” to those in charge. 
What is implied here is that the global economy is far from a self-sustaining 
system and instead requires constant care-taking to help it grow, gain strength 
and prosper. This also explains why the global economy, in other words, calls 
for active monitoring (Articulation 10) to both trace and “forecast” its 
development in order to facilitate proper interventions. 
The social (dis)embeddedness of the global economy 
Starting from the notion of the global economy as an elementary and 
ineradicable aspect of world society (Articulation 1) we have thus arrived at an 
understanding of the global economy as a fragile system that is constantly 
under threat, even of extinction (Articulation 9). While seemingly in conflict, 
the two articulations may in fact complement each other. Accordingly, the 
prevalent understanding in TEC concerning the precariousness of the global 
economy may reflect an acknowledgment of its fundamentally social and 
cultural underpinnings: the global capitalist system can only be sustained as 
long as the social, political and cultural elements that hold it together continue 
to support it. The way the two extremes may be implicitly connected in the 
epistemic work of transnational elites is captured in Alan Pike’s 2001 reference 
to the UN secretary-general Kofi Annan’s speech at the 1999 Davos forum: 
Mr Annan used his Davos speech two years ago to advance a deeply-held 
concern that the global economy was more “fragile and vulnerable” than 
was generally appreciated. He argued that unless the global market, like 
national markets, was held together by shared values, it would be exposed 
to backlashes from protectionism, populism, nationalism, ethnic 
chauvinism, fanaticism and terrorism. In addition to the efforts of the UN 
and other international agencies to promote human rights, acceptable 
labour conditions and environmental standards, he said, the corporate 
sector must tackle them directly. (A6/2001, AP.) 
In the passage, Kofi Annan warns about the “fragility and vulnerability” of the 
global economy. Here the global economy equates with the “global market”, 
which is apparently dependent on the existence and observance of “shared 
values”. Accordingly, various sets of value-related ideas and ideologies from 
protectionism to terrorism are threatening the global market with extinction. 
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These purportedly anti-global economic values are then contrasted with 
“human rights”, “acceptable labour conditions” and “environmental 
standards”, which seemingly correspond with the values of the global 
economy. The argument that the global economy “is held together by shared 
values” implies, in other words, that the global economy is constituted by 
certain social activities and processes and corresponding values and ideals. 
The global economy comes together only through these activities, and once 
they are abandoned, the global economy effectively ceases to exist. In this 
understanding, there is nothing inevitable or self-evident about the existence 
of the global economy. It is a contingent and conditional domain of social 
coexistence, which comes into being only through its reproduction in social 
interaction. 
The ontological premise of the social embeddedness of the global 
economy is not implied only in the kind of lofty rhetoric that can be expected 
from a UN secretary general. Rather, an understanding of the socially 
embedded and collectively constructed nature of the global economy seems to 
be a feature of even the most mundane elite discourses concerning the 
economy.  During the annual Davos forums, FT reporters routinely report on 
the purportedly shared perceptions and the general mood among the forum 
participants with regard to the global economic outlook. Significantly, instead 
of simply reporting on the evaluations, forecasts and prognoses that various 
expert institutions publish, FT journalists go to great lengths to interpret the 
individual and collective feelings of the people gathered in Davos. Accordingly, 
they habitually employ such terms as confidence and upbeat to describe 
generally positive outlooks, and articulate generally negative expectations with 
words like uncertainty, fear and sombre. Even when they point to often 
contradicting prognoses, analyses and opinions of economists and other 
experts, FT journalists rarely attempt to analyse the merits of each argument. 
Instead, they tend to offer an assessment about the “predominant view” among 
panel speakers or the forum participants at large. Those economic analyses 
and predictions that deviate from the apparent majority view are typically 
labelled as either optimistic or pessimistic. 
Why does the FT see it as necessary and relevant to inform its readers 
about such subjective perceptions and feelings of the attendees at Davos? The 
first and obvious implication here is that the perceptions and evaluations 
concerning the global economy held by the business executives, politicians, 
officials and economists at Davos are authoritative for their basis on specialist 
expertise and experience unmatched by the FT’s ordinary readers. But the 
second implication is more substantive: the people at Davos represent major 
investors, financiers, employers, regulators and economic policy makers 
whose decisions not only greatly affect the global economy but are shaped by 
their beliefs about the state and future direction of the global economy. In 
other words, developments in the economy are understood to be partially 
dependent on the beliefs the economic agents have about their environment 
and the expectations they have for the future. General optimism among 
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delegates about the world economic outlook is crucial for transnational 
businesses to borrow, invest and employ and thus for the economy to grow. 
Therefore, to report on the “general atmosphere” at the forum, and to inform 
readers about what is “in the minds” of the Davos delegates, is to be 
understood as an implicit recognition of the essentially constructive or 
performative nature of shared perceptions and beliefs regarding the global 
economy. FT reporting, in other words, implies that any outlook of the global 
economy must acknowledge the significance of the collective psychology of 
economic decision makers. 
As an illustrative example, let us examine the following FT editorial from 
2001, titled “Recession and recovery” and commenting on the Davos 
discussions on the global economic outlook.  
Last year, the e-word was all the rage in Davos; this year it is the r-word. 
Recession is uppermost in the minds of politicians and chief executives as 
they gossip at the World Economic Forum. The “new economic thinking” of 
a year ago required for the “new economy” dominated by e-commerce has 
all but gone. All the talk in Davos is certainly doing something for the 
economy of the Swiss Canton of Graubunden. But the fear is that the 
influential men with their hands on the levers of the world economy will 
either do too little too late to boost the global economy, or, and this is spoken 
more quietly, that whatever they do might be ineffective.  
Fears of recession arise not from hard economic facts. Rather, they are 
encouraged by the drip of bad corporate earnings figures, falling 
indicators of confidence, the lacklustre performance of stock markets, and, 
most important, a growing belief that previous optimism was based on 
shaky foundations. In Japan, the recent news has been unremittingly 
gloomy. Retail sales were 0.9 per cent lower in December than a year 
earlier. The trade surplus is falling as exports fail to grow as fast as 
imports. Consumer prices fell by 0.7 per cent in 2000, the largest decline in 
29 years, showing that Japanese consumers still refuse to be parted from 
their earnings or savings. 
European economies have been much stronger, although hopes of 
continued economic growth of more than 3 per cent are fading. This week 
the German IFO index of business confidence fell for the seventh consecutive 
month to its lowest level for more than a year. Most eyes, however, are on 
the US. Industrial production has fallen for the past three months; 
investment seems to have stopped dead in its tracks; and consumer 
confidence is on the wane. Last week the respected University of Michigan 
consumer sentiment index fell to lowest level since 1996. Interest rates in 
the US commercial paper market have risen sharply for companies with 
lower credit ratings, reflecting institutional concern that corporate 
financial health is weak. (A20/2001, Editorial.) 
As is customary to many of the FT’s journalistic reports from the Davos forum, 
the editorial begins with a representation of the prevalent ideas and feelings 
Economy and finance in elite ontology 
170 
 
among the participants. Such assessments are typically made in light of the 
apparent changes in themes and tone from the previous year’s gathering. In 
this case, the contrast in tone from the digital “new economy” hype of the 2000 
meeting appears particularly stark as Davos is suddenly dominated by “gossip” 
about recession. In the sarcastic tone that is characteristic of the FT, the 
editorial then appears to downplay the importance of “all the talk in Davos”. 
Yet the implication here that what is being discussed between the delegates at 
the forum is all but insignificant is contradicted by the very fact that a number 
of FT reports, and the editorial itself, pay so much attention to it. Accordingly, 
far from dismissing the “gossip” as nonsensical and irrelevant, the editorial in 
fact goes on to affirm the validity and relevance of the collective “fears” of 
recession and to offer plausible explanations for such fears. As a whole, the 
editorial thus reads as a warning to its international elite audience about the 
genuine risk of a global economic downturn. As such, the editorial certainly 
stops short of arguing that the Davos delegates’ fears are worrying because of 
their tendency to turn into a self-fulfilling prophecy in an economy based on 
collective perceptions. Yet by referring to collective feelings instead of 
“knowledge”, it effectively normalises the future orientation of actors in the 
economy and thus validates the importance of expectations as a key element 
in the global economy. Referring to “falling indicators of confidence” and “a 
growing belief that previous optimism was based on shaky foundations”, the 
editorial implies that such collective feelings and expectations may even be 
more important than “hard economic facts” in shaping the immediate future 
of the global economy. 
Aside from implying the importance of future expectations of economic 
actors in contributing to actual market cycles, the ontology of the global 
economy also features ideas that shared beliefs are key to its basic functioning. 
For instance, a conspicuous and recurring issue in the FT coverage in the early 
2000s is the perceived threat to the global economy posed by worrying 
developments in the US economy. Assessing the situation in two separate 
articles on 1 February 2002, Ed Crooks cites warnings by economists that 
equities in the US stock market are “grossly overvalued” in historical 
comparison and that the “massive US current account deficit” threatens the 
stability of the dollar as a currency (A50/2002, EC). Were the US dollar and 
the stock market to plummet, Crooks reasons, the results could be catastrophic 
for the world economy as a whole (A51/2002, EC). There is a constant threat, 
in other words, of an economic collapse, an assessment which is based on 
certain economic indicators. At the same time, however, markets keep on 
“overpricing” US stocks, and the value of the dollar is not falling. This 
conundrum – the seemingly irrational behaviour of international investors in 
sustaining the growing US indebtedness in the face of the risks inherent in 
such investments – is a recurring issue in the material between 2001 and 
2006. In 2002, Crooks, however, provides perhaps the bluntest explanation to 
the riddle: according to him, the investors’ behaviour results from their 
underlying “faith” in the robustness of the US economy. What is preventing 
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the global economy from unravelling, in effect, is a general trust among 
investors in that the US economy will not go under. Observing the debates at 
Davos on the state of the US economy, Crooks sees “a general interest” in 
maintaining this faith: “A dollar crash, accompanied by a further slump in 
stock prices and other US assets, would be such a grim outcome for the US and 
the rest of the world that there is a general interest here in ensuring that faith 
in the future of the US is maintained” (A51/2002, EC). 
Instead of simply reporting on economic “facts”, then, FT reporters 
recognise the importance of expectations, feelings and beliefs as central 
elements in the global economy. The frequent allusions to the “general 
atmosphere” and “mood” at the Davos forum is the most illustrative example 
of this tendency, and so are the habitual reports on the polls measuring the 
confidence among business leaders and investors in their immediate business 
environment. Overall, the discourse implies a recognition of the dependence 
of economic activities and the operation of markets on collective sense making 
(see, e.g., Marazzi 2008; Rubinstein 2000; Searle 2003, 203). Such an 
understanding of the economy as a phenomenon of collective psychology, 
shaped by language, shared perceptions and mediated discourses is clearly 
identifiable in the FT-mediated Davos debates on the global economy, and 
thus it seems to form a fundamental aspect of transnational elites’ ontological 
knowledge. 
Despite these observations, the intention here is not to argue that the 
ontology of the global economy in TEC represents an extreme form of 
“idealism”, overlooking any “material” aspects of the economy as a social 
process (cf. Taylor 2004, 31–3). On the contrary, when addressing the social-
psychological dimensions of the global economy the FT seems to imply that, 
while potentially having real economic effects, the “moods” of Davos 
participants are not simply based on unfounded rumours and free-floating 
discourses. Rather, as the 2001 editorial cited above implies, the common 
perceptions are influenced by “recent news” that in turn is based on indicators 
of the observable developments of economies. These indicators include “hard 
economic facts”, such as retail sales, exports and the overall growth of the GDP, 
but – in the circular logic of social constructions (Hacking 1999) – they also 
include measures such as indexes of business confidence and consumer 
sentiments. Thus, through polls conducted by research institutions, the 
aggregated perceptions of market agents become part of the “facts” that, in 
turn, shape the moods of elite decision-makers. The journalistic practice of 
outlining the general outlook of the global economy thus takes into account 
not just the “hard economic facts” but also the collective feelings and moods 
in the markets, shaped by their knowledge of these facts. The problem is that 
collective moods and perceptions, on one hand, and “hard economic facts”, on 
the other, may not always be in sync. Confidence in the economy may, after all, 
be based on “unfounded optimism” and thus lead to careless risk-taking. 
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Collective moods, in other words, can be dangerous as they may lead to herd 
behaviour.96  
Overall, then, the material demonstrates a rather nuanced 
understanding of the socially embedded and discursively constructed nature 
of the economy. In this respect, there are two key elements in this ontology. 
First, the fundamental fragility of the global economy means that there is 
perpetual uncertainty about its future development. This, somewhat 
paradoxically, prompts transnational elites to constantly debate and anticipate 
the turns that the economy may take. Indeed, it is exactly because of its 
fundamental unpredictability that the global economy requires ceaseless 
monitoring. Beliefs and expectations thus become central elements in TEC on 
the global economy, as outlined in Articulation 10 in the preceding discussion, 
and specialised agencies and experts, who present informed economic 
forecasts, occupy key positions in this epistemic work. Second, the ontology of 
the global economy emphasises the role that the collective psychology of 
economic actors play in shaping the global economy. Only when there is belief 
and positive expectations in the future growth and stability of the system, will 
the key economic agents continue their activities which sustain and reproduce 
the global economy. Consequently, the need to maintain the general 
atmosphere of confidence among the elite becomes a principle of crucial 
importance in this ontology. Indeed, as a sign of its centrality, the word 
confidence or confident appears 194 times in the data, or 0.36 times per article. 
Confidence and its negative counterpart uncertain/ty (0.17) can thus be seen 
as forming a key dichotomy around which the global economy is articulated in 
the epistemic work of transnational elites. 
Of course, there is an obvious gap between the acknowledgement of the 
markets and the global economy as being determined partly by social-
psychological phenomena and the kind of social embeddedness suggested by 
Kofi Annan when referring to the shared values and principles underpinning 
the global economy. Transnational elites may, after all, recognise the 
ultimately performative nature of market beliefs and discourses but still 
perceive the economy as a separate and autonomous domain in society. 
Therefore, an important dimension of the ontology of the global economy 
concerns its boundaries, limits and relations with other social domains. What 
is conceived in the FT as belonging to the domain of global economy, and what 
remains outside of it? And what is the relationship between the economic 
domain with the potential other domains of social agency?  
To obtain a view of the range of processes and activities the global 
economy involves and is articulated with in TEC, let us revisit how the FT 
presents the Davos agenda and the array of issues and themes in the coverage. 
 
                                                   
96 Views that the corporate managers and investors were caught in a “wave of exuberance” 
(A80/2003, GJ/WH) become a popular explanation for the so-called dotcom bubble in the FT 
articles of the early 2000s. 
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Table 4.2 in the previous chapter provides a view of the frequency of the 
primary topics in the material. At the core of the coverage are articles focusing 
on the status and outlook of the global economy (67 articles), as well as of 
national and regional economies (68 articles). Under these topics, the global 
economy tends to appear about growth and measurement of economic 
activities, outlined within a highly functional understanding of the global 
economy as a system of interdependent parts. 
A second set of issues covered by the FT concerns finance and financial 
markets (67 articles), companies and market sectors (46 articles), 
international trade (32 articles) and energy (9 articles). These topics are 
directly connected to the operation of the global economy and can be regarded 
as central economic activities. Yet compared to the macroanalysis, which is 
typical to the articles focusing on the global economy and national/regional 
economies, these topics often feature a more policy-oriented perspective: how 
to enhance, support or regulate these activities. Trade coverage, for instance, 
largely centres on the ongoing negotiations between trade ministers of leading 
economies concerning the WTO process of trade liberalisation and emphasises 
the importance of enhancing international trade as an economic policy goal. 
Similar discussions on financial market regulations, the price of energy, and 
the operations of particular companies, markets and business sectors aim at 
making the overall global economy operate better and grow faster through 
improving the core activities and processes that reproduce the global economy. 
Therefore, these topics typically manifest more policy- and agency-oriented 
interpretations of what the global economy is and reinforce an understanding 
of the global economy as a form of social interaction. 
A third set of issues on the FT agenda move further away from what 
would typically be regarded as “economic” matters. First, there are articles 
which concern what might typically be understood as “political” issues, dealing 
with geopolitics, international relations and foreign policies of big powers (43 
articles) or with particular political struggles and processes within a certain 
country or country group (21 articles). Second, there are articles which aim at 
taking stock of particular problems and questions that transcend the spheres 
of economy and politics narrowly defined and therefore emerge as broadly 
“social” issues. These topics include globalisation (33 articles), understood as 
global integration and the associated social phenomena from migration to 
problems of governance, climate change (11 articles), and various development 
issues in the global south from poverty reduction and food and water scarcity 
to the prevention of curable diseases (24 articles). Third, two sets of articles 
focus on particular actors and organisations of global importance: the World 
Economic Forum and the Davos delegates (86 articles) and the World Social 
Forum and global civil society (13 articles). Finally, there is a small number of 
articles (9) that deal with topics that appear only sporadically in the material, 
including articles about science, demographics, education and sports. 
Together, this third set of issues thus deals with a diverse range of social and 
political processes, relations, interactions and agents, addressing what might 
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be termed the global polity and world society (cf. Boli and Thomas 1999b; 
Larner and Walters 2004; Ruggie 1998). 
A significant share of the overall themes in TEC, therefore, do not appear 
to be economic in the conventional sense of addressing the operation of 
markets and businesses or aggregate indicators of production, trade and 
capital flows. However, these apparently “extra-economic” issues typically 
appear in the FT in a context which sets them in close relation with those issues 
that are more explicitly articulated in economic terms. Consequently, there 
seems to be a close connection in TEC between the matters of global economy, 
on the one hand, and global polity and society, on the other. The domain of the 
global economy is complemented in the elite ontology by other domains that 
together form what might be called the global extra-economy. 
There has been plenty of debate in literature on how the realms of the 
economy and the extra-economy are articulated in modern social imaginary 
(e.g., Massey 1988; Taylor 2004; Wallerstein 2004). Many have suggested that 
the social and the political have increasingly been seized by the economic in 
recent decades (e.g., Gill 2003, 117–8; Larner and Walters 2004, 510; 
Teivainen 2002), while the economy itself has come to be increasingly seen as 
an autonomous sphere, “disembedded” from social relations (Grossberg 2010, 
142; Mitchell 1998). This argument points not only to the increasing 
prevalence of economic rhetoric and rationality in political and public life, but 
also to institutional and structural processes through which many issues and 
decisions that have previously been part of representative politics and the 
public agenda have become dealt with by non-representative, “economic” 
experts and institutions, in effect narrowing the sphere of politics and 
democratic processes. In this vein, Gill (2003, 131–4) has pointed to the 
international “constitutionalisation” of many regulations and arrangements 
based on an economic rationality, which effectively discipline future 
legislation and policy-making of states and thereby restrict the scope of 
national democratic decision making. From this perspective, “the economy”, 
indeed, seems to have taken over much of what were previously regarded as 
relatively autonomous spheres of politics and society. 
An alternative proposition, however, would point to the two-way 
direction of influence between the economy and the extra-economy: as social 
and political processes become increasingly articulated in terms of the 
economy, also, inevitably, the economic is being increasingly seized by the 
social and by the political. As a result, processes previously related to the 
economy and rationalised in terms of an “economic logic” become articulated 
with (other) social processes and forces, which not only enable but also 
influence and limit “economic” processes. At least to some extent, TEC seems 
to recognise the inevitable interconnection between activities, issues and 
processes understood as inherently economic and those that are regarded as 
social or political in character. International politics, for instance, is not 
discussed simply in terms of diplomacy but with a specific interest in how 
international disputes, conflicts and terrorism potentially affect the processes 
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and costs of trade, investment and energy supply. Similarly, debates on the 
measures to curb climate change typically concern their effects on businesses 
and markets in terms of new regulations and costs of emissions, as well as in 
terms of the markets created for green technologies; and they also often deal 
with ways in which companies and CEOs need to be involved in actions that 
address climate change as a global problem.97 
Overall, the purportedly “extra-economic” concerns are rarely addressed 
in the material without reference to their “economic” significance. Accordingly, 
in the ontology of the global economy, “economic” processes and activities are 
inexorably tied with and influenced by “political” and “social” processes and 
activities, and the global economy can seldom be discussed without making 
reference to its embeddedness in global polity and society, which are 
characterised by goals and intentions that emerge from other aspirations than 
purely economic ones (cf. Fraser 2014). (As we will see in Chapter 7.2, debates 
on international politics and climate change develop values and ideas that defy 
pure economic reason.) Thus the global economy cannot sustain an apolitical 
appearance of itself as “disembedded” from global society. Rather, the 
ontology of the global economy is articulated in ways that come close to what 
Grossberg (2010, 147) calls “embedded disembeddedness”: it is a global 
economy conceived as a particular domain of social activities that have their 
distinct operational logics, but that are also inevitably interdependent with 
other processes that exist outside the economic domain. 
5.2 Practical epistemic work on the global financial 
crisis 
As the preceding discussion indicates, the discursive constitution of the global 
economy takes place mostly in the background of TEC. In other words, it tends 
to be articulated at the paradigmatic level of the epistemic work of 
transnational elites. However, epistemic work on the global economy also 
 
                                                   
97 Gill’s (1990, 145) observations concerning the debates in the Trilateral Commission point to 
similar conclusions regarding the wide recognition among transnational elites of the 
fundamentally political nature of the economy. As Gill observes, behind the founding of the 
Trilateral Commission and its practices of bringing together business leaders, politicians, 
officials and intellectuals was a conclusion that the rising importance of economic issues as 
the “predominant concern of our time” in fact reiterated the primacy of politics. In a 1973 
memorandum of the Trilateral Commission, Brzezinski argued that the global economy was 
an essentially political space in which the growing interdependence of economies ceaselessly 
creates political issues relating to production, exchange, currencies, raw materials, and so on. 
Therefore, the apparently “technical” or “economic” problems of the global economy 
necessitated the development of political activities and even new political structures. 
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involves much more practical dimensions. There is constant communication, 
in particular, about the actual state of the economy and its short-term 
prospects for markets. This kind of economic analysis typically involves the 
presentation of statistical indicators, informed predictions based on, and a 
limited set of factors and reasoning about, the behaviour of investors, 
consumers and policymakers. The debates also often involve arguments for or 
against certain policy measures to intervene in economic processes, to shape 
the behaviour of actors and to steer the economy in a certain direction. Even 
when these assessments are typically grounded on a rather unanimous 
understanding of the fundamental ontology of the economy, there is sufficient 
ambivalence about its operational logic among both experts and market actors 
to make the debate on the global economy a site of constant negotiation 
between alternative and sometimes even contradictory arguments. Such daily 
epistemic work on the state and the future of the economy forms the staple 
subject of reporting in economic news journalism and analysis. 
Major market volatilities and economic crises disrupt the normal 
running of things in the economy and typically force businesses, policymakers 
and regulators to make decisions in conditions of high uncertainty about the 
consequences of the actions. They can be regarded as key instances of the 
epistemic work on the global economy. In this regard, the global financial 
crisis of 2007–9 represents a dramatic event in TEC in the analysed period 
which, due to its unpredictability and seemingly far-reaching consequences, 
both challenges the practical epistemic work on the state of the economy and 
potentially de-stabilises some of the basic ontological premises concerning the 
global economy. What is often perceived as the worst financial failure in the 
world since the Great Depression of the 1930s precipitated a global economic 
recession and, due to its deep impact on the economic output, trade, 
employment, public debt and many of the biggest banks in the world, the 
global financial crisis still continues in many ways to influence the global 
economy (IMF 2009; 2016; Mirowski 2013). Accordingly, the crisis marks a 
significant turning point in the global economy and has since become a 
ubiquitous reference point in debates on global economic developments (see, 
e.g., Streeck 2011). From the perspective of epistemic work, a central question 
is whether, and in which ways, the crisis has impacted on the ontological 
understandings of the global economy and, particularly, of the role financial 
markets play in the economy. This is the main question motivating the analysis 
in this section. 
Finance talk 
In the years preceding the global financial crisis, financial markets do not 
feature prominently in the FT-mediated elite debates. From 2001 to 2006, 
only 8 articles out of 244 in the material have the financial markets as their 
principal focus. Then in 2007, the FT suddenly turns heavy attention to the 
sector, dedicating 11 articles on the subject on this single year alone, and 
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financial markets continue to be a prominent topic in the following years. 
From 2008 to 2011, the material contains a total of 48 articles (out of 288) 
concentrating primarily on the financial markets (see Table 4.2 in Chapter 4). 
In hindsight, then, the FT coverage of the Davos forum suggests that elite 
attention on the financial system heightens internationally just before the 
outbreak of the financial turmoil.98 
The term financial markets itself appears somewhat more constantly in 
the material, being mentioned 26 times (0.11 times per article) from 2001 to 
2006 and 46 times (0.16 times per article) from 2007 to 2011. However, when 
searching the data for other closely associated notions, such as financial 
system, which appears only 4 times in 2001–2006 but 76 times in 2007–2011, 
and banking system (6 and 34), differences in emphasis between the pre-crisis 
and post-crisis periods become more pronounced. The increasing frequency of 
references to financial system and banking system as synonyms to financial 
markets indicates a heightened attention on the systemic properties of 
financial operations. It suggests growing awareness that lending, borrowing, 
investment and money creation take place in specific institutional settings, 
which regulate and shape these practices, and also that these operations, and 
the rules and practices that govern them, have large-scale (i.e. systemic) 
consequences. Discourse about the financial system, in other words, indicates 
that the actors, operations, policies, rules and institutions, which form the 
financial markets as a social system, become an increasingly significant focus 
of attention only immediately before and after the global financial crisis. 
Certain financial market-related terms, such as capital market (10 
mentions in 2001–2006 and 26 mentions in 2007–2011), credit market (2 
and 16), bond market (2 and 16), money market (0 and 13) and mortgage 
market (0 and 11) manifest a similar rise in frequency in the post-crisis period, 
whereas equity market (4 and 6) and, notably, stock market (40 and 23) 
counteract the trend. This is in line with Tett’s (2009, xi, xix) observation that, 
before the crisis, both the mainstream and business media limited their 
attention on what happened in the financial system mostly to the stock 
markets, mostly because the swings in the value of company stocks provided 
reporters with an easy and dramatic object of reporting whereas the world of 
interbank trading, with its opaque practices and complex products, was 
considered uninteresting and difficult to understand. In the studied material, 
 
                                                   
98 Large subprime mortgage lenders and hedge funds started to make announcements of their 
problems in the spring and summer of 2007, prompting first interventions from the US 
Federal Reserve and other state agencies. See the timeline of the financial crisis provided by 
the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis: https://www.stlouisfed.org/financial-crisis/full-
timeline (accessed 15 May 2016); and the timelines of the US and international policy 
responses to the financial crisis provided by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York: 
https://www.newyorkfed.org/research/global_economy/policyresponses.html (accessed 15 
May 2016). 
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the stock markets were a frequent reference point when assessing the overall 
state of the economy and largely used as a convenient indicator of business 
cycles and market moods, even as its unreliability as a predictor of future was 
occasionally acknowledged. Then, as the financial crisis prompted increasing 
attention to the operation of the financial system as a whole, much more 
interest started to be paid to the various other kinds of markets that mediate 
capital flows between financial institutions. In this regard, the 2007 forum 
coverage thus marks a clear watershed in the data. 
A similar story can be told when observing the occurrence of some of the 
terms in the financial lexicon that entered the mainstream media during the 
global financial crisis, including financial innovation, subprime, derivative, 
credit default swap and hedge fund. With the exception of financial 
innovation (mentioned once in 2001) and hedge funds (mentioned once in 
2001 and 2003), none of these terms appeared in the data prior to 2006. In 
this sense, the familiar charges by critics that the business media failed to 
critically examine what was going on in the financial industry prior to the 
meltdown (e.g., French et al. 2009; Merrill 2012; Tambini 2010) seem to 
largely apply to the FT as well, even though occasional references to the 
dangers posed by the slowing down of the housing market boom in the United 
States appear in 2006 and 2007, before the eventual collapse. 
Financial markets in the pre-crisis ontology 
Overall, the analysed data suggests that TEC on the financial markets and 
various banking practices explodes just before the onset of the global financial 
crisis and continues to be fierce until 2011 when the debate abates somewhat. 
However, increase in the sheer volume of talk does not necessarily mark a shift 
in the way the financial markets are made sense of in terms of their nature and 
place in the global economy. Market failures, after all, have been frequently-
occurring phenomena of the global economy particularly since the 1980s, 
suggesting that a financial crisis should not come as an unthinkable event to 
the banking, business and policymaking elite. Just how much the global 
financial crisis manages to shake elite ontology of the global economy is 
therefore an open question, to which light can be shed by comparing the ways 
the financial markets are articulated in TEC before and after the crisis. 
Accordingly, in what follows, the analysis briefly outlines the principal 
perceptions of the financial markets that prevail in the data in the pre-crisis 
period from 2001 to 2007. It then proceeds to observe how the financial 
markets are articulated within elite communication on the financial crisis from 
2008 to 2011.  
The analysis is based on the initial open coding of the data as discussed 
in Chapter 4.1. This involved the close reading of all articles and the 
identification of all passages that express or imply assumptions and beliefs 
about finance and financial markets. The coding resulted in altogether 214 
passages. In line with the previous observations about the shifts in frequency 
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of the topic of financial markets and of the related individual terms in the data, 
the open coding also indicated a heightened amount of interest in the financial 
sector only from 2007 onwards: From 2001 to 2006, I applied the financial 
market code to a total of 40 passages. In the 2007 coverage, the code was 
associated with 19 passages, and from 2008 to 2011, altogether 155 passages 
contain the code. In the analysis, I first focused on the 59 passages from 2001 
to 2007 and formed groups of them according to the different ways in which 
they represent the financial sector, or specific actors of financial markets, in 
the overall context of the global economy. This resulted in three distinct 
discourses on the financial markets: the functional finance discourse, the 
disciplinary finance discourse and the destabilising finance discourse. Table 
5.2 lists the three discourses and illustrates them with relevant passages from 
the data. 
Table 5.2 Three dominant discourses of finance before the global financial crisis 
Discourse Passages 
FUNCTIONAL FINANCE 
 
Financial 
markets/investors as an 
enabling factor in the 
economy; source of 
growth, credit and finance. 
Developed by South Africa, Nigeria and Algeria, the project, 
known as the Millennium Africa Plan, or Map, has been 
likened to the Marshall Plan that helped rebuild western 
Europe with American money after the second world war. ... 
It is aimed at lifting Africa out of stagnation with the help of 
foreign governments and private investors. They are 
expected to provide debt relief and finance new 
infrastructure, while African governments eradicate 
corruption and commit themselves to democracy and 
economic reform. (A15/2001, VM.) 
Enhanced transparency by means of more reliable financial 
data offers the prospect of improved access to capital both 
for companies across the world and for emerging market 
economies. It would also contribute significantly to a more 
efficient allocation of global capital, as would the parallel 
initiatives to raise audit standards outside North America 
and Europe. (A18/2001, Editorial.) 
The OECD has consistently explained how the eurozone 
can lift these growth rates. More flexible labour markets, 
more competitive product markets, and more integrated 
financial markets are the order of the day, it suggests. 
(A254/2007, JT.) 
DISCIPLINARY FINANCE 
 
Financial markets as a 
disciplining factor in the 
Caio Koch-Weser, Germany’s state secretary of finance, 
said Mr Lula da Silva had “a good message”. “The key is 
that the reform momentum gets the benefit of the enormous 
credibility that the president brings, but it's a strong team 
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global economy; 
economic agents and 
economies competing for 
financial flows. 
and a strong start,” he said. “So far, so good, and the market 
is already honouring what they have done: [interest rate] 
spreads are down, and the Real [the currency] is up.” 
(A105/2003, RC/EC.) 
As Lord Levene, chairman of the Lloyd's insurance 
syndicate, moved around Davos yesterday, he was struck 
by one particular theme causing a buzz in the closed-door 
meetings of financiers: growing transatlantic competition for 
dominance in the financial world. "The New York-London 
(competition issue) is a really hot topic," he observed. … 
Earlier this month, for example, Citigroup acknowledged 
that the European operations of the investment bank were 
creating more profits than its American investment banking 
activities for the first time. … The growing debate about 
financial market regulation is also prompting keener 
attention from bankers, not least because some senior Wall 
Street figures, such as Thomas Russo, vice-chairman of 
Lehman Brothers, are engaged in US panels looking at US 
competitiveness. (A274/2007, GT.) 
DESTABILISING FINANCE 
 
1. Financial markets 
vulnerable to (a) external 
shocks and (b) inherently 
destabilising. 
 
2. Financial markets pose 
a threat to global 
economic stability. 
(1a) The Federal Reserve’s surprise decision to cut interest 
rates by 50 basis points this month shows how serious the 
US risks are. If the US economy tumbles, in spite of the 
Fed’s prompt action, the impact on the world will be serious. 
Capital could flow abruptly out of US markets, depressing 
the dollar and causing gyrations in financial markets around 
the world. (A9/2001, GB.) 
(1b) The greatest fear … is that the sheer liquidity of the 
market, with funds moving around the globe much faster, 
could make it harder for markets to respond to a 
catastrophic event that prevents the normally prompt 
clearance of transactions … A second worry is that the 
hedge fund industry's growth might arguably have been too 
swift. ... This raises the risk that many managers will resort 
to taking more extravagant risks or attempt to place 
relatively minor bets on perceived mispricings, and make 
these bets profitable by taking on high levels of leverage … 
Finally, traders worry that credit derivatives, the newest 
range of instruments, are yet to be tested by a severe 
downturn, and are so new that they do not yet have a well-
established regulation system. The fear is that the sheer 
pace of the growth in credit derivatives has outstripped both 
the scope of the existing regulation and the development of 
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infrastructure to manage exposures in the sector 
(A207/2006, JA.) 
(2) A … threat [to the US economy] is another downward 
leg in the bear market in equities. The widespread 
assumption is that the declines in stock prices are over. Yet 
the ratio of US stock prices to earnings is at least 50 per 
cent higher than its historic average. Experience suggests, 
however, that stock prices are mean-reverting in the long 
run. Further price falls could lead to weaker consumption 
and investment in the US economy. (A113/2004, MW.) 
First, the functional finance discourse features the financial markets as an 
integral part of the global economy which, through the allocation of resources, 
enables economic operations, drives growth and accelerates global economic 
integration. The contribution of financial markets to the global economy is 
often implicitly assumed in elite communication. For instance, in its 26 
January 2001 editorial (see Table 5.2), the FT expresses its support of the work 
of the International Accounting Standards Committee, arguing that the 
increased more integrated international accounting standards would enhance 
the “efficient allocation of global capital” and serve the needs of companies and 
whole economies (A18/2001). But the role of investors in helping economies 
grow is also occasionally explicitly expressed. Accordingly, when African 
leaders introduce an economic and social development plan for the continent 
at the 2001 Davos forum, they emphasise the role of international investors in 
providing capital for infrastructure investments (A15/2001, VM). More 
generally, when the elite discuss the prospects economic outlooks of individual 
economies of the world as a whole, financial markets frequently emerge as an 
element which needs to be taken into account: developing “more integrated 
financial markets” will spur faster economic growth (A254/2007, JT). Overall, 
then, financial markets appear to be a functional part of the general global 
economic system. 
Second, the disciplinary finance discourse presents the financial 
markets in terms of their power. It appears a disciplining factor in the global 
economy in which economic actors and whole economies compete for credit. 
In this discourse, financial markets operate as a group agent, sometimes 
represented by the faceless “international investors”, monitoring, directing 
and sanctioning the actions of other sectors or agents of the global economy. 
The common sense view is that economic actions require financing, and 
therefore all economic agents from individual businesses to entire economies 
compete for financial flows. This gives the financial markets their power to 
discipline other economic agents, including governments and businesses. The 
discourse of the disciplinary power of financial markets in the global economy 
is evident, for instance, in arguments that political leaders and chief executives 
must earn the trust of international investors to succeed and that the financial 
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markets reward such policies and commitments by offering credit at a low 
interest rate. Politicians, in particular, are judged by the reactions of the 
financial markets: as illustrated by the first example of this discourse that is 
presented in Table 5.2, Germany’s state secretary of finance evaluates the 
policies of Brazil’s Lula da Silva not against certain societal goals, such as 
employment or income equality, but on the basis of market reactions 
(A105/2003, RC/EC). Moreover, gaining the trust of investors may mean a 
variety of things from the design of policies that are deemed “credible” in the 
eyes of financial market actors to the sending of reassuring messages that the 
interests of investors will be taken into account in the future. The disciplining 
power of financial markets also extends to western governments, as illustrated 
by the second example of this discourse in Table 5.2. Here, Gillian Tett’s 
reporting on the competition between London’s City and New York as the 
leading global financial centre (A274/2007, GT; A279/2007, GT)  implies that 
big financial firms are able to play the two centres against each other in search 
for the most lenient regulatory environment. 
Third, the destabilising finance discourse shares the systemic 
perspective of finance, in which lenders, buyers and investors both shape the 
financial markets and the economy, as a whole, and react to changes of other 
agents and processes. However, whereas in the functional finance discourse 
the financial actors contribute beneficially to the overall global economy and 
world society, the destabilising finance discourse takes a divergent view of the 
nature of the deep interdependency between the global economy and the 
financial sector as its subsystem by emphasising the systemic risks and threats 
that this relationship entails. As such, there are two main varieties of the threat 
discourse. First, some arguments emphasise the vulnerability of the financial 
markets to destabilising forces (see Table 5.2). For instance, in a 2001 analysis 
of the global economic outlook Gerard Baker reasons that a sudden downturn 
in a major economy, such as the United States, would cause “gyrations in 
financial markets around the world” (A9/2001, GB). Similar arguments are 
made about the adverse effects to markets posed by the problems in the 
eurozone and Japan, as well as about the destabilising effects of a sudden 
geopolitical crisis. In principle, any change in the operational environment 
may represent a threatening prospect to financial agents or even the system as 
a whole.  
Second, the destabilising finance discourse also acknowledges that the 
financial market processes and agents are not only vulnerable to “external” 
developments and forces but are perfectly capable of creating problems by 
themselves. In his 2006 article, John Authers reports on the “growing 
concerns about the markets’ foundations”, referring to the threat that the 
velocity and high amounts of transnational transaction present to the financial 
system (A207/2006, JA). Moreover, new risks emerge within the financial 
markets due to the emergence and rapid growth of new players, such as hedge 
funds, and the development of financial products. In 2007, the concerns about 
financial risks emerge as an openly-debated topic at Davos. In this regard, 
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Gillian Tett reports about the doubts among central bankers and policymakers 
regarding their ability to track the mounting risks created by the new 
derivatives products: 
Malcolm Knight, managing director of the Bank for International 
Settlements, said: “Financial innovation has produced vehicles for leverage 
which are very hard to measure . . . liquidity is increasing very rapidly and 
this is affecting asset prices.” (A291/2007, GT.) 
While subprime mortgage credits are not identified in the 2007 coverage, in 
retrospect the warnings voiced in the FT by the likes of Nouriel Roubini, about 
the housing market bubble, and ECB president Jean-Claude Trichet, about the 
lack of transparency in the derivatives business, indicate a growing 
acknowledgment in TEC about dangerous weaknesses in the global economy 
and financial system. Such recognition of risks lying within that threaten the 
stability of the financial system is closely connected to the second variety of 
destabilising finance discourse, which emphasises the risks the financial 
markets pose to the overall global economy or individual economies. Martin 
Wolf, for instance, points to the negative effects on consumption and 
investment that a potential fall of stock prices could cause in the United States 
in a 2004 analysis (A113/2004, MW). More generally, market bubbles, credit 
crises and stock market crashes feature among the most popular doomsday 
scenarios that the global economy and its components face. Occasionally, 
there is even a broader recognition of the ways in which the financial markets 
can engender economic instability and prevent the stable development of 
societies. In an analysis of the Latin American economic outlook, Richard 
Lapper, for instance, remarks that, even as the region experienced some 
progress “in modernising its economies” in the 1990s, “the repeated financial 
crises that have shook the region since 1998 have it off track” (A121/2004, RL). 
Similar concerns relate to potential of major capital flight, a risk that many of 
the emerging economies must take into account, especially after the 1997–8 
Asian financial crisis (A207/2006, JA). 
A crisis of epistemic proportions? 
Overall, then, in the years leading up to the crisis the FT-mediated TEC makes 
sense of the financial markets in terms of their beneficial contributions to 
economic processes, in terms of the rules and limits they impose on agents in 
the global economy, and with regard to their volatile and potentially 
destabilising nature. The salience of the discourse emphasising the risks posed 
by finance increases markedly just before the global financial crisis as the FT 
starts to report on the concerns of central bankers and economists regarding 
the rapid accumulation of leverage in the markets. Indeed, when Gillian Tett 
at the end of the 2007 Davos forum revisits the “raging debate” among the 
participants on the systemic risks in the financial markets, she makes the 
observation that the discussion “does mark something of a departure for the 
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Davos group, given that these issues have generally been ignored in previous 
years” (A298/2007, GT). Moreover, the destabilising finance discourse is not 
only speaking in abstract terms about the inherent tendencies of the market to 
periodically run into problems, but it also addresses concrete developments in 
the markets. 
The pre-crisis debate of the destabilising threat posed by the financial 
markets takes place, however, in the context of accelerating economic growth. 
Most economic indicators from investment and employment figures to profit 
and inflation rates provide grounds for a belief that the “fundaments” of the 
economy are strong. Concerns about financial market developments are thus 
muted by the general optimism of businesses and economies about their short-
term prospects. Moreover, FT reporting on the rapid proliferation of credit 
derivatives and other financial innovations is marked by the presence of 
directly contrasting views about their significance. Accordingly, the public 
warnings that the system as a whole may have become more vulnerable due to 
the interconnections between the companies (mostly hedge funds and 
investment banks) engaged in the trading of the derivatives, are repeatedly 
balanced by views that these products of “structured finance” are making the 
system more resilient to shocks by diminishing the overall risk of failure of any 
individual agent in the market. These adaptations of the “efficient market 
hypothesis” (see, e.g., Davidson 2009, 93–5), in other words, effectively 
counter the warnings by maintaining that the market players are capable of 
assessing correctly the risks involved in the new instruments and that the 
inflation of the markets of these products thus does not represent a 
threatening bubble but a successful diversification of risks.  
Finally, concerns about financial market developments are tempered by 
the recognition that the markets are overseen by authorities. In the event of 
market failure, there are regulatory bodies and policymakers in place to act as 
firefighters who will prevent the contagion from spreading across the financial 
system and mitigate the adverse effects on the economy. Indeed, when 
addressing the threats posed by the financial system to the global economy, FT 
reporters habitually refer to the many legislative measures and regulatory 
practices of governments, central banks and international organisations which 
are designed to guide and control financial market operations. If anything, the 
previous market failures, from the 1997–8 Asian crisis to the dotcom crash in 
2000, have trained governments, central banks and international 
organisations to react efficiently to such events, so that “their consequences 
are well-rehearsed and policymakers believe they would be able to respond 
quickly to mitigate many of the consequences” (A199/2006, CG). Such faith in 
the surveillance, regulatory and failure-containment capacities of authorities 
becomes increasingly important after the middle of the decade in light of the 
mounting concerns about the growing volatility of the financial system. 
It is essentially due to the allure of such mitigating factors against any 
warnings of potential instability that the financial crisis is a disorienting 
experience in epistemic terms. The crisis exposes the vulnerability of the global 
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economy and the inadequacy of its supervisory mechanisms. The prior faith in 
that things were fundamentally in order is replaced by serious uncertainty 
about what is going to happen next. It is therefore not surprising that, as the 
2008 Davos forum takes place in the midst of a deepening credit crisis and a 
rapidly-developing stock market crash which threaten to throw the global 
economy into a recession, the prevalent elite discourse in the FT is not “we 
knew all along this would happen”. Instead FT reporters convey a collective 
sense of shock, fear and uncertainty among Davos participants. The evident 
seriousness and uncontrollability of the ongoing financial meltdown prompts 
FT reporters to cite a number of dramatic characterisations of the situation. 
The opening passage from an analysis article by John Authers and Gillian Tett, 
dealing with how investors and regulators are reacting to the credit squeeze 
and tumbling stock markets, offers an illustrative example: 
This has been no happy new year for the world’s equity markets. US stocks 
have had their worst January in more than a century - and this sell-off has 
prompted both a wave of selling across the world and a truly extraordinary 
response by the Federal Reserve, with America's central bank making an 
emergency cut in target interest rates of 0.75 percentage points. By the time 
news of a historic trading loss at France’s Societe Generale became public 
yesterday, the market could no longer even show much surprise. There is a 
growing belief that this spectacular sell-off portends more than just a 
periodic shift in the market cycle. Indeed, the events are now so dramatic 
that they are prompting many to call into question the entire capital market 
architecture that has emerged over the last decade, along with the 
approach the world's financial authorities have adopted since the last big 
break in the market - the bursting of the internet bubble in 2000. “We have 
to pay for the sins of the past,” says Klaus Schwab, founder of the World 
Economic Forum, which is currently holding its annual gathering of 
political and business leaders at the Swiss mountain resort of Davos. Or as 
George Soros, the legendary hedge fund manager, says: “This is not a 
normal crisis but the end of an era.” (A344/2008, JA/GT.) 
In the article, Authers and Tett describe what seems to be an all-out sell-off in 
the world’s equity markets, signalling a wide-spread panic among investors 
about the rapidly-deteriorating global economic outlook. The reporters 
proceed to assess the causes for the panic, citing, among other things, “very 
poor macro-economic US data” and reports indicating that the losses in the 
financial sector has been larger than previously, signalling that the supply of 
credit may be further restricted in the near future. Yet there are further 
potential concerns that may explain the market panic, including, most notably, 
the dawning recognition that the “credit bubble got so out of hand in the last 
few years” that any policy measures by central banks and governments are 
unlikely to fix the situation. Authers and Tett go on to cite a “senior 
international policymaker” who, being interviewed under the cover of 
anonymity, confesses that “’these are serious problems . . . People are scared’” 
(A344/2008, JA/GT). 
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Allusions to panic, fear and uncertainty are complemented with the 
almost ubiquitous references to “crisis”: from 2008 to 2011, the words crisis 
and crises appear no less than 475 times, or 2.04 times per article, having been 
mentioned “only” 94 times in the preceding seven years (0.31 times per 
article). Crisis thus turns into a habitual element of the epistemic work in TEC 
when discussing the state of the world. Supposing that the rhetoric of crisis 
typically evokes phobias about a community under threat, reinforces the 
general sense of urgency in dealing with the threat, and signals a high degree 
of uncertainty with regard to what is actually taking place and how the 
situation is going to evolve (‘t Hart and Karen Tindall 2009b, 4–6), elite 
communication on the financial crisis can be perceived as an implicit 
acknowledgment of a shock to the very ontology of the global economy as they 
know it. 
As the quoted passage from Authers and Tett’s article indicates, the shock 
and severity of the 2007–9 opened the door for the notion that “this 
spectacular sell-off portends more than just a periodic shift in the market 
cycle”. Indeed, some of the members of the Davos forum now seemed to be 
willing to question “the entire capital market architecture” and to declare “the 
end of an era”. Gillian Tett, the FT’s financial market editor who as journalist 
delved into the world of financial speculation in the three years preceding the 
outbreak of the crisis (see Tett 2009), emerged in the data as a particularly 
forceful actor in promoting the idea that the global financial crisis marks a 
fundamental shift in how bankers, regulators and policymakers perceive the 
risks and benefits of financialization. In several of her articles with headlines 
like “Pressures for a rethink are on the rise” (A324/2008, GT), “Bankers and 
bureaucrats seek a new philosophy” (A383/2009, GT) and “The great 
reckoning” (A422/2010, GT), Tett repeated the argument that the crisis has 
exposed huge weaknesses in the global financial system and shattered the 
previously-dominant faith in the benefits of “unregulated innovation” in the 
financial sector. 
While Tett went to great lengths in describing – and promoting – a sense 
of intellectual disorientation among policymakers and market practitioners 
alike, there were also further indications that the global financial crisis had 
epistemic dimensions. On the one hand, political leaders and certain leading 
officials quickly began to formulate public narratives of the crisis and make 
sense of its historical significance (see also ‘t Hart and Tindall 2009a). On the 
other hand, economists at central banks, the IMF and other international 
financial institutions developed causal diagnoses of the market failure, and the 
directors and board members of these institutions shared the insights of these 
analyses with the international regulatory and policymaking community in a 
number of conferences and workshops (see Rosenhek 2013). With its 
reporting and analysis, the FT contributed to this epistemic work on the 
financial crisis, both mediating elite views and providing its own diagnoses of 
what went wrong.  
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In the FT, Martin Wolf, the paper’s renowned economics commentator 
and author of books on the global economy and financial system (see Wolf 
2008; 2014a), was a particularly influential analyst of the financial crisis. In 
his 2008 column “Why the financial turmoil is an elephant in a dark room”, 
Wolf structured the on-going debate on the causes of the 2007–9 financial 
crisis by outlining three alternative explanations floated among economists.  
So how did the world economy fall into its predicament? One view is that 
this crisis is a product of a fundamentally defective financial system. ... The 
story is familiar: financial innovation and an enthusiasm for risk-taking 
generate rapid increases in credit, which drive up asset prices, thereby 
justifying still more credit expansion and yet higher asset prices. Then 
comes a top to asset prices, panic selling, a credit freeze, mass insolvency 
and recession. An unregulated credit system, then, is inherently unstable 
and destabilising. ... Yet there is a different perspective. The argument here 
is that US monetary policy was too loose for too long after the collapse of 
the Wall Street bubble in 2000 and the terrorist outrage of September 11 
2001. This critique is widely shared among economists … The view is also 
popular in financial markets: “It isn’t our fault; it's the fault of Alan 
Greenspan, the ‘serial bubble blower’.” ... A final perspective is that the crisis 
is the consequence neither of financial fragility nor of mistakes by 
important central banks. It is the result of global macroeconomic disorder, 
particularly the massive flows of surplus capital from Asian emerging 
economies (notably China), oil exporters and a few high-income countries 
and, in addition, the financial surpluses of the corporate sectors of many 
countries. In this perspective, central banks and so financial markets were 
merely reacting to the global economic environment. (A312/2008, MW.) 
Wolf’s recap of economists’ early explanations of the 2007–9 financial crisis 
thus points, alternatively, to the inherent bubble-building tendency of the 
financial markets, to mistakes made in monetary policy in the years leading up 
to the crisis, and to broader macroeconomic dynamics which both central 
bankers and financial market agents responded to in a rational fashion but 
with ultimately fateful consequences. As such, the column covers many of the 
views that are developed in subsequent analyses as they are mediated and 
reconstructed by the FT. At the same time, it illustrates the practical and 
contested dimension of the epistemic work of transnational elites on the 
financial crisis: there are many alternative views and no consensus on what 
caused the crisis – at least not initially. The fact that each account points to 
alternative and potentially contradicting policy responses adds to the 
politically-charged nature of the epistemic work on the crisis. 
Overall, it is possible to analytically distinguish between five major 
accounts on the causes of the global financial crisis as they were worked out in 
the in the FT from 2008 to 2011. First, there was the critique, only implicitly 
hinted at in the column by Wolf, of the investors’ and bankers’ role in causing 
the crisis due to their reckless risk-taking, which saw them taking on too much 
debt to finance ever bigger risks to achieve increasing returns. Second, the 
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roots of the crisis were located in the deficient regulation of finance, which 
allowed the innovation of new financial vehicles to proceed unchecked; an 
issue which did not emerge in Wolf’s early analysis but gained in prevalence in 
subsequent years (see below). Third, some accounts pointed to the failures in 
monetary and overall economic policy which had created strong incentives for 
investors to seek profit opportunities in risky trading and speculation and had 
encouraged excessive lending and borrowing among banks and households.  
Fourth, some accounts pointed to the “defective financial system” as 
summarised by Wolf in the cited column above. In these explanations, the 
focus was not so much on the bankers’ and investors’ personal responsibility, 
but on the financial markets as a system. As Wolf’s column illustrates, some 
regarded the financial crisis as an evidence of the inherently unstable nature 
of the financial markets, which have a habit of creating bubbles. But others 
pointed not to any universal logics at play but instead to specific developments 
that had made the financial system increasingly complex and opaque, 
rendering the risks lying in the system difficult if not impossible to assess: “the 
global financial system is now so complicated that nobody really knows how 
deep its problems run” (A356/2008, GR). Finally, the fifth prominent theme 
in the explanations of the global financial crisis referred to the broader global 
economic developments, particularly the so-called global savings imbalances. 
According to this narrative, as described by Wolf, many Asian countries 
accumulated huge dollar reserves due to their foreign trade surpluses and 
subsequently channelled them back to the United States, where this flood of 
dollars ended up inflating consumer credit markets and the housing bubble. 
The first three explanations – the banks’ recklessness, regulatory 
failures, and policy mistakes – each point their finger at particular groups of 
actors. While critiques of central bankers and politicians remained muted, 
political leaders, in particular, from Barack Obama (A398/2009, FG/AW) to 
Wen Jiabao (A393/2009, CB/AEJ/GT/JT), aired public critiques against 
bankers’ “irresponsibility” and “lack of self-discipline”. More generally, FT 
reporters repeatedly suggested that the banking crisis marked a serious loss of 
reputation for the bankers among transnational elites and a questioning of 
both their morality and proficiency. Private and public attacks on banks 
reached such levels that many bank executives, including Lloyd Blankfein of 
Goldman Sachs and Bob Diamond of Barclays, both regular participants at 
Davos, saw it fit to miss the forum in 2009, so that they would not have “to 
hear themselves being blamed for the economic crisis” (A403/2009, JG). This 
kind of rhetoric in the midst and aftermath of the global financial crisis reflects 
the kind of mix of collective remorse, anger and blame game that characterises 
how business elites, policymakers and media commentators often react in 
public to market failures and economic crises (see Brassett and Clarke 2012; 
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Sinclair 2010).99 In tandem, market failure turns into a fundamental failure of 
human character: during good times, the financiers and policymakers have 
succumbed to irrational greed, impudence and complacency. In addition to 
fitting neatly with elite understandings of the economy as a social-
psychological phenomenon (see Chapter 5.1), the moral rhetoric effectively 
normalises the crisis as a cyclical event which is followed by another period of 
success and which does not merit any rethinking of earlier beliefs concerning 
the economy. 
Yet, as the fourth and fifth accounts of the crisis suggest, the business-as-
usual rhetoric of human failures and market cycles did not succeed in entirely 
quelling the expressions of epistemic disorientation. The arguments about the 
increasing complexity of the financial system and about the economic 
imbalances that had fed the credit-led growth boom pointed to key systemic 
concerns in the global economy which could not be easily explained away as 
failures of individuals. As a result, much of the communication on the roots of 
the financial crisis addressed issues from the proliferation of financial 
innovation to the shortcomings in the regulation of the financial industry – 
and even the creation of a deeply interconnected global financial structure. 
That the crisis had originated from western financial centres had 
demonstrated financial volatility to be not just a concern for non-western 
economies. It now became clear that “even the most sophisticated financial 
systems” are prone to crises (A441/2010, MW). As a result, not only 
investments funds and banks were on the line, but also companies and 
governments “must face up to the challenges created by ... unprecedented 
levels of interconnectedness between risks” (A422/2010, GT). In this way, 
much of the debate on the causes of the financial crisis reinforced the 
destabilising finance discourse that was already part of TEC in the pre-crisis 
period. 
As already suggested above, the destabilising finance discourse is closely 
connected to the idea that to ensure stability the financial markets are, and 
must be, overseen by authorities. The importance of states as a necessary 
stabilising agent in the global economy was reinforced in the debate over the 
financial crisis: in many accounts it was precisely the internationally-
coordinated government action that prevented the global financial system 
from collapsing. By keeping the most important banks solvent through 
 
                                                   
99  Certainly, much of the rhetoric about regrets for past failures and questioning of the 
previous beliefs and attitudes resembles what occurred in the studied material after the 
bursting of the dotcom bubble in the early 2000s. At that time, Davos participants were 
depicted experiencing “unaccustomed humility and remorse” and wearing “hair shirts” 
(“metaphorically, if not physically”) (A79/2003, Editorial), and the regrets were mostly about 
the “wave of exuberance” of investors and speculators (A80/2003, GJ/WH) prompted by the 
illusion of the “new economy miracle” as epitomised in the booming internet and ICT 
companies (A1/2001, GJ). 
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massive injections of capital, as well as by creating more demand and supply 
for credit trough monetary and fiscal stimulus, the actions of governments and 
central banks, in effect, were credited for the “removal of panic from financial 
markets” (A441/2010, MW) and for carrying the global economy alive through 
the “heart attack” in the financial system (A474/2010, MW). In her 2011 
column, Christine Lagarde, the French finance minister and later director of 
IMF, credited the joint efforts of governments for no less than “saving global 
finance” (A483/2011, CL). These accounts of the financial crisis presented 
financial institutions as deeply dependent on public authorities, relying for 
their survival and prosperity on governments and public regulation. The 
financial crisis had made it evident that “taxpayers are the guarantors of the 
financial system”, and government support over many banks had been such 
that “it [was] really hard to imagine these banks operating on a quasi-
independent basis any time in the near future” (A362/2009, PTL). 
Overall, however, the five alternative accounts of the financial crisis 
pointed to the practical epistemic challenges prompted by the shocking events 
and suggested that there was no apparent consensus on the causes of the crisis. 
The plurality of crisis narratives was reflected in a corresponding ambivalence 
about the political responses to the crisis: There seemed to be a broad 
agreement that the elites must cooperate to “fix the financial system” 
(A350/2008, GoB) or to “reduce monetary disorder and create the conditions 
where financial stability can return” (A483/2011, CL). Yet, there was great 
ambiguity about the magnitude of the needed reforms. For instance, in his 
2008 op-ed, Gordon Brown, British prime minister, adopted a moderate view 
and advocated enhancing the independent monitoring and supervisory 
powers of the IMF to “enforce transparency throughout the system” and “to 
create an early warning system” to guarantee financial stability (A350/2008, 
GoB). Other leaders, however, took a more radical approach. In his speech at 
the 2010 meeting, Nicolas Sarkozy, the president of France, questioned the 
entire business model of western banks, “arguing that the proper role of banks 
is to lend to entrepreneurs and not to speculate on the markets” (A460/2010, 
GR), and called for a new Bretton Woods currency system (A461/2010, GT). 
For his part, Wen Jiabao, the Chinese premier, used his 2009 speech at Davos 
to call for nothing less than the establishment of “a new world economic order 
that is just, equitable, sound and stable” (A393/2009, CB/AEJ/GT/JT). FT’s 
banking editor Peter Thal Larsen, in turn, noted ahead of the 2008 forum that 
the banking industry was having “a real debate” about the failings of the 
prevailing business model (originate-to-distribute), in which they make loans 
with the intention of selling them to other market players, as opposed to 
holding the loans through maturity (A310/2008, PTL). Other concrete issues 
to address included not only the incentives of bankers that encourage overt 
risk-taking, as well as the problem of banks becoming “too big to fail” 
(A469/2010, GT). 
In sum, the financial crisis can be seen as a moment of epistemic 
uncertainty and disorientation in which transnational elites worked on shared 
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perceptions of the shifting state of reality. In this regard, the events prompted 
dramatic definitions of the situation and paved the way for public blaming of 
individual and institutional failures, as well for the critical scrutiny of the 
institutions and structures in the financial sector and the global economy at 
large.100 The presence of competing perspectives failed to give way to a unified 
causal account on the crisis, and uncertainty and disagreement reigned on 
what would represent a proper line of action to address the various problems. 
This general sense of disorientation and disagreement is particularly tangible 
in the coverage of the 2008 and 2009 forums. However, as the focus shifted 
from the past failures to the more future-oriented discussion on concrete 
policy measures in 2010 and 2011, the notion of regulation began to 
increasingly dominate the reform agenda. In tandem, there was less emphasis 
on the presence of differences and conflicts regarding the financial system at 
large. 
Regulation, recession and recovery 
Regulation of markets and businesses is obviously a permanent element of 
international political-economic discourse. Table 5.3 indicates that, save for 
2002, the FT kept regulation in the agenda in each year of its Davos coverage. 
Obviously, the issue of regulation was not exclusively connected to banks and 
financial operations; indeed, in the pre-crisis years most of the usage of the 
notion referred to other business sectors or to corporate and market regulation 
in general. Yet, as concerns about the developments in the financial system 
surfaced in 2006 and 2007, there was a slight increase in the salience of the 
term compared to previous years. The outbreak of the financial crisis 
prompted ever more frequent allusions to regulation in 2008 and 2009. But it 
was only in 2010 and 2011 that the notion became highly prevalent in the 
forum coverage, with its frequency more than doubling from the two previous 
years. 
Table 5.3 The frequency of “regulation” per year.* 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
13 - 6 3 7 11 11 15 16 33 34 
.30 - .19 .09 .14 .22 .20 .26 .27 .56 .60 
* The upper row indicates the number of mentions and the bottom row the number of mentions 
per article. 
 
                                                   
100 A study on the crisis debates in The Economist from September 2007 to October 2009 (Riaz 
et al. 2011), and an international comparative study on the political leaders’ public speeches 
on the financial crisis (‘t Hart and Tindall 2009a), made similar observations about the active 
promotion of institutional reforms by policymaking elites in the midst of the financial crisis. 
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The yearly differences in the frequency of the notion reflect broader shifts in 
elite communication on the financial crisis. As already discussed above, the 
issue of regulation was intimately connected to certain causal accounts of the 
global financial crisis. This is the argument according to which the crisis took 
place not so much because of the greed and short-sightedness of bankers but 
due to weaknesses in the control mechanisms of the markets. Official 
investigations into the roots of the crisis, such as the study of the US 
Congressional Oversight Panel, reinforced this message, arguing that “tighter 
regulations” were needed “to prevent [the financial crisis from] happening 
again” (A398/2009, FG/AW). Consequently, a new regulatory program 
captured a large part of the attention at Davos and emerged as the topic of 
“most impassioned debates” at the forum (A349/2008, GT/PTL). Calls and 
proposals by government leaders and central bankers for new regulatory 
measures and arrangements frequently made it to the FT reports from the 
forum. A regulatory reform thus became a self-evident expectation for FT 
journalists as a response to the financial crisis. Chris Giles, the economics 
editor, summed up this conviction in unequivocal terms:  
Key parts of financial regulation will be radically changed. International 
banks are almost certain to have some form of international supervision. 
Great effort will be put into removing the many forces within banking 
regulation that encourage institutions to take increasing risks in good times 
and clamp down in the bad times. Stress tests will have to be beefed up after 
the world proved much more volatile than the scenarios regulators 
approved. Credit ratings agencies will not escape a new regulatory 
onslaught. (A372/2009, CG.) 
In line with such demands and predictions, the crisis prompted a series of 
policy initiatives both at the national and international levels with the aim of 
creating new legislation, regulatory practices and international co-ordination 
to supervise the financial industry. These efforts attracted increasing attention 
during the 2010 and 2011 Davos meetings. Thus, whereas in 2008 and 2009 
regulation emerged as one area among a number of problems to be addressed, 
in the subsequent two years it increasingly dominated the crisis-response 
agenda. The issue of regulation also introduced a pragmatic tone to the debate 
over the financial markets: it underlined practical ways of dealing with the 
situation by addressing individual concerns. Even bank executives could 
embrace this pragmatic approach and became involved in designing and 
supporting regulatory initiatives. Accordingly, during the 2010 Davos forum, 
Josef Ackermann, CEO of Deutsche Bank, came out in favour of solving the 
“too-big-to-fail problem” with “a European rescue and resolution fund for 
banks”, and Bob Diamond, president of Barclays, spoke on behalf of “a global 
levy, which could see banks contribute tens or even hundreds of billions of 
dollars over a period of years” (A463/2010, TB/PJ). 
The participation of financial institutions in the efforts to supervise 
themselves did not indicate that the issue of regulation developed as a 
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consensual debate. Quite the contrary, FT journalists often presented 
“regulators”, “politicians” and “bankers” in at odds with each other. Indeed, as 
FT journalists recorded the rebound of the banking industry after the initial 
shock of the financial crisis, and followed its push-back against regulatory 
reforms, they presented regulatory measures as increasingly “contentious” 
(A423/2010, PJ). Instead of making sense of regulation in terms of a process 
to rebuild the financial system and the global economy under a new set of 
principles, rules and institutions, FT journalists thus presented it as a political 
struggle between banks and governments. However, this emphasis on the 
purportedly contested nature of regulatory measures worked to effectively 
hide the emerging broader consensus of financial regulation itself as the 
principal, if not the sole, way to respond to the crisis. Indeed, questioning the 
entire financial system and the prevailing business models subsided as the 
discussion turned towards more limited questions on the feasibility, validity, 
legitimacy and effectiveness of individual regulatory initiatives that were being 
proposed and implemented. While initially rooted in the perceived threats 
posed by the financial system, regulation emerged in this debate not as a self-
evidently necessary action to stabilise the financial system but as a contentious 
political process, which was assessed in terms of struggles and concessions on 
individual regulatory measures by rivalling actors in the global economy.  
The push-back of the banking industry against fundamental reforms was 
closely associated in the debate with the evolution of the financial crisis into a 
global economic downturn. The Great Recession, as it came to be labelled, 
presented a new field of concerns for the Davos elite to address. The issue of 
reforming the banking sector was now increasingly treated as a secondary 
problem in the face of the necessity to find ways to restart growth in the global 
economy. In this quest for recovery, private financial institutions were to play 
a key role.  
According to the dominant account of the global recession, the financial 
crisis had caused a “credit squeeze”, or the tightening of credit, in the economy, 
which was interpreted as the diminishing of the banks’ “lending capacity” 
(A316/2008, KG). Yet the banks were desperately needed in the recession “to 
finance the global economy” (A483/2011, CL), or to provide the all-important 
credit to businesses for their operations. Indeed, the global economy had a 
“huge demand” for credit, which only the banking sector had the power to 
provide (A506/2011, DS). Easing the credit squeeze was therefore necessary 
for the global economy to run effectively. A logical policy conclusion was that 
the banks had to be assisted by central banks and governments to encourage 
them to offer credit to businesses and to finance investments.  
The pragmatic debate on the economic crisis, which presented the return 
to robust economic growth as the primary global policy objective, thus 
reintroduced the discourse of functional finance, which already featured 
prominently in the pre-crisis debates of the global economy. Within this 
discourse, the banks emerged as essential vehicles for the needed credit to 
jump-start growth, and so the proposed new regulatory measures to limit the 
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operations of the financial markets began to be seen as a burden. This 
argument about the negative effects of regulation on the ability of the banks to 
finance the economy was neatly captured by Francesco Guerrera and Patrick 
Jenkins as they reported on the 2011 Davos forum debates on new banking 
rules: 
Everyone agrees that stronger, safer banks will inevitably be less 
profitable. But how much less? And does it matter to the broader economy? 
Larry Summers, until recently US President Barack Obama’s top economic 
adviser, insists it does. “The world is more likely to suffer from excessive 
risk aversion over the coming years, rather than insufficient risk aversion,” 
he told a Credit Suisse lunch on Thursday. … The constraints that such 
regulation will impose on banks’ lending capacity has been a central theme 
of Davos 2011 - one that bankers argue is of critical importance to the 
outlook for global economic growth. "Governments want growth and 
without the money to fund it themselves they need the banks to play that 
role more than ever," says Gary Parr, deputy chairman of Lazard, the 
advisory bank. (A513/2011, FG/PJ.) 
The passage illustrates the stark contrast between the destabilising finance 
discourse, which dominated during the financial crisis, and the functional 
finance discourse that increasingly took hold in subsequent years. In this latter 
discourse, the risk-taking by agents in the financial sector in search of greater 
profits was no longer regarded as the root of instability but rather as the 
solution to the problem of growth. Correspondingly, regulation was no longer 
understood as a necessary way to rescue the banking industry, but as a penalty 
or sanction to the banks. This made it possible for investors and bank 
executives to claim that the proposed new rules and taxes threatened their 
ability to rebound from the crisis: all regulations that restricted the banks’ 
ability to take risks and accumulate profits thus became to be seen as harmful 
and effectively pro-cyclical measures that would deepen the recession. In sum, 
by 2011 the debate on the financial markets appears to have shifted 
considerably: from the need to control and diminish the systemic risks banks 
and investors represented to the global economy, Davos attendees had moved 
to discussing how regulation would impose “constraints” on the capacity of 
banks to lend:  
The discussions on the fallout of the financial crisis featured not only 
concerns about economic recession and the role of the banks in recovery from 
it. Developments in the financial markets themselves attracted much 
attention. FT journalists reported, for instance, on how credit is flowing in 
large quantities from the leading western economies to emerging markets: as 
western economies one after another fell into a recession, investors were seen 
as “escaping dismal returns in the rich economies” (A429/2010, AB) to 
emerging markets “where growth prospects are the strongest” (A442/2010, 
CG). In addition, Europe’s mounting problems in the wake of the financial 
crisis prompted alarming commentary. Already in 2009, investors were 
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reportedly becoming increasingly concerned about the rising public debt of 
governments following the bank bail-out. Then, at the 2010 Davos forum 
George Papandreou, the Greek prime minister, attempted in vain to calm the 
creditors in the face of growing concerns about Greece’s ability to fund its 
rising public debt. The FT commented on the Greek troubles in an editorial on 
29 January 2010, arguing that “if enough investors fear that Greece cannot 
refinance, this possibility will become a self-fulfilling prophecy. The challenge 
is to gain investors’ confidence not only that Greece can tackle the deficit – but 
that enough investors trust it to do so for it to continue refinancing.” 
(A459/2010, Editorial.) 
As the two major themes in the post-crisis debate on the financial 
markets suggest, investors continued to hold great power and influence in elite 
ontology of the global economy. In the conversation concerning global 
financial flows, investors appeared as disciplining actors who were still seeking 
the highest returns for their investments, forcing economies to create as 
attractive conditions as possible to creditors. The way the Greek government 
was discussed in terms of being held hostage to the confidence of investors, 
manifested an understanding of how the sovereignty of individual economies 
– at least in the eurozone – was compromised by the willingness of investors 
to finance public deficits. Therefore, just as in the years before the crisis, the 
post-crisis debate often presented investors and the financial markets within 
the disciplinary finance discourse, which naturalises the power of the 
financial markets over governments and other economic agents. By 2011, as 
the Greek problems transformed into a fully-fledged eurozone crisis, Chris 
Giles observed the general shift in economic policy discussion around the 
world: from the idea that governments should support economic growth with 
public spending, the debate had turned to the need to cut public deficits with 
policies of austerity:  
Fiscal stimulus is now a thing of the past. The US is again something of an 
outlier, with Congress approving the continuation of the George W. Bush 
tax cuts in December in a fiscal package that also included further 
extensions in unemployment benefits and a one-year reduction in payroll 
taxes. … Elsewhere in advanced economies, public spending cuts and tax 
increases are firmly on the menu for 2011. Some countries are pursuing 
austerity with relish. In January, the German government said it hoped its 
budget deficit would fall firmly below the European 3 per cent limit after 
breaching the rules for only one year. The UK coalition government, with a 
much worse starting-point, has put deficit reduction at the centre of 
everything it does. … Elsewhere in Europe, austerity is even tougher, but 
has been forced on countries that had few options left after hitting the limits 
of investor willingness to finance their fiscal deficits at reasonable cost. 
(A486/2011, CG.) 
Giles’ argument demonstrates a rather nuanced understanding of the 
differential disciplinary power of finance over governments. As a policy 
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program austerity was a matter of choice for some governments, especially to 
those of the major economies including the United States, the UK and 
Germany.101 For the rest of the European countries, on the contrary, austerity 
was forced due to the investors’ loss of confidence and “willingness” to finance 
their public deficits. In a similarly weak position with regard to the 
international investors were the emerging economies, whose monetary 
policies were restricted by their “worry that if they raise interest rates further, 
a wall of money escaping the extremely low cash returns in the advanced world 
will force their currencies artificially high and undermine their long-term 
growth prospects” (A486/2011, CG). More generally, in the debate on the 
eurozone crisis and public deficits, creditor interest and debt discipline 
emerged as practically non-questionable principles in elite debate. Gillian Tett 
acknowledged as much when she assessed the problem that governments were 
facing in the “huge debts” they had accumulated in managing the financial 
crisis and its fallout: while tough austerity or inflation were both “pretty 
unpalatable” means of tackling the debt burden, there was really no alternative 
since the only other way was “through defaults, and that’s … pretty taboo as 
far as the Davos debate is concerned” (A423/2010, GT). Overall, even as elite 
debates featured a pragmatic and non-moralistic tone concerning the role of 
credit in the global economy, a common sense still regarded public debt as a 
problem, particularly in the crisis-ridden countries of the eurozone. Moreover, 
there was no questioning of the global system of US-led monetary order and 
the rules governing the creation and allocation of credit (see, e.g., Davidson 
2009, 134–41; Varoufakis 2013). 
The disciplinary finance discourse thus entailed an implicit recognition 
of the uneven distribution of power in the global political economy, in which 
size and institutional arrangements grant certain actors more freedom of 
manoeuvre than others. In this respect, the financial crisis, if anything, 
reinforced the perceptions of the centrality of the United States in the global 
economy. Indeed, if the years prior to the crisis were marked by frequent 
restlessness about a potential crash of the dollar as a consequence of the 
mounting US private and public deficits, this was no longer presented as a 
relevant concern after the crisis. The way US authorities dealt with the crisis 
by providing massive amounts of liquidity to the market essentially debunked 
 
                                                   
101 Notably, Giles’ acknowledgment of the nature of the UK government’s measures to cut 
public deficits as entirely optional and intentionally self-imposed austerity implicitly disclaims 
the government’s official argument. Yet only two days later, Giles reported how Nick Clegg, 
the deputy prime minister, justified the British “austerity drive” as an “unavoidable decision” 
that was determined by the need to reach a fiscal balance lest “other people will force you” 
(A511/2011, CG/GP/MW). True to FT journalism’s inherently “neutral” and non-confronting 
nature, this news report made no effort to probe the validity of Clegg’s claim, leaving it to the 
reader to decide whether to treat Clegg’s assertion of the power of investors to discipline the 
UK government as an expression of genuine belief or as a convenient rhetorical device. 
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any myths about the risks of the United States government of running out of 
credit.  
Nevertheless, there is an area where the power of finance appears to 
overwhelm the capacity of countries to define the rules irrespective of their 
size, and that is the world of regulation. As FT reporters covered Davos debates 
on new regulatory measures in the wake of the crisis, they expressed 
scepticism about their impact. “Are policy changes now in place that reduce 
the likelihood of further severe crises? The answer, alas, seems to be no” 
opined Martin Wolf in his 2010 comment (A441/2010, MW). Similarly, Deven 
Sharma argued in 2011 that “recent reform efforts, in areas ranging from 
proprietary trading to credit derivatives and credit ratings, have been 
piecemeal and parochial” (A506/2011, DS), and a 2011 editorial warned 
policymakers in forceful terms against succumbing to the pressure of the 
financial industry, stating that “banks still have to be made safe to fail” in order 
to “restore market discipline to the financial sector” (A526/2011, Editorial).  
These critiques of the post-crisis failure to implement a meaningful 
financial reform amounted to a tacit acknowledgement of the success of 
financial elites to shape the international regulatory response to the crisis. In 
fact, there appeared to be no ambiguity about the bankers’ positions 
concerning regulation nor about their intentions to influence governments 
and international officials. Already in 2008, Gillian Tett and Peter Thal Larsen 
observed that “investment banks - unsurprisingly - are keen to avoid any 
regulatory clampdown” and were on a “charm offensive” in Davos, “lobbying 
discreetly to offset the rising criticism of their finance model” (A349/2008, 
GT/PTL). Moreover, in her article ahead of the 2010 forum, Tett bluntly 
observed that “a host of senior bankers will be flying into Davos this year 
hoping to press their case for governments to impose only modest financial 
reforms” (A422/2010, GT).  
Yet, in addition to the successful lobbying by industry leaders, there 
appeared to be a more profound reason for the failures of governments to act 
more forcefully on the financial institutions. This was related to the perception 
of a fundamental incapacity of states to regulate the financial markets. 
According to this reasoning, “regulators and banks are caught in ‘game of cat 
and mouse’” in which the banks tend to have the upper hand (A524/2011, TJ). 
Due to their ability to move capital globally, investment bankers were in a 
position to evade nationally and regionally imposed regulation, and due to the 
existence of “shadow banking”, investors had many more tools in their 
proposal than the regulators who tried to constrain them. Efficient regulation 
of financial markets thus appeared as an impossible task. Or, as Tony Jackson 
summed it up: “the mice will always win” (A524/2011, TJ). 
In sum, the practical policy debates on the Great Recession and recovery 
featured discourses of the financial markets that were distinctly different from 
the critiques that were present in the conversations about the causes of the 
global financial crisis. In these debates, instead of being regarded as a 
“defective” element that threatens to drive the global economy into instability, 
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the financial system, and its banks and investors, emerged as enabling agents 
who finance growth and are therefore key to recovery. Moreover, due to their 
ability to move great amounts of capital across borders in search of higher 
yields, international investors were considered to be effectively limiting the 
available policy options of a great number of countries in the aftermath of the 
crisis; and as the all-important sources of credit, private financial institutions 
could even hold hostage indebted governments. As a result, as elite debate 
moved on from the immediate crisis assessments concerning “what went 
wrong” towards the more future-oriented discussion on the needed measures 
to lift the global economy out of the recession, the perceptions of the financial 
markets and the role of banks in the economy changed considerably. In many 
ways, the post-crisis debate reproduced the same perceptions of the financial 
markets that had been dominant already before the crisis. 
Financialised ontology 
In his analysis on the influence of the financial media over international 
economic policy, Jeff Madrick (2002) observed that major crises have 
periodically shaken elite faith in orthodox economic policies. Examining the 
western financial press coverage of the Russian shock therapy and the 
liberalisation of Asian financial markets in the 1990s, he argued that, in the 
wake of the Asian financial crisis and the consequent Russian default in 1998, 
the newspapers began to present critiques of privatisation, neoliberal 
structural reforms and the liberalisation of financial markets. Such critical 
accounts typically took the form of explicit pronouncements and even 
dramatic about-faces from prominent economists that had previously been 
vocal proponents of the so-called Washington Consensus policies. The 
financial media, in other words, largely cued what was considered the 
prevailing wisdom over economic policies, and only the emergence of rifts 
among policymakers and experts following market failures allowed ideological 
disagreements surface in elite communication. 
Based on the preceding analysis, the FT coverage of elite debates on the 
financial markets from 2001 to 2011 indicated similar patterns of consensus 
and disagreement. The 2007–9 financial crisis, in particular, can be regarded 
as a source of epistemic disorientation, shifting the prevailing discourses about 
financial markets in TEC. More precisely, the discursive impact of the crisis 
can be summarised in two main effects. First, it prompted vocal attacks on 
bankers and claims about the deficiencies of the financial system. Second, it 
reinforced the understanding that states were the ultimate guarantors and 
supervisors of financial markets. Yet both these discourses proved to be only 
temporary alterations in the way financial markets were made sense of in TEC. 
Certainly, the threats posed to the global economy by the financial system 
featured prominently in elite debates immediately after the outbreak of the 
financial crisis. This destabilising finance discourse occupied an important 
position in the accounts of the crisis and involved the explicit recognition that 
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governments needed to bring the financial system under public control. These 
shifts in elite debate can be seen as epistemic elements for a potential redesign 
of the global financial architecture. They could operate both as sufficiently 
serious warnings against non-action and as empowering calls for action to 
reconsider some of the institutions and rules governing over global finance.  
This sense of threat, which could potentially have paved the way to the 
questioning of the feasibility of the whole finance-led model of the global 
economy, was, however, quickly tamed under mundane disagreements on the 
pragmatics, politics and economics of financial regulation. Certainly, the 
debate on regulation, as it featured demands for greater transparency and 
oversight of financial institutions, reflected certain fundamental tenets of elite 
ontology. These concern, in particular, an understanding of the way in which 
the operation of financial markets and the global economy is dependent on 
trust. They also include an acknowledgment that openness, transparency and 
the availability of information are necessary elements in building that trust. In 
this sense, the post-crisis emphasis on regulation as the primary response to 
the crisis, as well as the key notions used in the debate, were logical responses 
which arose from the basic elite ontology of the global economy as a socially-
embedded domain of economic and market activities (see Chapter 5.1). This 
also explains why, after the global financial crisis, policymakers and regulators 
have indeed taken steps to enforce more transparency and oversight in the 
financial markets, for instance, in the Basel III process (e.g., Wolf 2014a, 225–
7).  
The issue of regulation, however, failed to shift elite ontology in any 
meaningful way and brought little new insight into TEC concerning the 
governance of the global economy. Moreover, as the financial crisis was 
followed by a deep economic downturn in the west, the epistemic work on the 
global economy moved from a crisis mentality to a more pragmatic policy 
discourse on the economic recession and recovery. In this context, a more pro-
finance discourse gained ground in elite communication. No longer appearing 
as a threatening force that needed to be brought under effective control, global 
capital flows emerged as an indispensable element of the global economy. The 
threat of the financial markets was replaced by other discourses, emphasising 
the enabling and indispensable role of finance in the global economy as a 
source of needed credit and growth. Discussions on regulation and recovery 
thus reproduced the functional role and disciplining power of the financial 
markets in the global economy. In sum, after the initial shock, the financial 
crisis seemed to do little to alter the prevailing discourses on the financial 
markets in TEC.  
What explains this discrepancy between the crisis-analytical discourse, 
giving salience to the destabilising nature of finance, and the policy-action 
discourse, emphasising the functional and disciplinary roles of finance? An 
obvious factor to consider here is the influence of investment bankers and 
other powerful players in the financial markets to shape the post-crisis policy 
agenda. As observed by Freeland (2012, 258–60), the key message of the 
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financial institutions after the crisis consisted of warnings about the regulatory 
creep and its adverse effects on economic growth, and they attempted to 
naturalise the global financial crisis as an event in the normal and reoccurring 
cycle of the economy. There were also suggestions that regulation is futile 
because financial institutions can eventually get around them. From this 
perspective, the so-called “regulatory capture”, in which the private interests 
of the big banks effectively replace the public interest as the leading principle 
of the regulatory bodies of the financial industry (e.g., Baker 2010; Goldin and 
Vogel 2010), formed a key context in which the crisis was made sense of in 
TEC. 
Any successes of the financial interests to dictate the reactions to the 
crisis should, however, be understood in light of the broader historical process 
of financialization (see Chapter 3.1) and the way it has been associated with a 
particular way of making sense of finance and its place in the economy. In this 
regard, and closely related to idea of the power of private financial institutions 
to shape the regulation of their own activities, Willem Buiter (2008, 99–103) 
introduced the notion of “cognitive regulatory capture” to help explain many 
of the policy decisions by the US Federal Reserve before and after the outbreak 
of the financial crisis. According to this view, central bankers at the Fed have 
adopted not just the objectives and interests, but also the perceptions of reality 
that prevail in Wall Street, leading them to believe that the profitability of the 
financial sector is the utmost objective that the central bank must protect. Jeff 
Faux (2006, 119–20) suggested that many politicians share a similar mind-
set. For him, an illustrative case is Robert Rubin, a banker who worked as the 
economic adviser and US secretary of treasury in the Clinton administration 
in between jobs at Goldman Sachs and Citigroup. In his memoirs, Rubin 
outlined what Faux considered to be the principal rationale for securing the 
interests of investors in financial crises and large corporate defaults. The 
rationale is rooted in the belief that doing otherwise would threaten the 
stability of the national and global economy: exposing the big banks to the 
risks they take would lead to bank runs, as well as to devastating capital flights 
from emerging economies. Accordingly, rescuing global investors, investment 
banks and other financial institutions features at the top of the “to do” list in 
times of crisis for any responsible politician and central banker. 
Rather than an identification with specific interests, it is thus the 
ontological understanding of the nature of the financialised economy that 
drives the pragmatic decision-making and related sense-making of 
policymakers and regulators in economic crises. This financialised ontology 
perceives finance as a functional element in the global economy and highlights 
the role of banks and investors as its primary drivers. It posits that all agents 
in the global economy are dependent on credit, which it assumes to be a 
limited resource. This belief obviously infers an enormous power to those who 
hold credit and the ability to lend. Investors can always look for the biggest 
possible returns in the global markets and, consequently, capital flows to those 
companies and economies that promise the highest returns on investment. As 
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a result, the global financial markets are considered to exert disciplining power 
in the global economy, often limiting the economic policy alternatives of 
governments to a minimum.  
As much of the economic policy debates after the financial crisis focused 
on issues of credit flows and public debt, the post-crisis elite communication 
thus effectively reflected and reproduced an ontology of the global economy 
that is characterised by the hegemony of finance. Indeed, when it comes to the 
epistemic work of transnational elites on the financial crisis, there was a 
notable omission of certain decades-long structural processes as relevant 
causal accounts, including stagnant real wages, rising private indebtedness 
and the general inflation of the financial markets, especially in the United 
States, but also elsewhere in the western world (see, e.g., Crouch 2011; Streeck 
2011; Varoufakis 2013). Perhaps tellingly, financialization was never 
mentioned in the analysed data. Moreover, despite the vocal attacks and 
denouncements of the financial industry, the centrality of finance in the global 
economy was never seriously questioned. There was no recognition, for 
instance, of the capacity of central banks, in principle, to finance public 
investment without the need for governments to borrow from the private 
sector (e.g., Wray 2012, 110–4). Nor was there any serious debate on a new 
business model for banks, and the need to promote “productive” capital 
against “speculative” capital never emerged as part of the discussion. 
Overall, then, the analysis points as much to continuities as to changes in 
the way the financial markets were made sense of in TEC before and after the 
2007–9 crisis. Considering the long history of financialization, this is not 
necessarily a surprising conclusion. According to Martin Konings (2016), the 
global financial crisis did not represent a radical break in elite understandings 
of finance precisely because the dominant neoliberal reason already informed 
them about the uncertainties and risks posed by a financialised economy. As a 
result, the crisis did not so much prompt elites to question their deeply-held 
beliefs and look for alternative policies to solve the situation as it activated 
“patterns of normalisation”, leading policymakers and regulators to resort to 
“the only possible course of action” (ibid., 282). Other studies have suggested 
similar conclusions: that the global financial crisis, if anything, has 
strengthened the previously prevalent beliefs among the elite about the global 
economy and financial markets (Mirowski 2013; Richardson et al. 2011, 196–
7), according to which governments all around the world are forced to pay 
“close attention to international constraints and obligations, including those 
of the financial markets” (Streeck 2011, 26). Far from prompting a radical shift 
in the social ontology, the crisis may have only reinforced the pre-existing 
beliefs and strengthened the resolve of transnational elites to continue 
implementing the policies and doctrines they believe the global economy 
requires: saving the financial institutions while imposing debt discipline on 
the public sector. 
6 TRANSNATIONAL ELITE AS AN ACTOR 
IDENTITY 
As discussed in Chapter 5.1, it is commonplace in literature to characterise the 
notion of “the economy” as a fundamentally a-political imaginary, which 
evokes structures and abstract processes but does not provide basis for 
recognising intentional collective agency vis-à-vis those structures. According 
to Taylor (2004, 76–9) the modern imaginary of society as an economy is 
essentially an individualistic understanding. In the modern understanding of 
economic life, “there is no collective agent”, and the account even “amounts to 
a denial of such”. The economy is composed of egoistic individuals who come 
together in relations of exchange, while “an invisible hand” of market forces 
and laws acts on their behalf to provide a spontaneous order. Similarly, 
Cameron and Palan (2004, 21) argue that the imagined global economy differs 
from the imagined community of the nation-state in that representing the 
space as an “economy” means it is not recognised as a space of political 
engagement for a community or polity (also see Fraser 2014, 67). Accordingly, 
the imaginary of the global economy, particularly when perceived as “global 
markets” (Taylor 2004, 79), may well be devoid of any prescriptions for 
collective agency and, in effect, may operate as a major hindrance to the 
realisation of a self-organised elite. The very self-understanding of 
transnational elites, as it becomes articulated in relation with the global 
economy, may rest on a framework which makes the idea of an elite capable of 
political agency essentially impossible. 
Nevertheless, while the economic imaginary operates as an “objectifying 
picture of social reality”, it co-exists in western modernity with the imaginary 
constitution of collective agencies (Taylor 2004, 77). Taylor (ibid., 80–1) refers 
to the relationship between the two in terms of a tension between order and 
freedom: the ideal of human agency and freedom clashes with the imaginary 
of the economy as an objective structure and order. But far from excluding 
each other, the objectified category of the economy may, in fact, prompt 
attempts to transform the economy into collective agencies through 
mobilisation. Imagining society as an economy is not to articulate society in 
terms of collective action, but because it “explains” a certain social domain in 
terms of particular mechanisms the economic imaginary enables individuals 
and groups to make sense of their action in society (Taylor 2004, 165). 
Similarly, ideas concerning the world as a “global economy” are connected to 
the practices of those operating in it (Cameron and Palan 2004, 37–8). Hence 
the objectifying and active accounts of society play complementary roles in 
enabling social action. 
This chapter analyses the negotiation over actor identities in TEC. As 
discussed in Chapter 4.2, actor identification is one of the three objects of 
epistemic work in political communication. Developing and negotiating over 
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the conceptions of relevant actors and their properties contributes to the self-
understanding of the participants of communication by telling them who they 
are, what communities they belong to and how they exist in relation to other 
actors. Identification and definition of actors also enables the general sense of 
agency in the world and informs what kind of motives or traits these collective 
or individual actors have (Alasuutari and Qadir 2014, 75–6). Arguably, the 
paradigmatic dimension of this epistemic work on collective actor identities 
expresses deep-rooted cultural beliefs and conventions that normalise and 
legitimise certain groups, organisations and states as actors in modern society 
(see Meyer and Jepperson 2000). In journalism and other forms of public 
discourse, this normalisation of collective agency typically takes place through 
linguistic practices that describe actions and, instead of attributing them to 
individuals, they reify collective entities, such as the business community, the 
elite or a nation as unified actors. Again, this paradigmatic level of the 
discursive construction of actorhood mostly takes place in the background 
level of argumentation. In contrast, the practical level of epistemic work on 
actor identities concerns the more explicit expression of attributes that are 
used to define certain collective actors. This chapter concentrates specifically 
on the representations of the Davos forum participants and their discursive 
construction as transnational elite actors – while recognising that it is by no 
means the only actor category that is being developed in the material. 
The negotiation over, and reinforcement of, a shared actor identity may 
have significant bearing on the conduct of transnational elites. Developing a 
conception of being member of a transnational elite shapes a person’s 
understanding of one’s place in the world and relations to other individuals 
and social groups. It involves the formation of particular social role 
expectations, or expected ways of conduct, as a member of an elite, thereby 
providing guidelines for action (cf. Tajfel 1981; Haslam et. al. 2011, 52–3).102 
A collective identity is, in this sense, prescriptive: identifying with 
 
                                                   
102 Instead of a collective identity, many social psychologists use the notion of a social identity 
to refer to the part of a person’s self-conception which is distinct from her personal identity 
(see Côté and Levine 2002). In Henri Tajfel’s social identity theory, for instance, social identity 
refers to “that part of an individual’s self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his 
membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance 
attached to that membership” (Tajfel 1981, 255). Accordingly, I understand the concepts of 
social identity and collective identity as being basically interchangeable. Some social 
psychologists, however, want to make a distinction between social identity and collective 
identity as different “identity orientations” where social identity refers to the person’s 
perceptions of oneself in the eyes of others and collective identity to one’s sense of belonging 
to a particular community (see Cheek et al. 2013). While not necessarily subscribing to this 
terminological distinction, I have decided, for clarity’s sake, to prefer the notion of collective 
identity over that of social identity. I use, however, the notions of collective identity, group 
identity and shared identity interchangeably in the text. 
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transnational elites helps individuals develop motives and purpose for their 
agency in the world (cf. Bicchieri and Muldoon 2011). At the same time, the 
prevailing understanding of a group’s collective identity may guide elite agency 
by punishing deviation from and rewarding adherence to the norm (Hopf 
2009, 281–3). 
Developing a shared actor identity is also related to the potential 
collective agency of transnational elites. A shared identity is not a necessary 
precondition for the elites’ political cooperation, but it reinforces their sense 
of belonging and feelings of loyalty towards each other, potentially 
engendering willingness to participate in collective efforts (cf. Brubaker and 
Cooper 2000, 7–8, 35). Members of a group may, after all, rationally agree on 
a mutually beneficial action but still fail to act upon it. Identifying with other 
members and the group as a whole increases the likelihood of successful 
collective action (Kantner 2006, 506; Turner 1999, 15). Economic 
globalisation processes, and the policies and decisions that have engendered 
them, is a case in point. As discussed in Chapter 3.1, national policymakers, 
international officials, bankers and business leaders have been key actors in 
promoting and enabling the internationalisation of production processes and 
free capital movements. Much of this policy conformity on an international 
basis has been premised on mutual agreement and consensus, rather than 
resulting from direct coercion. The formulation and promotion of certain 
ideas, for instance, about the beneficial nature of trade and market 
liberalisation, have obviously been key elements in the successful pursuit of 
such consensus (see Chapter 7). But policy conformity has arguably also been 
based on a successful identification of the political and business elites with 
their international peers. Conceiving oneself as part of the same group with 
internationally-operating bankers and business leaders increases the 
likelihood of international officials and national policymakers to acknowledge 
the interests of giant investment banks and firms, to make sense of policy 
issues in their terms, and to regard them more as friends rather than foes. At 
the same time, identification with members of other social groups, such as 
labour unions, civil society organisations and trade unions representing small 
businesses or national industries may diminish in importance, and their 
interests and perceptions may begin to seem increasingly foreign and 
parochial. An increasing strength of the sense of belonging to a transnational 
group of influencers may thus effectively naturalise policies of economic 
globalisation that conform to the interests of large banks and other TNCs. 
In addition to its agency-constituting capacity, transnational elite 
identity is characterised by its constructed nature. As Thomas Risse (2010, 20) 
argues, collective identities can be defined as social constructions that regulate 
the behaviour and define the properties of the members of a group. As social 
constructions they are performed and reproduced in communication and 
consist of collective meanings or “shared interpretations of group traits or 
attributes” (Abdelal et al. 2009, 30). Therefore, the collective identity of a 
transnational elite should be understood as a social construction that binds 
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individuals together and is performed in their communicative interaction. It 
should be noted, however, that members tend to express differing perceptions 
and interpretations of the group and that the collective identity is both 
reproduced and shaped in this negotiation over the group’s characteristics 
(Kantner 2006). 
When approaching collective identities as social constructions that 
manifest themselves in communication it is important to acknowledge that 
what is being observed in textual analysis are not direct manifestations of 
objectively existing self-perceptions of individuals. Based on textual analysis 
alone, it is impossible to infer whether such constructions point to the 
cognitive self-perceptions and affective senses of belonging that are actually 
held by the people who communicate them. In other words, texts should be 
seen neither as unambiguous manifestations or expressions of a collective 
identity nor as conclusive evidence of the existence of such identification 
among the members of the communicating individuals and audiences.103 
Nevertheless, texts can be regarded as constructions and representations 
of groups, their characteristics and the personal traits of their members. 
Therefore they offer their readers possibilities to identify with the group, in 
other words to shape, develop and reinforce collective identification, as well as 
certain models for acting as a member of that group. In this sense, an actor 
identity can be regarded as a subject position that the text offers to its reader 
(Althusser 1971; Eagleton 2007, 141–8; Hall 1985). Accordingly, as ideological 
discourse, TEC calls its participants into the subject position of an elite, a 
subjectivity that is produced in the processes of networking and interaction of 
transnational political and business leaders as well as the associated 
institutional practices of global governance (cf. Hall 1996, 5–6). Moreover, as 
discursive formations, identities are often constructed with the marking of 
difference and exclusion (Hall 1996, 4). According to Tajfel (1981, 258), the 
characteristics of the group gain much of their substance when expressed as 
perceived differences to other groups. When developing transnational elite 
identity, perceptions of relevant out-groups work as reference points against 
which the characteristics of transnational elites can be defined. Non-elite 
 
                                                   
103 In their critical examination of the social scientific uses of the concept, Brubaker and 
Cooper (2000) claim that “identity” often becomes meaningless when operationalised 
emphasising its fluid, constructed and “soft” nature. They suggest that concepts such as 
identification and social categorisation, which are both processual and active terms, should be 
preferred to identity in analytical usage. The authors make several valuable observations about 
potential weaknesses in studies that employ the notion of identity; nevertheless, in my view, 
their argument that dropping the term altogether in favour of closely related terms would 
clarify matters is not convincing. In this analysis, I refer to the transnational elite a socially 
constructed actor identity (or category) that operates as an object of identification to the 
readers of the Financial Times. 
Transnational elite as an actor identity 
206 
 
groups, then, potentially have an important role in the definition of what a 
transnational elite actually is and what holds it together as a group. 
Based on these premises, the chapter analyses the representations of the 
Davos forum as an elite community and its discursive articulation with the 
actor identity of a transnational elite in the following sections from four 
perspectives. First, the analysis observes how the pronoun we appears in the 
data, especially in the talk of Davos participants, to express collective 
identification. Alluding to “us” is a typical way of creating a sense of 
community and togetherness (Kantner 2006), and the extent to which “we” 
and “us” is articulated in TEC provides insight to the tendency of its 
participants to recognise the transnational elite as a relevant reference group. 
The second section examines how Davos delegates are being represented as a 
group or community in the FT coverage. In particular, it observes how the 
discursive construction of the “Davos Man” works as a representative for a 
broader transnational elite, or as a mythical figure that helps to define certain 
key characteristics and boundaries of transnational elites. The third section of 
the chapter focuses on the representation of the global civil society as “the 
significant other” that helps to identify Davos participants as a transnational 
elite and define its character as individuals and as a group. Finally, the fourth 
section analyses how FT journalists write about the forum and how they 
position themselves in relation to the Davos community. The analysis suggests 
that FT journalism mediates the relationship between the reader and those 
gathered in Davos, thereby offering the reader a certain subject position. This 
arguably makes it possible for the readers of the FT to identify with the Davos 
community and potentially consider themselves as part of a broader 
transnational elite. 
6.1 We, the elite? 
A sense of community and a group identity is typically expressed in the 
discursive construction of we-groups (Kantner 2006). A reference to “we” or 
an appeal to “us” in the discourse of Davos participants can be perceived as an 
indication that the speaker self-identifies herself as a member of a group or 
community. We-rhetoric thus discursively creates a group, separates it from 
others (“them”) and potentially reinforces a sense of community. Arguably, 
then, the extent to which TEC develops consciousness among its participants 
of being united as a group can be observed in the use of we-rhetoric.  
These group identifications appear in various guises and seem to be used 
for at least three kinds of purposes in TEC. First, a participant of the Davos 
forum can make an allusion to us in order to persuade others behind a 
particular action. Let us examine, for instance, the following passage from a 
2002 report on the forum debate concerning the Argentinian debt crisis, which 
had resulted in the Argentinian government defaulting on its external debt in 
December 2001. In New York, where the forum was exceptionally organised, 
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Peru’s president Alejandro Toledo called for international efforts to help 
Argentina deal with the crisis: 
President Alejandro Toledo of Peru yesterday called on the international 
community to provide financial aid for Argentina. “We need to meet the 
challenge of resolving the problems of Argentina not just from a solidarity 
point of view but because the longer we take, the higher the cost will be,” he 
told the World Economic Forum in New York. He said Argentina itself had 
to strengthen its institutions to prove its governability. “It has to show its 
willingness to put its house in order.” But he added that direct financial aid 
from outside to underpin reforms and “cushion the social impact” of the 
Argentine crisis had to be provided. “We have to put out this fire,” he said. 
His call was backed by Miguel Kiguel, the chairman of Argentina’s Banco 
Hipotecario. “The international community needs to support Argentina. 
They played a role in what happened in Argentina; now they need to be 
there when Argentina needs help.” (A74/2002, HC.) 
The passage illustrates the tendency in TEC to treat economic and financial 
problems in one country within the context of the global political economy (see 
Chapter 5.1). Indeed, the quotes of Toledo and the Argentinian banker Miguel 
Kiguel can be interpreted against the context of Argentina’s debt default (see 
Cibils et al. 2002): the crisis resulted from a rapid flight of foreign capital from 
the country, exacerbating the economic depression and reflecting the 
dependence of economies on foreign investors and international capital flows. 
Furthermore, the crisis was a consequence of the rising interest rates on 
Argentina’s external debt, which, in turn, had a great deal to do with the US 
Federal Reserve’s 1994 decision to raise short-term interest rates, leading the 
Argentinian government to a vicious circle of raising new debt to be able to 
service the old. As a result, “the international community” – referred to as “we” 
in Toledo’s remarks, and as “they” in Kiguel’s remarks – thus operates as a 
shorthand for the foreign investors, policymakers and central bankers whose 
decisions have greatly influenced the crisis in Argentina. As many of these 
actors are present at the World Economic Forum, it makes sense for Toledo to 
allude to “us” and for the reporter to identify this “we” with the forum 
participants at large. 
Overall, the FT coverage suggests that such use of we-rhetoric in a 
normative call for action is a regular feature, particularly in the discourse 
employed by state leaders and heads of international organisations in their 
keynote addresses at the forum. The “we” in such accounts is identified as a 
collective agent that is responsible for managing shared problems in the global 
political economy. The idea of Davos participants representing “the 
international community” and being collectively responsible for tackling 
global problems is, of course, forcefully promoted by the World Economic 
Forum and enshrined in its logo which includes the motto “Committed to 
improving the state of the world”.  This (self-)perception of the Davos forum 
participants’ global agency enables the UN secretary general Kofi Annan, for 
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instance, to make the case in 2001 for policies of more inclusive globalisation 
by the following use of we-rhetoric: “My friends, the simple fact of the matter 
is this: if we cannot make globalisation work for all, in the end it will work for 
no one” (A30/2001, HC/GJ). Similarly, Gordon Brown’s 2008 call for action 
to address the global financial crisis employs the pronoun “we” to create the 
sense of collective obligation among the Davos participants: Brown addresses 
the “political and business leaders, gathered at the World Economic Forum 
this week” and argues that the crisis presents an opportunity for reform that 
“we should” agree on, as well as a challenge which “we cannot afford to fail” 
(A350/2008, GoB). Indeed, times of crisis appear to be particularly fruitful 
contexts for such grand pronouncements by political leaders and international 
officials. They are also instances which provide opportunities for policymakers 
and business leaders to create a sense of collective obligations and legitimise 
them in terms of shared interests. Evoking the “we”-group works as a useful 
rhetorical device for these purposes. 
At times, however, corporate representatives also employ the notion of 
“we” in order to address the Davos community in the material. In the run-up 
to the 2010 forum, for instance, Mohamed El-Erian, CEO of Pimco, wrote in 
the Guide to Davos supplement about the major themes of debate in the 
upcoming meeting, calling specifically for debates on the “resetting of the 
global economy” and on the public sector deficits: “It is vital that we reset the 
global economy, and not go back to where we were” (A419/2010, MEE). 
Similarly, as Bill Gates, chairman of Microsoft promoted an international 
partnership between governments, international organisations and private 
sector funds to fight tuberculosis at the 2006 forum, he was quoted for 
characterising the challenge in the following manner: “This is a very tough 
disease. It's going to take all of us (to succeed)” (A237/2006, AJ). In these 
cases, no apparent distinction between the corporate and public sectors is 
made by the speakers. Instead, the “we” addresses the Davos elite as a whole, 
evoking a community that transcends the boundaries of government and 
business, the state and civil society. When used in this way, the rhetoric 
manifests the corporate leaders’ acknowledgment of the porousness of the 
public-private boundaries in global governance (see Chapter 3.2), as well as 
their willingness to perceive themselves as belonging to a same group with 
politicians and government officials. Such instances, however, are rare and the 
corporate leaders seem to largely avoid addressing the Davos forum as a whole 
in their remarks. While political leaders and heads of international 
organisations often call for collective action and express international elite 
identification, business leaders employ we-rhetoric primarily to allude to a 
particular business sector or profession, whether it is the bankers, hedge fund 
directors or corporate executives. In other words, rather than transcending it, 
it is more typical, that corporate leaders discursively reproduce the division 
between the private and the public sectors when employing we-rhetoric. 
Second, in addition to explicit calls to collective action, the notion of “we” 
is used by Davos participants as a means of self-observation. In these cases, 
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either the Davos community is evoked as an object of examination. Sometimes 
the examination may be critical, as in the case of a 2005 poll on the delegates, 
which revealed that 66 percent of the participants were male and 70 percent 
from North America and Europe and only 15 percent from Asia. The news story 
on the poll’s results is complemented with a quote from the moderator of the 
panel session, noting that “we have some serious imbalances” (A174/2005). 
Here the speaker invites members of the Davos community to share a self-
critical disposition about their nature as a group and about its collective 
gender, geographical and cultural biases. Yet we-rhetoric can also be used to 
express self-justificatory remarks. A 2001 forum debate on the globalisation 
protests is a case in point. As the global civil society aims much of its critique 
at the Davos forum and its participants, Laurent Fabius, the French finance 
minister, is quoted as saying: “We are said to be leaders of people but not 
representative – but many of us were elected by millions of people” 
(A23/2001, LB/HC). Here the self-observation of the Davos community as 
consisting of people who are partly elected by popular votes works as a way to 
justify the status of the participants as “leaders” and the social order more 
generally. Overall, while these forms of we-rhetoric express an identification 
of the Davos community by those on the inside, its discursive constructions 
take place much more from the “outside” in the form of representation and 
critique, as will be discussed in the following sections. 
A third way of summoning the Davos community in the use of the 
pronoun “we” can be evinced in FT reports on the daily panel discussions of 
the Davos forum. Here “we” is used simply to refer to those present at the 
forum debates without representing any normative call for collective action or 
a conscious self-observation of the group’s characteristics. As any 
communication at the forum is first and foremost directed at its other 
participants, this use of the pronoun can be regarded as part of any normal 
interaction between people: it simply expresses an individual’s awareness of 
the existence of a group. It is significant, however, because it reproduces, on 
the level of discourse, the existence of the Davos community. Moreover, it 
sometimes attests to a sense of familiarity between those present at the 
meeting: many of those transnational elites who attend the Davos forum do so 
every year, which allows them to make observations about what usually 
happens in the discussions. Accordingly, a 2005 article reported on “a familiar 
flurry of speculation” at Davos over the Chinese monetary policy. Even as some 
experts predicted that the People’s Bank of China was preparing to let the 
renminbi float – and thus to revalue against the dollar – Zhu Min, a senior 
Chinese banker, argued that such predictions were premature: “We will still 
be having this conversation in a year’s time” (A185/2005, AB).  
As the various uses of the notion of “we” and “us” illustrate, there is little 
doubt that Davos participants employ these notions in ways that attest to the 
existence of shared ideas of groupness. Thus the FT coverage of the Davos 
debates provides at least some evidence that members of the Davos forum 
express collective identification in their communication to other members of 
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the elite. Even so, we-rhetoric used in the sense is not a prevalent feature of 
the data. Even as references to “us” may well float around regularly in the 
actual debates and conversations at the forum, the journalistic coverage of the 
event does not consistently make use of the pronoun in this sense. Moreover, 
in addition to Davos participants as a whole, there are various other groups 
that “we” addresses in TEC. These alternative addressees include the business 
community, central bankers, the west, the non-US members of the 
international community, an individual country or government, an individual 
company or organisation, or the group of “young global leaders” of the World 
Economic Forum (see Chapter 2.2). The uses of the pronoun in reference to 
the Davos community should therefore be regarded as representing only a 
particular type of discourse, which does not clearly dominate in TEC. Instead 
the notion of “we” is also used in many other ways in the coverage, and it 
frequently summons into existence other groups or communities. These 
alternative reference-points for the pronoun “we” suggest that many 
alternative actor identities are present in TEC. 
6.2 The Davos community: elite unity and divisions 
While we-rhetoric is an important indication of the existence of a speaker’s 
sense of belonging to a group, a collective identity may develop not so much in 
explicit addressing of the group by its members themselves – in fact, an 
outright appeal to a we-group may even render the group identity overtly 
explicit and prompt a reaction of rejection in the audience or addressee. 
Instead, particularly in public discourse, a collective actor may be identified as 
much from the discursive position of an outsider as it is from the insider 
position of its members addressing it in we-rhetoric. In fact, as a journalistic 
form of TEC, the FT discourse differs markedly from, for instance, 
interpersonal communication or political speeches, in which it is often logical 
to make more frequent use of we-rhetoric. In comparison, FT journalism is 
much more prone to assume a position of an outside observer of events, 
reporting on the actions of others (who did what to whom etc.), rather than 
directly addressing peers. In this sense, journalistic discourse is a form of TEC 
which reproduces actor identities primarily by naming, or identifying, actors 
as protagonists of reported events. Accordingly, the FT coverage constructs 
representations of the Davos forum and its participants, which may shape 
their public image and self-understanding as actors. FT journalism can hence 
be regarded as having an active role in either reinforcing or undermining the 
identification of Davos participants as a transnational elite, as well in shaping 
how this actor identity is being defined. 
In terms of focus and coverage, the FT’s owners, editors and journalists 
seemed to consider the Davos forum and its participants of substantial 
importance during the early 2000s. Along with the daily news reporting from 
the forum, the FT published anticipatory articles before the start of the event, 
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and its annual special section on the world economic outlook was timed to 
coincide with the forum and typically referenced the event explicitly. 
Moreover, from 2008 onwards, the FT began to publish an entire supplement 
– the Guide to Davos – which aimed to familiarise the readers with the Davos 
forum (see Chapter 4.1). Each of the Guides contained an introductory article 
to the annual meeting which described the nature and history of the forum, 
while other articles presented some of the political, economic and social issues 
that were expected to form the central themes of that year’s conference.  
Another set of articles, appearing either in the Guides to Davos or as part 
of the daily reporting from the forum, offered insider looks into the meeting, 
describing how it was organised, how the participants typically used their time 
during the conference and what happened outside the official program. 
Occasionally, there was even some practical information included for the 
attendees of the meeting. Some of the articles, therefore, were explicitly 
directed at the actual Davos participants, even though they may also have 
served the voyeuristic interest of the broader readership. In this regard, John 
Gapper’s article “Davos: your guide to a peak performance” from 2006 was 
suggestive (see Figure 6.1). Its subhead reads “Where to stay, what to wear, 
how to gate-crash the best parties – John Gapper explains how to make the 
most of next week’s World Economic Forum, the annual talk-fest for movers 
and shakers” (A195/2006, JG). Here the apparent message of the first part of 
the subhead – that the article was intended to be a personal guide to those 
attending the Davos forum – was somewhat belied by the need to spell out 
what the event actually is in the latter part of the header. This dual message 
neatly illustrates how the FT constantly played a double role of addressing the 
Davos attendees and mediating debates between them, on the one hand, and 
operating as a window into what takes place at the forum for its broader 
readership, on the other.  
This discursively constructed connection between the FT readership and 
the Davos community will be further discussed in the final section of this 
chapter. For the present discussion, however, Gapper’s 2006 article provides 
an indication of the way in which the FT turned the readers’ attention to the 
Davos forum and thus discursively constructed it as an important event – and 
increasingly so during the 2000s. What justifies the great amount of 
journalistic coverage and commentary on what was essentially considered an 
“annual talk-fest”? The answer apparently lies in the people doing the talking: 
they are “movers and shakers”, and therefore their actions – and, purportedly, 
interactions – have significant repercussions for the FT’s readership. The 
subhead of the 2006 article is hence indicative of the way in which the FT 
constructs a representation of the Davos forum and its attendees as of being of 
high status and influence. 
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Figure 6.1 Representing the Davos forum 
Source: FT Magazine, 21 January 2006, pp. 16–7. 
The power and responsibility of Davos Man 
The 2006 headline was by no means the only association of the Davos forum 
with power and prestige. Other notable headlines included “Power élite at 
Davos set to vie with protesters for attention” (A1/2001); “Davos looks for best 
way to treat the great and the good” (A147/2005); “Leaders look to get back in 
black” (A251/2007); “High and mighty” (A281/2007); and “The world’s 
leaders head for the hills”.104 Such labelling practices that attributed forum 
participants with significance, power and influence also appeared in the body 
texts of the articles. Overall, the notion of elite appeared 58 times in the 
material, and 40 of those occurrences explicitly referred to the participants of 
the Davos forum. The various formulations included the global elite (11 
occurrences), the world’s elite (5), the Davos elite (3), the global business elite 
(2), the global business and political elite (1), the business and policy-making 
elite (1), the ruling elite (1), the elite of the free market world (1), the 
international power elite (1) and simply the elite (7). The Davos forum was 
therefore frequently associated with elite status both in the world as a whole 
and in the sectors of business and politics, and the participants were also 
occasionally represented as the most powerful members of world society. 
The very idea of elites obviously fits poorly with the dominant western 
discourse according to which we live in essentially democratic societies. 
Therefore, when used by FT reporters in newspaper reports and columns, the 
notion of elite often entailed a hint of societal critique. It could easily be 
 
                                                   
104 The latter is a subhead from the cover of the FT’s 2008 Guide to Davos, which appeared on 
22 January. 
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associated with sarcastic or derogative characterisations of the Davos 
delegates, such as “bigwigs” (A304/2008, HS), “the high priests of capitalism” 
(A155/2005, RC), “the great and the good” (A147/2005), “top dogs” 
(A281/2007) and “business and political grandees” (A324/2008, GT), which 
indicate that FT journalists often employed rather pungent rhetoric when 
addressing the Davos community (see section 6.4 below). Thus, even as it 
effectively normalised the prestige and influence of the Davos elite, attributing 
the forum participants with “elite” status could be considered a somewhat 
controversial discursive practice, rendering explicit the unequal power 
relations in the world. In this respect, a much more popular rhetorical practice 
of associating the forum participants with power was to write of global 
“leaders” in the sectors of business and politics: in comparison to the 58 
mentions of elite, the word leaders appeared 362 times in the material. To talk 
about leaders may be considered a much more acceptable and also perceivably 
more neutral identification compared to the notion of the elite. As opposed to 
rendering visible an elite that perhaps wishes to remain unidentified, the 
notion of leaders associated the people at Davos with positive attributes of 
prestige and leadership. Other such characterisations with a more neutral 
tone, which FT reporters used in place of the elite to allude to the power and 
influence of those gathered in Davos, included “the wealthy and powerful” 
(A24/2001, GJ/JoL), “the rich and powerful” (A45/2002), “the 2,000 high-
powered guests from around the world” (A46/2002, HY), “influential men 
with their hands on the levers of the world economy” (A20/2001, Editorial), 
“those at the centre of economic and political power” (A63/2002, RC), “global 
decision-makers” (A308/2008, FG), “powerful people” (A359/2009, JG), and 
the already-mentioned “movers and shakers” (A22/2001, HC; A195/2006; 
A438/2010, GR). 
In sum, the notions of elite and leaders were the most frequent and 
conspicuous among the various representational practices that associated the 
people in Davos with status, power and influence. Indeed, they should be 
regarded as highly suggestive and intentionally-used labels to define what 
unites the people at Davos, especially when contrasted with alternative and 
non-expressive references to forum delegates (160 mentions in the data), 
participants (103) and attendees (22), which do not imply any apparent 
interpretations about the nature and status of those present at the forum.  
In addition to these two alternatives, FT journalists employed another 
notable representational practice when addressing the forum participants. 
This was to label them as the embodiments of “Davos Man”. As mentioned in 
Chapter 2.2, “Davos Man” originated from Huntington’s (1996) notorious 
thesis about the clash of civilizations, where he used it to describe an 
international elite community that shares the political and cultural beliefs and 
values of internationalism, cosmopolitanism and market liberalism (see also 
Huntington 2004). The FT made relatively frequent use of the moniker, with 
Davos Man appearing a total of 38 times in the material (in 22 separate 
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articles) to describe the forum and its participants. Table 6.1 illustrates some 
of the headlines and passages employing the moniker. 
Table 6.1 Appearances of “Davos Man” 
Davos Man takes to the streets of New York (A48/2002, headline) 
It seemed then as though “Davos man”, effortlessly bestriding the twin peaks of business 
and high policy, was master of all he surveyed. But now he – and participants are still 
predominantly men – has come down to earth. (A80/2003, GJ/WH.) 
The future need not be as bleak as Davos Man fears (A110/2003, headline) 
Davos man does not seem to be particularly worried by the business implications of chaos 
in the Middle East. There were 17 sessions at the forum devoted to climate change - and 
just one to global political risk. A debate on “globalisation at the crossroads” considered 
three main threats to the world economy - failed trade talks, financial regulation and global 
economic imbalances. Nobody mentioned the war. (A295/2007, GR.) 
Up here in Davos, in the mountain air, the usual philanthropic suspects have gathered for 
the World Economic Forum. Bono, George Soros and Bill and Melinda Gates are all here. 
One old hand is out of town, however: Bill Clinton, the former US president and 
quintessential Davos man. Davos is a place ideally made for Mr Clinton in his post-
presidential incarnation. He embodies the aspects of the US that are still admired by the 
rest of the world after nearly eight years of George W. Bush. He is eloquent, thoughtful, 
sensitive to inequality and suffering outside US borders and determined to do something 
about it. (A338/2008, JG.) 
[T]hese are difficult times for “Davos Man”, the globe-trotting internationalist who trusts in 
free enterprise, ethical responsibility and the ability of people like him (and her) to improve 
the world. The financial crisis helped to elect Barack Obama, who is more of a Davos Man 
than his predecessor, George W. Bush. Mr Obama's international outlook and background, 
including his school days in Indonesia, would make him at home in Davos (although he is 
not attending). (A359/2009, JG.) 
There are rock festivals and book festivals – and then there is the annual globalisation 
festival, otherwise known as the World Economic Forum in Davos. For the past decade, the 
Davos meeting has brought together big business, high finance and top politics to promote 
and celebrate the integration of the global economy. Whatever their business rivalries or 
political differences, the Davos delegates all agreed that the road to peace and prosperity 
lay through more international trade and investment - globalisation, in short. But this year 
the forum has had to confront a new phenomenon - deglobalisation. The world that Davos 
Man created is slipping into reverse. International trade and investment is falling and 
protectionist barriers are on the rise. Economies are shrinking and unemployment is 
growing. (A412/2009, GR.) 
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As the passages illustrate, the FT occasionally treated Davos Man as a popular 
meme which required no explanation. It could therefore be used in headlines 
as a convenient stand-in for the more ungainly “World Economic Forum” to 
inform readers about the meeting in general. Accordingly, the 2002 headline 
“Davos Man takes to the streets of New York” communicated simply the fact 
that the conference was taking place exceptionally in New York as opposed to 
its traditional location in Davos, and there were no further references to the 
notion in the article. At other times, FT journalists used Davos Man as a 
reference to the forum’s participants. As Guy de Jonquières and William Hall, 
for instance, described the collective mood of forum participants in 2003, they 
noted a “stark contrast” to the “wave of exuberance” of the late 1990s when 
“Davos man” seemed to be “master of all he surveyed” (A80/2003, GJ/WH). 
After the end of the market boom, in other words, the mood of the business 
and political leaders present at the forum purportedly had lowered from the 
earlier heights. In his 2003 column “The future need not be as bleak as Davos 
Man fears”, Martin Wolf made a similar observation about the prevalent mood 
of uncertainty at Davos. Yet, to allay the fears of Davos Man, Wolf addressed 
the forum participants in an encouraging manner, arguing that political and 
economic challenges were far from insurmountable (A110/2003, MW). 
Finally, when Gideon Rachman, in his 2007 column, assessed that year’s 
meeting’s agenda in retrospect, pointing out the scarcity of debates on global 
security issues, he concluded that “Davos man” appeared to have little concern 
about potential new military conflicts in the Middle East (A295/2007, GR).  
In all these examples, the notion operates as a simple stand-in for the 
forum’s participants. Obviously, the term simultaneously conflates the forum 
participants into a single figure with an intentionality, agency and even 
feelings. 105  As when employing the other generalised notions of the elite, 
leaders, delegates, participants and attendees, FT journalists thus frequently 
treated the Davos people as a group and attributed them discursively with 
collective agency. 
At other times, however, FT journalists used Davos Man more 
deliberately, demonstrating awareness of the broader cultural implications of 
the notion and explaining its connotations to the reader. For instance, in two 
 
                                                   
105 Evidently, the obvious problem that the moniker also attributes the forum participants with 
a common gender did not prevent FT reporters from using it. However, as the passages in 
Table 6.1 from Guy de Jonquières and William Hall’s article (A80/2003, GJ/WH), as well as 
from John Gapper’s article (A359/2009, JG) demonstrate, the reporters occasionally made an 
implicit self-referential commentary to express their recognition that this naming convention 
was badly outdated for the times that value gender equality and neutrality. Indeed, due to its 
blatantly patriarchal and even sexist ring, the usage of the moniker occasionally gave the 
reporting and commentary a somewhat critical and gender-conscious tone. Even so, explicit 
and extended and critiques of the Davos forum for its gender bias were not present in the 
material. 
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of his articles published in 2008 and 2009, John Gapper employed the term 
in connection with particular individuals, including three US presidents. The 
earlier of the two texts concentrates on Bill Clinton and develops into an open 
critique of his role and behaviour in support of his wife in the 2008 US election 
campaign. Significant for our purposes is the way Gapper, in the opening 
sentences of the column, associates Clinton with celebrated philanthropists 
due to his prominent role in the Clinton Global Initiative, an annual forum that 
raises funds for development aid (see Table 6.1). Gapper claims that Clinton’s 
public image after his presidency has been positively shaped by these 
philanthropic efforts, making him a “quintessential Davos man”. The main 
traits of this benevolent character are then described in terms of “eloquent”, 
“thoughtful”, “sensitive to inequality and suffering” in the world, “and 
determined to do something about it”. (A338/2008, JG.) Similarly, Gapper’s 
2009 article associates newly-elected Barack Obama with the figure of Davos 
Man and describes the latter t in terms of a “globe-trotting internationalist 
who trusts in free enterprise, ethical responsibility and the ability of people 
like him (and her) to improve the world” (A359/2009, JG). Thus, whereas the 
first text associates the term with certain civilised and enlightened manners, 
the second includes more cultural, political and ideological traits, including an 
international background or lifestyle, an internationalist outlook and the 
promotion of “free enterprise”. In addition, both descriptions include 
references to a sense of ethical responsibility, capacity and willingness to help 
the less privileged. Indeed, the latter passage makes an indirect reference to 
the World Economic Forum’s slogan “Committed to improving the state of the 
world”. Overall, then, the notion of Davos Man, as used by Gapper, implies 
certain cultural dispositions that are purportedly shared by a certain type of 
elite. 
The final example in Table 6.1 is a passage from Gideon Rachman’s 2009 
column “When globalisation goes into reverse” (A412/2009, GR). The article 
tracks what Rachman presents as worrying signs of a “new phenomenon” in 
the wake of the global financial crisis: cross-border trade and investments are 
shrinking, and there is a general shift towards more protectionist policies 
around the world. Putatively, then, the decade-long march of globalisation, in 
the meaning of global economic integration, has suddenly been overturned. 
Rachman’s central idea is to associate the globalisation process with the Davos 
forum, which he characterises as “the annual globalisation festival” that brings 
together “big business, high finance and top politics to promote and celebrate 
the integration of the global economy” (see Chapter 7.2). In this way, elites of 
these three institutional spheres are brought together and embodied in the 
figure of Davos Man. Moreover, Rachman suggests that a globalising world 
has been collectively “created” by those three elites. This effectively attributes 
Davos Man with historical agency: it refers to the leading force actively driving 
global economic integration. “Davos Man”, in other words, implies that these 
elite participants are a united group of people with a common credo and 
shared agency. 
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Employing the figure of Davos Man was certainly not the only way in 
which FT journalists attributed the forum participants with common 
characteristics and shared ideas, thoughts, views, moods and even collective 
actions. After all, the people gathered at Davos were repeatedly assumed to 
share certain perceptions, understandings and even feelings. During the 2001 
meeting, for instance, Guy de Jonquières and John Lloyd reported on how 
“two thousand business and political leaders have been experiencing a 
distinctly ‘morning after’ feeling in Davos” in wake of the recent market failure 
precipitated by the dotcom bubble (A24/2001, GJ/JoL). A few days later, 
Hugh Carnegy reported on the forum debates on global problems, describing 
how the “breast-beating in Davos about the failings of globalisation took on 
the air of a collective confessional” and how “the World Economic Forum 
turned into an unprecedented public expression of guilty conscience” 
(A38/2001, HC). As these early examples illustrate, it was customary for FT 
journalists to treat Davos participants as a united group, ascribing it collective 
beliefs, attitudes, feelings and even a sense of shared fate. Indeed, as de 
Jonquières and Lloyd’s reported in 2001 on the “nervousness” the Davos 
people feel, they referred to worrying macro-economic indicators predicting a 
US, and also potentially an international, slowdown in growth. In this way, the 
Davos elite emerged as a group whose fortunes are collectively determined by 
the ups and downs of the global economy. 
As the previous example indicates, the discursive construction of the 
transnational elite was often closely associated with epistemic work on the 
global economy (see Chapter 5.1). Allusions to “leaders”, “influencers” and 
“movers and shakers” already indicated that Davos participants were typically 
addressed in FT journalism as individuals who have the capacity to influence 
and even control the global political economy through engaging in, directing 
or regulating economic activities. However, presenting Davos participants as 
powerful often served the purpose of criticism. Particularly issues that were 
identified as global problems or crises prompted reporters and commentators 
to look for those responsible and critically address political and business 
leaders for perceived failures. In this regard, the chaos and panic surrounding 
the 2007–9 financial crisis provided a good indication of how FT journalism, 
through the attribution of accountability, normalised elite agency in the global 
economy. As the 2008 Davos forum took place amid great uncertainty caused 
by the on-going turmoil precipitated by the rapid fall of the US financial 
markets, Chris Giles and Gillian Tett recalled a popular event from the 
previous year’s forum in which participants had been put in a dark room: 
The hot ticket at Davos last year was the “dialogue in the dark” event, when 
delegates at the World Economic Forum were plunged into complete 
darkness to experience the loss of sight. This seems an apt metaphor for the 
blindness of the world’s elite to the fragility of the global financial system. 
(A300/2008, CG/GT.) 
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In the passage, Giles and Tett allude to the “the blindness of the world’s elite”, 
implying that decision-makers were unable to prevent the financial crisis 
because they did not recognise and correct, in time, the systemic weaknesses 
of the global economy. For the reporters, the unfolding crisis thus represented 
a failure of transnational elites to properly manage the global economy. 
Nevertheless, as we saw in Chapter 5.2, the financial market crash also 
triggered a set of new issues, from financial regulation to global economic 
recovery, for transnational elites to tackle. Indeed, as Tett (A311/2008, GT) 
reported a day later, “central bankers and regulators” were already discussing 
“what needs to be done next in terms of reshaping the financial system”. From 
this perspective, critiques of “blindness” and of the failure to prevent the crisis 
do not amount to a denial of the economic-political agency of transnational 
elites: when it comes to the FT’s perceptions of transnational elites, failure to 
act does not translate into an incapacity to act with regard to the global 
economy. Quite the contrary, the critiques operated as affirmations of the 
power and responsibility of Davos participants. 
In sum, identifying transnational elites in terms of their influence over 
the global economy is as much a normative as it is a descriptive practice (see 
Abdelal et al. 2009). The various labelling practices and critical attributions of 
responsibility can therefore be interpreted as epistemic work on the 
transnational elite’s normative agency (cf. Alasuutari and Qadir 2016, 11). This 
posits that, as powerful actors, transnational elites must assume a governing, 
or managerial, role with regard to the economy. Accordingly, they do not only 
influence and steer the global economy in their daily decisions concerning 
regulation, investments and monetary and fiscal policies. They also have 
responsibility for broader or longer-term tasks, including the stabilisation of 
the global economy, as well as preventing and solving crises. This “duty to 
govern” (Mitzen 2011, 63) is attributed to those who are seen to have the 
capacity and power to act with regard to global economy. The agency of 
transnational elites, in short, is articulated in terms of protecting and 
maintaining the global economy, and, in this way, the conception of agency is 
associated with certain accountability. 
Representing the liberal-international community 
Allusions to the power and responsibility of Davos attendees can be regarded 
as epistemic work on the paradigmatic level of actor identification (see 
Chapter 4.4): it is about developing fundamental notions concerning the 
possibilities and limits of transnational elite agency in the global political 
economy. However, epistemic work on the transnational elite as an actor 
identity also includes a more pragmatic dimension, concerning their actual 
traits and characteristics. In this regard, besides its allusion to the shared 
agency of Davos participants, the notion of Davos Man is a significant 
discursive convention due to its representative function. This is evident, for 
instance, in the three latter examples presented above in Table 6.1. In these 
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examples, Davos Man alluded to a broad and less than clearly demarcated 
formation which is nevertheless united by a shared cultural disposition, 
political ideology and institutional position. This was an “emerging class” of 
“transnationalists” who are closely involved “in transnational institutions, 
networks and activities” (Huntington 2004).  
Davos forum participants, in other words, are often assumed to embody 
a broader group of people, having a certain representational position with 
regard to a wider transnational elite community whose members share certain 
characteristics. The notion of Davos Man operates in this sense as a kind of 
bridge between the concrete group of Davos participants and the broader idea 
of a transnational elite, allowing the people left outside of the forum to 
potentially develop a sense of similarity, belonging and identification with the 
Davos crowd. Whereas the Davos forum is a reasonably well-defined notion, 
referring to a concrete group of individuals, the transnational elite is 
necessarily a more vaguely defined actor category and identity. Davos forum 
participants operate as a public face to this broader elite, helping to define the 
nature of the elite community and its members. Insofar as the forum 
participants are associated with transnational elite status, their representative 
role, as it is embodied in the notion of Davos Man, enables the readers to also 
potentially identify with the status group. Practical epistemic work on the 
Davos elite, including definitions and characterisations of the group, may thus 
strengthen broader transnational elite identification with implications for 
individual and collective agency (cf. Alasuutari and Qadir 2014, 75). 
A good illustration of how the transnational elite community was being 
practically worked on in the FT, through the summoning of the Davos forum 
as an “imagined community” (Anderson 1991), is offered by a 2004 editorial 
titled “Waiting for Bush to speak unto us”. The editorial anticipated the 
upcoming State of the Union address by US president George W. Bush while 
also weighing on the geopolitical and economic fallout of his administration’s 
policies. Here is the opening passage of the editorial:  
It is a time of trepidation for us all - the great and good or just the rich and 
influential now heading for Davos for next week's World Economic Forum 
- as President George W. Bush prepares to deliver his State of the Union 
address on Tuesday. (A111/2004, Editorial.) 
As can be seen, the editorial begins with a suggestion that Bush’s address 
marks a “time of trepidation for us all”, while defining this “us” as the political, 
economic and social elite that is heading to Davos – including, of course, FT 
editors and correspondents. The passage, in other words, constructs a we-
community of Davos-goers who anxiously await to hear what Bush has to say 
to them. The reason for such collective concern, the editorial argues, is to be 
found in the US foreign policy during the Bush presidency, which the editorial 
associates closely with “the geopolitical ructions of the past year”. Even as it 
concedes certain foreign policy successes, the editorial presents US policies 
under Bush mostly as causes for concern, or even as threats to the Davos 
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community, and particularly to its business contingency. This is because of 
their potentially destabilising impacts on the geopolitical situation and on the 
global economy: while geopolitical upheavals could hamper transnational 
trade and business operations, the US economic policies and the growing US 
budget and trade deficits could well lead to a sudden economic crisis. The 
editorial concludes with an observation that the US policies in all probability 
continue to be dictated by national “self-interests”; yet it also makes the case 
that more “enlightened” policies by the Bush administration are to be hoped 
for in the future. 
In the end, the world can rely on America's “enlightened self-interest”, as 
Colin Powell, secretary of state, has claimed. But let us hope for somewhat 
greater enlightenment this year and in a second term if Mr Bush wins. 
(A111/2004, Editorial.) 
Critical commentary concerning the war on terrorism and other domains of 
the US foreign policy are by no means limited in the FT to this particular 
editorial. On the contrary, US foreign policy is a recurring theme in the “World 
outlook” supplements published each year in advance of the Davos forum. 
Moreover, in the daily meeting coverage, debates over US-related geopolitical 
conflicts occupy a prominent place especially in 2003 (Iraq war) and 2004 
(war on terrorism and Iraq war). While there is little evidence of any radical 
questioning of the more fundamental logics and presumptions that guide the 
West’s approach to international terrorism, most of these articles adopt a 
predominantly critical stance on US foreign policy generally and the “global 
war on terrorism”, in particular. What renders the cited editorial especially 
illuminating, however, is the way it implies a separation between the Davos 
community and the political leadership of the United States: 
[T]here is a question mark over the way the US is fighting terrorism. No 
one can argue with this US priority, which is emphasised by the fact that 
the US is sending John Ashcroft, attorney-general, as well as Dick Cheney, 
vice-president, to Davos. But what they will hear there is growing concern 
that blanket security checks on immigration and transport could seriously 
disrupt trade and business interchange. (A111/2004, Editorial.) 
The passage informs the readers that the US administration is being 
represented at the Davos forum by attorney-general John Ashcroft and vice-
president Dick Cheney. Yet the FT expects that in Davos they will not exactly 
be warmly welcomed. Instead, they will face “growing concerns” about the 
harmful impacts on trade and business of some of the measures adopted in the 
war on terrorism. By discursively juxtaposing the Davos participants and the 
representatives of the Bush administration, the editorial suggests not only that 
the Davos community does not agree on US foreign policies, but also that the 
Bush administration does not represent the community. This implication was 
also typical to other FT commentaries of US foreign policy, which repeatedly 
evoked the Bush administration as a potential threat to business operations 
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and to global economic stability and growth. Moreover, the editorial can be 
read as an implicit acknowledgment of the existence of certain boundaries and 
exclusivity to the Davos elite: despite attending the forum, representatives of 
the Bush administration are perhaps not considered to genuinely be a part of 
the Davos community. 106 
There is a further connotation attached to the Davos forum which is 
present in the quoted editorial. This can be evinced in the way it connects “the 
world” with the “us” of the Davos community: the opening sentence, with a 
reference to “us” and followed by an allusion to the forum, is structurally 
bridged to the text’s final paragraph, where “us” is associated with “the world”. 
Such discursive chains imply a conception of the Davos attendees as 
representatives of “the international community”. This association is further 
reinforced in one of the editorial’s middle paragraphs, which outlines some of 
the Bush administration’s purportedly more positive achievements, 
particularly in the Middle East:  
There is clear progress in parts of the Middle East with a new constitution 
in Afghanistan and the capture of Mr Hussein, though the turning-point in 
Iraq will come only when Washington hands power over to a legitimate 
local government. Libya has confessed to developing weapons of mass 
destruction, which Iran, for its part, has strengthened its treaty 
commitment to forgo. The presence of Libyan and Iraqi ministers at Davos 
will symbolise an end to their countries’ ostracism. (A111/2004, Editorial.) 
In this passage, the editorial considers the Libyan and Iraqi political 
representation at the Davos forum as an indication of the end of these 
countries’ “ostracism”. Attending the meeting, in other words, signals that the 
countries have become recognised members of the international community, 
and their leaders are now included in the international business and policy-
making elite. More generally in the FT coverage, the idea that attending the 
Davos forum signals participation in the international community is implied, 
particularly in the case of non-western leaders of countries that have been 
considered either unfit or unwilling to enter into economic and political 
interaction with the west, or that have otherwise been at odds with western 
powers. Davos thus operates as one forum in which countries and their leaders 
can reclaim their status of being part of the international community. 
 
                                                   
106 The representation of the Davos forum as being staunchly anti-Bush reached its apogee in 
the 2005 forum, when the FT reports on the British prime minister Tony Blair’s speech at the 
forum. Headlined “Blair calls for unity in the face of world challenges”, the story describes how 
Blair “urged 2000 business and political leaders gathered at the World Economic Forum” to 
acknowledge an apparent “evolution in US policy” and “bury their differences with 
Washington” (A179/2005, RC/KG/JT). Indeed, that Blair had to act as an apologist for the 
Bush administration in front of the Davos crowd works as a powerful indication of Bush’s 
unpopularity among the global elite at the time. 
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In this understanding of the Davos community as representative of “the 
international community”, participation at the forum suggests a mutual 
acceptance on the part of the Davos community and the individual. The Davos 
elite must see the leader and the country fit to join the community, and the 
participating leader needs to show willingness to accept the basic principles 
and commitments of transnational elites. Therefore, in the case of the Bush 
administration, the problem was not only that it carried out a foreign policy 
strategy that seemed to threaten the interests of the Davos community. Even 
more importantly, FT reporting suggested that it was a set of values, 
amounting to an entire worldview, which set the Bush administration apart 
from the “us” of the “enlightened” Davos elite. Indeed, as the two previously-
quoted articles by John Gapper from 2008 and 2009 indicated, Bush and his 
international reputation were sometimes quite openly juxtaposed with the 
notion of Davos Man and the values and dispositions it entails (see Table 6.1). 
The idea of the international community that the Davos forum represents, 
operated thus as a reference to a community whose membership is dependent 
not entirely on a position of power but on the willingness of the individual to 
accept and adopt an internationalist outlook and a corresponding set of values 
and policy principles (see also Chapter 1.3). Accordingly, while the Democrats 
Bill Clinton and Barack Obama were characterised as “Davos men” by Gapper, 
Bush was not, implying that not even Western leaders are automatically 
regarded as being part of the community.107 
Communal hierarchies and divisions 
As we discussed earlier, the notions of “us”, “the elite”, “leaders” and “Davos 
Man” condensed the idea that the participants of the Davos forum form a 
group, united by a sense of mutual belonging, privileged status, institutional 
position of power and certain cultural and ideological traits. However, such 
discursive constructions and representations of unity and homogeneity of the 
Davos community were accompanied in the material with frequent allusions 
to its diversity. The heterogeneity of the community was represented, first of 
all, by the various actor categories used by reporters when identifying forum 
participants. They included business leaders, bankers, politicians, central 
 
                                                   
107 International elite criticism of US foreign policy is by no means confined to the FT and, 
putatively, to the World Economic Forum. Gill (1990, 175–6) observes that the Trilateral 
Commission has frequently voiced critiques of US policies. This is because the economic and 
foreign policies pursued by the US administrations have often been interpreted as signs of 
economic nationalism or unilateralism which purportedly harm the general interests of global 
business. Moreover, the Trilateral Commission has often demarcated the boundaries of the 
internationalist community in such a way that leaves the US president outside. This has been 
particularly the case with Republican presidents, whereas many Democrat presidents have 
received much more favourable estimations. 
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bankers, international officials, religious leaders, economists, academics and 
celebrities, as well as union leaders and heads of international NGOs. 
Particularly the routine distinction between the business contingency, on the 
one hand, and the politicians and officials (who are frequently dubbed 
“bureaucrats” or “regulators”), on the other, indicated that, despite the very 
purpose of the Davos forum to bring people into interaction over the two 
institutional spheres, the boundary between the realms of business and 
politics remained an essential feature of the self-presentation and self-
understanding of actors in TEC. Moreover, as suggested by the earlier 
observations concerning the mutual blame game between bankers and 
policymakers in the midst of the global financial crisis (see Chapter 5.2), the 
relationship between groups sometimes appeared to be rather tense and 
characterised by mutual contempt. Observing the way that Bilderberg group 
attendees talked about each other, Richardson and colleagues (2011, 86–8) 
made similar arguments, noting that the discursive boundary-construction 
between the political and business members often involved negative 
stereotypical characterisations of the other group. Yet they also emphasised 
that such boundary-work was contrasted by rhetoric that transcended the 
business–politics divide. When it comes to the Davos forum, the figure of 
“Davos Man” as its key embodiment can be regarded as one such rhetorical 
device. As a symbol of a cosmopolitan internationalist who embraces free-
market liberalism, “Davos Man” makes no assumption about the position of 
the person in the business-policy-bureaucracy triangle. For business leaders, 
in particular, the notion implies capacity and willingness to transcend narrow 
corporate interests and predispose an interest in global questions that do not 
limit themselves to purely “economic” issues. 
For Richardson and colleagues (2011, 91–2), the rhetoric that 
undermined the boundaries between business and politics was reproduced by 
members of the Bilderberg group in the way that they addressed the intimate 
interaction between the public and private sectors as an essentially natural and 
taken-for-granted relationship. Indeed, the rationale for public-private 
collaboration was rarely questioned by them. This can be seen as an indication 
of the way that transnational elite individuals can effortlessly move between 
positions in business and government, which is reflected in their self-
understanding as actors and in how they make sense of the interaction across 
these realms (see Chapter 1.2). That a similar dialectic between boundary-
construction and boundary-transcendence seemed to operate in the FT 
suggests that TEC entails both elements that emphasise the contrasts of these 
two actor identities and factors that undermine them. 
The second major dimension in representing the diversity within the 
Davos forum concerned the nationalities of the participants. State leaders 
typically command public attention at the forum by their presence, and the FT 
often trumpeted their keynote speeches with sizable headlines. Moreover, at 
times FT reporters paid specific attention to certain “country delegations”. Of 
particular interest in this regard were the representatives of the US 
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administration. Indeed, in the absence of the US president, FT reporters 
tended to speculate and inform readers about which members of the 
president’s cabinet would attend the forum. Other countries received more 
sporadic attention. In 2006, for instance, the FT reported that the number of 
delegates from India had leaped to 80 from 30 in the previous year. Jo 
Johnson (A208/2006, JJ) reasoned that the notable increase in attendance 
was part of the Indian government’s carefully-designed PR campaign to 
market the country as “the world's fastest growing free-market democracy”. 
To reward India’s efforts “to dominate the agenda of policymakers, investors 
and the media” at Davos (A208/2006, JJ), FT’s 2006 forum coverage featured 
several articles on India, including reports on its legislative reforms that would 
advance the openness of its markets to foreign direct investment. 
The discursive focus on countries and nationalities was associated, either 
implicitly or explicitly, with hierarchies among the forum’s participants. 
Regarding politicians and national officials, the primary focus of the FT was 
on US, German, French and UK political executives, ministers and central 
bankers, implying that, as political representatives of the world’s “leading 
economies” they were important actors. In addition, as the frequent allusions 
to “emerging economies” in the coverage indicate (see Chapter 5.1), certain 
non-western countries were also considered to be significant. In practice, 
however, the FT’s attention was limited to the political leaders from the so-
called BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China). Accordingly, the FT 
published news stories when Brazil’s Lula da Silva visited Davos in 2003 and 
2005, and members of the Indian delegation, led by finance minister 
Palaniappan Chidambaram, were interviewed in 2006. Moreover, when in 
2009, both China’s premier Wen Jiabao and Russia’s president Vladimir Putin 
gave keynote addresses at Davos, they were front-page news in the FT. 
Representatives of other countries received no such treatment. This 
nationality bias in coverage was compounded where the visibility of members 
of the business contingency was concerned: Wall Street and City bankers, 
executives of well-known western corporations and a few corporate 
economists dominated much of the coverage, even as comments from non-
western business leaders, particularly from China, Japan and India, were also 
part of the reporting.  
Certainly, when it comes to assigning seats in the panels and controlling 
access to the various events at the Davos forum, the WEF organisation itself 
imposed a strict hierarchy among the participants. Delegates were given 
badges of different colours which granted them access to selected sessions 
depending on their status, and similar restrictions applied to the private 
parties organised by bankers and business leaders. FT reporters regularly 
made observations of such unequal treatment of Davos participants in their 
descriptions of the forum, characterising them, for instance, in terms of “status 
games” (A289/2007, GR) and “caste system rules” (A517/2011, GT), or as “a 
masterpiece of dividing and conquering that leaves everybody hoping to 
occupy a better position next time” (A195/2006, JG). These descriptions 
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highlighted that wealth, status, personal contacts and general “importance” 
played an important role in the hierarchical organisation of the social 
interaction at the Davos forum.108  
Significantly, however, through their differential treatment of Davos 
attendees – with a heavy focus on a small number of national leaders, business 
executives, bankers, international officials, economists and celebrities – the 
FT itself effectively reinforced these status hierarchies. As a result, the FT, in 
its representation of the Davos community, reproduced the hierarchy of a 
world as a global political economy, where the most significant individuals are 
western investment bankers, big business executives, US government leaders, 
some European leaders, heads of BRIC countries, central bankers and a small 
number of international officials. Hence the imagined world order remained 
highly western-dominated, even as the highlighting of Chinese and Indian 
politicians and business leaders functioned as an acknowledgment of their 
growing importance. Accordingly, Alan Beattie noted in his 2005 report that 
the “impressive line-up of chief executives from China and India [at Davos] 
underlines where the real future leaders of the world economy are likely to 
come from” (A145/2005, AB). But if the Chinese and the Indian were 
considered to be the leaders of the “future”, the FT’s heavy emphasis on 
western participants was apparently grounded on the assumption that they 
represent the contemporary leaders of the world.109  
Representing the Davos forum in terms of power hierarchies among its 
participants had therefore much to do with the epistemic work on the basic 
ontology of the global political economy (see Chapter 5.1). More importantly, 
the implicit and explicit references to nationalities also presented alternative 
actor identities to that constructed, for instance, in the notions of “the global 
elite” and Davos Man. Indeed, the references to nationalities often implied that, 
far from being a united, transnational or even “non-national” community, the 
Davos forum was divided along national or regional lines. The coverage 
alluded, in particular, to two major rifts that divided the Davos community 
into conflicting groups. The first rift emerged between European and US 
representatives. A 2003 Observer column – a regular feature that works as a 
space for FT reporters to express, anonymously, some of their more sarcastic 
and ironic remarks – commented on a round table organised at the forum to 
address this division in the following manner: 
 
                                                   
108 In a similar manner, Gill (1990, 155) argues how a certain hierarchy prevails among the 
participants of the Trilateral Commission: institutional position, experience and seniority in 
the network determine one’s position in the hierarchy, and accordingly, the top stratum is 
occupied by senior politicians, top bankers and corporate leaders, higher ranked policy 
specialists and influential lawyers. 
109  In this sense, the cultural identity of the discursively constructed transnational elite 
remains, in many ways, western (cf. Richardson et al. 2011, 113–4). 
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Davos is a psychotherapy session for the transatlantic relationship: a 60-
strong round table produced a long list of reasons for the rift, but as its 
rapporteur Phil Condit, Boeing chairman, admitted, reached few solutions. 
It was better at metaphors: Strobe Talbott, Brookings Institution 
chairman, argued: “Europe is Eeyore, somewhat despondent, occasionally 
saying Oh My, Oh My. The US is Tigger, bouncing wildly about to the 
distraction of Eeyore.” (A100/2003.) 
As the Observer column suggests, the existence of certain long-standing, if not 
permanent, disagreements and tensions in the “transatlantic relationship” was 
acknowledged by the Davos forum. Frequently alluded to as “transatlantic 
disputes” or even “hostilities”, the rift was clearly apparent in the years before 
the financial crisis. The column’s citation of Strobe Talbott’s Winnie the Pooh 
references aside, allusions to fundamental philosophical and ideological 
differences between Europeans and Americans were rare in the material. 
Instead, tensions were highlighted with regard to a number of more concrete 
policy issues. When the FT reported on the WTO’s Doha round of negotiations 
on the liberalisation of trade, for instance, correspondents often focused on 
the disputes between the EU and the United States. Transatlantic rifts were 
also associated with questions of foreign policy, culminating in “the spat 
between Europeans and Americans about Iraq” (A137/2004, AB). The policy 
approach to climate change was cited as another area that increased tensions 
in “transatlantic relations” (A253/2007, QP); as was macroeconomic policy, 
where the FT occasionally highlighted differences between Europeans and 
Americans concerning the management of the US trade balance and currency 
exchange rate. Overall, then, “Europeans” and “Americans” were often 
presented at odds with regard to controversial issues in the global political 
economy, reinforcing an idea that the two actor groups were repeatedly in 
conflict with each other. 
The other recurrently appearing rift was located between the United 
States and China. This “Sino-American divide” (A145/2005, AB) played out at 
the Davos forum particularly in FT reports on the debates concerning the 
imbalanced trade relations between the two countries, which had led, over the 
years, to growing trade and budget deficits in the United States and to 
simultaneous large surpluses in China (see, e.g., Bird 2012; Garrett 2010, 32–
4). The FT often presented these “global imbalances” as a threat to global 
economic stability. Moreover, because monetary and economic policies were 
considered to have an impact on these national trade balances, politicians and 
central bankers were held at least partly responsible for the growing 
imbalances. However, there seemed to be little agreement on how to deal with 
the trade imbalance, and, as FT reporters often indicated, the delegates from 
the two countries tended to blame each other for the situation. Alan Beattie 
noted in his 2005 article on the matter, for instance, that while China was 
blamed for keeping its currency undervalued in relation to the US dollar, 
Chinese authorities, including Li Ruogu, the People's Bank of China's deputy 
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governor, responded by saying that “the US should cut its own trade deficit 
rather than lecturing others” (A145/2005, AB). 
Elements of unity 
As suggested by the reporting on the hierarchies and recurring disagreements 
between Davos members, as well as allusions to rifts within the international 
community, the FT-mediated TEC often circulated common-sense 
perceptions of a divided elite, most typically along national or regional lines. 
Thus, the FT coverage did not necessarily assume any unity among 
transnational elites in terms of a sense of belonging, interests or policy 
preferences. As illustrated in the debates on the rivalries and disagreements 
between European, American and Chinese elites, TEC often made sense of the 
international community in terms of national interests and ideological 
divisions. Instead of a common identity of the Davos Man, elite 
communication thus frequently reproduced national and regional actor 
identities. 
However, if references to hierarchies and divisions tended to represent 
Davos participants as divided while reinforcing conflicting actor identities, the 
FT coverage indicated that there were at least three elements in TEC that 
worked to downplay such divisions and reproduced an idea of a united Davos 
community. First, as discussed in the early part of this section, perceptions of 
elite status and position of leadership represented Davos attendees as 
connected in terms of influence, power, prestige and societal significance. 
Second, everyday references to global realities, observed specifically in terms 
of the global economic and political developments, often created a sense that 
those gathered in Davos were united by a common experience. As the reporters 
assessed the world outlooks or described the general atmosphere at the annual 
forum, whether in the context of upbeat expectations or plummeting stock 
markets, what came through was an assumption that everyone in Davos was 
uniformly tied to this common reality. For instance, when Guy de Jonquières 
and John Lloyd described in 2001 how “two thousand business and political 
leaders have been experiencing a distinctly ‘morning after’ feeling in Davos 
this week” (A24/2001, GJ/JoL), they referred less to heavy partying at the 
forum but rather to the general sense of failure and regret among the attendees 
after the spectacular collapse of the dotcom bubble. Rather than indicating 
how the sudden downturn was hurting certain businesses or individual 
political leaders while others might actually benefit from it economically or in 
terms of power, they suggested that the leading international businesspeople 
and politicians had taken a collective blow. Such an argument makes sense 
only if one assumes that a common position of leadership presents certain 
“objective” realities that make the Davos elite a distinct group. From this 
perspective, the market crash represented a collective blow for the Davos 
community because it undermined their credibility and legitimacy as a status 
group and as power-holders, potentially weakening or even threatening their 
Transnational elite as an actor identity 
228 
 
position. Such reporting thus reproduced the conception that Davos 
participants shared a common experience – and even common fate that was 
determined by the turns of the global economy.  
Finally, in addition to a common context of action and a shared 
experience of leadership, Davos participants appeared as a coherent elite 
group with regard to their out-groups in the global civil society. Indeed, the 
conception of a Davos elite united in terms of power, interests and ideology 
emerged in TEC perhaps most forcefully at the turn of the century, when it was 
contrasted with the global civil society movement that took its aim at the 
ideologies and institutions of neoliberal globalisation. The following section 
examines how this social movement was constructed in FT journalism as a 
significant “other” that helped to define the Davos community and the 
transnational elite as an actor identity. 
6.3 The global civil society: coming together in the face 
of an adversary 
As discussed previously, the FT coverage of the Davos forum entailed relatively 
little explicit talk about “us”. Rather than being a label for self-identification, 
Davos participants appeared to be more clearly identified as a group by FT 
reporters who operated as its “outside observers”. Accordingly, the previous 
section made several observations about the constructed unity of the Davos 
elite. When it comes to representing the Davos community, however, its 
character was defined most notably in relation to its “other”. As Tajfel (1981, 
258) argued, the characteristics of one group gain much of their significance 
only in relation to the perceived differences to other groups. The discursive 
construction of collective actor identities therefore relies, to a great extent, on 
relevant out-groups with which to compare the group and define what holds it 
together. In other words, non-elite groups potentially have an important role 
in the definition of what the Davos elite actually is and what it represents. 
In this regard, a significant episode in TEC took place in the early 2000s 
as the Davos forum was publicly challenged by activists and civil society 
groups. This anti-Davos mobilisation was part of the broader wave of 
transnational activism and civil society organisation around the turn of the 
millennium in opposition to the neoliberal globalisation policies of major 
states and international organisations (see, e.g., Hardt and Negri 2006, 215, 
294).110 While its role in halting, for instance, the WTO-led process of trade 
 
                                                   
110 The so-called global justice movement, obviously, had roots in previous social movements. 
The IMF and the World Bank had been targets of civil society protests since the 1980s, mainly 
for their imposition of neoliberal economic policies on debt-ridden developing countries. With 
the liberalisation of trade and investment in the 1990s, these and other international 
organisations were increasingly identified by western labour movements and other civil 
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liberalisation following the Seattle protests in 1999, let alone its success in 
overturning the overall progress of neoliberal globalisation, is debatable, the 
movement certainly had a significant impact on the global public sphere as 
images of protests disseminated in the news media during international 
summits and meetings of international organisations. Indeed, the amount of 
attention civil society movements critical of globalisation were able to garner 
among both elite and mass publics may have been their greatest form of 
influence (see, e.g., Cottle and Lester 2011), promoting public recognition of 
the political nature of economic decisions and agreements reached at these 
elite forums (Teivainen 2012). Arguably, by gaining international media 
attention through conspicuous forms of grassroots mobilisation and protests, 
transnational civil society organisations managed to bring new issues to the 
international political agenda. Policy-making elites, in other words, felt 
pressure to publicly address some of the issues promoted by international 
CSOs and social movements. The agenda at the World Economic Forum also 
began to shift in the late 1990s. From an exclusive concentration on economic 
policy, markets and business matters, the Davos forum moved towards a more 
comprehensive global agenda of political, social and economic issues, thus 
demonstrating increasing recognition of the role of business in broader social 
processes (Pigman 2007; Friesen 2012).  
Besides managing to leave its mark on the issues debated in international 
forums and media, the social movements drew international media attention 
to themselves as a network of civil society organisations and as an emerging 
political force in world society. This is particularly significant with regard to 
the Davos community because the transnational network of NGOs and activist 
groups positioned themselves explicitly as its non-elite counterpart and 
adversary. Accordingly, the World Social Forum (WSF), the movement’s main 
show of force which was held for the first time in 2001, coincided annually with 
the World Economic Forum. Many of the WSF’s communiques presented it as 
an alternative to the Davos forum and in opposition to the ideology and 
interests reining at Davos. In addition, the World Economic Forums of 2001 
and 2002, in particular, were marked by large street protests outside the 
venue, in Davos and New York, respectively.  
In many ways, then, the global justice movement established itself 
publicly as an adversary of the Davos elite. This section observes how the 
global justice movement featured in the FT coverage of the Davos forum and 
concentrates on following issues: how the movement and its critiques entered 
TEC as a topic of conversation; how it was recognised as an adversary to the 
 
                                                   
society organisations as symbols and key institutions of neoliberal globalisation. Towards the 
end of the 1990s, the global justice movement began to represent a transnational coalescence 
of developing country organisations, labour movements and environmentalists who mobilised 
against the threatening social and environmental consequences of the neoliberal policies of 
economic globalisation (see Steger 2009, 197–212). 
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Davos participants; how the FT covered the reactions of the Davos forum to 
this public opposition; and how this juxtaposition between the Davos elite and 
the global justice movement reproduced and defined the transnational elite as 
an actor identity. While a great deal could be written about how the FT 
represents what it typically terms as “anti-globalisation” protesters, here the 
primary interest is in the ways in which covering the movement operates as a 
form of identifying and defining its counter-part: the Davos elite. 
Defined by the other 
As an indication of the global justice movement’s partial success in penetrating 
the barriers of entry into the elite media agenda internationally, the FT covered 
the WSF with correspondents filing reports directly from Porto Alegre, Brazil, 
where the forum was held from 2001 to 2003, and then again in 2005, as well 
as from Caracas, Venezuela, in 2006. Reports on the street protest against the 
Davos forum were published in 2001 and 2002, in particular. During the 2002 
forum in New York, the WSF and street protesters even emerged as the most 
frequent individual topic of coverage with eight stories dedicated to this theme 
(see Table 4.2 in Chapter 4). In addition, several other stories in these years, 
especially on the topics of globalisation and the WEF/Davos elite, featured 
allusions to the civil society critics of globalisation, and the movement 
continued to be acknowledged in the FT up to 2006.  
A 2001 article by Guy de Jonquières and John Lloyd is illustrative of 
various conventions in the FT coverage of the WSF. Titled “To have and have 
not”, the one-page analysis brought together de Jonquières reporting from 
Davos and Lloyd from Porto Alegre, observing how “this week’s annual 
gathering of the world’s elite in the Swiss Alps is being mirrored by an anti-
globalisation forum taking place in Brazil”. Among other themes discussed in 
the article, the reporters noted how the Davos forum had come under strong 
criticism for failing to address global inequalities and how the organisers 
sought to respond to the critique. The article also featured observations of the 
WSF, as well as interview quotes from Bernard Cassens, a senior editor at Le 
Monde Diplomatique, who was one of the main organisers of the 2001 WSF. 
Here are some key passages from the article: 
[At the Davos forum,) mixed feelings have also surfaced in discussions on 
this year’s headline Davos theme, “Sustaining growth and bridging the 
divides”. Stung by criticisms that the forum is just a rich persons’ club, the 
organisers have sought to include more representatives from developing 
countries, who account for half the 400 politicians present. Politicians from 
countries including India, Brazil and Tanzania have bombarded the 
wealthy and powerful with calls for a better deal on trade and investment, 
spiced with accusations of hypocrisy and unfairness by industrialised 
countries. Yashwant Sinha, India's finance minister, berated the “north” for 
a catalogue of sins, ranging from protectionism to luring away his 
country's educated citizens and subscribing to double standards over 
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environment policy. But the most rousing speech so far was by Vicente Fox, 
Mexico's new president, who said more needed to be done to combat the 
spiritual deprivation created by globalisation. “Attempts to sugar-coat the 
current form of globalisation with compensating policies aren't nearly 
enough.” It is debatable how far this year's meeting will bridge the north-
south divide or create a more compassionate public image for a gathering 
derided by critics as a citadel of bloodless capitalism. Some delegates think 
all the talk of inclusive policies and global corporate responsibility will 
evaporate once economic conditions get really tough. Amid all the swirling 
anxieties and uncertainties, one principle at least appears to unite those 
invited to Davos. Even the critics of globalisation accept that the process is 
an inexorable reality. The differences are about how it should be managed 
and the benefits shared. … 
The themes of the World Social Forum are those of the demonstrators of 
Seattle, Washington, Prague and other conferences of the global elite last 
year. They include how to produce and distribute wealth for all; how to 
construct a financial system that will tend to equality; how to “transform 
scientific development into human development”; and how to explore “the 
limitations and possibilities of planetary citizenship” … Mr Cassens, in the 
cool of his hotel cafe, gave some indication of the forum's ambitions. “This 
will now happen every year, like Davos, and it will become bigger and 
better. We will keep opposing the meetings of the global organisations, like 
those of the World Trade Organisation. But we will also build an 
alternative. We are not yet ready to have a definite programme, a ‘little red 
book’. We have modest aims to begin a process.” (A24/2001, GJ/JoL.) 
The first observation to make from the passage, and which is indicative of the 
more general thrust of the material is that, far from ignoring the rising 
momentum of transnational civil society mobilisation at the beginning of the 
2000s, the FT granted them a degree of legitimacy by sending reporters to 
cover the WSF. The paper even introduced some of the movement’s arguments 
to its readers. Similarly, in their 2002 article Raymond Colitt and James 
Harding (A47/2002, RC/JH) acknowledged that the “forum has gained 
international attention and recognition”, citing selected well-known names 
among WSF participants, including Mary Robinson, UN High Commissioner 
for Human Rights, and Juan Somavia, director-general of the International 
Labour Organisation. 
The second notable characteristic of the FT’s coverage of the WSF is the 
positioning of the movement in direct association with and opposition to those 
gathered in Davos. While de Jonquières and Lloyd’s article was somewhat 
exceptional in that it combined lengthy reporting from both events, reports 
from the WSF typically included at least one explicit reference to the Davos 
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forum.111 The journalistic convention of presenting the civil society movement 
in direct confrontation with the Davos forum was underlined by deliberate 
layout choices: practically all reports on the WSF were positioned on the same 
page as and next to the news and reports from the Davos forum, making the 
two groups appear in juxtaposition to each other. Moreover, when interpreting 
the relationship between the Davos participants and civil society, FT reporters 
often explicitly pitted the two groups against each other. As the headline “To 
have and have not” in de Jonquières and John Lloyd’s article suggests, in this 
juxtaposition the global justice movement typically came to represent the 
plight of the world’s poor, while the Davos forum represented the power and 
wealth of the transnational elites. Other characterisations of the split included 
“two sides of the globalisation debate” and “two opposite worlds of economic 
and political thought” (see Table 6.2 below).  
By highlighting the elite-civil society juxtaposition, the FT effectively 
brought attention to how the Davos forum had become a target of opposition 
and critique. Indeed, the 2001 Davos forum was not challenged only by the 
WSF but had also been marred by clashes between local police and street 
protesters outside Davos. In their vivid rhetoric, de Jonquières and Lloyd 
identified some of the arguments of the anti-Davos activists and 
demonstrators, including “criticisms that the forum is just a rich persons’ club” 
and “a citadel of bloodless capitalism”. By highlighting some of the negative 
characterisations of the Davos forum among the critical civil society, the 
reporters thus attempted to explain to their readers why the meeting between 
transnational business leaders and policymakers had become a target of the 
activists’ ire. Another article by Guy de Jonquières and Holly Yeager explained 
that, for its opponents, the forum represented an exercise of power and 
influence “behind closed doors”, amounting to nothing less than “an 
incestuous conspiracy” (A44/2002, GJ/HY).  
Table 6.2 compiles key characterisations with which Davos participants 
were juxtaposed with the civil society movements or the public at large, in the 
coverage of civil society activism. The table also includes some of the 
representations of the global justice movement’s agenda in the material, as 
well as their critiques against the Davos forum. As the various representations 
of the movement indicate, the opposition to the Davos forum was not limited 
to the apparent problems of legitimacy in business and political leaders 
meeting outside of the public view. FT reporters also explained it in terms of 
various ideological, political and socioeconomic dimensions. Accordingly, 
when explaining the aims and agendas of the global justice movement, FT 
 
                                                   
111 It should be noted that the analysis in this section is based on the articles on the WSF and 
the global justice movement which contained a reference to the Davos forum or which 
appeared on the same page with reports and articles on the Davos forum. It is thus possible 
that the analysed material does not contain all the articles referring to the global civil society 
movements that appeared in the FT during the periods of data collection. 
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reporters employed terms such as “opposition to current economic orthodoxy” 
and an “attack on globalisation and the overbearing influence of financial 
markets”. 
Table 6.2 Allusions to divisions, representations of the global justice movement and 
critiques of the Davos forum 
Allusions to divisions “the haves and have-nots” (A24/2001, GJ/JoL) 
“two sides of the globalisation debate” (A31/2001, GD)  
“the powerful and wealthy” and “the powerless and poor” 
(A30/2001, HC/GJ) 
“the divide between global capitalism and its critics” 
(A40/2001, Editorial) 
“the global elite” and “downtrodden masses” (A69/2002, KA) 
“two opposite worlds of economic and political thought” 
(A95/2003, RC) 
“victors of capitalism” and “the losers” (A125/2004, MW) 
Representations of 
global justice 
movement and 
activism 
“challenging the economic world order and its organisations” 
(A14/2001, RC) 
 “attack on globalisation and the overbearing influence of 
financial markets” (A25/2001, GD) 
“against the hegemony of neoliberalism” (A25/2001, GD) 
“opposition to current economic orthodoxy” (A24/2001, 
GJ/JoL) 
“against globalisation and neo-liberal economics” (A24/2001, 
GJ/JoL) 
“critics of globalisation” (A30/2001, HC/GJ)  
“the critics of multinational business and free trade” 
(A40/2001, Editorial) 
“anger at free-market liberalism” (A65/2002, JH) 
“against the concentration of wealth, the proliferation of 
poverty and inequalities, and the destruction of our Earth” 
(A76/2002, RC) 
opposition to “free-market capitalism” (A125/2004, MW)  
Critiques of the 
Davos forum and its 
participants 
“a rich persons’ club” (A24/2001, GJ/JoL) 
“a citadel of bloodless capitalism” (A24/2001, GJ/JoL) 
“worsening poverty” (A30/2001, HC/GJ) 
“an incestuous conspiracy” (A44/2002, GJ/HY) 
“corruption of businessmen and politicians” (A76/2002, RC) 
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With such discursive consolidation of two sides as opposites, FT reporting on 
the WSF indicated that Davos forum participants were facing a new adversary 
who was staging an attack on their personal reputation, the legitimacy of their 
privileged position and the soundness of their policy ideas. The way the lines 
between the two groups were drawn in the FT suggests, in other words, that 
the global civil society of protesters, activists, movements, or simply people 
living in poverty, emerged in TEC as the significant “other” of the Davos elite 
and could thus form a significant element in the development of the 
transnational elite as an actor identity. Civil society opposition effectively 
worked as a way to define certain essential characteristics of what was shared 
by Davos attendees, and in reflection of the representations of this “other”, it 
was possible to define what the Davos elite as a group was about (cf. Tajfel 
1981, 256). Correspondingly, due to the Davos participants’ representative role 
in TEC, the emergence of the global justice movement offered a way to 
articulate the basic beliefs and character of transnational elites as a broader 
actor category. 
In this regard, it is notable that, in its representation of the civil society 
critiques and agendas, the FT acknowledged such things as the “hegemony of 
neoliberalism”, “free-market capitalism” and “economic orthodoxy” as valid 
representations of reality – at least from a particular, non-elite, viewpoint (see 
Table 6.2). In this discourse reflecting civil society critiques, what 
distinguished Davos participants from their adversary was their elite status, 
affluence, decision-making power, access to private negotiations, a pro-
globalisation stance, neoliberal policy preferences, belief in “economic 
orthodoxy” and the active promotion of the power of finance in the global 
economy. The Davos forum thus became discursively constructed as a symbol 
of “free-market liberalism” and “global capitalism”, implying that its 
participants were united by a common set of beliefs and objectives. 
In some respects, the division between “the haves and have-nots” 
reproduced certain positive characteristics of Davos participants, not only 
indicating their consensual and united character but also associating them 
with power, prerogative and elite status. Yet, with the inclusion of social 
movement voices – and the reporters’ interpretations thereof – negative and 
critical conceptions of the Davos forum and its attendees also seeped into TEC. 
While much of the movement’s critique was institutional, structural and 
ideological in nature, thereby directing attention away from individual 
responsibility, part of its rhetoric was directly “anti-elite” in nature. 
Consequently, the coverage of the activist movement introduced critical 
questioning of the moral character of the Davos elite into TEC. As the passage 
above from de Jonquières and Lloyd’s article indicated, the very notion of 
being “elite” now associated negatively with “hypocrisy” and “unfairness”, as 
well as with policies and business practices that exacerbated “the north-south 
divide”. Elsewhere, when citing other concerns of the civil society movements, 
FT reporters also associated the Davos forum unfavourably with global 
poverty, inequality, exploitation and environmental degradation, as well as 
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with corruption and disregard for the plight of the less fortunate. Thus the very 
legitimacy of transnational elites, and particularly their policies and use of 
power, became contested.  
Reclaiming elite identity 
From the perspective of public epistemic work, civil society critiques of 
represented negative characterisations of the Davos elite as actors. The FT’s 
reproduction of anti-elite rhetoric indicated that negative representations of 
the Davos elite, held by “outsiders”, entered TEC. This, in turn, suggests that 
the transnational elites could no longer ignore protests against the social 
consequences of the policies of neoliberal globalisation and the business 
activities of TNCs. As much of these critiques identified TNCs, governments 
and international organisations as the primary agents of neoliberal 
globalisation, they also attributed business leaders, politicians and 
international officials with personal responsibility over the negative social 
impacts of globalisation. The political critique by protesters and WSF 
participants cast the Davos elite in a negative light and questioned both their 
activities and moral character as individuals. As a result, members of the 
Davos forum faced a challenge to their positive self-perception as actors. 
According to Tajfel (1981, 258–9), all groups need to protect the 
collective identity of their members by maintaining their positively-valued 
distinctiveness to other groups. Obviously, the observed allusions to wealth, 
power and elite status would likely serve this purpose; as would negative 
representations of those propagating anti-elite discourses (cf. Patomäki 2010, 
57–9). Accordingly, the expression of highly critical and negative views on the 
Davos elite was somewhat moderated by the way that FT reporters balanced 
them with equally derogative characterisations of the activists. Such attributes 
as “outsiders”, “angry”, “emotional”, “raucous” or simply “anti-“ effectively 
served to reproduce typical elite media practices of representing activists 
through negative stereotypes and characteristics. In addition, FT reporters 
occasionally framed the critical characterisations of Davos participants 
essentially as negative stereotypes that were intentionally formulated by the 
protest movements to garner support for their own cause. Therefore, rather 
than something that should be taken seriously, the negative characterisations 
were sometimes made to appear more like populist and intentional public 
image constructions by the opponents of the elite.  
Yet the public attacks against Davos participants could not be shrugged 
off merely as publicity stunts. Instead, the FT coverage suggests that civil 
society critiques prompted transnational elites to reflect on their own role as 
actors in world society. The following passages from the FT’s 2001 editorial 
titled “Global business”, published a day after the closing of the 2001 Davos 
forum, illustrates some of this identity-work: 
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The water cannon has become an uncomfortable symbol of the divide 
between global capitalism and its critics. At the World Economic Forum 
that ended in Davos yesterday, armed police kept the protesters at bay. But 
the generalissimos of big business did parley with their more respectable 
critics. That is good. However, the Davos forum should be much more 
careful to distinguish business objectives from the wider interests of the 
liberal market system. There is far too great a tendency to think that what 
is good for big business (rightly understood) is also good for the global 
economy and the people who toil in it.  
The business leaders listened to the pleas of African heads of state. They 
heard a call from Vicente Fox, Mexico's president, for an attack on world 
poverty. Some joined Kofi Annan, the United Nations secretary-general, in 
a campaign to involve more businesses in the infrastructure problems of 
the developing world. Others debated electronically with assorted idealists 
and romantic revolutionaries at a rival conference in Brazil. Such self-
criticism is welcome, especially if it promotes philanthropy or enlightened 
business practices. So are attempts to create a dialogue with the critics of 
multinational business and free trade. (A40/2001, Editorial.) 
The editorial sums up and comments on some of the main developments 
during the 2001 forum, including the violent clashes between police and street 
protesters, and the “parley” the members of the Davos forum had with 
representatives of the WSF. It also marks the appearances of African leaders, 
president Fox and Kofi Annan at Davos making “pleas”, launching “attacks” 
and campaigning in favour of the world’s poor. Indeed, the FT’s interest on the 
global justice movement in 2001 and 2002 coincided with a heightened focus 
on the appearances of political representatives from the developing world at 
the Davos forum. As the earlier-quoted 2001 article by Guy de Jonquières and 
John Lloyd already indicated, the Davos forum had answered to civil society 
critiques by inviting some 200 politicians from the developing world, and they 
had used the opportunity to present critiques on the unfavourable terms of 
international trade and investment.  
Similarly, in another article, Hugh Carnegy noted how “Africa has gained 
an unusually high profile in Davos” in an effort to “blunt criticism” over the 
forum’s alleged disregard of “inequalities in the world’s economy”. In this case, 
the critique was not attributed so much to the social movements and 
protesters. “Africa’s frustration over the shortcomings of globalisation” was 
instead voiced by Benjamin William Mkapa, Tanzania’s president. (A22/2001, 
HC.) He was joined by Thabo Mbeki, president of South Africa, who presented 
an economic policy plan at the forum, to save Africa from “poverty and chaos” 
(A15/2001, VM). The concentration on Africa was complemented with broader 
issues of poverty, inequality and global divides. In this respect, Lionel Barber 
and Hugh Carnegy reported on the speech by Vicente Fox, president of Mexico, 
and described it as “a clarion call for the world’s poor” that had been “greeted 
with enthusiastic applause” from the forum’s attendees (A23/2001, LB/HC). 
A repeated message in these public calls by the forum participants was that the 
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demonstrators’ fears and critiques concerning globalisation must be 
addressed by governments, international organisations and businesses, and 
by the entire Davos community. Instead of undermining the critique, the 
forum participants seemed to join it by raising some of the concerns of the 
global justice movement within the meeting itself. 
The rise of the civil society movement thus prompted the Davos forum to 
address some of the problems of globalisation. As the FT emphasised in the 
2001 editorial cited above, public criticism encouraged Davos participants to 
engage in some self-critical reflection regarding their own responsibility in 
tackling those problems. The editorial, however, also voiced some scepticism 
regarding some of these reactions and presented a critical look on the 
promotion of corporate social responsibility as the way to solve the problems 
of “global capitalism”. The paper argued that, instead of portraying themselves 
as working in the general interest of the world’s population, transnational 
business leaders should make it clear that “since their job is to make money, 
their embrace of wider social objectives is fundamentally for self-interest and 
not from benevolence”. Thus, even as the editorial expressed its faith in “the 
liberal market system”, which had “brought huge benefits to the world”, it also 
acknowledged the dangers of business-led globalisation and recognised the 
need to curb the excessive power of business.  
A 2002 editorial titled “Global warnings” continued along similar 
themes. This time the paper assessed the state of the globalisation debate. The 
editorial presented many of the arguments of the movement critical of 
globalisation, arguing that the activists and protesters who are concerned 
about the “marginalisation of the poorest countries” and who make demands 
for “reducing poverty, “investing in development” and more equitable 
capitalism “deserve a hearing”. Noting that the protesting organisations 
enjoyed widespread popular support, the editorial concluded by arguing that 
“business and government leaders at the WEF must engage to show that the 
system they represent can deliver prosperity for all”. (A55/2002, Editorial.) 
Together, the two editorials indicated a marked shift in the agenda of 
both the Davos forum and TEC more generally. Instead of ignoring or 
downplaying the issues highlighted by civil society, such as global poverty and 
inequality, the Davos forum demonstrated a degree of awareness of their 
importance. The editorials also implied that political leaders and transnational 
business executives partly acknowledged their power and responsibility in the 
face of these global problems. As a whole, the FT coverage of the global justice 
movement demonstrated the awareness of international business and 
policymaking elites about civil society criticism against their own role in world 
society. Thus the paper brought an element of self-critique into TEC. 
In addition to adopting, or co-opting, the global justice movement’s 
critiques of neoliberal globalisation, attempts to incorporate the civil society 
itself into the Davos process formed part of the forum’s response. Accordingly, 
the WEF increased the number of invited NGO participants in the annual 
meeting, thereby giving them a chance to meet business leaders and 
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policymakers and to participate in the panels on such issues as climate change 
and development. Moreover, during the 2001 forum Geoff Dyer reported on a 
teleconference debate between representatives of the WSF and the Davos 
forum (A31/2001, GD), and Raymond Colitt reported on how “behind the 
scenes, representatives of multilateral agencies and corporations on one side 
and protestors on the other have been working to establish a dialogue” 
(A63/2002, RC). Such allusions to inclusion and dialogue were thus additional 
elements in the coverage regarding the response of the Davos forum 
participants to their civil society adversaries. 
Overall, the ability to be self-critical, and the willingness to respond to 
and establish dialogue with the critics of globalisation emerged as key 
character traits of Davos participants in FT-mediated TEC. Through actions 
and expressions of their capacity to search for mutual understanding with 
their adversaries, business executives and political leaders demonstrated their 
compassion and virtuous character. These representations thus effectively 
countered the civil society critiques that defined Davos members as a self-
interested elite working against the interests of the world’s poor. Indeed, as 
the Davos forum showed its readiness for acknowledging responsibility and 
addressing the problems of poverty and inequality, a juxtaposition between 
the interests of the poor and the rich was rendered irrelevant. In his 2002 op-
ed, Kofi Annan, the UN Secretary General, argued as much in an attempt to 
justify his personal attendance at the gathering of “the glitterati and the global 
elite”.  
Many people are asking me why I have agreed to attend the World 
Economic Forum this year. Some even seem to think that by doing so I align 
myself with the glitterati and the global elite, turning my back on the 
downtrodden masses who - in these people’s eyes - are the victims of 
globalisation. If anything, the opposite is true. I see the forum as an 
opportunity to address that global elite on behalf of those downtrodden 
masses: on behalf, especially, of well over 1bn people in today's world who 
are living without enough food to eat, without safe water to drink, without 
primary schooling or healthcare for their children - in short, without the 
most basic requirements of human dignity. Personally, I do not believe that 
those people are victims of globalisation. Their problem is not that they are 
included in the global market but, in most cases, that they are excluded from 
it. But it is up to the global elite - to business and political leaders from the 
more fortunate countries - to prove that perception wrong, with actions 
that translate into concrete results for the downtrodden, exploited and 
excluded. (A69/2002, KA.) 
With the globalisation protests and the perceived rise of an anti-elite 
sentiment, close relations with the Davos elite seemed to be a burden to all 
those who wished to present themselves as the defenders of the “have-nots” at 
the beginning of the 2000s. This even included Annan who chose to defend his 
participation at the forum. Far from downplaying the significance of the Davos 
forum as a gathering, or the extent to which power is concentrated into the 
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hands of a small elite group, Annan’s text developed into a validation of 
transnational elites as a powerful group of people that may well work for the 
interests of the masses. Certainly, Annan demanded that transnational 
companies “take the lead” in mobilising “global science and technology to 
tackle the interlocking crises of hunger, disease, environmental degradation 
and conflict”. Yet his key message to the critics of neoliberal globalisation was 
that inclusion in the “global market” was in the benefit of the global poor. 
Consequently, Annan implied that the business executives and political 
leaders at Davos were on the right side of history when promoting global 
economic integration. The Davos forum could now present itself as a defender 
of the poor. There were no longer grounds for outlining a fundamental divide 
between the interests of “the global elite” and those of the “downtrodden 
masses”. 
In sum, as civil society critiques entered TEC, they reinforced the sense 
that transnational business executives and political leaders were somehow 
responsible for global problems, such as poverty and inequality, as well as 
failing to improve the living conditions and opportunities of the world’s 
majorities. This conflict between the protesters and the elites, which 
reproduced negative views on the Davos elite, was played out in the FT 
coverage of the WSF. However, as Davos participants demonstrated their 
willingness to take responsibility and address civil society concerns, the elite’s 
interests needed no longer be contrasted with those of the masses. On the 
contrary, the chosen set of policy prescriptions would ensure that the pursuit 
of liberal market policies of globalisation contributed to the benefit of all. The 
division between transnational elites and civil society ended up being 
interpreted as an unfortunate rift, not something inevitable but based on anti-
elitism, misunderstandings and lack of dialogue. The solution thus reinforced 
the possibilities for a positive identification with transnational elites. 
Public challenge and transnational elite identity 
To summarise the preceding analysis, the beginning of the 2000s was 
characterised by the reproduction of transnational elite identity in the 
representations of its significant out-group, the global civil society. The 
transnational network of activists explicitly addressed the Davos forum and 
identified its participants as a transnational elite by positioning itself clearly 
as its adversary. The Davos forum and some of its participants reacted to this 
public critique in several ways, including public interventions that addressed 
of some of the movement’s concerns. The Davos forum also extended more 
invitations to civil society organisations to participate in the forum. Through 
these forms of engagement, a mutual recognition emerged between the Davos 
elite and the civil society representatives of the WSF. Arguably, such public 
confrontation served to reinforce the collective identity of both groups and, 
consequently, the period of public protests by the transnational civil society 
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provided valuable insights into the substantive content of the transnational 
elite as an actor identity. 
In addition to its influence on the international policy agenda, the 
transnational civil society has an impact on public awareness concerning 
global politics and power. By selecting international organisations and forums 
as their primary targets, instead of individual nation-states or governments, 
the global justice movement helped to create a deeper sense of the 
concentration of the transnational exercise of power. In tandem, it brought the 
global political and economic elites under a new kind of critical scrutiny. The 
movement identified the existence of a certain group of institutionally 
powerful people behind the neoliberal restructuring of the global economy. As 
the street demonstrations and WSF gatherings coinciding with and addressing 
the WEF annual meeting indicated, the Davos elite appeared to the protesters 
as the main driver of neoliberal globalisation that the movement opposed. In 
this way, the Davos elite represented the single most important adversary for 
the global justice movement.  
In the FT-mediated TEC, a clear-cut division emerged between the Davos 
forum and the WSF, as well as between the social groups they represented. The 
perceived and self-proclaimed opposition of the transnational civil society 
against the Davos forum thus discursively reproduced the transnational 
business and policymaking elite as a unified group. In the FT, the civil society 
mobilising that addressed the WEF became part of TEC, and in that sense FT 
reporting on the global justice movement turned into a conversation about 
transnational elites themselves. The FT coverage of the global justice 
movement was thus especially relevant for its contribution to the construction 
of the transnational elite identity.  
In their study, Bennett and colleagues (2004) examined the 2001–2003 
coverage of the World Economic Forums and World Social Forums in the New 
York Times, analysing how well journalists enabled open deliberation on 
globalisation between the two groups. Their observations concerning the 
relative marginalisation of the global civil society actors in terms of access and 
recognition as compared to the privileged position of the WEF participants in 
the coverage corresponds with much of the analysis in this section regarding 
the FT’s coverage of the two forums. Yet there is also a marked difference in 
this analysis and the conclusions made by Bennett and colleagues regarding 
the relevance of the increased debate on global inequalities prompted by the 
rise of civil society mobilisation. While taking note of the growing focus on 
activist issues at the Davos forum, Bennett and colleagues (2004, 450–1) 
regarded this shift more as an attempt to improve the public image of the 
forum and the elites than as a genuine move towards engaging their critics to 
open dialogue. Thus they concluded that the New York Times effectively 
turned into a vehicle of the Davos forum’s re-branding campaign.  
In my view, however, the shift in agenda can also be seen as prompting a 
change in the Davos elite’s self-conceptions. By its emergence as a recognisable 
collective actor and explicit orientation as an opponent of the Davos elite, the 
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global justice movement helped reinforce the sense of togetherness among 
them. It operated as the most significant “other” to the Davos group; one that 
most clearly identified it as a transnational elite and hence potentially 
contributed to the development and strengthening of its collective identity. 
Nevertheless, as Michael Barnett (1999, 9) pointed out, collective identities are 
potentially contingent because they are dependent on the interaction with 
others, as well as the changing contexts within which this interaction takes 
place. Accordingly, when the issues to be addressed change, this also inevitably 
changes the perceptions of what is important to the people debating them.  
Following Barnett’s insights, It was precisely due to this relational aspect 
of identity formation that the global justice movement was so significant for 
the reproduction and definition of the transnational elite as an actor identity. 
Due to the movement’s public critiques, the Davos forum could no longer 
ignore problems of neoliberal globalisation. Instead it had to somehow 
address these problems and thus to demonstrate global consciousness and 
responsibility for solving them. This willingness and ability to “interact” with 
the other potentially reinforced and strengthened the self-understanding of 
transnational elites – but the interaction also potentially, and partially, 
transformed that identity.  
Instead of merely “re-branding” the forum, elite journalism as a form of 
intra-elite communication thus participated in reproducing and redefining the 
transnational elite as a collective actor identity. Through the construction of 
the division between the Davos elite and transnational civil society actors, the 
FT strengthened the (self-)awareness of the Davos forum participants as a 
powerful group that shapes global processes. In the process, the identification 
of the Davos people as “the global elite” was imbued with both positive and 
negative connotations. On the one hand, elite status related to power, 
influence, prestige and privilege, rendering the identity attractive and 
something to strive for. On the other hand, the notion was stained by 
connotations to greed, hypocrisy and self-interestedness, being against the 
poor and having contradicting interests with the world’s majority.  
In the face of such challenge to the transnational elites’ self-identity, 
there was a demand for the reinforcement of positive self-representations. 
These took the form of representations of self-critique, openness to complaints 
from the outsiders, as well as the willingness and ability to respond to such 
criticism. Dialogue with one’s adversaries emerged as a particularly relevant 
response and trait of the elite and contributed significantly to repairing the 
damages done by the protesters to the self-image of transnational elites. Such 
demonstration of respect despite differences in opinion forms one of the key 
norms in the behavioural code of transnational elites, as does the ability to 
present one’s views in a constructive, non-confrontational manner 
(Richardson et al. 2011, 55, 118). These kinds of diplomatic skills emerged here 
as a quality and a natural disposition that distinguished transnational elites 
favourably from their adversaries. 
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6.4 FT journalism and transnational elite identification 
In the previous sections of this chapter, we have seen how Davos forum 
participants referred to ”us” when addressing their peers; how FT reporters 
represented forum members as an elite group and normalised their collective 
actorhood in the figure of the Davos Man; and how the FT coverage of the 
global justice movement as the significant “other” helped to define the 
characteristics of the Davos elite. All these discursive practices can be 
interpreted as contributing to the identification of Davos members as a 
collective agent, thereby exemplifying the kind of public epistemic work which 
allows transnational elites to make sense of themselves as actors. Yet while the 
focus thus far has been on the representation and identification of the Davos 
forum participants as collective agents, the purpose has not been to argue that 
the actor identity of the transnational elite is necessarily restricted to them. 
Nor should the representations of Davos participants be regarded as an 
indication that the forum members somehow form a unified group. The aim 
has been rather to observe how addressing Davos participants enables, in a 
more general sense, the identification and definition of transnational elite 
agency. From this perspective, the figure of the Davos Man ought to be seen as 
a representative of a broader transnational elite, defining its principal 
characteristics. 
Newspapers, television and other forms of mass media have an 
important role in reproducing collective identities and reinforcing a sense of 
belonging to large communities whose members do not personally know each 
other (e.g., Anderson 1991; Risse 2010). A relatively small number of elite 
actors tend to dominate international media publicity, and therefore they play 
key roles in the ”imagined communities” that form around business media 
outlets and publications. From this perspective, the FT’s coverage of the 
annual Davos forum gains further significance. The forum is an event during 
which Davos participants, through the FT, speak to the broader elite 
community of international business and politics. As much as this 
communication involves the dissemination of ideas and arguments, it also 
includes an implicit invitation to the readers to accept the economic, political 
and ideological leadership of Davos participants. Moreover, even while the 
average readers of the FT, typically international business executives, 
professionals, policymakers or officials, are unlikely to obtain personal access 
to the highly exclusive crowd of the Davos forum, they may still identify 
themselves in many ways with the ”Davos community” and make sense of their 
own position and agency in society in relation to the Davos elite. Through its 
representative role, the Davos elite may render the transnational elite an 
attractive actor identity. 
While leading businesspeople, politicians and international officials 
occasionally publish columns and op-eds in the FT in order to directly address 
the paper’s elite readership, most of the time the journalists operate as the 
gatekeepers in the FT-mediated elite interaction. In other words, reporters act 
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as the primary mediators of the ”quasi-interaction” (Thompson 1995) that 
takes place between the Davos elite and the FT’s readers. The FT offers a 
window to what happens at the Davos forum, as well as to the actions and ideas 
of its participants and enables an imagined connection between the readers 
and the elite contingency that gathers in Davos. The transnational elite as an 
actor identity potentially emerges precisely in this self-reflection and self-
identification of the FT’s readership as it enters into quasi-interaction with 
Davos participants (cf. Reilly 1999). At the same time, given the role FT 
journalists play in mediating the communication between the Davos elite and 
the paper’s readership, the ways in which journalists represent the forum and 
its participants have major significance in shaping this connection.  
Accordingly, this final section of the chapter takes a closer look at how 
FT journalism operated as a mediator between the Davos people and the FT’s 
broader readership. The focus is on how the journalists related to the Davos 
forum participants and how their discursive practices, when reporting from 
the forum, invited readers to adopt certain subject positions in relation to the 
Davos elite. As Hartley (1982, 87–8, 93) and Fowler (1991, 232) have pointed 
out, the news media have particular ways of addressing their audience based 
on the characteristics they assume their readers, viewers and listeners to have. 
In the process of trying to appeal to their audience, editors and journalists 
construct an ideal reader or viewer and tend to support their positive self-
identification. Accordingly, the readership of the FT may be understood as an 
imagined community insofar as the readers are invited to understand 
themselves as part of a group of like-minded peers that are connected by 
occupation, status, experiences, economic circumstances and political 
challenges. Starting from the premise that the Davos elite fulfils a 
representational role, forming a basis for and defining the key features of the 
broader transnational elite as an actor identity, the aim is to inquire to what 
extent FT journalism potentially fostered positive identification among its 
readers with Davos participants. 
Unmasking the Davos elite 
Let us start with a passage from the introductory article “Davos: your guide to 
a peak performance” by John Gapper, which was already referred to at the 
beginning of section 6.2. As the headline indicates, Gapper wrote the article to 
an imaginary attendee of the Davos forum. This is how it begins: 
You have got the invitation. You are one of those noble folks with a social 
conscience and an important job who wants to make the world a better 
place. Alternatively, you are joining a sinister club that plots global 
domination from a small Swiss village. Whatever. You are going to Davos. 
So here is the lowdown. First, they hold the World Economic Forum half-
way up a mountain. That is no problem if you own a private plane or can 
hire a helicopter to get there (for guidance on the latter, see the programme 
you have been sent). Just make sure that, once you reach Davos, you also 
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rent one of those silver chauffeur-driven Audis or BMWs that swish around 
with snow-chains on their tyres. You can't afford any of that? Oh dear. Well 
then, get a plane to Zurich and catch the train to Davos.  … 
If you have made it to Davos, the Platz/Dorf thing is a significant clue as to 
the days ahead. Platz is, socially and geographically, the top end of town. 
It has the conference centre and the hotels where most of the social events 
and drinks parties are held. ... [I]f you are in Dorf, you will probably feel 
like a second-class citizen who has been barred from the top table. This, you 
will find, is the essence of Davos: there are circles within circles and elites 
within elites. An invitation to attend only gets you on to the first square of 
the board. (A195/2006, JG.) 
The article goes on to provide tips about some of the most interesting events, 
presentations and parties at the forum. Thus, even as the article purports to be 
a guide, it in fact offers an insider view on what goes on during the meeting to 
those not attending. As we can see from the quoted passage, Gapper addressed 
a Davos-goer whose actual wealth and institutional position he did not know. 
Accordingly, he presented various alternatives for the means of travel and the 
place to stay – and, later in the article, for the panels and parties to attend to 
– according to the wealth, status and personal connections of the presumed 
reader of the “guide”. By distinguishing more than one “yous”, the article 
therefore implied that many of the Davos participants are not, or do not see 
themselves as, particularly wealthy, powerful or important. Still, it is notable 
how, even as the various allusions to being deprived of top status tend to invite 
the reader into the position of an “ordinary person”, Gapper also undermined 
this effect with his reference to feeling “like a second-class citizen”, which has 
a strongly ironic tone. This implies a recognition that even the “first square of 
the board” at Davos is inhabited by “elites”. Moreover, further in the article, 
Gapper described how the social stratification at the forum invites not so much 
scorn at the constant status competition it causes; it rather tends to make 
attendees try harder to succeed in that competition. The article thus implied 
that hierarchies are natural and elite status is something to strive for. Indeed, 
barring another unmistakably ironic reference to a “sinister club that plots 
global domination”, Gapper never implied that there should be anything 
questionable or undesirable about being “elite”. 
The notion of a sinister club, of course, plays with the popularly-known 
conspiracy theories surrounding the Davos forum and other private gatherings 
of international business leaders and policymakers. Notably, however, what 
directly precedes this conspiracy theory reference in the passage above is an 
allusion to what could be termed as the semi-official narrative promoted by 
the Davos forum itself. Indeed, the suggestion that the reader is “one of those 
noble folks with a social conscience and an important job who wants to make 
the world a better place” is a rather direct reference to the forum’s official 
motto “Committed to improving the state of the world”, and captured in this 
definition, then, is essentially the figure of the Davos Man (see section 6.2 
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above). By contrasting the image of a conspirator with that of the Davos Man, 
both described in equally witty terms, the passage implies that both of these 
figures are essentially myths that should not be taken seriously. While perhaps 
higher in terms of their wealth, social status and the importance of their “jobs”, 
Davos participants are no more noble and socially conscious than the FT’s 
reader. 
In this way, Gapper’s irony disclaimed and even ridiculed the “moral 
conception of the elite” apparent in the Davos forum’s official rhetoric, which 
effectively serves to legitimise the power and influence of the elites on the basis 
of their virtuous moral character (cf. Mills 1956, 13–5; see Chapter 3.4). The 
text can thus be interpreted as a form of unmasking the elite which deprives 
the Davos people from their moral superiority of character, bringing them 
down to earth and onto the same level as the “rest of us”. From this perspective 
it is notable how, beyond the observed passage, the employment of irony and 
sarcasm, which at times borders outright sneer or ridicule, was a feature that 
recurred with striking frequency in the FT coverage of the Davos forum. This 
practice could already be witnessed in some of the labels FT reporters used to 
address forum participants (see Section 6.2): “the great and the good”, “high 
and mighty” and “business and political grandees” all come across as attributes 
that ironically over-emphasise privileged position and moral virtuousness. 
John Plender’s allusion to “big business plutocrats [who] gather in Davos”, in 
turn, can be seen as an outright insult, particularly when connected to his 
assertion that “they should not forget why they are among the world’s least 
loved people” (A149/2005, JP).  
Sarcastic commentary extended to the reporters’ descriptions of what 
takes place at the forum. The following Observer column, a regular feature of 
the FT that allowed reporters to write commentary in a particularly witty 
manner from the cover of apparent anonymity, works as a good illustration. 
Titled “Alpine spirit”, the headline makes use of a familiar talking point at the 
forum known as the “Davos spirit”, which refers to the collegial, friendly and 
confidential atmosphere that purportedly rules at the forum and distinguishes 
it from other elite meetings of transnational scope. To give the notion an ironic 
twist, the column makes light-hearted mockery out of the “spiritual” events in 
the 2005 programme while throwing gibes at individual companies and 
attendees: 
Davos Man does have a soul, too. Take Thursday, when he could spend the 
afternoon at a three-hour workshop led by Benjamin Zander, conductor of 
the Boston Philharmonic orchestra, and his wife, Rosemary, which 
promised to “offer decision-makers new ways to transform their personal 
and professional lives”. Then there was an hour-long “celebration of faith” 
led by a motley assortment of leaders representing all points on the 
spiritual spectrum: from the Grand Mufti of Bosnia to Chief Arvol Looking 
Horse, spiritual leader of the Bigfoot Riders. Next came a dinner that 
promised to “define the characteristics and stages of personal reinvention” 
with the likes of musicians Peter Gabriel and Lionel Richie; Betrand 
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Piccard, the round-the-world ballooner; and the author Paulo Coelho. 
Observer was too occupied with weightier concerns to attend, but hopes at 
least someone from Shell took the opportunity. One irony is that Jose Maria 
Figueres, the former Costa Rican president who as former co-chief 
executive of the WEF helped devise the programme, was unable to attend. 
He resigned last October after admitting receiving Dollars 900,000 for 
consulting services to a French telecoms firm, which he did not disclose, and 
could do with a makeover. (A188/2005.) 
Observer columns, and other short features like the Davos Digest and People 
columns, were convenient spaces when FT reporters sought to present some 
witty commentary on the forum and its individual participants. Moreover, as 
the example suggests, the marketing discourse and pseudo-psychological self-
help rhetoric which colour some of the more esoteric sessions in the Davos 
forum programme, offered easy targets for such witticism. Such commentary 
invites readers to shake their heads in amused disbelief at the apparent 
marketing balderdash and, at the same time, at the vanity or even naivety of 
the Davos delegates who purportedly attend these sessions. They thus speak 
to an imagined readership of level-headed and rational people, who can see 
through marketing rhetoric and can only wonder what place spiritual self-
enhancement has in a conference dedicated to the “weightier concerns” of 
international business and politics. 
Aside from topic-related sarcasm, these columns often worked as spaces 
for throwing gibes at Davos participants involved in personal and corporate 
scandals. The closing remarks of the quoted Observer column make reference 
to the scandal that involved the World Economic Forum in 2004, when Jose 
Maria Figueres had to resign from an executive position in the organisation 
over a failure to disclose his full earnings to Costa Rican tax authorities. Earlier 
in the column, another swipe is directed at Shell, which was also embroiled in 
a recently-erupted scandal, when it was uncovered that the company had 
overstated its oil reserves.112 Such innuendos were a recurring feature in the 
coverage in the early 2000s, in particular, when a series of corporate scandals, 
including most famously Enron, Arthur Andersen and Parmalat, tarred the 
reputation of several business leaders. 
In addition to irony and sarcasm, FT reporters used other textual means 
to effectively unmask and reveal the “true” character of Davos participants. 
The most conspicuous of such journalistic practices was the presentation of 
observations concerning various rhetorical strategies and image management 
pursuits that the forum and its participants purportedly engaged in. When 
quoting or commenting on people at the forum, FT reporters often described 
what they saw as intentional measures by organisations or individuals to build 
 
                                                   
112  The ensuing investigation led Shell eventually to pay over $400 million in fines and 
compensation to shareholders in 2007. 
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or maintain a positive public image. Concerning the forum as a whole, the 
annual list of participating organisations and individuals was typically 
interpreted in a frame of public relations management as, for instance, 
business leaders and companies embroiled in scandals cancelled their 
attendance or were scrapped from the list. Similarly, when the Davos forum 
extended invitations in the early 2000s to international NGOs as a response 
to the heightened civil society critique against the meeting, FT reporters 
interpreted this as an effort to “appear” to be in dialogue with broader society. 
Similarly, when the forum organisation decided in 2003 to hand out a smaller 
amount of gifts and freebies to attendees, as well as to tone down the official 
final gala of the meeting, FT reporters interpreted this as an attempt to signal 
acknowledgement of the “hard times” and hence to counter the image of the 
annual gathering as a party for an uncaring elite distanced from reality.  
Concerning individual organisations and leaders, FT reports occasionally 
suggested that company executives used the Davos forum for PR efforts, such 
as corporate greenwashing, or that political leaders came to Davos for public 
image construction purposes. Moreover, instead of simply reporting the views 
of their interviewees, FT journalists often added their own interpretations 
about the hidden agendas behind the statements. They would imply, for 
instance, that their interviewees were simply repeating their institution’s 
official talking-points, or they would explicitly characterise a panel speaker’s 
remark as an intentional public display of a certain stance (rather than 
revealing the true views of the speaker). To some extent, such explicit 
disclosure by FT journalists of the PR strategies and intentional practices of 
image control appeared to “deconstruct” these actions. By bringing out the 
purportedly true intentions and motivations behind the public performances 
of the Davos delegates, reporters tended to diminish the perceived sincerity 
and credibility of the elites, while, of course, reinforcing the sense that the 
reporters themselves were keeping a critical and analytical distance to the 
elites they were reporting on. 
Personal gibes and inferences about hidden motives were obviously in 
stark contrast to the ordinary news reporting from the forum which was mostly 
cleansed of such personal opining and in which speakers and interviewees 
were referred to in ways that worked to reinforce their esteem, credibility and 
importance as decision-makers and influencers. Observed in this broader 
context of news reporting, the practices of mocking and questioning the Davos 
participants can be interpreted as a kind of discursive counter-balance to the 
official rhetoric. It effectively functions as a way to symbolically degrade the 
powerful by the less powerful. As such, these rhetorical strategies work as an 
indirect form of acknowledgment of the power and importance of the Davos 
elite. There would, after all, be no point in ridiculing a nobody. 
Finally, aside from the various practices of sarcastic commentary and 
unmasking of the Davos elite’s image management strategies, the FT 
expressed more direct and issue-specific critiques against Davos participants. 
In these cases, critical commentary was not prompted by corruption or other 
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personal blunders, but was instead directed at the performance of politicians, 
officials and businesspeople as holders of important office. A 2005 editorial 
titled “Davos’s poverty of leadership”, for instance, criticised the forum 
participants for avoiding discussions on difficult issues: for a meeting that was 
billed “Taking Responsibility for Tough Choices”, the editorial argued that 
“tough choices were thin on the ground”. It maintained how “leadership is 
about making tough choices, and there is not enough leadership around” when 
it came to making “hard trade-offs” concerning, for instance, the costs for 
businesses from efforts to slow down climate change. (A186/2005, Editorial.) 
Again, the critique presented here can be regarded as a form of 
unmasking in the sense that it directs attention to the contradiction between 
the favourable image that the forum attempts to give of itself and the reality as 
perceived by the paper. Moreover, the editorial’s criticism of the lack of 
leadership offers an illustration of the way the entire Davos community 
becomes negatively implicated on the grounds of its allegedly subpar 
performance in global economic governance. As the global economy is 
perceived, in TEC, to be in a state of nearly constant uncertainty and instability 
(see Chapter 5.1), Davos participants were typically judged based on their 
ability to individually and collectively make decisions that would improve the 
market situation and prevent the threats from materialising. Consequently, 
economic crises and market shocks, when interpreted as results of failed 
decisions on the part of business enterprises, regulators and policymakers, 
demonstrated the incompetence of these global decision-makers. In such 
interpretations, the blaming finger of FT journalists often pointed to 
individual decision-makers or a certain elite contingency, and occasionally the 
critique was also directed collectively at the Davos elite. 
Distancing and familiarity 
Through their various forms and practices of unmasking criticism of the Davos 
forum and its participants, FT reporters reproduced typical features of 
political and business journalism, which is often expected by practitioners and 
audiences alike to maintain critical and analytical distance to those in power 
(Carpenter et al. 2015; Hellmueller and Mellado 2015; Mellado 2015). Doyle 
(2006), for instance, interviewed business and financial journalists, including 
journalists working for the FT, and discovered that all of them emphasised the 
“need to retain a critical distance in relation to corporate sources” (ibid., 439). 
Indeed, even as the simultaneous need to secure future access inevitably 
moderates journalists’ capacity for criticising the powerful, FT reporters, due 
to the importance of their publication among international business media, 
may be especially well-equipped to perform an independent watchdog role 
with regard to corporations and political leaders (ibid., 440). 
In terms of regulating the quasi-interaction between the reader and 
Davos participants, these journalistic practices of distancing and criticism may 
have significant repercussions for the FT’s potential promotion of elite 
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identification among its readership. Describing the forum and its events in 
ironic tones, FT journalists often invited readers to set themselves apart from, 
if not above, the apparent balderdash that the participants engaged in at the 
forum. References to certain esoteric events at the forum, in particular, tended 
to represent Davos participants as a starry-eyed or even naïve bunch and 
emphasised the virtues of level-headedness and rationalism. Describing status 
hierarchies implied the vanity of those at the top, and naming forum attendees 
with certain derogatory labels, associated with their status as “the elite”, even 
invited the reader to adopt a certain anti-elitist position.  
It should be noted, however, that this stance is not to be confused with 
populist anti-elitism: FT journalists seldom positioned themselves directly 
against the elites or spoke on behalf of other social groups or the general public. 
On the contrary, when making anti-elitist remarks, the reporters often made 
sure to also marginalise and ridicule populist viewpoints. The previously-
observed passage from John Gapper’s article is an illustrative example. After 
summarising, in an ironic tone, the self-promoted image of the cosmopolitan 
Davos Man, Gapper offered, as its polar opposite, the notion that the Davos 
forum is a “sinister club that plots global domination from a small Swiss 
village”. Both views were obviously not meant to be taken seriously by the 
reader, and thus the civil society movements’ criticism of the Davos forum as 
a form of elite networking and interaction that reproduces unequal power 
relations in world society became effectively associated with deluded 
conspiracy theories. As the example suggests, anti-elitist rhetoric tended to be 
used not so much to outline a populist perspective but rather for stylistic effect, 
and in order to discursively occupy a certain middle ground between the 
uncritical adoration and cynical denouncement of the Davos elite. 
More generally, the expression of sarcasm directed at Davos forum 
participants, as well as the use of derogative labels to address them, clearly 
indicated that FT journalists were aware of the critical public perceptions that 
exist about the World Economic Forum, of its reputation and of its symbolic 
significance for many counter-hegemonic groups. But there was a marked 
difference between the general tone of FT commentary and civil society 
critiques: the way FT journalists employed derogative labels when referring to 
the Davos elite was far from the kind of cynical condemnation or angry ridicule 
one could witness in a citizen protest during a global summit or in a 
publication of an anti-elite group. In contrast, the FT’s sarcasm was light-
hearted and took mostly a form of insider-jokes and friendly jabs at individual 
Davos participants, or the entire Davos community. 
The unfavourable notions of the Davos elite that were reproduced in FT 
journalism, can in fact be interpreted as a levelling strategy that was used to 
bring the most celebrated and prestigious members of the transnational elite 
to the same level with the paper’s readers. In a sense, this discursive practice 
of levelling fits well with the notion of the economy as a separate social sphere 
as it is articulated in TEC (see Chapter 5.1). Indeed, the modern imaginary of 
the economy has traditionally been associated with an anti-elitist position and 
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the notion of equality: in the sphere of the economy and markets, all actors are 
regarded as equals (Taylor 2004, 74). Through its practices of “unmasking” 
the Davos elite, FT journalism effectively played to this market ideology of 
equality by encouraging its readers to perceive themselves as equals to those 
gathering in Davos. However, far from the position of a “common person”, the 
self-perception thus promoted was one of a level-headed business executive, 
policymaker, official or professional who is well capable of reflexive and 
critical scrutiny of the business leaders and policymakers gathering at Davos 
but who does not hold any deep suspicion towards, or grudge with, these 
world-societal elites.  
Viewing FT journalism as a form of intra- or inter-elite communication, 
in which both the readers and the elite sources of coverage perceive themselves 
as belonging to the same class or community, the displayed irony and sarcasm 
can even be interpreted as a form of reflexive self-deprecation (cf. Reilly 1999, 
220). Far from denouncing its objects and creating a sense of otherness 
between the Davos elite and the readership, it may rather promote a sense of 
familiarity and closeness. Such sense of familiarity could be reinforced, for 
instance, by the correspondents’ occasional deviation from the usual practice 
of formal address when referring to Davos attendees. Particularly in the 
Observer columns and other short commentaries, the reporters occasionally 
took the liberty of using only first names or well-known nicknames of the 
Davos people they wrote about. In this context of intimacy, even harsh and 
insulting labels, such as a “plutocrat”, could be interpreted as an instance of 
friendly mocking. Similarly, regular allusions to various image-control 
strategies by interviewees and organisations may be understood not so much 
as a form of deconstruction or as an establishment of critical journalistic 
distance, but as an implicit confirmation of the unwritten rules of the game in 
business and politics as they are conducted in the public sphere. From this 
perspective, the coverage contributed to a sense that the Davos people, the 
journalists and the FT readers were all aware of a certain representative 
function of transnational elites and their public performances. The need to 
hide one’s true intentions when speaking in public was a natural part of the 
game, and the Davos participants, the journalist and the readers were “in it 
together”. 
Adding to the discursively-constructed sense of affinity between the 
readership and Davos members, FT journalists occasionally explicitly 
expressed their own identification with the elite. This took place through the 
use of similar “we” rhetoric that was already observed in the quotations of 
Davos participants themselves (see Section 6.1). As the previously-observed 
editorial from 2004 indicated, FT editorials, in particular, made use of the 
notions of “we” and “us” to identify the paper with the Davos community or to 
create a sense of a broader international elite community (see Section 6.2). 
Moreover, as the following closing passage from a 2007 column by Martin 
Wolf illustrates, at least some members of the FT’s editorial staff did not 
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perceive any contradiction in identifying themselves with the perspective of 
the world leaders they reported on:  
This year's “Davos dilemma” - the contrast between the world’s favourable 
economics and troublesome politics - is clear enough. But its resolution is 
not. A range of possible outcomes, from the perverse and catastrophic to 
the uncomfortable and even benign, is conceivable. The outcome is not 
inevitable. We can choose. We have a duty to make the right choices - to 
choose co-operation over conflict, and, as Tony Blair put it, openness over 
turning one's back on the world. The time to choose is now. (A297/2007, 
MW.) 
In the column, Wolf took a look back on some of the main themes of debate in 
the 2007 meeting and articulated four alternative near-term scenarios for the 
global political economy. As was customary to FT journalism in general, and 
Wolf in particular, the narrative was about a future full of uncertainty and risks 
of varying size and immediacy: from “perverse and catastrophic to the 
uncomfortable and even benign”, all options were on the table as far as short-
term global political and economic developments were concerned. Yet, as Wolf 
often liked to emphasise in his columns, what ultimately determined the 
“outcome” was political leadership, or even better, collective action on the part 
of the international elite community. “We can choose”, he argues in the 
passage above. The employment of “we” can here be interpreted as Wolf’s 
appeal to collective responsibility (“we have a duty”). The implication is that 
readers should identify themselves with the columnist as fellow members of 
the international elite community, and think and act according to the 
preference outlined by the author. Aside from Wolf, such an explicit evocation 
of an international elite community was occasionally displayed by Gideon 
Rachman and other columnists, as well as by FT editorials, when presenting a 
more or less articulated political demand or moral argument. 
Overall, then, despite various discursive strategies of establishing critical 
separation from Davos participants, there were several discursive practices 
through which FT journalism made it possible for readers to identify with the 
Davos community, albeit in a self-reflexive manner. This entailed observing 
the community analytically, and even critically, but at the same time having a 
sense of being in many ways part of it. Even as the way FT editors and reporters 
addressed and wrote about the forum and its participants occasionally 
presented the Davos crowd in an unfavourable light, the prominent discourse 
did not reproduce the kind of anti-elitist rhetoric which would create a 
distance, or a sense of mutual otherness, between the readers and Davos 
members. On the contrary, the promotion of familiarity and the use of “we” 
rhetoric suggested that a potential identification with the Davos elite, and a 
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sense of belonging to an international elite community, could well be 
reinforced in TEC with the aid of FT journalism, and not in spite of it.113 
Weak and strong identification 
This chapter has been guided by the assumption that communication in the 
forums and media of transnational elites shapes the collective self-perceptions 
of its participants. As suggested in the previous sections, reinforcing a sense of 
a group or community, naming the community and its members, and 
formulating ideas about the characteristics that its members share are key 
elements in the practical epistemic work on actor identities. Obviously, 
different forms of communication have different ways of reinforcing collective 
identification and a sense of belonging. The FT as a mediated and journalistic 
form of TEC addresses and forms a relationship with a broad readership 
community, assuming that its members share certain traits. The discourses 
reproduced and disseminated in the FT thus invite readers to adopt certain 
subject positions. 
The principal focus in the chapter has been on the ways in which 
identifications of the Davos forum participants as a group or community were 
expressed in the FT’s coverage of the forum. The underlying idea here is that, 
due to its prevalent public profile, the Davos forum forms an important object 
of elite identification. Being invited by the World Economic Forum to 
participate in the annual conference is an important recognition of an 
individual’s status and, as the preceding analysis suggests, attendance at the 
forum generally symbolises membership in an international elite community. 
Consequently, Davos attendees assume a certain representative function as a 
public face for a broader international elite. The public narratives of the Davos 
forum shape understandings of what the transnational elite community is like, 
 
                                                   
113 This positive identification with the Davos elite may be an important element in the success 
of the wealthiest 0.1 percent of the population to continue to gain the public acceptance of 
their wealth and power among the wider elite of “ordinary” business leaders, politicians and 
bureaucrats. Freeland (2012, 80–4) argues that, historically, the “merely rich” in the Unites 
States have closely identified with the “very rich”.  Yet tensions among the elites may be 
growing as the richest 0.1 percent have pulled far ahead of the “merely rich” over the past 
several years. The richest 0.1 percent, after all, are a very small minority (in the world, there 
are just 1810 US dollar billionaires in 2016, according to Forbes.com) which is highly 
dependent on the support of the richest 0.9 percent below them – especially as the 99 percent 
may be increasingly turning against them. In this respect, a sense of familiarity, a perception 
of fundamental equality that is part of the economic imagination, and an identification with 
the status and actorhood of transnational elites may well work as key ideological factors that 
undermine any sense of a fundamental conflict of interest between the wealthiest and most 
powerful groups in world society. 
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who belongs to it and what its position in the world is. In this representational 
role, the Davos Man emerges as a recognised, ideal-typical embodiment of the 
transnational elite, alluding to its unity and defining the shared character 
traits of its members. Accordingly, as the FT covers the Davos forum and 
constructs representations of the Davos Man, the transnational elite as an 
actor identity is indirectly defined. This association of Davos delegates with an 
international elite may have at least two possible effects. On the one hand, it is 
possible to imagine the Davos elite as one particular elite group among others. 
On the other hand, it makes it possible for the FT’s readership to form an 
imagined connection with the Davos elite and to identify themselves in its 
public image. The Davos community thus serves as an object of potential 
identification for the FT’s readership. By bringing its readers into a quasi-
interaction with the Davos forum delegates, FT journalism invites its readers 
into the subject position of the transnational elite. 
The discursive construction of the transnational elite as a collective actor 
identity involves labelling and defining people who share certain common 
characteristics. This obviously has the effect of concealing any differences and 
divisions between the members of the group. In this regard, it should be noted 
that representations of Davos participants as a single group were by no means 
a dominant feature in the material. On the contrary, a frequent practice in FT 
journalism was to draw attention to the existence of separate groups among 
the people gathering in Davos, such as business leaders, bankers, politicians, 
bureaucrats, economists and celebrities, without presuming any unity or 
groupness of the forum participants as a whole. Dividing the participants 
along national lines or into country blocs, such as Europeans or corporate 
leaders from emerging countries, was another habitual practice in the forum 
coverage. This is not an unexpected finding considering that reifying countries 
and country blocs as actors in the international sphere is a typical practice in 
international political and economic news reporting. The news value, after all, 
often lies in the actions that certain elite actors take in relation to others. While 
a detailed quantitative analysis of the occurrence of various actor groups in the 
material was beyond the scope of this study, it was probably more an exception 
than a rule that the journalistic focus turned on the actions of the Davos 
community as a unified group rather than on its professional or national sub-
groups. 
Accordingly, the transnational elite as an actor identity that is 
epistemically worked on in TEC must necessarily co-exist with other actor 
identities. In some ways, the transnational elite can be perceived to exist in 
opposition to various other available subjectivities. When, for instance, 
differences between “Europeans” and “Americans” are emphasised (see 
section 6.2 above), or policy discussions on the financial markets are narrated 
in terms of struggles between “bankers” and “regulators” (see Chapter 5.2), the 
readers are invited to accept such actor categories as mutually exclusive – and 
to choose their side. However, besides being in a contradictory relationship, 
the actor identity of the transnational elite can also be perceived in a 
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relationship of mutual reinforcement with these alternative subject positions. 
In fact, the very meaning of the transnational elite as a subject position 
presupposes the existence of these other elite positions: to be transnational 
elite, one must (already) be a national political leader, a central banker, an 
international business leader, a high official of an international organisation, 
a renowned private sector economist and so on. The transnational elite may 
thus operate as an umbrella category, which covers and brings together a 
number of alternative subject positions. 
The strength and significance of the transnational elite as an actor 
identity should not be overestimated. Collective identification does not 
automatically follow from any objectively existing similarities in the class or 
status position, social background, lifestyle or other characteristics of 
individuals (Brubaker and Cooper 2000, 19–20). What is required for a shared 
identity of a transnational elite to develop is that a person’s self-understanding 
becomes partly articulated in terms of being a member of the group.114 This 
potential sense of belonging to a transnational elite is, obviously, just one actor 
identity among others that international business leaders and policymakers 
may experience and perform in their interactions with others. People typically 
identify with multiple groups (Held 2002; Pries 2012), which tends to 
relativize and diminish the significance of any one actor identity.  
More generally, it has often been argued that, in (late) modernity, 
identities are increasingly “reflexive” and therefore more consciously and 
“independently” constructed by individuals (e.g., Giddens 1990, 32–3, 52–5, 
75–80; Taylor 2004, 54–5).115 In her discussion on the European identity, 
Cathleen Kantner (2006) argues that strong collective identities are rare in 
modern societies. By this she means that collective identities do not usually 
involve recognition of shared interests. They are therefore “weak” in the sense 
that while people may acknowledge their membership in a group that exists 
for a cooperative enterprise, they do not develop a sense of ethical 
commitment to the group. Therefore, the “weak” collective identity does not 
significantly diminish the extent to which the individual pursues her “own” 
goals and desires. The motive for cooperation derives from the pursuit of 
individual interest rather than from a shared, ethically-motivated project. In 
 
                                                   
114 The notion of identity development points to the processual nature of a person’s self-
understanding: while the notion of identity refers to a set of ideas that are relatively stable 
over time and make an experience of personal continuity possible, it is not to be understood 
as a totally fixed or unchanging element of the personal self (see Berger and Luckmann 1967). 
115  However, as Matthew Adams (2003) points out, this should not be interpreted as an 
argument that culture and society no longer play a role in the construction of the self and 
identity. Quite the contrary, individuals are always socially embedded and they learn their 
identity in an interaction with others: only within these social frameworks may we then learn 
to be individuals (Taylor 2004, 64–5). 
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contrast, individuals entertaining a “strong” collective identity cooperate with 
other group members out of a sense of a common good and collective interest. 
Kantner (ibid., 513) assumes that such strong collective identities usually 
relate to communities into which individuals are born and raised. Yet she also 
acknowledges that people may decide to come together and form new 
communities in the pursuit of a common project. 
Kantner’s classification of “weak” and “strong” collective identities rests 
on a sharp distinction between individual interests and collective goals and 
seems to reproduce a rather simplistic dichotomy between a personal identity 
and a collective identity. There seem to be little reason to take for granted such 
separation between a person’s ideas about herself and her interests as an 
individual and as a member of a group (Bicchieri and Muldoon 2011; Turner 
1999, 28–32). On the one hand, conceptions of personal identity are 
inextricably tied to language, conversation, communicated ideas and 
comparisons to others, and therefore social relations and groups always 
influence the way personal identity is experienced (Berger and Luckmann 
1967, 172). On the other hand, one seldom thinks about oneself purely as an 
individual and not in terms of a certain collective identity or a social role. 
Therefore, as Haslam and colleagues (2011, 54) argue, identifications based on 
group membership are as much expressions of the self as the so-called 
personal identity. Accordingly, many studies in social psychology indicate that 
people describe themselves at least as often in terms of collective identities as 
they do by references to the personal self (Onorato and Turner 2004). Such 
views tend to undermine the relevance of arguments concerning the 
increasingly “independent” construction of identities and “individual” 
interests as suggested by the theoretical accounts of reflexive modernisation. 
There are many reasons to assume that groups influence the way their people 
perceive themselves and their personal interests. 
Despite these reservations, Kantner’s distinction between “weak” and 
“strong” collective identities is suggestive and can be regarded as ideal-typical 
ends in a continuum. Accordingly, we can assume that actor identities may 
exist to varying degrees of strength and stability. Through time, a certain actor 
identity can lose or gain in force in relation to other, competing, identities. 
National identity, for instance, has not only become an almost ubiquitous 
phenomenon globally, but it has also in many places gained strength in 
relation to local, religious, ethnic or class identities, thus becoming more 
powerful as an integrating and organising element on a societal level (Smith 
1991). In the case of the transnational elite, the increasing identification of 
international business leaders and policymakers to this actor category would 
not necessarily have to mean that their sense of national identity would 
consequently disappear. Indeed, there is no reason to assume that 
transnational elites would become “non-national” or entirely disembedded 
from national relations, culture and feelings of national belonging. The 
strengthening of the “post-national” elite identity would imply, however, that 
there are more and more contexts of interaction and decision-making in which 
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global decision-makers perceive themselves as members of a transnational 
elite instead of members of national community (cf. Held 2002). 
Consequently, it would reinforce feelings of loyalty towards international elite 
peers, increase the sense of obligation to follow the perceived dominant norms 
and values of transnational elites, and provide particular guidelines for 
making sense of the environment in which they act, of their position in the 
world, as well as of their available alternatives of action. The transnational elite 
as an actor identity, in other words, would gain strength as a regulative force, 
both cognitive and affective, in the sense-making and decision-making of 
business leaders and politicians. 
The analysis in this chapter has been limited to an inquiry into the 
potential of transnational elite identification in the FT-mediated TEC. 
Observing how the transnational elite as an actor identity is defined and 
represented in association with the Davos forum participants, the analysis has 
merely indicated the presence of that actor category as a potential subject 
position or object of identification. As such, the analysis has provided few 
indications regarding the strength or weakness of this actor identity. 
Obviously, beyond labels and characterisations, there are a number of factors 
that can serve as a basis for the formation and strengthening of collective 
identification within a group, including (perceived) proximity, similarity, 
positive interdependence, cooperative interaction, shared interests or threats, 
or a common history, fate and culture (Risse 2010, 25–6; Turner 1999, 15). It 
could be argued that, in the case of transnational elites, many of these 
prerequisites remain decisively weak, particularly when compared to the sense 
of proximity and similarity among national elites provided by similarities in 
their class backgrounds, upbringing, education, working life, career paths and 
associational life (Mills 1956). Even as international business and policy elites 
often share many traits, hailing from upper class families, sharing similar 
education backgrounds and adopting mobile lifestyles approximating 
something of a transnational elite culture, the differences in national contexts 
and the relative scarcity of day-to-day interaction may hinder the creation of a 
sense of proximity and similarity among transnational elites.  
Conversely, compared to larger segments of people, the relatively small 
number of elite individuals may make it significantly easier for them to create 
transnational group identities (cf. Risse 2010). Indeed, the mobility and ability 
to establish connections over geographic distances increase the likelihood of 
transnational elites creating forms of trans-local and transnational 
togetherness (Patomäki 2010, 71). In addition, as Mills (1956, 281–3) argued, 
the similarity of the social background is not in itself a necessary requirement 
for the appropriation of shared world-view and values. Elite circles 
themselves, through their selection criteria and constant testing and vetting of 
prospective new members (see Richardson et al. 2011, 119–20), tend to create 
what Mills called “a quite homogeneous social type”. 
Thus, and despite the above-mentioned hindrances and limitations, 
there seem to be no insurmountable obstacles for transnational elites to 
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develop a sense of group membership. However, for the transnational elite 
identity to become an increasingly important factor in shaping the agency of 
business leaders and policymakers, it needs to maintain and strengthen its 
appeal (cf. Tajfel 1981, 256). Accordingly, the growing significance of the 
transnational elite identity can be seen to be dependent on its capacity to 
define values, goals and ideals that appear to the members of the group as 
attractive, binding and perhaps even self-evident. In this regard, Kantner 
(2006, 516) argues that in-group debates, particularly around important 
policy issues that bind the group together, are conducive to the reinforcement 
of a collective identity. Indeed, rather than being grounded in explicit naming, 
a group identity may be more effectively reproduced in communication in 
which certain issues are presented and defined as shared problems and a 
common perception of social reality is negotiated. From this perspective, the 
major identity-building power of the FT and the Davos forum is connected to 
their character as platforms on which members of transnational elites can 
convene and address each other. By facilitating debates around issues that 
matter to its readership, the FT can be seen as contributing to a potential 
collective identification among transnational elites. The next chapter observes 
some of these more indirect ways in communication that may work to 
construct shared ideas of the group and its members, reinforce collective 
identification and foster a sense of belonging to a transnational elite. 
7 THE GLOBALISING ELITE: VALUES, 
IDEALS AND SOCIAL PURPOSE 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the development of the transnational 
elite as an actor identity enhances the potential for collective agency among 
those who identify with this subject position. At the same time, the discursive 
articulation of an actor identity is closely associated with specific ideas of its 
collective agency. In its public manifestations in FT journalism, transnational 
elites effectively are what they do. These ideas of conduct can be regarded as 
not only descriptive but also prescriptive, articulating certain values and ideals 
which (ought to) guide elite agency. Developing and negotiating such shared 
values and ideals about what is good and desirable can be regarded as a key 
dimension in the epistemic work that takes place in TEC (cf. Alasuutari and 
Qadir 2014, 76–7). Moreover, as Christine Korsgaard (2009, 20–1) points out, 
identity should not be seen as merely a set of prescriptions or principles for 
action, but also as “a role with a point”. Accordingly, the transnational elite as 
a collective actor identity contains more than just normative prescriptions of 
agency, or the dos and don’ts of being elite. There is also the broader idea of 
social purpose that should be analysed. Indeed, as Freeland (2012, 71–2) 
argues, elites tend to feel the need to see themselves as progressive forces in 
society – and, crucially, in the globally-oriented minds of the elite, this no 
longer means so much acting locally or even nationally, but globally. 
In the FT coverage of the Davos forum, the formulation of normative and 
value-related prescriptions of agency is closely associated with the debates on 
the global economy. As observed in Chapter 5.1, the elite ontology of the global 
economy involves structures and abstract processes but also social activities 
based on human intentions, expectations, understandings and psychology. 
Consequently, the ontology of a socially-embedded global economy paves the 
way for a normative conception of agency, outlining ideas about what agents 
in the global economy do, or ought to do. Yet, the FT agenda also includes a 
wide array of issues that are not necessarily directly related to the core, 
traditionally understood, economic concerns. Accordingly, the Davos elite are 
presented in a way that sees them concerned with a broader set of questions 
than merely those that are immediately related to the bottom line. These 
“extra-economic” values and ideals call for elite agency that serves a greater 
good and advances the interests of humanity as a whole (cf. Richardson et al. 
2011, 74–5).  
This chapter observes this epistemic work on the guiding values and 
ideals in TEC. The analysis here is specifically informed by the notion of “social 
purpose”: it assumes that in formulating certain values and ideals, FT 
journalism articulates what elite decision-makers of global business and 
politics should do and, at the same time, fosters a sense of social and historical 
purpose. As prescriptions for action, elite values and ideals thus define certain 
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desirable social and political objectives in the global economy and world 
society. The chapter begins with a discussion on two key values and ideals 
associated with the global economy, growth and freedom, which together 
translate into the policy objective of liberalisation. Subsequently, the chapter 
moves on to examine how the elite’s social purpose in world society is 
articulated in terms of globalisation and cosmopolitan commitments. The final 
section of the chapter observes how the changing political-economic realities 
after the global financial crisis  impact on the epistemic work on these political 
objectives. It also discusses how the idea of ”globalisation consensus” is used 
rhetorically to appeal to the transnational elite’s sense of common purpose in 
the face of growing disagreements and divides. 
7.1 Economic growth and freedom 
The growth imperative 
In terms of specific values and ideals, perhaps the most important objective in 
the global economy is to secure continued and uninterrupted economic 
growth. As a capitalist system, the global economy creates a constant demand 
for growth, and this “systemic thrust” (Fraser 2014, 57–8) to accumulation is 
strongly reflected in TEC. Accordingly, as already observed in Chapter 5.1, 
growth was a ubiquitous notion in the coverage with 695 total appearances in 
the material, indicating the high degree of its naturalisation as a self-evident 
value and objective. However, we also observed that the global economy was 
often articulated in terms of a fragile system in which the stability of growth is 
constantly at risk. Business and policymaking elites were expected to act upon 
various opportunities and challenges to ensure continuous growth. From this 
perspective, the FT’s yearly coverage of the Davos debates amounts to a 
representation of the shifting emphases in the elite agenda on how to fulfil the 
growth imperative. An editorial commenting on the 2006 Davos forum 
debates on the global economic prospects offers a good example of the way in 
which growth tended to be naturalised as a value and connected to various 
practical activities and challenges. Titled “Corporate confidence, geopolitical 
unease”, the editorial makes the case that the optimism evident in the Davos 
debates needed to be tempered by the recognition of various uncertainties in, 
and threats to, global economic growth: 
Not even the unpleasant surprise of weak fourth quarter growth in the US 
could shake the strong belief at this year's World Economic Forum that 
2006 will be a good year for business. The world economy is starting to fire 
on multiple cylinders, with decent prospects for growth in Japan and the 
eurozone, and China promising to generate more domestic consumption. … 
Business scents the sweet smell of success. The integration of China and 
India into the world economy at a moment when technology is digitising 
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and disaggregating old business models offers companies huge 
opportunities to cut costs and increase efficiency. … At this juncture the 
greatest danger may lie in complacency. Concerns about global economic 
imbalances have eased markedly. However, it still remains doubtful that a 
transition from US consumer-led global growth to expansion led by the 
eurozone, Japan and China will proceed smoothly.  
Some essential pieces of the optimists’ jigsaw are still missing. The general 
mood of profit and possibility makes the reluctance of the business leaders 
in Davos to unleash a global investment boom all the more puzzling. Part 
of the answer must be that they still privately fear that the current pattern 
of growth is not sustainable. Yet some of the answer surely lies outside the 
world of business. Alongside corporate confidence is a nervous awareness 
of the rapid transmission of unforeseen risks - whether the victory of 
Hamas in last week's Palestinian elections, the spread of bird flu from Asia 
or the development of Iran's nuclear programme - in an ever-more 
interconnected world. Turbulent world politics crowd in on the comfortable 
business environment. One reason why a successful conclusion of the Doha 
trade round is so important is that it would not just enhance commercial 
opportunities, but it would also demonstrate the international community's 
capacity to defy the forces of disintegration and harness the power of 
commerce to bind it closer together. (A239/2006, Editorial.) 
As the editorial indicates, the notion of growth was typically operationalised 
in FT journalism as an aggregate macroeconomic indicator. Growth referred 
to an increase, or “expansion” in the official rates of GDP, and it was only 
implicitly presented as a value, or a social or policy objective, in itself. While it 
is certainly possible, in principle, to make arguments like “we need growth” or 
“we have to engender more growth”, it was much more typical for FT 
journalists to outline other objectives that were, purportedly, related to 
economic growth. In the quoted passage, such alternative ideas about what is 
good or desirable include “consumption”, “investment”, “cost cuts”, 
“efficiency”, “expansion” and “business” in general. Another frequently-used 
notion that alluded to the growth ideal without explicitly mentioning it was 
“recovery”. Especially in wake of the market shocks and economic crises of 
2001 and 2007–9, which caused a dent in GDP growth, there was a surge of 
talk about recovery, referring to the need to get the economy back to the pre-
crisis rates of growth.116 In this way, in addition to the ubiquitous use of the 
notion of growth itself, the growth imperative was often articulated in the 
material through various associated terms according to the most pressing 
concerns regarding the global economy in any given year. 
 
                                                   
116 The notion of recovery appears 165 times in the material. Of these, 59 occur in 2002–2004 
and 63 in 2010–2011. 
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As in the case of the management of the global economy, growth often 
appeared as a collective responsibility of transnational elites. The quoted 
editorial, for instance, refers to the “US consumer-led global growth” and to 
the “expansion led by the eurozone, Japan and China”. These four leading 
economies, in other words, appeared to be jointly responsible for global 
growth. Moreover, allusions to “the world of business” and to “the 
international community” associated global economic growth as a collective 
task without pointing any specific group of actors as the drivers of growth. 
References to “unforeseen risks”, from geopolitical threats to the avian flu, as 
well as to the “commercial opportunities” promised by a new international 
agreement on trade liberalisation, implied that transnational elites need to 
tackle the challenges and seize the opportunities of growth in a co-operative 
effort. 
While emphasising growth as a collective imperative, the editorial also 
specifically mentions companies and business leaders, implying that the 
realisation of the prospects of growth was ultimately dependent on their 
decisions to expand business operations. This is why the FT expresses its 
puzzlement over the apparent contradiction between the “strong belief” 
among Davos participants in “the world economy” that was “starting to fire on 
multiple cylinders”, on one hand, and the business leaders’ apparent 
unwillingness to take advantage of the improved profit opportunities and 
“unleash a global investment boom”, on the other. In this account, the drive of 
private companies for profit represents the key dynamic of the global economy 
and source of its growth. Provided that the necessary economic conditions 
exist (improved demand prospects in Japan, Europe and China), it was the 
task of corporate leaders to maintain growth by investing, cutting costs and 
enhancing efficiency. 
The editorial thus illustrates a broader discourse apparent in the material 
in which various actors fulfil different roles in the global economy. In this 
distribution of tasks, the private sector operates as the locus where growth 
takes, or should take, place. Business leaders, bankers and investors emerge 
in this account as key drivers of growth through their practices of lending and 
investing. The conception of their central role in growth creation also brings 
forward a variety of expectations related to their conduct: the corporate elite 
contribute to the global economy by extending their operations to new 
markets, by creating transnational production chains and by engaging in 
international trade. Moreover, ideally functioning markets that are free and 
competitive presume certain rules of conduct, and the normative agency of the 
corporate elite is formulated in a close relationship to this ideal. Corporate 
executives are expected, for instance, to make responsible investment 
decisions, seek profit without taking too big risks, and not to pile up too much 
debt. Consequently, market failures not only disclose deficiencies in the 
regulation of economies and markets, but they also imply violations against 
the normative agency of the corporate elite. This is why public accounts of 
economic crises tend to turn into narratives of human weakness and flaws of 
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moral character (Mirowski 2013, 256–8). Accordingly, in the wake of financial 
collapses, the perceived failure of the executives, lenders and investors to act 
rationally and accountably, and their propensity to become greedy and submit 
to unrealistic growth expectations frequently prompted critical commentary 
in the FT (see Chapter 5.2). Corruption and unlawful business practices were 
other subjects of moral condemnation, prompted particularly by large-scale 
corporate scandals (see Chapter 6.4). Indeed, violations of the norms of 
corporate governance were condemned not only because highly publicised 
exposés were seen to tarnish the public image of business and to erode the 
public’s trust in the corporate community. There was also the concern that 
illegal and corrupt business practices could actually harm the markets by 
shaking “wider business confidence” and discouraging investments into 
companies (A212/2006, DR). 
But while the role of companies and investors in creating growth was 
recognised by FT journalism, and they could even occasionally be criticised for 
holding back or endangering growth, the private sector was not necessarily at 
the heart of the growth discourse. In fact, much of the discussion on the global 
economy revolved around the need to create favourable growth conditions that 
would allow for the businesses and investors to fulfil their natural purpose of 
creating growth out of a successful pursuit of profit. The following two 
passages are illustrative in this sense. In the first, Chris Giles reasons in 2009 
on the prospects of lifting the global economy from the recessionary cycle of 
the financial crisis; in the second, Andrew Edgecliffe-Johnson explains in 
2008 why both investors and companies are increasingly looking for business 
opportunities in Africa. 
Companies are not spending money, partly because they can’t get credit, 
but also because there is no confidence. If you can turn those two things 
round and get companies to think about investing later on in the year, then 
you might see the “green shoots of recovery”. (A362/2009, CG.) 
The corporate world is looking around in its domestic markets in the west 
and asking if they will provide the growth which their investors are 
expecting and the answer is typically no. … When you come to Africa … the 
growth rates on offer compared to what is possible within Europe or some 
of the established Asian markets are so attractive they cannot be ignored. 
(A310/2008, AEJ.) 
In both passages, companies emerge as the key drivers of growth; yet they also 
appear as fundamentally dependent on the broader conditions in which their 
growth is possible. In Giles’s account, corporate investment is the source of 
growth; yet companies are not investing, or “spending money”, because they 
lack access to finance as well as confidence in their future profits. Arranging 
credit and creating a climate of confidence in future profits thus emerge as the 
two primary preconditions for companies to put the economy on the path of 
recovery. In Edgecliffe-Johnson’s analysis, companies are looking to grow, or 
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increase their profits in order to fulfil the expectations of their investors. In 
this respect, Africa emerges as a particularly promising environment for their 
operations, because there the overall “growth rates on offer” are much higher 
than in the western markets or even some of the Asian markets. In this 
account, therefore, there is a straightforward equation of growth with private 
profit. The potential growth, or profit, rates of companies are nonetheless set 
not so much by their own operations but by economies as a whole. 
Consequently, it is mostly the task of economies to “provide the growth” which 
company owners and investors expect from them. Giles’s allusion to 
confidence and Edgecliffe-Johnson’s reference to the “growth rates on offer” 
imply that also the non-business sector, and particularly the government, has 
an important role in generating private sector growth. In order for economies 
to grow, governments and other actors “outside the world of business”, as the 
previously-quoted editorial puts it, need to support private-sector profit-
seeking. 
The clearest indicator of locating the responsibility for engendering 
growth outside the private sector are the critiques politicians and officials face 
when certain economies fail to engender acceptable growth rates. Indeed, 
national political leaders are often criticised for the lack of economic growth. 
In 2002, for instance, when Gerhard Schröder outlined German economic 
policies at the Davos forum, Lionel Barber’s report presented the chancellor as 
defending himself and the German government against “critics at home and 
abroad … suggesting that Germany had become the sick man of Europe 
because of its low growth and high unemployment”. According to the article, 
Schröder’s defence centred on the government’s corporate tax reforms which 
had purportedly made “Germany highly attractive for foreign investors”. 
(A61/2002, LB.) In this case, as in many others, FT journalists understood the 
role of governments in the global economy in terms of creating favourable 
conditions for growth that takes place in the private sector.  
The FT’s growth discourse, in other words, revealed a rather strict 
separation between private-sector and non-business actors. Because growth 
was seen to take place in the private sector, business leaders, bankers and 
investors emerged as its main generators. While governments were seen to 
bear great responsibility over economic growth, their agency was considered 
to be limited to creating the conditions which enable private profit-making and 
offer lucrative investment opportunities, particularly to foreign investors. In 
this account, the capacity of governments themselves to engender growth 
through, for instance, production, investment and employment, was not 
acknowledged.  
In the global financial crisis, however, this division of labour between the 
public and private sectors became somewhat blurred. As governments and 
central banks engaged in efforts to shore up crumbling banks and businesses 
through monetary and fiscal expansion, it was evident that non-business 
actors took on a direct role in managing economic processes. In the following 
years, several crisis accounts in the FT applauded the governments of major 
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economies for their role not only in rescuing the financial system, but also in 
mitigating the damages to the overall global economy. The following two 
passages serve as good illustrations of this reasoning. The first passage is from 
Chris Giles’s report on the 2010 World Economic Outlook by the IMF, which 
analysed the reasons for the rapid recovery of the global economy from the 
deep slump of 2008 and early 2009. The second passage is from Martin Wolf’s 
column “What the world must do to sustain its convalescence”, describing a 
debate on the global economy that Wolf himself moderated at the 2010 Davos 
forum. 
The Fund attributed the surprising strength of the world economy to a 
rebound in confidence that helped people around the world be more 
confident about taking risks and boosting economic activity. But officials 
warned that temporary policy had been vital in securing growth. Olivier 
Blanchard, IMF chief economist, said: “For the moment, the recovery is 
very much based on policy decisions and policy actions. The question is 
‘When does private demand come and take over?’ Right now it’s OK, but a 
year down the line, it will be a big question.” (A442/2010, CG.) 
The starting point for the discussion was an obvious one: the policy 
interventions of late 2008 and 2009 have been a resounding success ... The 
world economy survived the heart attack in the financial system. It did so 
as a result of fiscal and monetary stimuli that are unprecedented in 
peacetime. These actions were essential and successful. ... The big questions 
for this year are how quickly to withdraw the monetary and fiscal stimulus 
and which should be withdrawn first. (A474/2010, MW.) 
As the passages indicate, both the economists at the IMF and the policymakers 
and experts at the Davos forum attributed the “surprising” turnaround in the 
global economy, after the “heart attack” of 2008–9, to the actions of 
governments. The IMF chief economist acknowledged that “the recovery is 
very much based on policy decisions and policy actions”, helping “people 
around the world” to take risks and “boost economic activity”. Similarly, Wolf 
observed that there was no doubt among the Davos forum participants that 
the governments’ actions in the financial crisis had not only been necessary 
but also overwhelmingly successful. Of course, by spelling out the “obvious”, 
Wolf’s article implies that there was no room at the Davos table for orthodox 
neoliberals who might argue that, instead of saving the economy, the 
governments had only disrupted the normal operation of markets while 
creating all sorts of moral hazards by rescuing insolvent and incompetent 
businesses. Indeed, these latter kinds of arguments did not feature in the FT 
coverage of the debates on the crisis. Overall, then, it seemed to become a non-
disputable argument that whenever the private sector is unable or unwilling to 
take the “risks” needed to generate growth, as was apparent in the midst of the 
financial crisis, the governments need to step in.  
However, what makes the quoted passages particularly noteworthy is the 
way that they frame government agency in the economy as something 
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temporary and unprecedented: Giles referred explicitly to “temporary policy”, 
and Wolf articulated government action in terms of “policy interventions”. 
Instead of the state being seen as a formidable economic agent in its own right 
for which management of economic processes is part of its normal operations, 
the actions by central bankers and governments are perceived as an anomaly 
and understood as temporary “stimuli”. Because the government only makes 
extraordinary “interventions” in the economy and can, at best, provide 
“temporary”, short-term, “stimuli” for growth, the “big question” is when will 
the government “withdraw” from the economy. Again, the very notion of 
stimulus implies that the government in itself is unable to generate growth and 
only provides “stimuli” for the private sector where genuine growth takes 
place. Wolf’s account could thus be interpreted as an indication of the 
continuing power of neoliberalism to shape the language with which the 
economy is made sense of. 
A somewhat more direct acknowledgment of the government’s ability to 
create growth is made in the preceding passage by Olivier Blanchard, the IMF’s 
chief economist. His rhetorical question about private demand “taking over” 
from “policy actions” as the driver of growth implies the acknowledgment that 
in that moment growth, understood here in terms of an increase in aggregate 
demand, is actually being generated by the public sector. Yet the passage 
demonstrates that for both Blanchard and Giles this is an obvious problem – 
Giles even frames the economist’s observation about the vitality of policy in 
securing growth as a “warning”. As these examples indicate, the occasional 
acknowledgement of the capacity of the non-business sector to generate 
growth was typically accompanied in the FT with warnings and a general sense 
that there was something inherently wrong and deeply problematic about this 
role of the government. A return to the normal state of things, in which the 
private sector takes up its role as the growth driver, was thus a self-evident 
objective, and the only “big question” concerned the timing of this shift. There 
was no suggestion in the FT’s post-crisis debate that it should actually be the 
permanent role of the government to generate necessary demand in the 
economy in order to guarantee desired rates of growth, or to pursue other 
objectives such as full employment, as the Keynesian understanding of the role 
of the state in the economy would suggest (e.g., Davidson 2009; Wray 2012, 
187–98). 
Liberating the global economy 
In a 2005 column titled “The irresistible pull of a free and prosperous Europe”, 
Martin Wolf reviewed the year’s Davos meeting and highlighted the speeches 
given by Turkish and Ukrainian heads of state. With full admiration towards 
these “impressive leaders”, Wolf presented their addresses at the forum as 
affirmations of their countries’ inherent desire to join the EU and expressed 
his personal support for their respective bids: 
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The inspiring moments [at the Davos forum] were … the statements by 
Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Turkey's prime minister and, still more, by Viktor 
Yushchenko, the newly elected president of Ukraine. … Mr Erdogan 
remarked that joining the EU would lead to a “reconciliation of 
civilisations”. Mr Yushchenko was able to state that “the people of Ukraine 
declared that they chose to be part of Europe during the Orange 
Revolution”. On the wintry streets, millions declared that they wished to be 
free. What better definition can there be of what the EU stands for? In 
Davos, these two impressive leaders stated the desire of their peoples to 
share in the liberty and prosperity of contemporary Europe. … Turkey and 
Ukraine prefer freedom to serfdom, democracy to dictatorship, prosperity 
to poverty and peace to war. They aspire to join a club of states built on 
these values. Such fervour deserves its obvious reward. Both these countries 
must gain membership. (A193/2005, MW.) 
In Wolf’s argument, by confirming their countries’ commitment to pursue EU 
membership, the leaders of Turkey and Ukraine effectively demonstrated the 
attraction of the EU as an embodiment of freedom, democracy, prosperity and 
peace. In fact for Wolf, the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, where ”millions 
declared that they wished to be free”, was just the latest example of the 
inspirational example of western Europe in the world. He goes on to argue 
that, after World War 2, Western Europe has operated as a beacon of hope for 
repressed peoples from Spain and Portugal to the former communist countries 
of Eastern Europe and helped them in their demand for greater freedoms from 
their governments.   
While the celebration of western Europe and the EU as bastions of 
freedom and prosperity is an indication of the general strength of these ideals 
in TEC, Wolf has a more specific purpose in this column. After paying tribute 
to Erdogan’s and Yushchenko’s commitment to joining “the club” of countries 
that believe in freedom and prosperity, he addresses the on-going debates in 
the UK on the new EU constitution and takes note of the “deep-seated 
hostility” among the British towards the EU. For him, the “irony of ironies” is 
the possibility that the UK would be on its way out of the EU just as Turkey 
and Ukraine are seeking to join. Wolf locates the reasons for such anti-EU 
attitudes among the British partly in the widespread “belief that the EU’s 
economy is a calamity”. Yet, according to Wolf, this is a false perception. As he 
argues: 
The EU is not the collapsing behemoth of fevered imaginings. A compelling 
indication of this truth comes from the 2005 Index of Economic Freedom … 
No fewer than 10 of its top 20 countries are EU members. Luxembourg, 
Estonia, Ireland, the UK and Denmark are all ranked above the US. True, 
Italy is 26th and France 44th. But this variation proves that the EU does 
not compel countries to follow bad policies; it merely allows them, within 
limits, to do so. The UK's recent success similarly shows that membership 
is far from a hindrance to good performance. … None of this is to suggest 
that the EU's economy is functioning perfectly. Aggregate demand has been 
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far too weak in recent year, while the economies of the three big eurozone 
economies remain over-regulated. But the EU continues to provide the 
opportunities for rapid catch-up exploited, in the recent past, by Ireland, 
Portugal and Spain. More important, it has forced political reforms across 
the continent. The EU has been far more successful in generating economic 
and political reform in its "near abroad" than the US has been in Central 
and South America. (A193/2005, MW.) 
The latter part of Wolf’s column is illustrative in the way it connects the 
abstract principle of freedom to the realm of the economy. In his attempt to 
persuade the UK audience to acknowledge the economic success of the EU, 
Wolf resorts to an index which purportedly demonstrates the high level of 
“economic freedom” in many EU countries. At the same time, the index works 
to separate “bad policies” of Italy and France from the apparently good policies 
that enhance economic freedom. Moreover, economic freedom associates 
positively with “economic reform” and “good performance” in terms of growth 
while contrasting negatively with “over-regulation”. In this way, Wolf 
translates the ideal of freedom into the language of economic policy with the 
intention of persuading his readers that the EU operates as a global model and 
enforcer of greater economic freedom.  
In economic policy discourse, the value of freedom typically translates 
into the ideal of free and competitive markets of equal exchange. Because the 
precondition of free exchange between market actors is freedom from any 
outside control, negative liberty is, alongside growth, a central value in 
capitalist societies (Fraser 2014, 67). Accordingly, the idea of liberalisation 
emerged in the material as an unequivocally desirable policy objective that can 
be applied to various areas and circumstances and evoked as a response to a 
multitude of problems in the economy. As it happens, the economy and 
markets can never be completely “free”, and hence there is always more 
liberalisation to be achieved. The context of the global recovery after the 
slowdown of the early 2000s offers an illustrative example. As the European 
economy was failing to keep pace with the growth rates of the United States 
and China, Brian Groom reported on the discussions at the 2003 Davos forum 
over the European economic policy, describing how Gerard Kleisterlee, chief 
executive of Royal Philips Electronics, “voiced European industry’s frustration 
with the slow progress of the EU's three-year-old Lisbon process of economic 
liberalisation” (A97/2003, BG). Similarly, George Parker’s 2005 article 
described the critiques aired at the forum about the inability of the EU to raise 
its growth rate as planned and pointed to the “missed opportunities and failed 
promises” of European leaders in the implementation of the Lisbon Agenda of 
economic reforms (A158/2005, GP). In this way, economic liberalisation 
emerged as the self-evident solution to the EU’s lagging growth. While Europe 
as a whole could be applauded as a bastion of “economic freedom” in global 
comparison, as Wolf did in the quoted passage above, it was also perfectly 
logical for European decision-makers to be criticised for their failure to carry 
out further liberalising reforms.  
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Because the norm of liberalisation applies universally to countries 
around the world, independently of the present state of their “economic 
freedom”, regions, governments and politicians can be critically examined 
according to their willingness and ability to accomplish reforms that advance 
liberalisation. For instance, in his 2004 analysis of the Latin American 
economic outlook, Richard Lapper noted that the recent turn towards more 
left-wing governments in many of the region’s economies demonstrated an 
unmistakeable “mood shift” with regard to liberalisation: even as Venezuela’s 
Hugo Chavez “pursued relatively moderate economic policies respecting 
privatised banks and utilities and pursuing friendly relations with 
international oil companies”, “Mexican congressmen have repeatedly blocked 
electricity liberalisation”, Uruguay blocked “private involvement” in its oil 
company, Costa Rica kept holding “state monopolies of the telecoms and 
electricity industries”, and even the Dominican Republic, “one of the 
liberalisers of the 1990s”, renationalised electricity distributors (A121/2004, 
RL). Similarly, in his 2004 report on the Davos panel discussing the Chinese 
economy, Guy de Jonquières quoted Donald Evans, US commerce secretary, 
who commended Chinese leaders for the country’s “economic performance”, 
for their willingness to open trade and, for their “embrace of free market 
principles”, while also voicing his concern over “centrally planned policies” 
and “protectionist” tendencies within the Chinese leadership (A135/2004, 
GJ). Comparable observations about the willingness or unwillingness of 
national governments to engage in further liberalisation were made about 
India in the 2006 coverage and the Persian Gulf states in the 2010 coverage. 
In the FT’s economic policy discourse, economic freedom and 
liberalisation appeared rarely as intrinsic ideals that are valuable in 
themselves. Instead, as the previous examples indicated, liberalising reforms 
were typically presented as desirable policies because they enable greater 
economic growth: policies that enhance “economic freedom” are necessary 
precisely because they engender a higher rate of economic growth, or improve 
“economic performance”. In this way, the capitalistic growth imperative and 
liberalisation became closely interlinked. At the same time, associating 
economic reforms with the value of freedom provided the policy with added 
legitimacy.  
Liberalisation was also often presented as a way to attract foreign 
investment, the importance of which was emphasised particularly in relation 
to non-western economies, from Lula Da Silva’s Brazil to the oil-rich states of 
the Gulf.  For instance, Raymond Colitt described in a 2005 article how Brazil’s 
president Lula da Silva was heading to the Davos forum with the intention of 
inviting foreign investors to help “modernise Brazil’s transport system” and 
thus make the nation more competitive as an “aspiring global trade power” 
(A155/2005, RC). In these explanations, attracting foreign investors is all 
about creating a “conducive environment”, which, in turn, requires liberalising 
reforms. In addition to the usual set of privatisations, the freeing of capital 
flows and deregulatory reforms intended to level the playing field between 
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domestic and foreign companies and investors, liberalising reforms in these 
accounts also referred to the establishment of credible regulatory and judicial 
institutions, as well as to reducing the levels of corruption.  
To non-western country leaders, liberalisation emerged as a central duty 
because it promised an increased inflow of foreign investment, which arguably 
provided economic growth and welfare. Policies of liberalisation were thus 
implicitly justified by referring to the opportunities they create for foreign 
businesses. This was, obviously, another example of the normalisation of 
private corporations as the primary growth drivers in the global economy. 
Moreover, “opening” markets and deregulating cross-border capital flows 
“liberates” companies that operate on a transnational basis, and therefore the 
norm of liberalisation emphasised the role that TNCs play in the global 
economy as generators of growth and welfare. This association between 
policies of liberalisation, TNCs and higher economic growth and welfare was 
occasionally made explicit by FT reporters. In 2003, for instance, Martin Wolf 
argued that the entry of TNCs into domestic markets had beneficial 
consequences, leading to higher wages and increased exports (A83/2003, 
MW). 
In the international sphere, the principle of liberalisation was closely 
associated with world trade negotiations. Free trade was consistently 
presented as a desirable, if not self-evident, objective, and alternatives to trade 
liberalisation – policy measures that aim to limit or regulate trade and cross-
border investment – were condemned as harmful protectionism. Indeed, 
international trade emerged in the FT coverage as perhaps the most 
conspicuous domain for the reinforcement of liberalisation as a policy norm. 
Alternative policies were presented as actions that ran not only against what 
was deemed as the rational economic policy for any national economy, but also 
against the greater common good: global economic growth. Trade 
liberalisation also became closely associated, if not explicitly equated, with 
another key policy objective: integration into the global economy. The 
following section observes global integration, or globalisation, and trade 
liberalisation as central “social purposes” in transnational elite agency. 
7.2 Globalisation and cosmopolitan commitments 
As discussed in Chapter 3, globalisation as a social process of global economic 
integration has often been associated with the activities of international 
business and political elites. Indeed, one way of understanding globalisation 
is to see it as the material consequences of the strategic and tactical actions of 
TNCs, IGOs and governments, which are based on a shared conception and 
discourse of the globalising economy (cf. Cameron and Palan 2004, 2–3). The 
notion of (economic) globalisation, then, operates as a form of shorthand 
description, or reification, of the actions performed by transnational elites, 
whose decisions are based on a shared understanding of what the global 
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economy is and how it operates. The World Economic Forum, in turn, has long 
recognised the significance of globalisation as an economic development and, 
as discussed in Chapter 2.2, has been its enthusiastic proponent. By elevating 
globalisation to central place on the Davos agenda, the forum has promoted 
and advanced consciousness of the global condition among business and 
political elites since the 1970s. Meanwhile, the forum has attempted to 
influence and shape its participants’ understandings of globalisation, even as 
its own views of the process have shifted over time (Pigman 2007). 
Defining globalisation 
With globalisation constituting a central element in the forum agenda, the 
globalisation debate also has a strong presence in the FT-mediated elite 
communication. Overall, globalisation appears in the material no less than 
330 times, and, on average, every fourth article contains the word.  It is a 
particularly hot topic in the early years of the 2000s, with well over 50 per cent 
of the articles in the 2001 and 2002 coverage including the notion. After this 
initial flurry of debate over the concept, the topicality of the issue somewhat 
diminishes. Still, between 2003 to 2011, a share between 14 and 23 percent of 
articles annually mention the term at least once. 
Globalisation does not always have an exclusively economic connotation 
in FT journalism. Occasionally it is used to describe the transnational scope of 
certain non-economic phenomena, including terrorism and migration. 
However, these uses of the notion are rare, and the overwhelmingly dominant 
perspective on globalisation is distinctly economic. In the most typical usage 
of the term, globalisation is simply another word for integration as in “global 
economic integration” or “the global integration of markets”. Throughout the 
material, globalisation manifests itself in concrete developments and 
processes, such as in the growth on international and interregional trade, in 
the increase of cross-border flows of capital, or in the geographic expansion of 
the networks of production and distribution. When such flows and networks 
grow from one year to the next, globalisation is seen to be advancing. This also 
means that markets and the economy become more integrated globally when 
the flows and connections that make up a particular market or economy extend 
geographically and render it less local or national in nature.  
In academic literature, globalisation is often treated as a theoretical 
concept or as an ideological construction that serves to justify particular 
political ends and means (e.g., Ampuja, 2012; Cameron and Palan 2004; 
Rosenberg 2005; Scott 1997; Steger 2005). In FT journalism, however, the 
notion is anchored in concrete activities and processes, many of which can be 
statistically measured. Therefore, globalisation emerges as a real-world 
phenomenon that can be established as a “fact”. Gerard Baker and Quentin 
Peel, for instance, argued in their 2002 article that “globalisation is an 
objective fact, a reflection of dramatic technological change, not a policy” 
(A49/2002, GB/QP); and an editorial published on the same day made the 
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case that “globalisation is an economic reality, even if the growth of world 
trade may have slowed, and investment flows are down” (A55/2002, 
Editorial). Presenting such explicit conceptual definitions may be regarded as 
somewhat unusual for journalism, and should be interpreted within the 
context of a contested debate around the nature of globalisation that took place 
in the international public sphere in the late 1990s and early 2000s. From this 
perspective, FT argumentation may stem from the need to make a case 
specifically against those who might criticise globalisation as nothing but a fad, 
representing a fashionable but temporary idea circulating in the public 
discourse, yet lacking any concreteness to it. To distance itself from the 
doubters, the FT emphasised that globalisation was not simply another empty 
catchword popularised by public relations and marketing talk, nor was it a 
name for a particular policy or ideology. Even as its ubiquity and liberal use in 
business and political rhetoric inevitably prompted suspicions, globalisation 
was “real” because the notion referred to “objectively” measurable trends, such 
as world trade and cross-border investments.  
Portraying globalisation as an objective fact, and not a matter of policy 
or choice, easily attributes the notion with an almost natural force-like status. 
Indeed, globalisation was frequently articulated in FT journalism in terms of 
a process that has a number of driving “forces”, including technology, 
communications, and the movement of goods, services and capital. 
Globalisation, like other economic processes, often appeared as something 
that simply happens due to the intervention of some invisible hand or law of 
economics which no human agency can control. This made it possible for Guy 
de Jonquières and John Lloyd to argue that “even the critics of globalisation 
accept that the process is an inexorable reality” (A24/2001, GJ/JoL). Such 
allusions to the inexorability of globalisation, of course, are by no means 
extraordinary. Critical analyses have often pointed out how in political 
rhetoric, and especially in neoliberal discourse, globalisation tends to be 
presented as an inevitable process that is driven by no human agency, thereby 
effectively emptying the concept of any political dimension (e.g., Amoore et al. 
2000). 
However, to treat globalisation as a real development in the global 
economy does not necessarily imply an understanding of it as a self-directing 
process. In his numerous contributions to making sense of the phenomenon, 
the FT’s Martin Wolf made exactly this case. In 2001, for instance, he argued 
that “economic globalisation is the product of two distinct, but mutually 
reinforcing, forces: reductions in the cost of transport and communications; 
and liberalisation of barriers to movement of goods, services, capital and 
labour” (A10/2001, MW). In Wolf’s analyses, which took stock of these 
“mutually reinforcing forces”, globalisation was articulated as a process the 
continuity of which was essentially dependent on a number of conditioning 
factors. For one, technological innovation needed to advance; and there 
needed to be an increase in cross-border trade. Moreover, because economic 
activities were about the “movement of goods, services, capital and labour”, 
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they were always hindered by controls and barriers. Therefore, global 
economic integration was dependent on the lowering of those barriers. 
Globalisation was, in essence, about the greater “freedom” of flows. 
In this way, Wolf closely associated globalisation with “liberalisation”, 
which he understood as enabling and advancing cross-border flows and 
economic processes. Yet, precisely because cross-border activities and flows 
can, in principle, grow indefinitely, and the economy and markets can always 
become less bounded by geography and regulatory restrictions, the world 
economy could never become fully globalised. Like liberalisation, globalisation 
was, by definition, a never-ending pursuit, “an unfinished revolution” 
(A83/2003, MW), but one whose uninterrupted advance cannot be taken for 
granted. Indeed, for Wolf the idea that globalisation takes place due to the 
operation of some transhistorical and impersonal forces scarcely appeared 
convincing. In fact, he explicitly rejected interpretations of globalisation as an 
inexorable process: for him, “the best way to view globalisation is, in effect, as 
an ongoing process that is not new, has not progressed very far, and is far from 
irreversible” (A10/2001, MW).  
As the prevalent perspective on globalisation moved away from the view 
of it as a self-directing force and towards a policy-driven process, global 
economic integration became articulated with elite agency. Globalisation was, 
in essence and by definition, what transnational elites do. It consisted of 
agreements, policies and “decisions to liberalise” (A83/2003, MW) cross-
border activities, to render national boundaries more porous and to open 
markets to new competitors. These tasks were the primary responsibility of 
political leaders, international officials and regulators. However, whereas 
political decisions enabled globalisation, it was economic activities and 
business decisions, including trading and investing across borders, offshoring 
production, transporting goods and innovating technologies, that ultimately 
realised the process. Therefore, business leaders who engaged in, directed and 
funded such activities, essentially performed globalisation. Accordingly, in his 
2005 article on the business practices of outsourcing of offshoring, Dan 
Roberts quoted Arie Lewin, a Duke University professor, confirming that 
“companies are learning how to source human capital on a global basis, just as 
they source goods and materials from the cheapest place” (A153/2005, DR). 
A number of accounts of globalisation thus indicated awareness of the 
close relationship of mutual dependency between political and corporate 
agency and the process. In the end, few commentators in the FT treated 
globalisation as a self-directing and autonomous phenomenon with natural 
law-like qualities. That such allusions still lingered in FT journalism, even as 
they appeared to be marginalised and even explicitly denied by other writers, 
may indicate an ongoing shift in the dominant perception of the process 
among transnational elites in the early 2000s. Again, attempts to define 
globalisation and its nature must to be interpreted against the broader public 
debate on the benefits and discontents of globalisation, which became 
controversial around the turn of the millennium (see Chapter 6.3). By raising 
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a highly visible public challenge against international institutions and their 
policies of trade and market liberalisation, civil society protests effectively 
demonstrated the relationship between globalisation and particular 
institutions, policy decisions and international agreements. They were, in 
other words, partly successful in deconstructing globalisation as a self-driven 
process and hence politicising the notion. Accordingly, even if an 
understanding of globalisation as an inexorable process may well have been 
dominant among the business and political elites for the better part of the 
1990s, the FT debate on globalisation in the early 2000s suggests a more 
refined understanding of the phenomenon. Partly as a consequence of the 
public threat to their agenda represented by globalisation activists, at least the 
FT-mediated TEC now appeared to appreciate the extent to which global 
economic integration, in fact, depended on intentional policies and business 
decisions. 
Defending globalisation 
Aside from reinforcing the identification of the international business and 
policymaking elites as the principal agents of globalisation, civil society 
protests had another effect: they prompted the elites to publicly defend not 
only themselves as legitimate actors, as we observed in Chapter 6.3, but also 
globalisation as a policy choice. As the Davos forum took the question of 
globalisation into its agenda in the face of mounting grassroots mobilisation, 
it explicitly addressed many of the issues that the global civil society raised as 
problems caused by the neoliberal policies of economic integration. Most 
significantly, in this respect, the forum addressed questions of global poverty 
and inequality, and their relationship with globalisation. In addition to 
reporting on Davos speakers’ reactions to these contested issues, some of the 
FT journalists were keen to offer their own insights. Martin Wolf, in particular, 
distinguished himself as an active participant in the great globalisation debate 
of the early 2000s. In his 2001 column “Growth makes the poor richer”, Wolf 
explicitly outlined his views on the relationships between inequality, poverty 
and global economic integration. Having cited the latest World Bank figures 
on global poverty and estimates of rising trends of income inequality between 
countries, he compared these to a World Bank study on historical growth 
trends in the world. Wolf then inferred that growth is “the most important 
single determinant” of both poverty and inequality and proceeded to elaborate 
his conclusions: 
A link does indeed exist between globalisation, inequality and poverty. But 
it is neither new nor the one critics point to. Globalisation does not make 
countries poor; it helps make them rich. But it has not made all countries 
equally rich. The result is growing global inequality and a concentration of 
extreme poverty in the countries that have failed to jump on to the growth 
ladder and stay on it. The partial spread of rapid economic growth is 
explained, in turn, by the inadequacies of policies, politics and institutions 
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in many countries. Yet, while the rich have not become rich because poor 
countries are poor, they have too often failed to give the poor the assistance 
and opportunities they desperately need. At bottom, however, the countries 
that have failed to generate sustained growth either turned their backs on 
global integration, such as India, have lacked preconditions for exploiting 
those opportunities, such as much of sub-Saharan Africa, or have suffered 
from both obstacles. The path to reducing poverty and closing income 
differentials requires removing such impediments. But one thing, above all, 
is quite clear: if the world is to become less unequal through raising the 
bottom, rather than collapsing the top, and still more if mass poverty is to 
be eliminated, it can only be via successful integration, not its opposite. 
(A2/2001, MW.) 
Accusing “critics” of having mistakenly equated growing income inequality 
with poverty, Wolf argued that increasing inequality only indicated differences 
in relative growth rates between countries and areas. Therefore rates of 
poverty, at least as an absolute measure, could be reduced even as income 
inequality increased. Moreover, because poverty resulted from the lack of 
economic growth, the latter emerged as the principal, if not the only feasible, 
means of alleviating poverty. Wolf thus outlined a rather ideal-typical right-
wing position on the dispute between the political left and right on global 
capitalism at the turn of the millennium. According to this reasoning, the left 
was missing the point in focusing on growing income inequalities. Instead of 
being regarded as a problem, inequality should be seen as a sign that certain 
countries were lifting themselves out of poverty through growth. Economic 
growth, in turn, was intimately connected, in historical perspective, to 
globalisation: countries, and the global economy as a whole, experienced 
growth in periods of global integration, while periods of disintegration were 
associated with lower growth rates. Therefore globalisation could not be 
causing poverty but was instead helping to alleviate it. Turning away from 
liberalising policies would thus be counter-productive. The factor that 
explained growing inequality between countries and persistent poverty in the 
world was not globalisation but the lack or incompleteness of the process. 
Wolf’s argument helped justify certain dominant beliefs concerning the 
beneficial nature of economic globalisation among the international business 
and policy elites. Indeed, even as the Davos forum participants acknowledged 
the relevance of the problems raised by civil society movements, they kept 
arguing in favour of continued economic integration. Here the notion of 
growth became a key element of argumentation. Globalisation and the 
continuous growth of the global economy were associated in a tight knot of 
mutual dependency, in which the well-being of the world’s population as a 
whole appeared to be dependent on advancing economic integration. When 
globalisation was understood as a condition for global economic growth, and 
growth was associated with the decline in poverty, it became possible to turn 
the concern for the world’s poor into a call for further economic liberalisation. 
In this way, the benefits of globalisation were articulated in terms of the 
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general good. Accordingly, a repeated argument of FT journalists when 
addressing the claims of “anti-globalisation” activists was that while there 
could be certain problems in the process, globalisation was, in the end, in 
everyone’s interest. 
The assertion that globalisation ultimately benefits everyone was a bold 
argument to make particularly in 2001, when the Davos forum gave great 
attention to African countries as the “losers” of globalisation. Indeed, Hugh 
Carnegy noted that “Africa's inability to gain much from globalisation - and 
anger over some of the obstacles - has been a recurrent complaint among 
African politicians, businessmen and academics at Davos” (A22/2001, HC). 
Among other Davos participants, Wolf also acknowledged that some countries 
evidently “have failed to jump on to the growth ladder and stay on it”. Yet, 
because globalisation itself could not be the cause of global poverty and 
inequality, reasons for the failure of some countries to benefit from the process 
had to lie elsewhere. As the quoted passage indicated, Wolf sought 
explanations in “the inadequacies of policies, politics and institutions” of the 
countries themselves. These included the poor decision of some of them to 
“turn their backs on global integration”, as well as on the failure of rich 
countries to “give the poor the assistance and opportunities they desperately 
need”.  
Again, the passage illustrates a broader discourse on what were 
considered as the political and institutional hindrances to development. For 
instance, when the Peruvian president Alejandro Toledo called for the 
international community to extend a helping hand to the crisis-ridden 
Argentina in 2002 (see Chapter 6.1), he also claimed that the Argentinian 
government had “to strengthen its institutions to prove its governability”. The 
same article quotes Felipe Larrain Bascunan, “a prominent Chilean 
economist”, who argued that “the lack of independent judiciaries and 
widespread corruption” were key weaknesses across Latin America and 
concluded that “poverty is a problem of weak institutions, not a lack of 
resources”. (A74/2002, HC.) Overall, corruption, lack of adequate institutions 
and the failure to integrate into the global economy were among the popular 
explanations when addressing why some countries lagged others in economic 
welfare. Thus, to alleviate the problem of poverty, those countries and regions 
where poverty rates were the highest needed to hasten their efforts to liberalise 
their economies while implementing “reforms” that would pave the way for 
growth.  
In this way, FT journalism drew attention to the way in which elite 
representatives of poor and developing countries took responsibility for their 
own problems. In this account, while the role of the international community 
was to assist and provide incentives for poor countries to take the path of 
modernisation and globalisation, the primary responsibility fell on the 
countries themselves. Indeed, when reporting on the complaints of African 
representatives at the 2001 Davos forum, Hugh Carnegy took heart from his 
observation that “a striking feature among these same people has been the 
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strong recognition that Africa must look to itself to make progress as much as 
seek outside help” (A22/2001, HC). At the same time, emphasising the 
responsibility of developing world elites amounted to an implicit equation of 
the civil society critiques against neoliberal globalisation with a kind of victim 
mentality that purportedly blames the west (or the global north) for all the 
social ills of these societies. In this argumentation, critiques concerning the 
policies of liberalisation and the institutional structure of the global economy 
were equated with an attitude of “seeking outside help” and deemed 
unconstructive and unhelpful. In contrast, African representatives at Davos 
were commended for recognising the responsibility of the regional and 
national agents to improve their societies instead of blaming others. Such 
arguments are, of course, well in line with the neoliberal ideology. As Mirowski 
(2013, 131–2) points out, neoliberalism not only sees competition everywhere 
but also naturalises it, and therefore presents, as the only conceivable solution 
to a problem, that the agent (person, company, country, continent) becomes 
more competitive. In other words, the loser in the markets, or in the global 
economy, always demonstrates its lack of competitiveness and is thus to be 
blamed for its own condition. By failing in global competition, the loser simply 
gives evidence of its own failure, not the failure of the system. 
The beliefs in the universal benefit from global economic growth and the 
causal connection between growth and economic integration lie at the heart of 
the transnational elite consensus on globalisation. Within this apparent 
consensus, globalisation emerges as a desirable objective, something that 
needs to be protected and advanced by business and political elites. Even as 
the FT, at the beginning of the 2000s, paid attention to civil society critics and 
to the perceived problems in globalisation, at no point does the paper suggest 
that globalisation itself should be questioned. “That integration should be 
sustained is beyond serious question”, a 2002 editorial titled “Stay global” 
explicitly concludes (A70/2002, Editorial). In the words of Martin Wolf, 
globalisation “is an opportunity, not a threat”, and the task of decision-makers 
is to ensure that “the world seizes the opportunity for ever greater integration” 
(A10/2001, MW).  
Globalisation as historical project 
The preceding analysis has suggested that the transnational elite discourse on 
globalisation was affected by the opposition it faced to its agenda in the 
international public sphere and by its effort to incorporate and address some 
of the issues raised by global civil society. However, FT journalists never 
suggested that there was any serious doubt among the business and policy-
making elites about the beneficial nature of globalisation. Rather than opening 
up a serious argument on possible policy alternatives to liberal globalisation, 
addressing global civil society worked as a way for transnational elites to state 
their commitment to the policy project: if anything, the elite consensus on 
globalisation was apparently reinforced when articulated against opposition. 
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In a way, the FT’s interest in the Davos elite’s public diplomacy and 
argumentation with the global justice movement over globalisation, and the 
active engagement of its leading reporters and columnists in the debate, is 
somewhat surprising, insofar as their elite readership already shared an 
unwavering belief in the benefits of globalisation. The FT, in other words, 
should hardly be a vehicle for any persuasion of the unconverted when it 
comes to attitudes towards global economic integration and liberalisation. 
Accordingly, the epistemic work by FT journalism, and particularly its leading 
columnists and editorial writers, in favour of globalisation should perhaps best 
be read as an effort to provide political and business elites with certain talking 
points against domestic opposition. More importantly, it also helped to define 
the phenomenon and reproduce the dominant rationality about it as a process 
and a political project. The preceding observations thus indicate that civil 
society critique allowed both FT journalists and Davos participants to hone 
their arguments in favour of globalisation and to present it as a positive policy 
objective, closely connected to the inherent value of growth. 
Reinforcing the belief in and touting the importance of globalisation also 
served the purpose of putting pressure on global decision-makers to advance 
the policies of liberalisation. Indeed, another significant feature in the 
globalisation discourse, as it developed in the FT-mediated TEC, was its 
implication for collective agency. The frequent associations of liberalisation 
with globalisation indicate that global economic integration was understood 
as an essentially political project: far from being a self-directing process, 
globalisation required intentional policy and business decisions to open and 
integrate markets. For globalisation to proceed, governments, businesses and 
all other agents of the global economy needed to actively pursue market 
integration. Therefore, the apparent consensus in favour of globalisation 
called for elite action, and implied the centrality of political agency in 
globalisation. Crucially, as the following editorial from 2001 suggests, the 
continuing commitment of decision-makers to liberalisation could be taken 
for granted. Titled “Trading system under threat”, the editorial drew attention 
to the challenges that the WTO process of trade liberalisation was facing after 
the negotiations broke down in the Seattle meeting in 1999. 
This year’s World Economic Forum has been thick with warnings that a 
slowdown of the global economy could start a slide into protectionism and 
warring trade blocs. That prospect has sharpened the focus on the plight of 
poor countries, which are heavily represented in Davos and which would 
stand to lose most. … Winning domestic support for liberalisation poses an 
even bigger challenge when economic growth is weak. However, if the 
mutual trust essential for successful WTO negotiations is to be established, 
rich economies must resist obstruction by both producer lobbies and vocal 
critics of globalisation. Governments must therefore argue more strongly 
for the benefits of free trade. But if poor countries are to benefit, they must 
recognise that their problem is too little globalisation, not too much. They 
need to attack the high trade barriers that have throttled development, and 
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open their economies to the world. Increased international assistance, to 
equip them with the capacity to implement reforms, would provide an 
incentive to do so. (A35/2001, Editorial.) 
The international negotiations over a new comprehensive free trade 
agreement formed a key issue around which the question of globalisation was 
articulated in the material, particularly in the years preceding the global 
financial crisis. The WTO-led process was, obviously, one of the most 
significant concrete manifestations of what global market integration was all 
about as a political project. Because the liberalisation of international trade 
was viewed as a fundamentally desirable goal in FT journalism, articles that 
focused on global trade talks discussed globalisation in a very different 
framework than the debates on global poverty and inequality. In contrast to 
the critiques and problems raised by the global justice movement, in the 
coverage of the WTO process, globalisation through “free trade” could appear 
as an entirely unproblematic objective and as an unequivocally beneficial 
process. It is no wonder, therefore, that the FT emphasised the importance of 
continuing the negotiations. 
Despite the purportedly universal benefits of liberalisation, the WTO 
negotiations turned out to illustrate the difficulties and failures in carrying out 
the globalisation project. After the break-up of the Seattle meeting in 1999, the 
inability of the negotiating parties to bridge their differences and further trade 
liberalisation became a constant cause of worry in FT reports and commentary 
from the Davos forum. A new round of negotiations opened after the WTO 
meeting in Doha in November 2001. Yet after this initial success, the Doha 
round of talks hardly progressed in the subsequent years. Consequently, as the 
large mass protests subsided and the international news media interest in the 
global justice movement declined after 2003, concerns over advancing 
globalisation were increasingly articulated in the FT in reference to the stalling 
WTO process. In this debate, as the quoted editorial illustrates, success in 
further trade liberalisation was directly linked to the broader policy objective 
of globalisation. The undesirable alternative of failing to reach a new global 
free trade agreement was articulated in terms of “protectionism”, de-
globalisation, or the fragmentation of the global economy into “warring trade 
blocs”.  
As it happens, precisely because it was understood as a policy choice, 
which thus depends on active political agency, globalisation, just like the 
global economy (see Chapter 5.1), appeared to be under almost constant threat 
in the FT’s outlook. As the quoted editorial claimed, the globalisation project 
was not threatened only by the “obstruction” of “producer lobbies and vocal 
critics of globalisation”, but also by the weakness of international elite unity 
over globalisation as a common objective. In the already-mentioned 2002 
“Stay global” editorial, the paper issued another warning, stating that while “in 
the 1990s, the impulse towards global economic integration survived financial 
crises and a rising tide of protest”, “economic slowdown and the September 11 
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terrorist attack have multiplied the force of the challenges” (A70/2002). Citing 
these multiple challenges amounted to the warning that countries could well 
turn away from the path of global integration. Martin Wolf, for instance, 
acknowledged that “however difficult it may be, it is not impossible for a 
modern state to restrict international economic integration” (A10/2001, MW). 
Even if “political and policy environments” supportive of globalisation “exist 
today”, they “may not do so tomorrow”, Wolf argued in another article 
(A214/2006, MW). Indeed, the very nature of globalisation as a non-
autonomous and non-inevitable process made it necessary to continuously 
advance and defend globalisation. 
In these accounts of the precarious and ever-threatened process of global 
economic integration, the policies of market liberalisation were frequently 
embedded within historical narratives. While the 1990s emerged as the 
immediate historical framework for the current drive of integration, it was also 
presented as a project with much longer historical precedents. In his 2002 
article, for instance, Alan Beattie reported on the slowing down of 
international trade in the aftermath of the economic downturn. Drawing 
parallels to the Great Depression, he noted how, in the 1930s, “countries 
retreated from multilateralism, attempting to engineer competitive 
devaluations and abandoning free trade” and pointed out that such “flights to 
protectionism” “may well have” exacerbated the economic disaster 
(A52/2002, AB). Similarly, Martin Wolf noted in his 2006 article that the 
world economy ”retreated from openness between 1914 and the middle of the 
twentieth century” (A214/2006, MW). In this way, FT journalists warned that, 
after periods of global market integration, countries could well lose their 
interest in or incentives to further open their markets and start to impose 
restrictions on cross-border flows and transactions. Yet history also offered 
encouraging examples of leadership. In the aftermath of the September 11 
attacks in New York, the FT’s “Stay global” editorial invited the world’s leaders 
to look back on the aftermath of World War 2.  
The challenge is to deepen global integration without impairing security. 
The requirements for both are essentially the same: the right blend of 
leadership and co-operation. Times of danger are, as the Truman 
administration showed after the second world war, times of opportunity. 
The world's leaders have recognised the dangers. They must also seize the 
opportunities. (A70/2002, Editorial.) 
The editorial emphasised the importance of political leadership in 
globalisation: throughout history great leaders, such as president Truman, had 
recognised the opportunity to further global integration in times of crisis. 
More generally, the FT coverage of the globalisation debate indicated that 
global integration required leadership as well as multilateral collaboration. 
The qualities of present world leaders should be measured by their historical 
predecessors who took bold steps towards greater integration. Indeed, despite 
citing various threats and oppositions to the project, FT journalists also often 
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expressed their confidence in the strength of the globalisation project. Even 
the editorial quoted above made the optimistic case that “encouragingly, 
globalisation has proved resilient to shocks” and that “no country” has turned 
its back on global economic integration (A70/2002, Editorial). As these 
reassurances indicate, much of the FT discussion on global trade rested on the 
assumption that the principles of growth, free markets and global integration 
were shared by the Davos community and transnational elites more generally. 
The existence of domestic forces and civil society movements in opposition to 
liberalisation created a problem insofar as they were seen to restrict and 
obstruct the globalising agency of transnational elites. Accordingly, a further 
task in the normative agency of transnational elites was that they needed to 
convince their opponents and the general public of the universal desirability 
of their own norms. The values and ideals of global capitalism should not be 
only embraced by business leaders and policymakers, but the elites should also 
engage in their public legitimation. As illustrated in the 2001 editorial quoted 
above, the FT occasionally pointed to this justificatory duty of transnational 
elites in terms of “winning domestic support” for liberalisation policies.  
Overall, then, globalisation was articulated in the FT as a long-term 
historical project in which international business and policymaking elites play 
central roles. As the drivers and defenders of globalisation, they were bringing 
more growth and prosperity to the world. Elite consensus on globalisation, in 
turn, was rooted in their deep dependency on the process itself: by advancing 
global economic integration through their daily activities and decisions, 
transnational elites were reaping benefits and making profits. Gerard Baker 
pointed out this mutual dependency between globalisation and the agency of 
transnational elites when he noted that it was precisely ”the global integration 
and prosperity on which the Davos visitors depend for their daily bread” 
(A81/2003, GB). In this way, the whole process of global integration 
articulated with the self-preservation of transnational elites themselves. The 
intimate relationship between the transnational elite, the global economy and 
globalisation thus emerges as a central facet in the FT’s epistemic work (cf. 
Starr 2004). Globalisation, in another words, can be regarded as an existential 
question for transnational elites. 
These observations about the identification of business and political 
elites with globalisation as a form of historical agency are analogous to a 
number of other claims in literature. Hans Jürgen Krysmanski (2012, 23), for 
instance, argues that a central element in the 1990s globalisation zeitgeist was 
the belief that, after the cold war, the “bourgeois civil society” would bring 
peace and prosperity to the world through the extension of markets. The idea 
of a world united by peaceful commerce can be found already in the Kantian 
visions of the European bourgeoisie of the eighteenth century (Koselleck 
1988), and it was also part and parcel of the US imperialist vision claiming to 
bring liberty to the world (Anderson 2013). Notably, Krysmanski (2012, 24) 
claims that September 11, 2001, buried such visions of global peace. Yet, as my 
analysis of the FT’s globalisation discourse in the early 2000s indicates, 
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visions of a world brought together by trade and market integration, paving 
the way towards global prosperity and inclusion, still inspire participants in 
TEC. There is certainly recognition of challenges to this vision, including 
political opposition, military conflicts and global terrorism, but the utopian 
vision has not entirely disappeared: the world can still be united, in principle, 
under liberal capitalism. 
Cosmopolitan commitments 
As the preceding discussion suggests, as a political project that generates 
growth, lifts people out of poverty, increases general welfare and extends 
economic freedom, globalisation was articulated in the FT as a central 
historical purpose for collective elite agency. As such, it may be the most 
prevalent yet not the only value-related social purpose that was promoted in 
the FT coverage of the Davos forum. While the association of globalisation with 
the values of growth and freedom allowed business leaders and policymakers 
to see themselves as being on a liberating mission, there were other ways in 
which elite agency became articulated in terms of making the world a better 
place. Indeed, the pursuit of profit, growth and other purely “economic” goals, 
even as they were associated with the general good, did not exhaust the social 
commitments communicated by Davos forum participants. 
In this respect, Friesen (2012, 95–101) identifies a clear turning point in 
the Davos forum agenda. Having been characterised in the 1980s and early 
1990s by “narrowly defined business interests”, the agenda moved decisively 
towards addressing broader societal concerns from the late 1990s. She locates 
the shift in the 1995 forum, when the meeting was themed “Leadership for 
challenges beyond growth”. After that, Friesen argues, “panels on 
globalisation, security, corporate social responsibility, economic justice, and 
individual responsibility came to occupy a substantial place on the program” 
(ibid., 95). The role that transnational businesses, in particular, ought to play 
in solving global problems became an important topic at Davos. Friesen (ibid., 
109–10) describes how at the 1997 meeting, businesses were urged to consider 
their social responsibilities by politicians, Nobel laureates, the UN secretary 
general, as well as several chief executives, and argues that the shifts in agenda 
demonstrated increased rejection of the previously-dominant neoliberal faith 
in free markets and their ability to solve social ills without the need for active 
interventions. For her, this shift in discourse amounted to an implicit, if not 
explicit, acknowledgement that the neoliberal rules imposed by the 
Washington Consensus, purported to improve economic efficiency and global 
prosperity, had not delivered what they promised by way of social welfare 
(ibid., 130). 
As also documented by Pigman (2007, 128–32), the inclusion of more 
NGO’s and labour leaders, the formulation of a more civil-society-attentive 
agenda, and the introduction and promotion of the Global Compact, designed 
by the UN and TNCs as a voluntary initiative to involve companies with UN 
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programs, were some of the concrete measures by which the new shift towards 
a growing emphasis on social responsibility over unregulated business and 
profit-seeking was evident (Friesen 2012, 131–2). In short, Friesen (2012, 128) 
observes that the “normative and social responsibility aspects of economic 
globalisation became more important each year” and that “Davos shifted from 
a forum designed to help business understand the global business 
environment to an organization playing a part in shaping the global agenda”. 
Through its constant “consciousness raising” and efforts to shape the world-
views of its participants, she argues, the forum had a notable impact on 
business leaders. The idea of businesses carrying out morally good deeds 
beyond the maximising of immediate profit became increasingly acceptable, 
paving the way for a “two track argument” about the mutual benefits for 
society and business from such actions (ibid., 145). At the same time, business 
leaders demonstrated increasing interest in getting involved in the 
formulation of global rules guiding international policy-making (ibid., 101). 
The promotion of social awareness at Davos also made its way into the 
FT reporting from the forum. As Table 4.2 in Chapter 4 indicated, the forum 
coverage included a variety of issues not directly related to the core of the 
global economy as traditionally understood, including questions of 
development and climate change. Clearly, then, the business and policy elites 
gathered in Davos are presented in FT as a group that is concerned with a 
broader set of questions than merely those immediately related to the bottom 
line or narrow economic interests. A “Davos Diary” news brief from the 2005 
forum makes exactly this point. Reporting on the results of an electronic poll, 
the article revealed that Davos attendees “ranked global poverty the number 
one priority issue, followed by equitable globalisation and climate change” and 
pointed out that “global economy came in eighth” (A174/2005).  
As discussed in Chapter 5.1, the “extra-economic” issues are closely 
connected and even partly embedded within the array of concerns related to 
the global economy. Thus, they may, to a degree, merge within the ontology of 
the global economy and reproduce the same core values and ideals of elite 
agency, including growth and liberation, as those topics that are more 
explicitly articulated in terms of the global economy. Yet these other topics 
also evoke a related but distinct set of ideals, including democracy, human 
rights, internationalism and social responsibility, which are more in tune with 
a cosmopolitan vision of world society or world polity than the global economy 
in its traditional sense (e.g., Beck 2006; Fine 2007). It is therefore not only 
norms and values derived from the perceived imperatives of the global 
economy against which the actions of the business leaders and policymakers 
are measured in TEC; they are also addressed as ethical societal agents in a 
broader sense. But the promotion of cosmopolitan societal values and 
principles may also lead to contradictions if they are seen to clash with core 
economic values or imperatives (cf. Fraser 2014, 68–9). In what follows, let us 
briefly observe the representation of three sets of world-societal values and 
ideals that are apparent in the material – democracy and human rights, 
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internationalism, and social responsibility – and pay attention to the different 
ways in which FT journalism deals with these tensions, usually implicitly but 
sometimes explicitly. 
(1) First, democracy and human rights typically appeared in the FT as 
unequivocally desirable goals, which ought to be supported as inherent values. 
In the coverage of the Davos forum, they sometimes emerged as norms against 
which the countries and leaders were being judged. For instance, a 2005 report 
observed how the Chinese delegates at the forum were not only receiving 
tributes to the recent economic success of the country but were “also having to 
cope with awkward questions about human rights and democracy” 
(A173/2005). Criticism was also occasionally levelled at western leaders for 
their support of non-democratic regimes. For instance, in his 2008 article 
“Freedom, up to a point”, David Gardner took a critical look at the fallout of 
the Bush administration’s democracy promotion in the Middle East and “the 
Muslim world”, noting that “in strategically vital countries such as Egypt, the 
west has not really pressed the democracy argument” (A334/2008, DG). In his 
favourable take on the UN’s Global Compact, Alan Pike, in turn, explained how 
the initiative emerged from the need to persuade the corporate sector to 
“tackle” human rights, acceptable labour conditions and environmental 
standards (A6/2001, AP). Democracy and human rights thus often worked as 
universal values against which even corporate leaders should be held 
accountable and which they should promote as part of their business practices. 
The promotion of democracy and human rights, however, is often ill at 
ease with the policy objectives of liberalisation and global market integration. 
That the Davos forum welcomes business and political leaders from countries 
that are considered non-democratic indicates that upholding democracy and 
human rights cannot be a precondition for the acceptance to the club. 
Therefore, to actively promote these values would raise uncomfortable 
questions about the democratic credentials of Davos participants themselves. 
Moreover, the very ideas of liberalisation and globalisation as universally 
desirable economic policies do not correspond well with the notions of 
national sovereignty and viable policy alternatives that are part and parcel of 
democratic processes. As Kantola (2007) discovered in her study on the FT’s 
editorial coverage of national elections, politics, as an expression of popular 
will, is often represented in the paper as a threat to the observation of sound 
economic policies. This view is also evident in the way the FT discusses 
national politics in terms of the uncertainties it causes in the political 
governance of the global economy and how it may risk to prevent the further 
liberalisation of trade and investments. As a result, the imperatives of the 
capitalist global economy are often at odds with the principle of democracy, 
and thus there is a marked contradiction in the promotion of democracy as a 
value and norm in the global economy.  
Such tensions may partly explain why the values of democracy and 
human rights attract only limited attention in the FT coverage of the Davos 
forum. Overall, democracy is explicitly mentioned 75 times in the material 
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(human rights occurs 19 times), which is comparable to the 70 occurrences of 
liberalisation but certainly in another league to growth (695 mentions) and 
globalisation (330 mentions). Aside from the controversial “freedom agenda” 
of the Bush administration, the FT seldom quotes political and business 
leaders employing the rhetoric of democracy and human rights, and their 
active promotion is primarily relegated in the material to UN representatives, 
international NGOs and civil society movements. In this way, the issues of 
human rights and democracy are implicitly handed over to these “specialised” 
groups and institutions and not presented consistently as something that is of 
key concern to governments, corporations or Bretton Woods organisations. As 
far as normative agency is concerned, the Davos elite appear to be more 
concerned about improving the state of the world in terms of creating more 
economic growth and welfare than by expanding the political and social rights 
of the world’s majorities.  
The relative prevalence of economic values also means that, occasionally, 
democracy and human rights as values are demoted in TEC to a status of 
instrumental values, gaining significance only as secondary goals which may 
or may not help to create more economic prosperity for the people. For 
instance, in his 2004 article comparing the recent economic and political 
developments of India and China, Victor Mallet pointed out that China’s more 
rapid economic growth was explained by “China’s admirers”, who include 
“many western business executives”, partly as an effect of its leaders’ ability to 
make “painful but necessary decisions without the inconvenient delays and 
reversals that plague democracies such as India” (A118/2004, VM). Gideon 
Rachman made the case even more bluntly, stating that the “constituency for 
enlightened despotism is strong among businessmen, such as those now 
assembling in Davos for the World Economic Forum”. According to them, 
Rachman continued, “authoritarian rule has its virtues” and “a premature 
move to democracy would invite only anarchy”. Rachman also implied that the 
views of business leaders are understandable, because “many of their best 
markets are countries that do not do well in the Freedom House rankings”. 
(A309/2008, GR.) In other words, from the perspective of the global economy 
in general, and transnational business in particular, it may be perfectly 
sensible for members of transnational elites to support, and do business with, 
“non-democratic” regimes. Moreover, if one continues to make the conclusion 
that democracy emerges only gradually with the rise of living standards, 
welfare and levels of education, one can even justify prioritising economic 
growth over democratic reforms by resorting to the very principle of 
democracy. 
(2) Second, another set of values and ideals repeatedly articulated in the 
material was associated with what might be loosely termed as 
internationalism. This refers to a commitment and interest in global affairs as 
well as to the adoption of a non-nationalist and non-parochial approach to 
social issues. Of course, as a personal disposition and cultural trait, liberal 
internationalism itself has sometimes been associated with the business and 
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policy elites who gather at Davos (see Huntington 1996). Operating within 
transnational networks and spaces, they are assumed to develop an 
“international” lifestyle and actively seek international networks and 
cooperation to address common concerns. Accordingly, individual members 
of the elite could be evaluated by FT reporters against the norm of 
internationalism by referring to their apparent willingness to participate in 
international arenas and affairs instead of isolating themselves from the stage 
of global politics. In his interview with Angela Merkel, the German chancellor, 
ahead of the 2007 forum, Benoit Bertrand, for instance, expected that “the 
cosmopolitan crowd that converges on Davos” would be delighted to find out 
that, far from “turning her back on international politics”, Merkel “has carved 
an ambitious international agenda for 2007” (A246/2007, BB). Merkel’s 
ambitions concerning world politics, as well as her apparent appetite for 
international elite gatherings, was then presented as a welcome indication that 
the German leader shared the cosmopolitan attitudes of international business 
leaders and policymakers. 
While occasionally present in the characterisation of individual Davos 
participants and their personal dispositions, the ideal of internationalism 
could more readily be observed in discussions of world politics. Here it was 
usually used to judge the approach of governments to international 
cooperation and articulated in the notion of multilateralism. That decisions, 
agreements and policies should be negotiated and reached collectively or 
between many participants, rather than being dictated by one actor 
(“unilateralism”) or involving only two actors (“bilateralism”), worked as a 
general principle that could be applied to various issues and in multiple arenas 
in FT journalism. Most notably, these included the WTO negotiations on trade 
liberalisation, where multilateralism operated as a central justification. 
According to such arguments, multilateral negotiations prevented the world 
from disintegrating into “hostile trade blocs” A34/2001, GJ/FW), guaranteed 
a system of trade based on rules, and protected the “weak” countries from “the 
harsh law of the jungle and bare-knuckle bullying” by the powerful countries 
(A205/2006, GJ). As the “multilateral” route towards trade liberalisation, the 
WTO process thus constantly compared favourably to the prospect of bilateral 
or regional agreements. 
Foreign policy was another topic around which multilateralism was 
operationalised in FT journalism to evaluate the conduct of political leaders. 
Accordingly, governments were expected to solve conflicts by resorting to 
multilateral mechanisms of conflict resolution. After the September 11 
terrorist attacks, particularly the Bush administration’s “unilateral” approach 
to the war on terror raised concerns in FT journalism (see Chapter 6.2). In the 
broader critiques of the adverse effects on the geopolitical and economic 
stability of the Bush administration’s conduct in international arenas, 
multilateralism operated as a central principle against which the US foreign 
policy was made sense of and judged. Quentin Peel’s assessment of the 
significance of Bush’s re-election in 2005 illustrates the frankness with which 
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FT journalists tended to condemn the Bush administration in this regard: 
“Opinion is divided on whether a second four years will result in a more 
diplomatic and inclusive administration, or whether Mr Bush will pursue his 
unilateralist agenda with the same single-mindedness as in his first term” 
(A163/2005, QP). 
Critical assessments of US policy in terms of its perceived unilateralism 
did not end with the change of administration.117 After Obama’s first year in 
office, Gillian Tett claimed in 2010 that “it was the issue of US unilateralism 
that haunted the financial reform debates in Davos”, putting an end to the 
“naive hope” among the forum participants that the Obama administration 
“would deliver a multilateral US policy approach” (A469/2010, GT). However, 
here the norm of multilateralism was extended beyond geopolitical and 
military conflicts to the topic of financial regulation. Accordingly, as a 
reference to international coordination and cooperation, multilateralism 
worked as a principle that could be attributed practically to all policy areas 
from climate change to international regulation and global governance. 
Multilateralism, in short, emerged in the Davos forum coverage as the 
principle through which the world operates, or should operate, in unity and 
peaceful cooperation. This self-evidence of the desirability of multilateralism 
in FT journalism may be grounded in the broader elite discourse on global 
governance in which cooperation and collaboration emerge as key notions. 
Indeed, in their interviews with Bilderberg attendees, Richardson and 
colleagues (2011, 211) observed that collaboration was such a self-evident part 
of their rationality that “to question it is to appear laughably naïve in the ways 
of the world”. Similarly, in the FT journalism addressing the international 
business and policymaking elites, the unilateralist factions of US foreign policy 
elite often appear, if not laughably naïve, at least “single-minded” and 
unsophisticated.  
(3) Third, as a form of global consciousness – or a sense of one’s moral 
obligation towards other people and living beings which transcends narrow 
boundaries and extends to the world as a whole – the principle of  
cosmopolitanism can be seen to associate with an expressed concern for a 
number of concrete issues articulated in terms of social responsibility. In the 
FT coverage of the Davos forum, these global concerns included poverty, 
curable diseases, as well as climate change and other environmental problems. 
 
                                                   
117 Concerns of US unilateralism appear to be a general feature of global elite communication 
and thus transcend both FT journalism and the Bush administration’s years in power. As 
observed by Richardson and colleagues (2011, 50–1), some of the Bilderberg attendees 
condemned Bush policies in their interviews and questioned the “legitimacy” of the United 
States in world politics, stressing the virtues of diplomatic efforts and the consideration 
of ”global public opinion”. Similarly, Gill (1990, 201) suggests that the Trilateral Commission 
is part of a broader ”international establishment” that stabilises international relations and 
possibly also moderates the unilateralism of the United States.   
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Alleviation of global poverty featured strongly in the FT coverage, particularly 
in 2001 and 2002, and then again during the 2005 and 2006 forums. As 
already discussed, the former period marked the rise of the global justice 
movement and reflected Davos discussions on the effects of economic 
globalisation on the planet and on the poor. The second flurry of talk around 
poverty coincided with a number of issues, including the UN report on the 
Millennium Development Goals, pledges by the G8 to alleviate poverty, the 
launching of the Red brand by Bono at Davos, as well as international relief 
efforts following the Asian tsunami. In addition to poverty, this development 
agenda included other problems mainly associated with the global south, 
particularly HIV/Aids and other infectious diseases, but also food security and 
water sustainability. Climate change, in turn, was a prevalent theme in the 
coverage from 2005 to 2008 (see Table 4.2 in Chapter 4).  
Featured in the public agenda of the forum and identified as global 
problems, the implication was that the cosmopolitan business and political 
elites gathered in Davos were expected to address these issues. Here the 
assumed awareness of global interdependences translated into a call for 
action, summed up in the forum’s slogan “committed to improving the state of 
the world”. This moral obligation to act in the face of environmental problems 
and human suffering potentially derives from their identification as “the 
world’s leaders” with genuine global and agency and power (see Chapter 6.2). 
The distinctive feature in these calls to address poverty, preventable illnesses 
and environmental problems was that, aside from governments or the 
international community in the abstract, they were often directed specifically 
at the business contingency of the Davos forum. Getting the corporate elite 
involved in financing human development programs and adopting better 
environment and labour standards was the stated objective of many speakers 
and interviewees at the forum, including political leaders, CSO representatives 
and the UN secretary general. Members of the private sector were also 
frequently quoted by FT journalists, arguing that the business community 
needed contribute more to the collective efforts of tackling global problems.  
Debates on the role of businesses in solving global problems featured two 
models of cosmopolitan behaviour for corporate executives: personal 
philanthropy and corporate social responsibility. FT reporters occasionally 
mentioned specific events on philanthropy hosted at the Davos forum by 
celebrities such as Angelina Jolie and Sharon Stone. More importantly, a few 
“celebrity philanthropists”, most notably Bill Gates and George Soros, featured 
prominently in the FT coverage of the forum. As FT journalists frequently 
reported on the generous donations to development projects by the Bill and 
Melinda Gates Foundation, Gates appeared first and foremost as 
philanthropist in the forum coverage, and only secondarily as the head of 
Microsoft. Soros, for his part, featured both as a philanthropist and as a major 
financier, not only voicing normative opinions on the need for businesses to 
get involved in human development, but also presenting his views as an expert 
on market developments, economic policies and financial regulation. Overall, 
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Soros appeared in a total of 17 articles in the material, whereas Gates was 
quoted or referred to in no less than 30 articles. Together, they operated as 
representatives of business elite activism for the social good, as well as voices 
of moral conscience whose role was to push both political and business leaders 
to do more for the global poor, or to otherwise restore moral conduct and 
prudence within the business community. Their celebrated philanthropic 
efforts hence granted these individuals a distinct status as role models for elite 
social responsibility. 
Personal philanthropy aside, corporate social responsibility, or CSR, 
represents a more institutional and systematic model for business leaders to 
address societal ills. In her 2005 article on the issue, Alison Maitland observed 
that companies were increasingly beginning to “work together, alongside 
governments and development agencies” to tackle “the world’s challenges”: 
As the World Economic Forum calls for action from all sides to tackle 
poverty, disease and the lack of education, some answers to the world’s 
challenges are already emerging from boardrooms around the globe. One 
trend is for companies to begin working together, alongside governments 
and development agencies, on problems too big for any one group to handle 
alone, such as the Aids pandemic. “We are definitely seeing a much more 
sophisticated approach from companies that have been pioneers of 
community work,” says Jane Nelson, an international expert on corporate 
responsibility and author of Partnering for Success, a report from the 
World Economic Forum's project on global corporate citizenship. … “It is 
not enough to avoid harm,” says Ms Florini, who is senior fellow in 
governance studies at the Brookings Institution in Washington. “The 
business sector needs to be actively thinking about positive steps it can take, 
partly to restore trust and partly in its own interests. Businesses that catch 
on to this more quickly and start positioning themselves, not just in PR 
terms but in terms of business strategies, are the ones that are going to 
benefit very substantially in the long term.” (A194/2005, AM.)  
Overall, the FT presented CSR as a regular topic of discussion at the Davos 
forum. It emerged as a particular way to speak, one promoted especially by the 
forum, about businesses’ social commitments. As FT journalists repeatedly 
pointed out, TNCs regularly donate funds for, or otherwise participate in, 
government-led or UN-led programs that address global problems, including 
diseases, lack of education, environmental issues and disaster relief. A more 
substantial dimension of CSR involves changing the ways the companies 
operate in their daily transactions. Hence the CSR discourse on the duty of 
businesses to actively participate in the solution of global issues, rather than 
being part of the problem, included not only donations and involvement in 
specific programs, but also the idea of changing business practices to address 
environmental, labour and human rights issues. 
The idea that businesses should help pursue such goals is obviously much 
older than the present debate on CSR. Barnet and Müller (1974, 124), for 
instance, argue that, already in the 1970s, TNCs faced increasing doubts 
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concerning their contribution to actual human development and growing 
pressures to demonstrate “that they have answers to the problems of world 
poverty”. Similarly, Colin Crouch (2011, 134–43) claims that the contemporary 
CSR practices result from the pressures emergent in TNCs’ social and political 
environment, including the concerted CSO campaigns that mobilise public 
opinion and customers, rendering TNCs as objects of political action. The CSR 
discourse and practices thus demonstrate that TNCs are increasingly 
recognised as politically and socially responsible actors (ibid., 169).  However, 
the discourse also reproduces an ontology of world society in which TNCs play 
a great role and influence and in which the political system and civil society 
adapt to this new “reality”. As Crouch (ibid., 134) sums up, the discourse of 
CSR is effectively about the capacity of CEOs to pursue public policy goals, or 
“global goods”, alongside states and IGOs. The CSR discourse thus partly 
serves to legitimise and naturalise the political and social power of TNCs. 
In the broader context of the ideas and values that articulate elite agency 
in the global economy, (corporate) social responsibility must obviously 
negotiate with the core economic ideal of growth, particularly when 
understood in terms of private profit. The apparent contradictions between 
the two norms was not missed by FT journalists, and the coverage of the CSR 
debate tended to oscillate between the view that companies exist only to seek 
profit and the claim that they have broader responsibilities. From the former 
perspective, the whole Davos chatter on CSR appears as nothing but a publicity 
stunt by executives who know that it is important to be seen to be ethical. For 
critics, resorting to voluntary initiatives from TNCs is therefore an inadequate 
way to address the social and environmental impact of private business, and, 
instead, legislative and regulative changes are needed to shape private 
incentives towards more socially responsible and sustainable practices. These 
views were particularly visible in the debates on climate change, as FT 
reporters often expressed and cited sceptical remarks about the true motives 
of TNCs in promoting the issue. In anticipation of the 2008 forum, for 
instance, Andrew Edgecliffe-Johnson made a personal observation that many 
corporate leaders appeared to have realised that climate change was not 
simply an opportunity for some positive brand building but also a direct 
challenge to their businesses; ”that there is also an impact on the bottom line”. 
Yet, the general wariness of the FT reporters regarding the businesses’ true 
intentions can be witnessed in Edgecliffe-Johnson’s cautious conclusion that 
”this is an issue of more urgency this year for the corporate world and a bit less 
flam and PR” (A311/2008, AEJ, emphasis added). 
Those promoting CSR, in contrast, start from an entirely different 
proposition, as illustrated by the above passage from Maitland’s article. 
Adopting the view that naturalises the political power of TNCs, it points to 
“problems too big for any one group to handle” and thus emphasises the 
importance of getting businesses to “work together” with other actors in world 
society. To achieve this, corporate leaders should be persuaded to view CSR 
practices as beneficial for their business operations, both in terms of 
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reputation and profit, and in terms of shaping a more stable and lucrative 
general business environment. From this perspective, engaging in CSR can 
even be presented as giving companies an edge over their competitors, helping 
them “to benefit very substantially in the long term”. In this regard, one heavily 
promoted event at the Davos forum related to the 2006 presentation of Bono’s 
Red brand, which offers companies the opportunity to launch a specific 
product line using the brand with the premise that part of the profits are 
channelled into the fight against HIV/Aids in Africa. The Red concept is the 
most direct example of CSR in which companies do not need to make a choice 
between profits and helping the poor. In this way, the apparent chasm between 
social responsibility and private profit is rhetorically bridged, and CSR can be 
turned into a win-win model for both business and world society.   
In sum, cosmopolitan values and ideals seem to play a significant role in 
the transnational elite’s epistemic work as normative elements of its collective 
agency. However, FT journalism adopted an ambivalent approach to these 
dimensions of the elites’ social purpose. On one hand, by covering debates on 
global problems, and by granting headlines to celebrity philanthropists and 
activists from Bill Gates to Bono, the FT participated in the construction of the 
Davos forum’s public agenda of promoting a sense of social responsibility 
among transnational elites. The FT reproduced the notion of the Davos forum 
as a place for the globally and ethically conscious actors united by their 
commitment to make the world a better place, and thus it enabled the 
identification of transnational elites as a progressive force in world society. On 
the other hand, FT reporters frequently expressed doubts about the ”true” 
intentions of Davos participants, implying that, instead of holding egalitarian 
values, self-interest and opportunism prevailed among business and political 
leaders. Such sceptical views were mostly expressed in a form of irony, 
targeted at individual Davos delegates or the generalised figure of the Davos 
Man, and took place not in the news articles but in columns that by definition 
adopt a sharper and more ironic language (see Chapter 6.4). More 
importantly, however, the promotion of cosmopolitan values as the basis of 
transnational elite agency was undermined in the elites’ epistemic work by 
their relative marginalisation in relation to what might be termed as the 
paradigmatic values and ideals of the transnational elite: securing growth and 
integrating the global economy through liberalisation. Because growth and 
globalisation mostly appeared in the FT discourse as being in the general 
interest of the world, they made it possible to articulate transnational elite 
agency in terms of a positive historical purpose. Other societal commitments 
existed in a complementary, if at times delicate, relationship with these 
paradigmatic ideas. 
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7.3 Disintegration and common purpose after the 
financial crisis 
This chapter has focused on how the epistemic work of transnational elites 
articulates elite agency in terms of certain economic values, cosmopolitan 
ideals, as well as notions of common objectives and social purpose. In this 
respect, globalisation emerges as a central notion that brings together growth, 
liberalisation and the notion of general good into a narrative of the 
transnational elites’ historical agency. Thus far, however, the analysis has been 
largely limited to the period before the global financial crisis. For the 
remainder of this chapter, we take a closer look at how the crisis impacts on 
the epistemic work on the elite’s agency, and especially on the narrative of 
globalisation as a common historical purpose that purportedly brings the elite 
together. 
Loss of consensus 
As discussed in preceding analysis, transnational elite communication, as it is 
mediated and shaped by the FT, displays a rather unified understanding of 
globalisation as a desirable, yet policy-dependent, drive to integrate the global 
economy via market liberalisation. Yet it is also evident that this apparent elite 
consensus on one of the key principles of elite agency often failed to materialise 
in concrete policy decisions. The repeatedly frustrated negotiations on the 
WTO-led liberalisation of trade are a case in point, as the elites failed to reach 
a comprehensive multilateral trade agreement. This presents a difficult 
conundrum: if liberalisation is a universally beneficial political project, why is 
it so difficult to realise?  
FT journalists repeatedly sought explanations for the elite’s failure to act 
in accordance with this purportedly shared principle. The most obvious 
conclusion concerns the apparent nature of trade negotiations as a form of 
inter-governmental bargaining whose zero-sum logic overrides the 
perspective of universal benefits. Accordingly, governments come to the table 
with conflicting “national interests”, which results in a loss of a common 
agenda. Descriptions along these lines were commonplace in numerous FT 
reports and analyses on the disagreements and conflicting positions between 
various countries or country blocs. However, the stalling negotiations also 
implied something more serious than the existence of clashing bargaining 
positions and mundane disagreements between governments. The failure to 
reach a deal on trade prompted interpretations of a more fundamental 
problem: that liberalisation was losing its political momentum. As already 
indicated in the previous section, the problems in WTO talks were sometimes 
attributed to the governments’ difficulties in “winning domestic support” for 
further liberalisation due to temporary economic problems, “obstructive” 
efforts by industrial lobbying groups and the “critics of globalisation” 
(A35/2001, Editorial). As drivers of globalisation, the international business 
The globalising elite: Values, ideals and social purpose 
292 
 
and policy elites had harder time realising their agency because of mounting 
domestic resistance to the project.  
Yet, as the negotiations kept stalling, doubts also emerged about whether 
the elites themselves actually shared a commitment to liberalisation. In 2006, 
for instance, Guy de Jonquières suggested that, as the focus of the WTO 
negotiations had moved from simple issues like trade barriers to more 
“sensitive” areas such as services, which many countries wanted to keep safe 
from open competition, governments had become more protective of their 
“right to regulate”. In tandem, the very premise that had linked the freeing of 
trade with economic growth was becoming more suspect. “Not only has the 
World Bank recently cut its estimates of the gains to poor nations” de 
Jonquières noted, “but the strength” of global growth in the middle of the 
2000s had “taken some of the edge off arguments that the Doha round is 
needed” in order to stimulate growth. (A205/2006, GJ.)  
In sum, the failing WTO talks revealed the weakening of liberalisation 
and globalisation as organising principles for elite agency in two ways. First, 
the very nature of the negotiations tended to reinforce the sense of national 
identities among the elites and to lead them to conceive of their agency in 
terms of national interests and sovereignty rather than universal interests, 
multilateral rule-making and global governance. Second, the key conceptual 
connection between liberalisation and growth, which had given a powerful 
ideological motive to the opening of domestic markets to foreign competitors, 
was losing some of its credibility, making it less irrational for leaders to reject 
the dictates of IGOs and TNCs. 
If anything, the global financial crisis appeared to exacerbate this 
ideological confusion and loss of common purpose. In FT journalism, the crisis 
was repeatedly made sense of not simply as a financial and economic event, 
but also in terms of an intellectual shock, signalling a cognitive disorientation 
and loss of trust among the elites in some of their central beliefs and principles. 
As already observed in Chapter 5.2, much of this apparent questioning of 
previously taken-for-granted assumptions concerned the nature of financial 
system and its position in the global economy. But it also extended to other 
principles of faith, including certain theoretical ideas and practical rules of 
thumb that guided economic and monetary policies. Chris Giles, for instance, 
argued how “the Greenspan doctrine” of inflation targeting had been 
“tarnished at best” by the global credit bubble (A372/2009, CG). Gillian Tett 
made the case that “faith in economics in general - and efficient market 
theories in particular ha[d] been undermined” by the recent events, and that 
the dramatic interventions by many governments and central banks to shore 
up faltering banks and businesses had “broken cherished taboos” concerning 
the state’s capacity and right to intervene in the affairs of private businesses 
(A422/2010, GT). Gideon Rachman observed how participants at the 2010 
Davos forum looked at China as “an example of the virtues of ‘state capitalism’ 
- in which government plays a bigger role in guiding the economy than has 
been fashionable in recent years” (A472/2010, GR). Also Tett assessed the 
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same debates on the Chinese economy and indicated that the US model of 
capitalism had become associated unfavourably with “laissez faire economics”. 
Tett cited Tony Tan from the Government of Singapore Investment group, who 
argued that many Asian countries were now questioning the “US and 
European assertions” that the best way to run an economy is a “system of free 
markets and minimal regulation, and large dependence on financial 
institutions and minimum interference by the state”. (A466/2010, GT.) 
In this way, FT reporters indicated that experiences of the global 
financial crisis and the way it was managed had paved the way for considerable 
disorientation, as well as new cleavages, in Davos concerning the ideas and 
principles guiding the global political economy. Among the various aspects of 
this questioning and apparent loss of consensus identified by the FT, the 
doctrine and project of globalisation appeared as the most notable and often-
mentioned casualty. According to these interpretations, the economic crisis 
prompted new evaluations about the benefits and risks of globalisation. In his 
2009 outlook on the global economy, Gideon Rachman spelled out the reasons 
for these apparent strains on the “globalisation consensus”: 
[T]he 2009 meeting of the World Economic Forum is taking place at a time 
when the “globalisation consensus” is under strain as never before. The 
international financial crisis has directly undermined one of the central 
assumptions behind that consensus - the idea that international economic 
integration provides a path to steadily rising prosperity. Instead, at the 
moment, the globalisation of the economy appears to have done the 
opposite - spreading a dangerous economic virus around the world, and 
creating the threat of another global depression. (A382/2008, GR.) 
As the passage indicates, arguments about the dangers of an integrated global 
economy gained new credibility in the financial crisis. Similarly, Gillian Tett 
claimed that the crisis had demonstrated “some of the potential downsides” of 
globalisation (A311/2008, GT). FT reporters thus explicitly brought forward 
the idea that belief in global economic integration as a universally beneficial 
process had marked the thinking of the Davos elite. This “globalisation 
consensus”, as Rachman dubbed it, was now at risk because integration itself 
suddenly appeared as a threatening process that rendered the world and its 
parts more vulnerable to shocks. Globalisation was no longer seen only as 
something that generates growth, but also as a process that could spread a 
“dangerous economic virus” across the system. Moreover, FT journalists 
recognised that this apparent erosion of the long-standing agreement on the 
beneficial nature of globalisation could have major implications “for how we 
run our political economy” (A362/2009, GT). 
If the civil society critiques of the early 2000s against the neoliberal 
policies of liberalisation primarily served to reinforce elite consensus on 
globalisation, the fallout of global financial crisis appeared to be an entirely 
different proposition. Rather than coming from non-elite civil society groups, 
this time the challenge against liberalisation appeared to emerge primarily 
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from within the elites themselves. The principal threat to the globalisation 
project was now presented in terms of the cognitive disarray and increasing 
doubt the elites felt towards the basic premises that had directed economic and 
regulatory policymaking since the end of the cold war. As such, the post-crisis 
disunity marked a much more serious challenge than civil society protests on 
the ideational and normative underpinnings of elite agency.  
Not unlike the global civil society critiques, also the post-crisis challenge 
to globalisation prompted outspoken arguments in defence of the great 
liberalisation process. Gordon Brown’s 2008 op-ed, already quoted in Chapter 
5.2, exemplifies this apparent need to discredit doubters and re-articulate a 
pro-globalisation position in elite communication. Brown did this by making 
sweeping historical arguments about the universal economic benefits of 
globalisation: 
Without the globalisation we have already enjoyed, world trade would not 
have grown twice as fast in the past three years than it averaged in the past 
three decades and the price of our clothes and computers would not have 
halved in the past 10 years. Low inflation is the product not just of prudent 
macroeconomic management in the wake of oil and commodity price rises 
but also the downward pressure from lower prices of Asian goods. 
(A350/2008, GoB.) 
As the passage illustrates, Brown employed counter-factual arguments to 
make a case for the benefits of global economic integration and trade 
liberalisation. Citing recent advances in the growth in trade, falling prices of 
consumer goods and low inflation, Brown’s account of the micro- and 
macroeconomic gains can also be interpreted as a form of collective self-
congratulation over common achievements. In this sense, Brown expressed a 
sense of historical purpose in the collective actions of transnational elites: by 
integrating and liberating the global economy, they had made the world a 
better place. At the same time, as an address to the international elite 
community, Brown’s intervention works as an expression of personal 
commitment and as a call for the elite to unite behind the ideal of globalisation. 
Occasional arguments in favour of further liberalisation 
notwithstanding, in the post-crisis debate, the defence of globalisation 
increasingly took the form of threat rhetoric. Accordingly, observations about 
eroding elite consensus on globalisation were habitually combined with 
warnings about its political and economic implications. The principal question 
obviously concerned the very fate of globalisation as a project of global market 
integration and liberalisation of trade. According to the dominant view, it was 
unclear whether governments would stick to the globalisation agenda, but the 
potential reversal of the trend towards greater liberalisation and integration 
would certainly be bad news for the global economy. In his 2009 article on the 
year’s outlook on world trade, Alan Beattie cited bleak World Bank forecasts 
and speculated on the effects that the global downturn would have on 
governments’ attitudes towards trade barriers: 
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[W]ith the global economy once more plunging back into recession, the 
World Bank, for one, predicts that trade will contract again this year. 
Whether that represents a hiatus or the beginning of a full-scale retreat will 
depend largely on how governments react to the global slowdown. … 
Governments have yet to resort to the kind of actions that helped worsen 
the depression of the 1930s. But with economies sinking into recession and 
unemployment rising, the conditions are becoming more propitious for the 
long-predicted protectionist wave to come. (A371/2009, AB.) 
By alluding to the depression of the 1930s Beattie emphasised the historical 
importance of the decisions governments were undertaking in their response 
to the global slowdown of the late 2000s. The ominous scenario in this regard 
was that leaders around the world would erect the kind of barriers on trade 
which “helped worsen the depression” in the past. While the risk had not yet 
materialised, it was apparently growing as the economic conditions 
deteriorated.  
Beattie’s musings about the threat of a “long-predicted protectionist 
wave” were echoed by Quentin Peel who argued that ”the protectionist 
backlash” represented “the greatest danger for the world in the coming years” 
(A323/2008, QP). Indeed, as an antithesis to the ideal of liberalisation, 
protectionism became a central notion in the post-crisis coverage. Figure 7.1 
illustrates this marked shift in discourse: as liberalisation became almost non-
existent in FT journalism after 2007, protectionism turns into something like 
a new buzzword, especially in the 2009 coverage. Moreover, if the notion of 
protectionism may seem a somewhat mild way to argue against the risks of 
turning away from the liberal orthodoxy, warnings ahead of the 2011 forum 
about a “currency war” (A499/2011, GR) and “trade wars” (A488/2011, AB) 
are examples of more threatening rhetoric. 
Voicing threats about a potential disintegration of the global economy 
could be interpreted as either wildly exaggerated and out of place, or 
influential and even successful in convincing decision makers of the dangers 
inherent in a wrong path of action. As it turns out, there was no significant 
“protectionist backlash” against globalisation, and countries did not impose 
strong controls on cross-border trade and capital flows anywhere near the 
scope of the 1930s. Thus, while warnings continued to abound, the apparent 
achievement of a collective commitment by political leaders to refrain from 
competitive protectionist measures was also noted in FT journalism in 
subsequent years. Accordingly, citing a recent IMF study on the effects of 
recent policy measures on world trade, Alan Beattie observed that “the frothy 
rhetoric of protectionism and trade conflict have yet to break out into anything 
particularly substantive” (A488/2011, AB). In her column in the 2011 Davos 
guide, Christine Lagarde, France’s minister for the economy, finance and 
industry, presented this as a proof that “we had learned the lesson of the Great 
Depression” (A483/2011, CL). 
The globalising elite: Values, ideals and social purpose 
296 
 
 
Figure 7.1 Yearly occurrences of “liberalisation”* and “protectionism/protectionist”** 
in the material 
*N= 71, **N=137. 
Elite divides 
Despite the apparently successful avoidance of a protectionist backlash in the 
wake of the financial crisis, references to an eroding elite consensus continued 
to appear in the FT in 2010 and 2011. Part of the reason is that, while the 
apparent loss of elite consensus on globalisation was frequently associated 
with the financial crisis and its disorienting impact on the ideational compass 
of international business leaders, politicians and officials, it was also related 
to a discourse about a more fundamental and long-term shift in the global 
political economy. Accordingly, the erosion of consensus argument was 
increasingly expressed within a narrative of a “global power shift”. In this 
account, globalisation was contributing to the rise of emerging economies, 
most notably China and other Asian countries, while weakening the position 
of western economies. The very progress of globalisation itself and its 
economic consequences hence emerged as a major explanatory factor when 
explaining the apparent loss of elite unity. In his 2010 article, Gideon 
Rachman articulated the power shift narrative in an illustrative manner: 
Since the end of the cold war, discussions at the World Economic Forum in 
Davos have followed a reliable pattern. Everybody agreed that 
globalisation was a jolly good thing - but it was the delegates from the US 
and Europe who shaped the debate. It was informally accepted that the 
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flow of ideas - as well as investment and jobs - was from west to east. The 
global financial crisis has changed all that. … Struggling with bulging 
deficits and high unemployment - and uneasily conscious of a shift of power 
to the east - western leaders are questioning many of the ideas that 
underpinned the old Davos consensus. These days, it is the Asian nations 
and the big emerging economies that are most comfortable with 
globalisation - and it is they that are urging the westerners not to give up 
on free trade. (A472/2010, GR.)  
Rachman’s analysis thus assessed the factors behind what he perceived as the 
breaking of the “old Davos consensus”. Tracing the debate on globalisation 
back to the 1990s, he identified US and European leaders as those shaping the 
consensus view that liberalisation was in the benefit of all. After the financial 
crisis, which hit western economies the hardest, the same consensus was now 
being questioned by western leaders themselves. In Rachman’s view, the 
reason for this questioning lay in the economic difficulties western leaders 
found their countries in, as well as in their experience of a “shift of power to 
the east”. Conversely, as the main beneficiaries of globalisation in wake of the 
financial crisis, Asian elites had become the most vocal supporters of global 
market integration.  
In this way, Rachman indicated that the aftermath of the global financial 
crisis had increased a sense of conflicting interests in the global economy and 
eroded the belief that globalisation equally benefits everyone. In his 2011 
column, Martin Wolf elaborated this interpretation, arguing that there was a 
“new shape to the world economy”: because non-western economies were not 
suffering from the economic hardships to the same extent as the west, the 
fallout of the financial crisis and the following economic downturn had led to 
the perception that “this is a divided world” (A489/2011, MW). FT reporters 
thus connected the erosion of globalisation as an orienting concept in 
international politics to the shifting power in the global economy. In this 
account, as long as the power and economic benefits kept concentrating to the 
west, western elites argued that globalisation provided universal benefits. It 
was only when economic growth concentrated outside the west that they 
started to lose faith in globalisation. 
On the whole, the post-crisis debate on globalisation increasingly 
emphasised the presence of conflicting interests, as well as international and 
geopolitical divides. Typically, FT reporters represented these rifts as 
challenges to the US and European dominance in the global political economy. 
Thus, when Wen Jiabao and Vladimir Putin addressed the forum in 2009, the 
main news report of their speeches was titled “Wen and Putin criticise western 
leaders at Davos” (A393/2009).118 In other stories, Wen was quoted blaming 
 
                                                   
118 The article itself revealed the FT reporters’ somewhat blatant bias against these alleged 
critics of western leaders. The Chinese and Russian leaders were described “lecturing” their 
western counterparts “for policy failures” that led to the financial crisis. Putin reportedly 
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the United States for triggering the financial crisis due to its fiscal and trade 
deficits, as well as “high consumption based on massive borrowing” 
(A410/2009, LB/GD/JK/LZ). Putin was presented as calling for a new 
international system of international reserve currencies, which would 
effectively dismantle the privileged position of the US dollar as the world’s 
primary currency (A394/2009, AEJ/GT). 
Aside from challenges to the western-led world order, however, the 
growing divides were reflected in warnings of a new kind of “economic 
nationalism” and the simultaneous disregard of the global economic interest.  
The notion of export-led growth was a key element in these warnings: with a 
sudden deep slowdown in growth and large increases in public deficits in most 
parts of the world, many governments were simultaneously looking to cut 
public investments and jump-start growth by relying on increased exports. 
However, the global financial crisis had disrupted the pre-crisis dynamic in the 
global economy in which the United States operated as the primary source of 
demand (see, e.g., Varoufakis 2013). In the post-crisis global economy that 
suffered from the lack of aggregate demand, it therefore appeared as highly 
problematic that many countries were simultaneously pursuing economic 
policies that weakened their domestic demand for imports and relied on the 
willingness of other countries to maintain current account deficits. Calling for 
“durable rebalancing of demand in the world economy”, Martin Wolf argued 
that “far too many countries are relying on export-led growth” and that “this 
is a recipe for stagnation” (A474/2010, MW). Indeed, FT reporters frequently 
associated the eroding globalisation consensus with mercantilist “beggar-thy-
neighbour” policies in which governments, instead of working together to 
coordinate a new wave of investments to revive private sector growth, 
attempted to gain benefits at the expense of others (A395/2009, CG). Short-
sighted national considerations thus trumped the global economic interest.  
Aside from the perceived need to warn decision-makers of the dangers of 
protectionism and to defend the ideal of liberalisation, the rhetoric of a divided 
elite thus reflected a more general longing for transnational elite that would 
collectively address the common problem of lagging global growth. This ideal 
about a united elite that comes together to solve the problems of the global 
economy resulted logically from the very understanding of the nature of the 
global economy as an interdependent system (see Chapter 5.1). Indeed, as 
suggested in Chapter 6, the transnational elite as an actor identity was closely 
associated in FT journalism with the notion of the (global) economy. As the 
 
                                                   
“mocked” American delegates, and Wen made “scathing comments” about the 
macroeconomic policies “of some unnamed countries” (A393/2009, CB/AEJ/GT/JT). The 
next day’s editorial continued along the same line, arguing that even as some of Putin’s 
observations about the risks to the global economy due to its excessive dependence on the US 
dollar were valid, his message “came loaded with so much anti-US bile” that the address did 
little to help his cause (A400/2009, Editorial). 
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observed allusions to Davos participants as “leaders”, “influencers” and 
“movers and shakers” indicated, they were often presented as decision-makers 
who have power to influence and direct the global political economy through 
engaging in, directing or regulating economic activities.  
In these arguments in favour of collective action and responsibility, the 
Davos forum played a key role. As Rachman’s allusion to the “Davos 
consensus” in the quoted passage above already indicated, the forum worked 
in the post-crisis debate as a symbol of the leaders’ faith in globalisation 
against the mounting threats of disintegration. Globalisation was now referred 
to as “a common project” that had “brought together world leaders” 
(A362/2009, GR). Indeed, for Rachman the Davos forum had been 
instrumental in clarifying a common purpose for the elites: “big business, high 
finance and top politics” were brought together “to promote and celebrate the 
integration of the global economy … whatever their business rivalries or 
political differences … as the road to peace and prosperity” (A412/2010, GR). 
In this way, the notion of globalisation again served to construct the agency of 
transnational elites in terms of a historical purpose and to reinforce the 
perceived need to find common ground on global economic policies. 
Overall, the narrative of the Davos consensus on globalisation can be 
interpreted as a reaction to the perceived threat of elite disunity and potential 
disintegration of the global economy into hostile blocs. However, this also 
meant that the immediate concern after the crisis about the need to “rethink” 
some of the discredited ideas and principles of liberal globalisation were set 
aside, and the very absence of consensus came to be seen as the primary 
problem. Moreover, as the protectionist instincts of politicians emerged as the 
principal risk to the maintenance of open borders for the flows of capital and 
goods, the FT’s post-crisis narrative of the threatening erosion of the 
globalisation consensus can be seen as an implicit expression of the interests 
of western banks and TNCs in preventing major shifts in global economic 
governance. As the threats to the globalisation consensus became articulated 
in terms of clashing national interests, disagreements concerning the 
ideological underpinnings and power imbalances in the governance of the 
global political economy were downplayed. In this regard, the incapacity of the 
FT to cover and mediate any genuine debate on how to respond to the 
mounting tensions caused by the perceived “power shift” in the world order is 
indicative of the failure of transnational elites in preventing subsequent 
eruptions of hostilities, particularly between the western powers and Russia in 
2014 (see, e.g., Sakwa 2015). 
The imperative of collective agency 
As discussed at this chapter’s outset, epistemic work on shared values and 
ideals is a key precondition of the potential of transnational elites for collective 
agency. One of the obvious requirements for any collective agency is that the 
members of the group express commitment to shared goals and know about 
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the commitment of others. In this regard, the Davos forum and the FT function 
as platforms on which business and political elites can and do negotiate shared 
ideals, values and objectives, including economic growth, liberalisation of 
markets and global integration, as well as publicly state their commitment to 
such objectives. In this way, FT-mediated elite communication manifests 
certain ideals and values that potentially justify, rationalise and sanction elite 
activities. In the sense that these principles shape the self-understanding of 
international business and political elites as actors, this reproduction or 
reinforcement of certain organising principles in the global political economy 
can itself be understood as a form of collective agency. The Davos forum and 
the FT, in other words, can be regarded as sites for “collective planning agency” 
in the sense Mitzen (2011, 61–2) uses the term in relation to global governance: 
elite gatherings and media are spaces in which transnational elites attempt to 
formulate ideas and principles according to which to steer the global economy 
(see Chapter 3.4). The popular notion of “policy-planning networks” in the 
literature of international relations and global political economy refers to this 
same phenomenon when characterising elite forums and clubs, including the 
World Economic Forum and Bilderberg. The implicit premise behind the 
notion is the capacity and realisation of a collective (planning) agency by 
members of transnational elites.   
Regarding specific goals and purposes, growth appears in TEC as a highly 
normalised value that is inherently tied to the ontological understanding of the 
nature of the capitalist global economy. As a paradigmatic notion of what is 
desirable and thus beyond any questioning, securing economic growth 
operates as a central objective in judging the conduct of both business and 
policy-making elites. Other commitments that cannot be explicitly questioned 
are the cosmopolitan ideals and norms concerning internationalism, 
cooperation and social responsibility to address global problems. Even as 
doubts may often be raised whether individual business leaders and 
politicians, or the elite as a whole, actually conform to these values, their status 
as desirable goals is hardly suspect. There is both implicit and occasionally 
even explicit acknowledgement, however, that the cosmopolitan ideals exist in 
an uneasy relationship with the economic values, and they must ultimately be 
relegated into secondary position when confronted with the core capitalist 
principles of growth and profit. As a result, considerable epistemic work is 
needed to justify the former so that they do not conflict with the latter. At the 
same time, an implicit division between the “economic” concerns of capitalist 
accumulation, which tend to naturalise an egoistic seek for profit and growth 
in the name of the general benefit, and the “non-economic” concerns of human 
suffering and natural disasters, which call for egalitarian and morally good 
behaviour, serves, in a way, to keep the economic issues outside the realm of 
moral questions. 
Liberalisation offers another example of a value-laden objective, which is 
subject to a fair amount of epistemic work in the FT-mediated TEC. Associated 
positively with economic growth, liberalisation forms, particularly in the early 
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2000s, the unproblematic core of the notion of globalisation as a historical 
purpose of elite agency. However, the second wave of the globalisation debate 
in the post-2007 years of the financial crisis and economic recession marks a 
significant shift in tone. Affirmation of the benefits of liberalisation is replaced 
by warnings of protectionism as the “Davos consensus” on the universal 
benefits of globalisation is declared to be under threat. Davos participants 
appear to be increasingly open to state intervention in the economy, regulation 
of markets, suspicious of finance, less committed to free trade, hesitant about 
globalisation in general, and less inclined to look up to the United States as the 
model of capitalism. The increased precariousness of liberalisation as a 
generally accepted policy objective thus becomes associated with the notion of 
growing international divisions. Observations of elite dissensions are 
complemented with warnings of economic nationalism and the consequent 
deterioration of the global economy. The rhetoric of the Davos consensus on 
globalisation thus amounts to both implicit and explicit calls for renewed elite 
unity and collective agency in the face of common challenges. In this way, the 
key ideals and values evoked in TEC become closely associated with a demand 
for collective agency. 
8 CONCLUSION: TRANSNATIONAL ELITE 
COMMUNICATION AND THE 
CONTRADICTIONS OF LIBERAL 
INTERNATIONALISM 
The growth of transnational financial and production networks has been a 
conspicuous feature of capitalist development after World War 2. Crucial to 
this economic globalisation has been the simultaneous establishment of 
international rules, practices and institutions to ensure a relatively stable 
business environment in which corporations can operate across national 
borders. This study has approached these parallel processes from the 
perspective of transnational elite formation, arguing that efforts to integrate 
elites across the domains of business, politics and administration are an 
inherent part of contemporary global governance. Moreover, within the 
context of the global political economy that is characterised by highly uneven 
power relations, transnational elite formation should be understood as an 
attempt of western elites, particularly those of the United States, to 
incorporate non-western elites into a liberal international order that is friendly 
to transnational business and finance. 
While developing these arguments, the study has occasionally played 
with the idea of “a global elite”. Indeed, the main title of the study is a 
conscious nod to two works to which it is in great debt: Kees van der Pijl’s The 
Making of an Atlantic Ruling Class (2012/1984) and Leo Panitch and Sam 
Gindin’s The Making of Global Capitalism (2012). In his work, van der Pijl 
traces the influence of trans-Atlantic business and policy circles in shaping 
national economic and foreign policies in the United States and European 
countries towards greater Atlantic integration during the twentieth century. 
Panitch and Gindin, in turn, provide a detailed account of US economic and 
foreign policy-making that contributed to global economic integration since 
World War 2. As an adaptation of the titles of these two major works, this study 
employs the notion of the “making of” as a reference to both intentional efforts 
and inadvertent outcomes, facilitated by specific institutions and exclusive 
public spaces, that potentially pave the way towards greater transnational elite 
integration.  
In this regard, the notion of a global elite represents a vision, or the 
hypothetical end-point, of these integrative efforts and processes. It is an 
integrated elite comprising the most powerful decision-makers in the global 
political economy, capable of acting in unison and guiding their institutions in 
a coordinated fashion towards common goals. Obviously, a global elite of this 
kind exists only as a myth or, indeed, as a conspiracy theory. However, 
acknowledging this should not blind us to the actual processes and institutions 
that work towards this goal. They should be perceived precisely as efforts to 
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mitigate inter-elite rivalries and conflicts and as attempts to guide 
transnational elites towards as much coordination and action on the basis of 
shared interests as possible. 
Where the study hopes to contribute to existing work on the international 
political processes of globalisation is its focus on the way particular, exclusive 
forms of communication and media bring together business and policy-
making elites, creating spaces for them to network, interact, develop common 
understandings of reality, share ideas about public policies and negotiate 
differences between competing interests. There has been an increase in recent 
decades in the number of policy-planning groups, think tanks, clubs, 
conferences and retreats that bring together corporate executives, political 
leaders and international officials and facilitate debates on matters of the 
global economy. In addition to such exclusive meeting places, there is a variety 
of international media outlets and publications targeting these elite groups. 
The study has defined these institutions and processes as transnational elite 
communication (TEC), referring to the interpersonal and mediated forms of 
interaction in which members of transnational elites address each other on 
issues of common concern. With specific focus on the World Economic Forum 
and the Financial Times as forms of TEC, the work operates as an inquiry into 
its relevance for transnational elite formation.  
In probing into the nature and significance of TEC, the study has been 
informed by work done in multiple disciplines. Theoretically, however, it has 
drawn especially from three research areas: elite studies, global political 
economy, and communication and media studies. First, elite studies have 
provided important insights into the nature and formation of elites. In this 
regard, the study has been influenced particularly by C. Wright Mills (1956), 
whose notion of the power elite points to the institutional, cultural, social and 
historical conditions which may contribute to concentration of political and 
economic power and to the formation of an increasingly integrated elite. 
Second, scholarship on global political economy has provided this study with 
a historical framework to understand the broad socio-economic and 
institutional context in which contemporary elite formation takes place. In 
addition to the work of van der Pijl, Panitch and Gindin, the study has outlined 
the evolution of the global political economy after World War 2 with the help 
of the works by Ellen Meiksins Wood (2003), Colin Crouch (2011), Bob Jessop 
(2002), Leslie Sklair (2001), William Robinson (2004), David Held and 
Anthony McGrew (2002), and others. Based on this literature, the postwar 
global political economy has been characterised by the US-led drive towards 
increasing market integration. US and western power has also shaped the 
institutions and practices of global economic governance, designed to facilitate 
the world-wide liberalisation of markets.  
Third, the perspective of communication and media studies has 
motivated the analysis of the role of communicative practices, the media, and 
the public sphere in the processes of global governance and transnational elite 
formation. Here the work has drawn on research concerning international elite 
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clubs and forums (e.g., Gill 1990; Pigman 2005; Richardson et al. 2011; 
Tsingou 2015) and international business journalism (e.g., Allen and Savigny 
2012; Davis 2000; 2010; Grünberg and Pallas 2013; Kantola 2007; Madrick 
2002; Merrill 2012). But it is most indebted to the work of Habermas (1989), 
Eley (1992) and others on the formation of the bourgeois public sphere. 
Adopting their insights into the significance of associational life and particular 
discursive practices on the historical rise of the bourgeoisie, the study 
addresses public forms of association and communication as essential 
elements in the potential self-organisation of transnational elites. The next 
section sums up the principal findings of the theoretical exploration into the 
nature of transnational elite integration and the significance of TEC. 
8.1 Transnational elite integration and communication 
As pointed out in Chapter 1, the notion of the elite typically refers to the 
concentration of political power in society to a relatively small number of 
individuals. An institutional view of elites, moreover, understands the 
concentration of power in terms of organisational positions that grant 
individuals in key decision-making positions considerable institutional power. 
Accordingly, the notion of the transnational elite refers to the concentration of 
power in the global political economy to a relatively small number of 
strategically-positioned individuals in organisations that have the capacity to 
wield power transnationally if not globally and have access to the processes of 
global economy governance. In this regard, particularly large TNCs and major 
states can be identified as places to look for transnational elites. Chapter 3 
suggested that their growing power and integration after World War 2 has 
resulted from major transformations in the global economy and developments 
in transnational elite interaction. These can be summarised in terms of US-led 
globalisation and financialization, and in terms of the increasingly close 
interaction between TNCs, governments, central banks and inter-
governmental organisations in the management of economic activities. 
First, emerging from World War 2 as the world’s most formidable 
economic, political and military power, the US state and corporate elites 
cohered, to a significant degree, behind a long-term foreign policy objective of 
liberal internationalism. As observed in Chapter 3.1, this involved the 
promotion of policies in the rest of the capitalist world that advanced the 
liberalisation of markets. With the successful incorporation of most of the 
countries and regions into the liberal economic order, these processes of US-
led globalisation and financialization have paved the way to an increasingly 
integrated global economy and the rise of institutions whose operations and 
outlooks are increasingly global. Most notably, globalisation and 
financialization have increased the power of large, market-dominating TNCs 
in the past four decades. In addition to their capacity to direct markets and 
productive processes, large TNCs also increasingly exert political influence to 
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shape the legislative and regulative environment in their favour. The political 
influence of large TNCs takes a variety of forms from lobbying and political 
campaign financing to establishing industry groups and think tanks or 
financing research.  
Second, the postwar period has seen an increase in the number of 
institutions and organisations for the international coordination of state 
functions needed for the facilitation of transnational business. As discussed in 
Chapter 3.2, this field of global economic governance brings together 
government leaders, central bankers and IGO directors with executives of 
large banks and TNCs and institutional investors. This is a complex field, 
involving multiple processes of planning, negotiation, coordination and 
decision-making with the intention of setting standards and regulating 
economic activities. Global economic governance is not typically based on 
international laws and binding agreements but on voluntarism. It is 
characterised by informal exchanges, coordination and collaboration. 
Governance can thus be understood as practices of coordinating actions 
among willing participants on the basis of norms, informal agreements and 
shared premises.   
Dependent on practices of negotiation and establishment of common 
perceptions, successful global economic governance is thus highly dependent 
on transnational elite integration across the domains of business, politics and 
administration, as well as across the boundaries of nation-states. A 
consequential mechanism, especially for the former dimension of integration, 
has been the “revolving door” that moves individuals back and forth between 
positions in the public and the private sector (see Chapter 1.2). The revolving 
door is significant because of its cultural effect: it increasingly eradicates the 
boundaries between the “private” and “public” roles of elite individuals and 
effectively unifies the social outlooks of individuals moving between these 
social domains. But the integration has also been advanced by the 
multiplication of exclusive communicative spaces, including associations, 
forums and media, targeting the international business and policy-making 
elites, which were introduced in Chapter 2.  
TEC can be regarded as an essential part of the solution to the problem 
of the governance of the global economy. As discussed in Chapter 3.3, the 
forums and media of TEC have emerged partly in response to the needs to 
facilitate improved coordination of activities for the governance of the global 
economy. In this regard, a notable trait of elite associations, forums and 
exclusive media outlets, is their capacity to facilitate “public” deliberation in a 
“private” space: transnational elites come together in these highly exclusive 
spaces to discuss matters of public interest. Both the forums and the 
international elite media operate as platforms of communication that serve to 
establish a common agenda on global governance. Elite forums and media are 
spaces in which elites negotiate and develop shared views, which can then 
form the basis for multilateral agreements. 
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TEC is an important domain of what can be understood as structural or 
ideological power in the global political economy (see Chapter 3.4). Insofar as 
global governance is about “offering attractive new ideas, formulating new 
strategies, and persuading people of the importance of new social goals” 
(Avant et al. 2010, 9), power in the global political economy has an important 
communicative dimension. Ideology, in the sense of a cognitive map that 
informs agency, entails both ontological beliefs about the nature of reality and 
normative ideas, values and principles. TEC, in other words, shapes the 
discursive forces that guide the activities and decision-making of elite groups. 
As an ideological practice, TEC also contributes to the capacity of political and 
business leaders to maintain their financial, productive and military forms of 
power at national and global levels.  
Finally, as discussed in Chapter 3.5, TEC contributes to a sense of 
fraternity and group consciousness among its participants. In this regard, elite 
media, forums and forms of public life may operate as powerful vehicles for 
the self-organising of transnational elites. The popularity of the clubs and 
associations bringing together corporate leaders and policymakers on an 
international basis suggest that there is broad recognition among elites about 
the need to transcend national interests and narrow industry-specific outlooks 
in order to articulate common goals. The physical and mediated spaces of TEC 
can hence be understood as building blocks of a public sphere for the making 
of a transnational elite as a collective agent. However, there are obvious 
difficulties in such attempts to incorporate elites behind a common political 
project. As the history of international elite forums and media after World War 
2 indicates, the US and European elite networks have traditionally led these 
efforts and attempted to include and co-opt non-western elites. This inevitably 
tends to increase the heterogeneity of participants, and their sense of diverging 
economic interests, political orientations and cultural perspectives may easily 
start to erode the sense of commonality and solidarity among elites. As a result, 
there is an obvious tension between the dual objectives of transnational elite 
integration of trying to simultaneously promote group cohesion and to 
incorporate new elements. 
In sum, the interest of the study in the FT and the World Economic 
Forum has been informed by the assumption that at stake in these forms of 
TEC is the “making of a global elite”, to be understood as an intentional, 
ongoing and indeterminable process of advancing transnational elite 
integration and collective agency across the domains of international business, 
policy and administration. In these exclusive communicative spaces, a global 
elite potentially organises itself by formulating shared policy agendas and 
constructing a self-conception of itself as a historical agent. The starting-point 
thus emphasises the culturally-constructed nature of agency, where world-
cultural beliefs and conventions normalise, legitimise and guide collective 
agency (Hopf 2009; Meyer and Jepperson 2000). In the latter part of the 
study, the empirical analysis of TEC focused on some of the central ideational, 
or “epistemic” foundations of elite integration and agency: the negotiation 
307 
over and establishment of a shared ontology, actor identities, and values and 
ideals. In the following section, I briefly review and discuss some of the 
principal findings of the analysis. 
8.2 Elite ontology, identity and social purpose 
The qualitative analysis concentrated on the FT coverage of the World 
Economic Forum’s Davos meetings from 2001 to 2011. As discussed in Chapter 
4, international elite media and journalism are an interesting object of study 
when inquiring into the ideational dimension of elite formation for being part 
of the everyday sense-making environment of transnational elites. Media 
outlets and publications reinforce the presence and legitimacy of certain ideas 
and beliefs in the public sphere, and they facilitate the creation of an imagined 
community of their readers and audiences. In this regard, the FT is an 
important space for facilitating inter-elite communication among the 
international business and political elites and bringing their attention to issues 
of common concern. Thanks to its international reach, the FT not only 
advances the transnational dissemination of common concepts and frames of 
reference on the issues of global economy and politics but also brings together 
an imagined elite community of business professionals, politicians and 
officials across national borders. 
To observe how FT journalism may advance elite integration, the study 
adopted the sociological perspective of discursive institutionalism, and drew 
particularly on the notion of epistemic work (Alasuutari and Qadir 2014), 
which refers to the discursive means by which actors come to shared 
understandings concerning available policy alternatives, courses of action and 
themselves as agents in the social world (see Chapter 4.2). Alasuutari and 
Qadir (2014) distinguish between three dimensions or “objects” of such 
epistemic work: ontological premises, actor identifications, and norms and 
ideals. These three interconnected and partly overlapping objects of epistemic 
work can also be considered integral elements in enabling and guiding 
transnational elite agency. Accordingly, the aim of the analysis was to observe 
how FT journalism mediated and shaped TEC on the ontological 
understandings concerning social reality, on the self-perceptions of 
transnational elites as social agents, and on the values, ideals and social 
purposes that should guide elite agency. In the kind of political 
communication that is customary to the Davos forum debates and the FT 
journalism that covers them, epistemic work takes place around various 
concrete issues that the corporate leaders and political decision-makers are 
addressing at the time. Correspondingly, the analysis focused on certain 
prevalent issues and topics as they emerged out of the overall material (see 
Table 4.2 in Chapter 4 for an overview of the main topics of coverage): debates 
on the global economy and financial markets informed epistemic work on 
ontological premises; representations of the Davos community highlighted 
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epistemic work on the transnational elite as an actor identity; and the 
prevalent topic of globalisation was key in motivating epistemic work on 
values and ideals. The main findings concerning these three objects of 
epistemic work are addressed one at a time in the following paragraphs. 
Subsequently, brief remarks about the observed impact of the financial crisis 
of 2007–9 on TEC draw the section to a close. 
(1) First, economic developments and the state of the global economy as 
a whole had an overwhelming presence in the FT reports from Davos. In 
Chapter 5, these debates informed the analysis on the articulation of a social 
ontology around “the global economy” as a discursively constructed social 
domain and object of governance (Jessop 2002; Jessop and Oosterlynck 2008; 
Mitchell 1998). The notion of the economy, of course, has long historical 
presence and importance in the public sphere (Habermas 1989; Postone 1992; 
Taylor 2004). Yet, whereas the early bourgeois public sphere was organised 
around the dichotomies of state/economy and state/civil society in an 
essentially national context, the processes of globalisation and the concurrent 
concentration of capital on national and transnational levels may have 
dramatically shaken these fundaments. As argued in Chapter 3, the period of 
increasingly globalised capitalism has prompted the establishment of 
transnational forums and media with the intention of facilitating sense-
making and action on the premise of an interconnected and inter-dependent 
global political economy. Accordingly, if the contemporary phase of capitalism 
renders it ever more important to think of and act on the premise of a “global 
economy”, epistemic work on the ontology of this social domain is of great 
ideological importance; it is a crucial ideational element, or social imaginary, 
around which TEC is established (cf. Grossberg 2010, 109–10; Massey 1988; 
Ruccio 2008).  
The analysis concluded that, in TEC, the global economy is articulated 
both in terms of an autonomous, if complex and interdependent, system and 
as a socially-embedded domain of social agency which conforms to political 
(i.e. human) interventions and changes in collective psychology. What is 
notable here is that TEC on the global economy does not seem to reproduce a 
stark dichotomy between the state and the economy as mutually hostile 
domains; instead, the monitoring of and intervention in the markets by 
governments and state agencies is considered an essential precondition for a 
thriving and stable global economy. Consequently, insofar as transnational 
elites organise themselves through the discursive practices of the public 
sphere, this takes place not so much in opposition to or defence against the 
interventions of a political authority but in order to manage and shape the 
global political economy in public-private partnership. 
Another notable feature in the analysed articulations of the global 
economy was the prevalence of a sense of uncertainty. Discourses on the global 
economy were clouded by almost constant alarms, risks and threats, whether 
in the form of market failures and shocks or resulting from political shifts and 
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international conflicts. In a broad sense, the discourse of uncertainty can be 
understood as a logical expression of the future-oriented disposition of elites 
who operate in a capitalist money economy that is characterised by 
fundamental uncertainty (see, e.g., Davidson 2009, 32–3). Alternatively, we 
can interpret it as an expression of what Martha Starr (2004) describes as the 
existential anxiousness of transnational elites, uncertain about their fate as a 
group and as individuals. But the discourse also reflects and reproduces more 
political concerns in the early 2000s about the sustainability of the current 
world economic and institutional order and about the wisdom of the dominant 
policy model of the past three decades or so. In addition, it is a discourse about 
uncontrollability, articulating an experience that little can be done to correct 
various threatening developments in the global economy. There is a sense, in 
other words, that global economic governance is failing in the absence of 
adequate institutions or political will and capacity. As also suggested by 
Richardson and colleagues (2011, 57–8), such perceptions of the chaotic 
complexity and ungovernability of the world are recurrent themes in western 
elite discourse (see also Naím 2013). 
Moreover, as observed in Chapter 5.2, financial markets occupied a 
central place in the ontology of the economy, particularly during and after the 
financial crisis of 2007–9. The analysis distinguished three prevalent 
discourses about the role of finance in the global economy: the functional 
finance discourse emphasising financial markets as the drivers of growth and 
necessary source of credit; the disciplinary finance discourse claiming that all 
economic agents and economies are dependent on and disciplined by the 
financial markets; and the destabilising finance discourse warning about the 
threats financial markets pose to individual economies and the global 
economy as a whole. While the financial crisis prompted vocal attacks in TEC 
on bankers, denouncements about the deficiencies of the financial system, and 
heightened awareness about the power and responsibilities of the states as the 
ultimate guarantors and supervisors of financial markets, the crisis debate did 
not produce a radical shift in the underlying discourses about finance. What 
survived the crisis, in other words, was the already thoroughly financialised 
ontology that perceives finance as a functional element in the global economy, 
highlights the role of banks and investors as its primary drivers, and posits 
that all agents in the economy are dependent on credit, which it assumes to be 
a limited resource. Such dominant forms of sense-making in TEC may partly 
explain why governments pursued the kind of crisis policies they claimed were 
necessary for the global economy: saving the financial institutions while 
imposing debt discipline on the public sector (cf. Konings 2016). 
(2) Second, the public practices of integrating transnational elites 
necessarily involve the development and articulation of a shared subject 
position, or a collective actor identity. If the economic imaginary tends to 
operate as an “objectifying picture of social reality” (Taylor 2004, 77), 
epistemic work on actor identities can be seen as a mobilising effort against an 
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agentless economic ontology. Chapter 6 concentrated specifically on the 
discursive reproduction of the transnational elite as a collective actor. Part of 
this work was performed by the elites themselves: the analysis started by 
observing how Davos forum participants occasionally employed “we” rhetoric 
when addressing themselves as peers (see Chapter 6.1). But a more significant 
element in the reproduction of an elite identity were the various 
representational and discursive practices of FT journalists when describing 
the forum and its participants. Chapter 6.2 examined how FT journalism 
normalised the transnational power of the Davos attendees by frequently 
referring to their leadership, influence, wealth and even status as the global 
elite. Reporters also normalised the collective actorhood of the forum 
attendees by evoking the figure of the Davos Man. Employing the moniker was 
the most conspicuous discursive practice through which FT journalists 
attributed the forum participants with common characteristics and shared 
ideas, thoughts, views, moods and even collective actions. It also worked as a 
way to attribute the transnational elites with collective responsibility over 
global economic governance: the journalistic critiques of the Davos forum 
participants often implied that, as the most powerful agents in international 
politics and business, they were to blame for economic problems in general 
and market failures in particular. 
This paradigmatic and less conscious articulation of the Davos elite as a 
collective agent was complemented by the more explicit labelling practices and 
characterisations which helped to define an elite individual as an actor. In this 
respect, the Davos forum and its participants could be regarded as a 
representative group in TEC for a broader transnational elite identity. An 
examination in Chapter 6.2 of how FT journalism in its editorials and 
commentary distanced itself from the foreign policies of the Bush 
administration, and its war on terrorism in particular, indicated that the 
transnational elite was defined in FT-mediated TEC in terms of a liberal-
internationalist and multilateral outlook that an individual needs to share in 
order to qualify as a member of the club. Moreover, an analysis in Chapter 6.3 
of the impact of the civil society protests against neoliberal globalisation and 
its central institutions on TEC in the early 2000s indicated that the global 
justice movement, for a period of time, played an important role as the 
transnational elites’ “significant other”, helping to identify, defend and 
legitimise a transnational elite community and separate it from the non-elites. 
In the civil society movement, the transnational elites were confronted by 
negative perceptions of their role in societal development. Yet in the ensuing 
public confrontation, as it was reconstructed by FT journalism, elites redefined 
themselves as positively distinct from protest movements and protesting 
publics in terms of promoting more deliberative and “responsible” forms of 
debate and action. In this way, “responsibility” acquired a positive meaning, 
in contrast to the debates on economic governance. Even though market 
failures and corporate scandals continued to cast doubts on the capabilities 
and character virtues of elites, “power with responsibility” turned into a source 
311 
of positive self-identity in the elite’s confrontation with the critical civil society. 
In TEC, elites seemed to make the distinction between themselves and the 
protest movements largely in these terms: the protesters neither have power 
nor responsibility; whereas the elite have both. 
The observation of the epistemic work on actor identities concluded in 
Chapter 6.4 with an analysis of the FT as a medium that offers its readers a 
certain subject position. Focusing on how FT reporting worked as an 
intermediary that established a pseudo-interaction between its readership and 
the Davos elite it reported on during the World Economic Forums, the analysis 
observed the journalistic practices of creating both distance and familiarity 
with its objects of coverage. On the one hand, the reporters often employed 
irony and sarcasm to present the forum and its participants (either 
individually or collectively) in a somewhat dubious light, thereby inviting the 
readers to adopt an attitude of critical scrutiny with regard to Davos delegates. 
On the other hand, FT journalists did not even come close to denouncing the 
Davos forum from a political anti-elite perspective. If anything, the irony and 
light-hearted sarcasm operated to knock Davos participants of their purported 
pedestal of virtuous superiority and invited the readership to treat them as 
equals. Overall, FT reporters thus mostly enabled their readers to positively 
identify with Davos participants, hence promoting the adoption of a 
transnational elite actor identity. 
(3) Third, promoting identification with the transnational elite and 
commitment to collective agency is closely associated with establishing 
specific values and ideals that give a sense of purpose and legitimacy to these 
actors. Part of the positive self-identification of transnational elites is that they 
see themselves not on an entirely selfish mission: corporate leaders, for 
instance, may be convinced that their products and services are making the 
world a better place, or more generally that capitalism is a liberating force in 
the world (Freeland 2012, 55–6, 71–2). In addition, they tend to be 
increasingly involved in laudable social causes through, for instance, 
philanthropy. As manifest in the World Economic Forum’s slogan, 
“Committed to improving the state of the world”, elites need to perceive 
themselves as serving a greater good, operating in the interests of humanity as 
a whole (Richardson et al. 2011, 74–5). Connecting certain ideals and values 
to the actor identity, a sense of “social purpose” enhances the appeal of 
perceiving oneself as transnational elite and, consequently, the elites’ capacity 
for collective elite agency. 
Epistemic work in TEC thus also concerns the formulation of and 
negotiation on values and ideals that articulate ideas about what the 
transnational elite is for in world society. Chapter 7 observed the prevalence of 
the notion of growth and the rhetorical power of freedom in TEC and argued 
that these two values were articulated with the general social purposes of 
liberalisation and globalisation. Growth in terms of capitalist accumulation 
was positively associated with the general welfare of world society and 
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emerged as a fundamental imperative for both corporate elites and 
policymakers (see Chapter 7.1). The globalisation of business via the 
liberalisation of markets, in turn, appeared as the primary activity through 
which the elites answer to this call as the principal agents and enablers of 
growth. Chapter 7.2 took a close look at how FT reporters defined globalisation 
both as a historical phenomenon and as a political choice, and how they 
defended it against the political critiques of the global justice movement by 
associating globalisation positively with growth, reduction of global poverty 
and the universal interest. The analysis indicated that, in FT-mediated TEC, 
globalisation became discursively constructed as perhaps the most important 
political objective of the early 21st century, and as such the notion can be 
understood as the contemporary expression of liberal internationalism as a 
historical project which gives the transnational elites their raison d’être.  
As both an economic and political project that generates growth, lifts 
people out of poverty, increases general welfare and extends economic 
freedom, globalisation is a central idea motivating and legitimising the agency 
of transnational elites. Yet the pursuit of profit, growth and other purely 
“economic” goals, even as they can be associated with the general good, does 
not exhaust the social commitments that are formulated and disseminated in 
TEC. As Chapter 7.2 indicated, cosmopolitan values of human rights and 
democracy, as well as the ideals of internationalism, multilateralism and social 
responsibility, inform transnational elite agency, even as they, to differing 
degree, exist in a tense relationship with the more paradigmatic values and 
ideals of growth and liberalisation. In these cosmopolitan ideals, we can 
witness how the elite agenda partly echoes the concerns of the global civil 
society: poverty, climate change, illnesses, corporate power and social justice. 
Indeed, while highly exclusive, TEC should not be seen as insulated from the 
broader culture in which it is embedded (cf. Kramer 1992, 245–7). The 
increasing need to address social concerns in TEC can hence be interpreted as 
a sign of the impact that civil society movements have in the transnational 
public sphere, broadening its agenda from the one dominated by the narrow 
economic interests of corporate elites and forcing the elites to address such 
issues when claiming to represent the common interest of humanity.119 On the 
whole, however, cosmopolitan ideals appear to be secondary in relation to 
what might be termed as the paradigmatic values of TEC: securing growth and 
integrating the global economy through liberalisation. Transnational elite 
agency is mainly articulated in liberal-internationalist terms of growth and 
 
                                                   
119 In a similar manner, van der Pijl (1998, 134–5) makes note of a subtle agenda shift at the 
World Economic Forum after the mid-1990s towards addressing concerns about the dangers 
of “unregulated market capitalism” and issues of inequality and social responsibility 
associated with economic globalisation, indicating how transnational elites constantly adjust 
to the changes in their operational environment and the rise of challenging forces from the 
civil society. 
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globalisation, granting it a positive historical purpose, and other societal 
commitments exist in a complementary, if at times delicate, relationship with 
these paradigmatic ideas. 
(4) Fourth, and finally, as the deepest market failure in western countries 
since the 1929 crash, the financial crisis of 2007–9 had a notable impact on 
TEC. Even as it did relatively little in terms of shifting the debate on the 
financial markets themselves, as noted above, in certain other respects it 
operated as an identifiable turning point in FT’s epistemic work on ontological 
premises, actor identities, and values and ideals. Regarding the ontology, the 
crisis itself certainly tended to emphasise the interconnectedness of the global 
economy and thus to reinforce previous beliefs about the interdependent fates 
of economies. However, as the aftermath of the crisis was characterised by 
uneven economic development in which “emerging economies” continued to 
achieve high rates of growth whereas western economies faltered, TEC on the 
global economy increasingly emphasised the diverging fortunes of economies. 
Instead of integrating economies, dynamics in the global economy were now 
seen to be leading to an increasingly “divided world”, as observed in Chapter 
5.1.  
The same division was reflected in the epistemic work on actor identities. 
Chapter 6.2 observed how FT journalism established fault-lines especially 
between the Americans and Europeans, between the Chinese and Americans 
and between the west and the rest, and how these divides linked to perceptions 
of inequalities and hierarchies within the Davos community. Global economic 
integration, in other words, does not render nations, or national identities, 
irrelevant in the sense-making of elites. The same goes for the boundaries that 
continue to separate corporate leaders and bankers from politicians and 
regulators. The financial crisis, prompting various policy struggles over the 
regulation of finance and disagreements over monetary and fiscal policy, only 
heightened the recognition of separate, and often antagonistic, groups among 
elites. In this regard, the crisis seems to have reinforced the rhetoric of elite 
rifts and divides and weakened the capacity of the transnational elite to 
operate as unifying actor identity capable of bringing elites together.  
The perception of elite divides also affected the epistemic work on 
common values and ideals, turning globalisation into an important site of 
ideological contestation. As observed in Chapter 7.3, the “Davos consensus” on 
globalisation was declared to be under threat by FT reporters as elites 
appeared to be increasingly divided on the universal benefits of liberalisation 
in the wake of the financial crisis. These recurrent observations about the loss 
of faith in globalisation, purportedly part of the more general cognitive and 
ideological disorientation among elites caused by the severity of the financial 
crisis, can be read both as a rather straightforward economic policy argument 
and as more general expression of concern about growing rifts among 
transnational elites. On the one hand, the rhetoric of the decaying 
globalisation consensus was connected to warnings about protectionism, 
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currency wars and mercantilist growth strategies and hence amounted to a 
claim that a wrong-minded policy reaction by governments to the market 
failure would have dramatic economic consequences and risk a full-blown 
global depression. On the other hand, claims about the loss of consensus were 
closely connected to views about western decline and the rise of emerging 
economies and thus to the “divide” between western countries and rising 
powers. They hence expressed broader concerns about the capacity of elites to 
find common causes and act together in the general interest of the global 
economy. The crisis, in other words, was an important event that prompted 
the need to articulate, more forcefully than before, values and ideals that 
should unite elites. In this regard, the historical globalisation consensus 
worked as a mythical reference point that underlined the importance of 
collective agency of transnational elites in global economic governance. 
Overall, as the analysis of FT journalism over a period of eleven years 
indicates, epistemic work for advancing transnational elite integration and 
collective agency is an ongoing and contradictory process that takes place in 
contingent circumstances and in relation to world events outside the forums 
and media of TEC. Transnational elite identity, for instance, seems to be 
strengthened during the height of the critical globalisation movement as a 
common adversary brings the transnational elite together, sharpens its 
contours as a group and reinforces its collective character. After the protest 
movement loses its impetus and largely disappears from the international 
mediascape, also the transnational elite loses some of its suggestive force and 
capacity to give meaning to elite agency. Similarly, epistemic work on the 
ontology of the global economy is obviously affected by what happens in the 
“reality” of the global political economy. The rapid growth rates in the mid-
2000s encourage discourses of a global economy that is ever more closely 
integrated and functioning as a whole, whereas the post-crisis period of highly 
uneven growth rates between regions prompts ideas about a divided world of 
declining and emerging economies. Finally, the formation of a common social 
purpose or political project is a contingent process as shifts in the global 
economy shape the actors’ perceptions of their objectives and interests. An 
apparent consensus on the liberal-internationalist agenda prevails through the 
early 2000s as a guiding rationale for elite agency. Yet after the crisis, belief in 
the universal benefits of globalisation appears to be waning and, as the lowest 
common denominator, fails to prevent rifts from deepening between elites. As 
a sign of the failure of TEC to inspire collective agency towards common 
objectives, a sense of growing interest conflicts seems to be growing in the 
post-financial crisis global economy. 
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8.3 Epistemic work, TEC and transnational elite 
integration 
Having summarised some of the main findings of the empirical analysis, let us 
return to the original research problem that motivated the study; the question 
concerning the integration of transnational elites and their capacity for 
collective agency. Focusing on transnational elite communication, as it was 
mediated and organised in the FT reporting on the World Economic Forums 
from 2001 to 2011, the empirical analysis was based on the premise that public 
epistemic work in international elite forums and media facilitate the 
cooperation, coordination and the development of perceptions of shared 
interests and objectives among political leaders, corporate executives and 
international officials and professionals. In light of the preceding discussion, 
then, the big question is: was the first decade of the twenty-first century a 
period of intensifying integration and collective agency of transnational elites? 
In some ways, it certainly seems so. In one of the big narratives of the 
decade, China, India and other non-western economies became increasingly 
integrated into the transnational circuits of capital, and the global financial 
crisis gave further impetus to their progressive incorporation into the pre-
existing institutional arrangements of Western-led global economic 
governance (Beeson and Bell 2009; Cammack 2012; Wade 2011). In historical 
terms, we may hence speak of the emergence, in the past few decades, of an 
elite that is increasingly integrated on a global scope and which has found a 
common purpose in the endless quest for profit and growth and in the 
extension of capitalist market relations around the world. These developments 
are reflected in the elites’ epistemic work: “emerging markets” are included in 
the ontology of the global economy as systemically important parts of an 
interdependent whole (Chapter 5.1); non-western business and policy 
representatives at the Davos forum are recognised as part of the community 
and BRIC-country leaders are among its most noteworthy representatives 
(Chapter 6.2); and the high growth rates around the world help legitimise the 
advancing global integration as a universal interest (Chapter 7.2). 
From this perspective, the epistemic work in international elite forums 
and media facilitates the incorporation of non-western corporations into 
global capital and productive networks, non-western states into the global 
economic governance apparatus and non-western elites into the institutions 
and culture of the transnational elite. In what can be seen as one of its major 
successes in inspiring collective agency, major economies did not react to the 
global financial crisis and the subsequent recession by erecting barriers to 
cross-border trade and investments (Cooper 2010, 755). Indeed, the 
transnational appeal of the ontological understanding of an interdependent 
global economy, of the actor identity of transnational elites as its principal 
agents, managers and guardians, and of liberalisation as a shared interest can 
be witnessed in the public recognition of collective responsibility by the G20 
over the financial system and the global economy in and after the global 
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financial crisis (see Cammack 2012; Helleiner and Pagliari 2009, 275–6; 
Lannoo 2014; Wade 2011, 357–8).  
On the other hand, the inability of governments in the aftermath of the 
crisis to agree on coordinated fiscal and monetary policy measures in order to 
return the global economy into pre-crisis rates of growth indicates that a 
shared commitment to an integrated global economy is not enough to prevent 
major cleavages from opening on other fronts. Both European and many non-
western governments have engaged in a series of mercantilist economic policy 
measures designed to boost exports at the expense of others with harmful 
implications for overall global economic growth (see, e.g., Stephen 2014; 
Varoufakis 2013). As a result, the growth of the global economy remains 
anaemic, geopolitical tensions are on the rise, and there are few signs of 
collective efforts to address these systemic problems. In light of these current 
deadlocks in global economic governance, the 2000s may be characterised as 
a decade of growing contradictions of global capitalism, including the build-
up of vast trade imbalances, financial instability, economic inequality, credit-
led consumption and environmental disaster during the boom years (see, e.g., 
Streeck 2011; 2014), with a general inability to address them collectively. Even 
as the financial crisis prompts concerted action to shore up the banking sector 
and to prevent a repeat of the Great Depression of the 1930s, elites seem to be 
incapable of rising above narrow sectoral or national interests to work 
collectively on these broader systemic problems. 
In this respect, an important aspect in the elites’ epistemic work, one that 
the analysis was not able to give due attention, is the conceived “power shift” 
in the global political economy during the 2000s. As discussed in Chapter 6.2, 
this rhetoric about the relative decline of the United States and Europe and the 
simultaneous rise of China and other “emerging economies”, involves the 
representation of hierarchies and divisions within the transnational elite 
community. But more importantly, it reflects the persistent influence in TEC 
of the inter-nationalist, as opposed to globalist, social ontology of a world 
divided into competing camps (see Alasuutari and Qadir 2016, 11–3). China’s 
rise is relative to the ostensible US decline and made sense of in terms of 
China’s rapid economic growth, huge dollar reserves, ascendance to G20 and 
other international forums, and a newly assertive international diplomacy 
(Cooper 2010, 745–6; Rothkopf 2012, 9; see also Nederveen Pieterse 2009). 
In this way, elites continue to make sense of the world in terms of competing 
national states and blocs in which power is not only unevenly distributed but 
also a zero-sum game. Far from building on an apolitical imaginary of a global 
marketplace of transactions between equals, the epistemic work in the FT-
mediated TEC is thus notable for its reproduction of national identities, 
interests and rivalries. 
The analysis also gave another indication of the weakening of a shared 
elite identity. After the demise of the global justice movement – and the partial 
incorporation of its agenda as well as representatives of CSOs into the Davos 
forum – TEC lost an important identity-building element: the juxtaposition 
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between the Davos elite and the global civil society. When the conflict between 
the Davos forum and social movements waned after the early 2000s, the 
transnational elite lost their “significant other” which for a time seemed to 
reinforce their sense of belonging to a distinct group and hence formed a 
crucial component of the elite’s collective identity. Without a clear rival group 
in world society, the transnational elite seemed to lose some of its force as an 
identifiable form of collective agency. However, the rise of far-right 
movements and anti-liberal politicians in the post-financial crisis period –
recently culminating in the Brexit vote and the election of Trump – may well 
alter the situation. In nationalist populism, the Davos elite can again confront 
a growing political and world-societal force which not only rejects their ideas 
and values but sets itself explicitly against the elite. This juxtaposition may 
well revitalise the discursive construction of the transnational elite in TEC as 
a positive self-identity. In addition, a common cause of fighting the emergent 
anti-globalisation movement as the new “evil” in world society may again 
remind transnational elites of the interests that unite them as opposed to those 
that pull them apart. 
Inter-elite struggles and epistemic work 
Overall, then, epistemic work for collective agency in transnational elite 
forums and media cannot be understood without taking into account the 
broader social relations of power in which these interactions take place.120 
Transnational elite agency in a cooperative and collective manner requires that 
elites transcend their immediate particular interests – organisational, sector-
 
                                                   
120 Here this work’s approach diverges to some extent from the way Alasuutari and Qadir (2014) 
associate epistemic work with the notion of epistemic governance. Grounded in a Foucauldian 
conception of power, the governance approach rejects “that there is a particular elite group or 
centre of power” which is able to “make us perceive the world in a suitable way” (Alasuutari 
and Qadir 2016, 4). Instead, Alasuutari and Qadir (ibid., 4–5) point out that all actors are 
involved in epistemic work and try to act upon the conceptions they construct of the social 
world. The view adopted in this study is certainly compatible with the argument that all actors 
are involved in epistemic work and act upon their personally or institutionally constructed 
perceptions of reality, of themselves and of the beliefs of what is desirable. However, being 
motivated by elite-theoretical assumptions and global-political-economic considerations, this 
work also posits that the world-cultural ideas that enable and govern this epistemic work are 
historically rooted and that certain elites and institutions are more powerful than others in 
shaping them. TEC and the transnational elite public sphere are institutionally structured, and 
the power for the public epistemic work in these forums and media is not equally shared 
between the participants. As a result, certain conceptions of reality, actor identities and values 
and ideals gain prominence at the expense of others in the transnational elites’ public 
epistemic work. This structural power over the exchange of ideas may also facilitate the 
formation of consensuses and perceptions of common interest. 
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specific or national – and articulate general interests in terms that they believe 
serve also their particular interests in the longer term (see Eley 1992, 302–3; 
van der Pijl 1998, 4). However, recognition of common interests does not 
necessarily arise from enlightened deliberation, and it often takes a hegemonic 
power to unite elites behind particular political objectives (Richardson et al, 
2011, 100; van der Pijl 1998, 5). As discussed in Chapter 3, there are two 
notable centres of power that have driven and set the terms for transnational 
elite integration in the postwar era: the US state and the transnationally-
oriented western banks and corporations. Liberal internationalism has been 
the key ideological pillar behind this project. 
In this regard, the notion of globalisation in TEC can be perceived as an 
example of what van der Pijl (1998, 4) calls “concepts of control”, referring to 
abstract ideas that encapsulate a set of social and economic policies and 
corresponding beliefs about what is in the general interest. Historically, 
concepts of control become “comprehensive”, according to van der Pijl (ibid.), 
when they successfully deal with the contradictions in intersectoral 
competition and profit distribution. In the period between World War 2 and 
the mid-1970s, for instance, “Keynesianism” and “the welfare state” could be 
regarded as such concepts that were generally accepted in western economies. 
Even though they represented the particular interests of an industry based on 
mass production and organised labour, they also motivated the state 
apparatus that was committed to full employment and demand management. 
Interpreted as a concept of control, globalisation can be seen as a useful 
narrative of societal and economic development which connects various 
interests and restrains harmful inter-elite rivalries. After all, liberalising cross-
border trade and financial flows and opening markets for international 
businesses are by no means universally endorsed policies among corporate 
leaders, policymakers and regulators. Proponents of such liberal-
internationalist policies are challenged in practically all countries by economic 
nationalists and mercantilists, who push for policies to protect domestic 
industries from foreign competition and to support them in gaining a 
competitive edge in global markets; as well as by foreign policy realists, who 
see growing international interdependence and foreign ownership as threats 
to national sovereignty and security (see Mirilovic and Ollapally 2012; Stephen 
2014). Having been successfully turned behind the liberal-internationalist 
agenda of the transnationally-oriented sectors of American finance and 
business, the US government has therefore needed to resort to its various 
means of power to persuade other governments to open their economies to 
foreign capital.  
Part of this process has been the cultivation of corporate, political and 
professional elites in favour of globalisation, first in Western Europe and later 
in non-western countries, through their integration into transnational elite 
clubs and forums such as the World Economic Forum (see Chapter 2). The 
deepening integration of major non-western economies into the global 
economy in the past three decades indicates that proponents of globalisation 
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have gained a significant foothold in these countries (Stephen 2014). 
Accordingly, Paul Cammack (2012, 12) argues that the non-western members 
of the OECD (Mexico, South Korea and Turkey), and the major non-western 
powers in G20 (Brazil, China, India, Indonesia and South Africa) have 
positively committed to the neoliberal globalisation agenda, articulated in 
terms of the “integration into the global economy through the pursuit of 
overseas markets and global competitiveness” (see also Beeson and Bell 2009, 
75). Arguably, the epistemic work on the notion of globalisation in 
transnational elite forums and media has been instrumental in this regard. As 
the analysis in Chapter 7 indicated, the liberalisation of trade, markets and 
capital flows is associated positively with economic growth in TEC and forms 
the unquestionable core of the notion of globalisation as a historical purpose 
of elite agency. Indeed, even if proponents of nationalist and realist outlooks 
tend to dominate the design and conduct of foreign policy in countries like 
China, India, Japan and Russia, they have largely been convinced by their pro-
globalisation compatriots to embrace economic integration because it has 
been successfully associated with increasing economic efficiency and growth 
and thus seen to serve the national interest of gaining more international 
power, security and sovereignty (Mirilovic and Ollapally 2012, 217). Through 
their ability to articulate the liberalisation agenda in terms of growth, the 
globalisers have thus managed to bring elites together at the national and 
international levels behind a common policy and perception of shared 
interests.  
If the successful spread of the liberal-internationalist agenda can be seen 
as resulting from the hegemonic position of the US state and corporations in 
the global economy, the international cooperation in the global financial crisis 
may also be interpreted as a demonstration of the continuing dominance of 
these two powers over others. As the effective leader of the crisis management 
efforts, the US Fed and Treasury were able to secure the support of other 
governments and central banks in shoring up Wall Street and other financial 
centres (see Panitch and Gindin 2012, 301–30).  
However, the hierarchical nature of the global political economy not only 
implies the capacity of a few actors to impose their will on others, it also 
renders global economic governance a site of contestation and a source of 
inter-elite divisions. Emerging countries are increasingly questioning the US 
dominance over key institutions of global economic governance, including the 
Bretton Woods organisations (Stephen 2014; Vestergaard and Wade 2013; 
Wade 2011), and both non-western and even some western elites are openly 
voicing certain previously discredited ideas, including state intervention in the 
economy, the regulation of markets, limiting the power of finance, and the 
harmful social effects of trade liberalisation (cf. Rothkopf 2012, 349–51). This 
may have significant implications in terms of the diversity of economic policies 
around the world: the global economy may not be in a steady path towards 
homogenisation where all economies eventually adopt the idealised form of an 
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Anglo-American model of finance-led capitalism (see Buzan and Lawson 2014; 
Hall and Soskice 2001; Plender 2003, 75–83).  
Together, rhetoric about the loss of consensus on globalisation and the 
notion of “power shift” can be seen as reflecting these developments in TEC. If 
the integration of China, India, Russia and other “emerging markets” into the 
global capitalist economy could, during the early 2000s be narrated in terms 
of a historical advance of neoliberal globalisation, in which these newcomers 
would gradually abandon their state-led models of capitalism, the global 
financial crisis has put this credo in doubt. It is now increasingly apparent that 
the integration has also marked the “rise” of non-western economies and, as a 
result, the existing institutional and ideological order of global economic 
governance faces growing challenges of legitimacy. The crisis, in other words, 
appears to have affected the global political, economic and, most importantly, 
ideological leadership of the United States, in particular, and the west in 
general (cf. Streeck 2014, 63). As a result, not only might the major emerging 
economies be more inclined to maintain their policies of trade restrictions, 
capital controls and state control in key business sectors, including banking 
(Agnew 2009, 231; Dicken 2011, 177–8; Stephen 2014, 929), but they could 
also inspire others to follow their lead. Therefore, the rhetoric about the loss 
of consensus on globalisation may express not only acknowledgement among 
transnational elites that the US/western ideological leadership and legitimacy 
in the global political economy has eroded. It can also be read as an expression 
of concern among the globally-oriented elites that the global drive towards 
greater liberalisation of markets may be over: governments around the world 
might start to adopt less neoliberal policies of market integration and stifle 
transnational business. 
It is evident, then, that both deep-seated ideological divisions and 
recently-intensified power struggles hinder efforts to integrate non-western 
elites into the already existing institutions and forums of global economic 
governance (Helleiner and Pagliari 2009; Wade 2011). The period of 
stagnating growth and growing social tensions in the west and the continuing 
ascendancy of emerging economies after the financial crisis has brought these 
tensions to the fore (see Buzan and Lawson 2014; Ougaard 2016). 
Consequently, US and western elites have lost some of their capacity to dictate 
the terms and agendas of transnational elite integration, and hence elites 
appear more divided than in the two decades after the end of the cold war. Yet 
the current disagreements and ideological contradictions do not necessarily 
imply less capacity for collective action in the future. The increasing weight in 
these forums of non-western elites inevitably creates tensions and ideological 
confusion, but it also alters their agenda to include new ideas (Cammack 2012). 
Discourse about a loss of consensus, in other words, may simply signal that 
new ideas and interests are being allowed into the relatively restricted and 
exclusive public spaces of TEC. If successfully incorporated and negotiated, 
they may in fact generate more collective elite agency in the longer term. 
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Therefore, while successful incorporation of non-western powers into the 
arrangements of global economic governance is obviously a highly complex 
question involving, for instance, significant shifts in the composition, relative 
voting powers and working practices of central inter-governmental 
institutions, such as the UN Security Council, G20 and the Bretton Woods 
organisations (see, e.g., Wade 2011; Slaughter 2015), it has an important 
public dimension, as well. The forums and media of TEC, traditionally 
established, owned and dominated by western elites, must be both willing to 
and capable of increasingly accommodating non-western interests and a 
pluralist view of world order (cf. Buzan and Lawson 2014, 89–91). As 
discussed in Chapter 2, this is exactly what many transnational elite forums, 
most notably the World Economic Forum, have purportedly aimed at by 
broadening the scope of their participants to corporate and policy-making 
elites of emerging economies and developing countries. Similarly, some 
western business media outlets and publications have actively sought non-
western audiences, bringing them to a common communicative space of TEC. 
The FT, for instance, launched its Asia edition in 2003, and its 32,000 
subscribers in 2014 suggest that the FT has at least some success in appealing 
to non-western elites and addressing them in a discourse that accommodates 
their values, ideals and perceptions of reality. 
However, as the primary focus in the empirical part of the study was the 
exploration of the epistemic foundations of transnational elite formation, I 
have not been able to analyse the geographical and ideological 
representativeness of the FT-mediated elite communication. Indeed, one of 
the most important lines of inquiry that this study motivates is the further 
development of methodology for an empirical analysis of the ideational 
dimension of transnational elite integration in the public spaces that are 
supposed to facilitate such incorporation of views. The extent to which the 
international media provide access to non-western elites, allow them to set the 
agenda and terms of debate, assume a “non-western” position and confront 
traditional “western” views openly from that perspective, and mediate 
arguments between various standpoints are some of the dimensions such an 
inquiry would need to address. 
In the absence of such a quantitative and formal analysis, conclusions 
about the FT’s capacity to incorporate different views and interests of 
ideologically divergent groups of elites must remain highly tentative. On the 
one hand, it is evident that the FT’s Davos forum coverage both routinely uses 
non-western corporate executives, politicians and analysts as sources, and 
deliberately seeks non-western views on politically sensitive issues. Political 
disagreements about large trade imbalances between the United States and 
China is a case in point. The official US argument accusing Chinese authorities 
of keeping the external value of renminbi artificially low was routinely 
balanced by presenting the “Chinese view” about the need for the United States 
to cut its trade deficit (see Chapter 6.2). On the other hand, and such practices 
notwithstanding, “western” elites tend to be privileged sources in FT 
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reporting, and their role as agenda setters when it comes to issues concerning 
the global political economy and global governance is likely to be 
overwhelmingly dominant. Imbalances in geographical representation are 
bound to be reflected in ideological biases (see Chapter 2.3): due to its own 
roots in the British Empire, the FT is bound to be highly embedded in a 
western-centric outlook of global order. This inevitably hinders its potential to 
moderate national rivalries and advance transnational elite integration in a 
post-hegemonic world order. 
Liberal-internationalist elites and the crisis of neoliberal globalisation 
As already noted, challenges in the incorporation of non-western elites into 
the US-led governance of global capitalism coincide with increasing doubts 
about the sustainability of the liberal-internationalist project of market 
integration. Since the early 1980s, this long-term objective of transnationally-
oriented corporations (see Chapter 3.1) has been dominated by western 
financial and industrial capital and articulated in the doctrines of 
neoliberalism (Konings 2016; Ougaard 2016). Yet the success of the neoliberal 
project has also given rise to a number of contradictions. In this regard, 
Stephen Gill sums up the challenges posed by the ideological dominance of the 
“large internationally mobile elements of capital” in the following way: 
Intra-class and inter-class struggles take place at both domestic and 
international levels, and any set of ideas, institutional proposals, and 
policy arrangements will favour some interests rather than others. At 
the present point in time, the prevailing perspectives appear to be those 
associated with large internationally mobile elements of capital in the 
metropolitan countries. These perspectives stress economic efficiency, 
competition, and global factor mobility, and the need to constrain 
some of the intervention capacity of the state that might impede 
globalisation. Nevertheless, in both political and economic terms these 
policies may prove to be profoundly contradictory. By this I mean that 
the deflationary thrust of policy, the impoverishment of masses of 
people in many countries, and the marginalisation of labour and the 
cadres from policy-making circles in the OECD substantially narrow 
the social basis for hegemony. In this sense, the legitimacy and political 
durability of neo-liberal dominance can be seen as sowing the seeds of 
its own contradictions.  
Gill 1994, 194. 
Writing more than two decades ago during the heyday of neoliberal 
globalisation, Gill’s analysis is also fitting, to a large extent, for the post-
financial crisis world. Despite the initial cognitive shock of the global financial 
crisis, central tenets of the pre-crisis economic policy were never seriously 
questioned among transnational elites (Crouch 2011; Mirowski 2013). 
Certainly, as an indication that the most aggressive phase of the “neoliberal 
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dominance” has passed, the debate has been characterised by 
acknowledgement that the massive state intervention in the economy was 
necessary in the midst of the crisis and that some international regulation of 
financial markets is needed to secure their functioning. At the same time, 
“efficiency, competition, and global factor mobility” as the other pillars of the 
ideological consensus continue to dominate contemporary elite discourse on 
economic policy. Correspondingly, also the “contradictions” that threaten the 
durability of the dominant ideology are largely the same. While the rise of 
emerging economies and the credit-led boom in western consumption led to 
rapid growth rates in the late 1990s and 2000s, the post-crisis insistence on 
austerity has brought the “deflationary thrust of policy” back to haunt the 
global economy (e.g., Streeck 2014, 58–60). 
As a central ideological tenet, liberal internationalism has been 
successful in preventing a full-fledged protectionist drive towards the erection 
of national and regional barriers on factors of production. But in itself, it is 
incapable of providing solutions to key contradictions in contemporary global 
capitalism. It is articulated in a political context characterised by a neoclassical 
suspicion of the public sector, a cameralistic fixation with austerity, 
neomercantilist strategies of export-led growth, and the continuing 
significance of carbon-based industries, which are, quite expectedly, feeding 
into popular impoverishment, rise of nationalist sentiments, intensifying 
geopolitical tensions between major powers and rapid environmental 
degradation. All of these developments risk undermining the social legitimacy 
and political dominance of liberal internationalism, and in this sense it may 
again be sowing the seeds of its own demise. Certainly, dominant elites in both 
major economies and the majority of small ones still tend to see it in their 
interest to maintain the liberal-internationalist order of relatively free-flowing 
factors of production (cf. Ougaard 2016, 470; Stephen 2014). Yet, as the recent 
rise of anti-liberal political movements around the world, including a number 
of western nations, indicates, the political landscape may be shifting 
dramatically within the next decade if a decisive turn in the global economy 
fails to materialise. Indeed, the frequent expressions of alarm about the loss of 
globalisation consensus in the FT after the financial crisis indicate implicit 
recognition of the threat to the liberal-internationalist project posed by the 
inability of elites to solve its inner contradictions.  
It is therefore unsurprising that many scholars have pointed to the need 
for a radical shift in the dominant economic policy paradigm to prevent the 
end of the liberal-internationalist project and the disintegration of the global 
economy into warring trade blocs (e.g., Davidson 2009; Patomäki 2013; 
Streeck 2015; Varoufakis 2013). According to some of these views, the needed 
shift would entail greater coordination of economic policies to ensure enough 
aggregate demand in the economy; the reduction of income and wealth 
inequality on the level of both individual societies and the world as a whole; 
the creation of stabilising mechanisms to prevent harmful current account 
imbalances and the accompanying debt cycles; the establishment of a new 
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global reserve currency; substantial reforms of the financial sector, including 
the rules on credit creation and the financing of public spending; and a major 
international, state-driven investment program to accelerate a rapid shift 
towards a low-carbon or carbon-neutral economy. In short, it would mean that 
global Keynesian and environmentalist values, ideals and objectives gained 
dominance in international economic policy debate. 
Is an ideological shift of this kind conceivable in TEC? In his analysis of 
the Trilateral Commission meetings over the 1970s and 1980s, Gill (1990, 228) 
emphasised the prevalence of a pragmatic and utilitarian approach to 
economic policy-making among the liberal-internationalist elites. For 
instance, while broadly sharing the Keynesian consensus about state 
intervention, high employment and the importance of international macro-
economic coordination in the 1970s, the Commission flexibly shifted its 
positions during the 1980s to be better in tune with the increasingly neoliberal, 
monetarist and market-fundamentalist zeitgeist of the decade (ibid., 176, 191). 
Similarly, van der Pijl (2012, xxxi) observed the rise of corporate liberalism 
after the Great Depression as a “synthetic strategy” with which liberal-
internationalist fractions of US capital accommodated their “laissez-faire” 
interests with the requirements of the national large-scale industry and 
organised labour for state intervention. A liberal-internationalist drive to an 
integrated and open global economy can hence co-exist with different kinds of 
social forces and power balances between them. 
Today, western financial capital as the primary driver of the neoliberal 
form of globalisation may be increasingly challenged by other forces in the 
global political economy. These include, at least, the rise of non-western 
capital, often closely tied to state power; the potential resurgence of the 
interests of productive capital; and the increasing prevalence of the social, 
political and business interests in decarbonising the economy (Ougaard 2016). 
Insofar as the contradictions between these various interests are successfully 
managed – so that they do not lead to a systemic collapse or military conflicts 
– they may pave the way to a new strategic synthesis. Indeed, some observers 
have suggested that the global financial crisis marks the beginning of a long 
“interregnum” between the demise of neoliberalism and the stabilisation of a 
new hegemony (Helleiner 2010; Stahl 2016). This is a period marked by 
intense political struggles and the development of new ideas, some of which 
will eventually form the basis of a new hegemony in global economic 
governance. While there are thus far little signs of those ideas being articulated 
in terms of global Keynesianism, the new consensus may involve at least some 
elements of it, such as a degree of capital controls, public investment 
programs, relaxation of austerity and green industrial initiatives. 
Whatever the form the contemporary struggles take in the upcoming 
years, the ideological flexibility of liberal-internationalist elites is likely to be 
tested again. Whether they will succeed has much to do with the discursive and 
institutional processes of TEC and the epistemic work they facilitate on the 
changing global political economy. In this regard, Gill (1990, 228) pointed to 
325 
problems in the knowledge-formation processes of the Trilateral Commission: 
even as it constantly sought to invite new members, the generation of new 
ideas to address the contemporary problems of capital accumulation was 
seriously hampered by the dominance of old establishment perspectives and 
interests. This may be seen as a general problem of elite clubs as a form of 
interaction, in which agenda-setting power and argumentative authority tends 
to be concentrated, officially or unofficially, to the oldest and institutionally 
most powerful members.  
On the whole, similar epistemic problems limiting the range of available 
views and policy perspectives also taint transnational elite media. Media 
organisations cannot escape the broader context in which they operate and are 
fundamentally compromised by their proximity to power and the 
establishment (e.g., Bennett et al. 2007; Herman and Chomsky 2002). 
Accordingly, by authorising a small range of elite voices and repeating the 
same discourses, FT journalism may also contribute to the prevalence of 
establishment views. Moreover, due to its objective of catering primarily to an 
audience of globally-oriented corporate leaders, officials and politicians, and 
being historically and ideologically tied to the outlook of finance, the FT’s 
capacity to question the prevailing tenets of liberal internationalism is 
seriously hampered. Indeed, the paper is not necessarily prone to advance 
nationalist, protectionist or realist arguments of elites whose interests are tied 
to national institutions or less mobile and liquid forms of capital. In this way, 
an overtly rigid ideological inclination towards liberal internationalism may 
render the FT incapable of making its select readership face opposing views. 
As an institution of TEC, the FT is, in other words, in danger of falling short of 
offering a forum where central ideological tensions concerning the global 
economic governance can be played out, and it may therefore be unable to 
facilitate the kind of congruity of views that would make more efficient global 
governance possible (cf. Gill 1990, 229). 
However, even if incapable of questioning liberal internationalist elites 
per se by offering a forum for their opponents, the FT may still contribute to a 
shift in their economic-policy orientation. As the prevailing macroeconomic 
policy-combination of monetary stimulus and fiscal austerity has failed to 
engender a robust recovery in the global economy after the financial crisis, 
there have been growing rifts within the ranks of international policymakers 
regarding proper policy measures (Ougaard 2016, 463–4). Such periods of 
heightened contestation between elites may open up space for the press to play 
a more proactive role in international policy debates (see Bennett et al. 2007; 
Handley 2010; Robinson 2001). In the eurozone crisis, in particular, leading 
FT reporters have become vocal critics of the German-led austerity and 
repeatedly given public recognition and legitimacy to calls for a policy shift 
towards more expansionary fiscal policy (e.g., Münchau 2013; 2015; Wolf 
2013b; 2014b). These recent interventions by Martin Wolf, Wolfgang 
Münchau and some of the other prominent columnists of the paper indicate 
that there has been a clear interest in the FT to explore new economic policy 
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ideas, including some developed by the members of the post-Keynesian school 
of economics, to make sense of the current conundrums of the global political 
economy. Moreover, the paper has granted public attention and even actively 
promoted certain “radical” policy proposals, such as “helicopter money”, 
which have emerged out of the ranks of elites as ways to bring the world 
economy out of its current stagnation (Giles 2013; Wolf 2013a).  
Indeed, as a small hint of the power of the media to keep certain policy 
ideas in the minds of decision-makers in international business and politics, 
in August 2016, an investor survey by Bank of America Merrill Lynch reported 
that 39 percent of the participating asset managers expected at least one major 
central bank to resort to helicopter money in the following twelve months, 
meaning it would hand out cash directly to households in order to boost 
spending (Tett 2016). In these small ways, the FT may thus be contributing to 
a gradual shift in the leading ideas of global economic governance. Obviously, 
in the absence of Keynesian elites powerful enough to shift the balance of 
power between interests in the global political economy, the ideas promoted 
by the FT are unlikely to gain much traction.  
8.4 Contributions of the study and suggestions for 
further research 
As outlined in Chapter 1, this study has developed at the intersection of various 
disciplines and fields of research, including, most notably, communication and 
media studies, the global political economy, and elite theory. Moreover, it has 
drawn, both theoretically and for empirical observations and interpretations, 
from scholarship in cultural studies, sociology of international politics, 
cultural political economy, social psychology, the public sphere and 
globalisation studies. The combination of such a large number of research 
perspectives reflects my intention to draw as comprehensive an account as 
possible of the inherently complex phenomena – transnational elite 
integration and communication – that have formed the object of this study. 
While it has hopefully contributed positively to the diversity of viewpoints, the 
combination of various lines of research inevitably has the downside of 
providing less in terms of coherence, theoretical development and depth of 
analysis. Consequently, the contributions of this study to existing research 
mostly concern the new ideas and perspectives that bringing together separate 
fields of research may generate; they are more about the opening of new lines 
of inquiry than about developing a more profound theoretical or empirical 
understanding of what is already known. In what follows, I discuss such 
openings, particularly as they relate to the fields of communication and media 
studies, global political economy and elite studies. 
(1) Having its disciplinary home in communication and media studies, 
this dissertation has drawn on well-established theoretical traditions that see 
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communication as a practice of forming and sharing cultural meanings and 
the media as vehicles for integrating people culturally into groups and 
communities (see Chapter 1.3). Where the study departs from the traditional 
mainstream of research along these lines is its rejection of national 
communities and audiences as the relevant theoretical and analytical starting 
point, and of the culture of the subordinated classes and counter-hegemonic 
groups as the primary objects of interest. Instead, inspired by the critiques of 
methodological nationalism on one hand, and drawing on the historical work 
inspired especially by Habermas on the formation of bourgeois publics on the 
other, I have emphasised the importance of communication and media in the 
collective policy coordination and potential self-organisation of transnational 
elites. To give further relevance to this approach, I deliberately chose as my 
objects of analysis the Financial Times, a news publication of significant 
transnational reach and global focus, and a subject matter that was well 
removed from the usual concerns of political news as they are covered by the 
national media: the World Economic Forum of international corporate 
executives, government leaders and international officials, and their debates 
on the global economy. 
As Davis (2003, 669–70) points out, inquiries into the communicative 
practices of elites and the impact of media on their decision-making are 
increasingly important in the age of audience fragmentation and the decline of 
political participation through mass parties and national institutions. 
Arguably, decisions and negotiations that matter in the global political 
economy are increasingly taken outside the purview of national parliaments 
and publics, within networks and between institutions that operate on a 
transnational scale (Crouch 2004). Questions of global economic governance, 
including the coordination of monetary and fiscal policies, the liberalisation or 
regulation of markets and the development of an adequate institutional 
framework for the steering of the economy, are hardly at the heart of what the 
mainstream news media bring to the agenda of national audiences. Yet the 
transnational elite networks engaged in such matters are not entirely self-
reliant in their communication but also need media to both follow and shape 
the international policy agenda. Specialised media outlets serve these needs by 
establishing exclusive spaces for the kind of public-private deliberation that 
forms an integral part of global governance (see Chapter 3.3). 
An elite-theoretical perspective on communication and media hence 
focuses on the ways in which the media are involved in the exercise of power 
by key actors in the global political economy. It inquires how the media are 
used by the decision-making elites to shape decisions and legitimate policies 
and relations of power, but it is also interested in how the elites themselves are 
influenced by the media and the “dominant ideologies” of mediated elite 
cultures (Davis 2003, 672–3). Thanks to increased interest in recent years on 
the PR strategies and practices in political communication (see, e.g., Louw 
2010; Strömbäck and Kiousis 2011), part of this research agenda is already 
being explored quite extensively. In this work, however, I have followed a 
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different path with the aim of contributing to the development of an elite-
theoretical perspective in communication and media studies in two ways. 
First, as an adaptation of debates on the historical bourgeois public sphere, I 
have sought to theorise the role of the elite media and other organised 
practices of elite interaction and communication in transnational elite 
integration and self-organisation. From this perspective, the clubs, forums and 
media targeted at decision-making elites in the fields of international business 
and politics provide private-public spaces, in which policy ideas and 
arguments can be developed and debated in a confidential manner and in 
which the overall public agenda of global economic governance is established. 
At the same time, the forums and media have the intention and effect of 
bringing these elites together with implications for their self-understanding as 
individuals and groups. Transnational elite public spaces are places to meet 
one’s peers and to be recognised as a fellow member of an elite. Consequently, 
I argue that the institutions and practices of transnational elite 
communication (TEC) should be analysed as forms of transnational elite 
integration and formation. 
Second, as a contribution to an emergent elite-theoretical perspective in 
media studies, I have introduced the notion of epistemic work as a way of 
analysing inter-elite communication. Obviously, a wide range of analytical 
methods developed within the discipline and others can be used to observe 
different aspects of elite communication. When it comes to the political 
struggles between elites and their exertion of discursive power in the media to 
shape political outcomes, many established methodologies, including 
interviews and surveys, and text-analytical methods, such as framing analysis, 
can be of use. In contrast to these approaches, the perspective of epistemic 
work focuses on the establishment of epistemic underpinnings of political 
communication and thus sheds light on the very foundations on which 
practical policy struggles are based (see Alasuutari and Qadir 2014; 2016). In 
this sense, epistemic work as an analytical approach comes quite close to 
argumentation analysis, which delves into the rhetorical strategies and hidden 
(reality) premises used in persuasion (Billig 1991; Perelman 1982); and it also 
relates to many adaptations of discourse analysis, where the interest tends to 
lie in the ideological undercurrents of utterances and the ways in which 
discourses create their speakers and audiences, offering them certain subject 
positions (Carpentier and De Cleen 2007; Eagleton 2007, 141–8; Fairclough 
2006; Saukko 2003; Wodak and Krzyżanowksi 2008). Certainly, the empirical 
analysis of this study is very much indebted to the insights made by both 
argumentation analysis and discourse theory. Epistemic work may be 
understood as a closely-related but alternative conceptual framework that 
helps to organise observations from a qualitative analysis of public speech with 
a focus on the epistemic foundations of inter-elite consensus on particular 
issues and policies. Elite journalism of major publications and news outlets 
can be regarded as an influential form of public epistemic work, which shapes 
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its readers understandings of the social world, of themselves as actors and of 
the key ideals and values that guide their agency. 
Obviously, while the concentration in empirical analysis on newspaper 
material and their qualitative content analysis is useful in shedding light on 
the ideational elements of transnational elite integration and collective agency, 
it has the downside of overlooking other important dimensions in “the making 
of a global elite” in communicative practices. Public epistemic work for global 
economic governance is shaped by a variety of institutional and material 
factors, and further research can take various alternative paths to address 
them. First, a particularly relevant approach in this regard would be to give 
further emphasis to elite integration as a phenomenon and practice of the 
public sphere, examining how the forums and media of TEC historically 
provide access to a broader range of actors and views, both internationally and 
across social domains, and how they mediate and structure the interactions 
between elites. Such an analysis could, for instance, continue from the 
preliminary work outlined in Chapter 2 of this study and systematically map a 
range of media outlets and clubs, examining changes over time in the 
constitution of their audiences and membership. This would provide a more 
comprehensive view of how TEC as a transnational public sphere has evolved 
and how it is being constituted.  
Second, from a more cultural studies perspective of the public sphere, 
research could concentrate on the audiences and participants of TEC with the 
aim of exploring how their communicative practices in the transnational elite 
public sphere are reflected in their worldviews and social identities (see 
Chapter 3.5 for an initial exploration of these arguments). Finally, third, quite 
another approach to TEC would concentrate on the media practices and 
communication strategies of elites who participate in the processes of global 
economic governance. Work in the fields of public diplomacy and political PR 
has already highlighted some of the discursive practices and strategies through 
which governments and corporations seek to shape the policy views of other 
actors and processes of global governance (see, e.g., Bourne and Edwards 
2012; Comor and Bean 2012; Gilboa 2008). Drawing attention to the 
increasingly mediated nature of contemporary political processes, such 
analyses would contribute to the understanding of global governance as an 
argumentative practice and complement similar research being pursued in the 
fields of international relations and the sociology of international politics. 
(2) Theorising the significance of the organised forms of interaction 
between elites in the domains of international business, politics and 
administration, I have drawn extensively on the theory and analysis of the 
global political economy. As discussed in Chapter 3, the interdependent 
relationship between the state, or the transnational state apparatus, and 
financialised global capitalism, represented most notably by large TNCs and 
banks, is obviously a well-established argument in this scholarship. So is an 
understanding about the dominant position of the United States in the world 
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order and about its indispensable role in securing the operation global 
capitalism. Yet, despite frequent allusions to US hegemony and a unipolar 
world order after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, there is also broad 
acknowledgment that the ability of the US government to exert control over 
the global political economy is limited and it needs to involve other actors in 
multilateral arrangements in order to make global economic governance 
possible. What has also been referred to as “club governance” (Tsingou 2015; 
see also Keohane and Nye 2001), the institutional and cultural interlocking of 
elites across societal domains and national boundaries can be seen as concrete 
manifestation of this relationship of mutual dependence between major states 
and transnational businesses: the integrating global economy makes it 
necessary to bring elites together in organised yet informal settings in order to 
manage the contradictions of global capitalism. In practice, this typically takes 
the form of ad-hoc crisis control, where governments and central banks 
coordinate an international response to contain and mitigate the effects of 
market failures, but it also has the potential of establishing shared systems of 
rules, regulatory regimes, and even broad policy paradigms that guide 
capitalism’s development over the long term. The widespread adoption in the 
capitalist world of the Fordist model of mass production and consumption and 
Keynesian macroeconomic policies in the 1960s, for instance, was actively 
promoted by the United States and facilitated by trans-Atlantic elite networks 
(Hirschman 1989; Hoogvelt 2001, 147; Gill 1990; van der Pijl 2012).  
Focusing on these forms of transnational elite interaction on matters of 
economic policy and global governance, the perspective of TEC helps shed 
light on this active and intentional dimension of elite formation and the 
collective agency it enables in the management and direction of global 
capitalism. By emphasising agency, it reminds that even abstract historical 
processes, such as globalisation and financialization, result from the 
intentions and goals of specific actors, as well as from ideational work in which 
shared understandings of political objectives and interests are established 
between relatively autonomous actors (cf. Campbell 1998). 121  Similarly, 
 
                                                   
121 Where agency lies in the global political economy is, of course, a widely contested question 
(see Avant et al. 2010). In this respect, the perspective of elites has definite advantages. 
Whereas post-Marxist perspectives on the “transnational capitalist class” (TCC) tend to 
undermine the autonomous agency of the state and pluralist views of power tend to over-
estimate it, elite studies focus on the interactions between business and politics from a 
perspective that grants both states and corporations a degree of autonomy vis-à-vis one 
another. Elites are formations that come into existence through interaction and establishment 
of collective interests. The interactions between corporate leaders and politicians are therefore 
characterised by the simultaneous existence of conflicts and efforts to build lasting coalitions 
and shared interests. The TCC thesis about an integrated, globally-operating and self-
conscious group of capitalists is often debunked by pointing to the scarcity of transnational 
boardroom interlocks in TNCs and the purportedly “national” character of capital (Burris and 
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seemingly stable power relations, such as the US empire or the Western-led 
world order, must be continuously reproduced in negotiations between actors 
and naturalised in ideational, behavioural and institutional levels (see 
Rosenau 1992, 14). The US and western leadership in international policy 
coordination and articulation of political objectives and values is certainly 
grounded in the control of various material resources, but it must also be 
sustained through the ideological influence, or epistemic work, in which non-
western elites are persuaded that the policy measures are in their own interest. 
Scholarship on both sociological institutionalism and cultural political 
economy has emphasised the importance of ideas in the adoption of policy 
models and in the constitution and government of the economy (see Alasuutari 
and Qadir 2014; Jessop 2009; Jessop and Oosterlynck 2008; Risse 2000; 
Schmidt 2008). Following the insights developed in these related fields, the 
study of TEC focuses on the role of discursive practices in the integration of 
elites and their exercise of power. Transnational corporate and policy-making 
elites are not innately liberal internationalists and do not automatically adopt 
such views due to some objective interests. Instead this ideological position, 
associating certain policies with notions of what is good and desirable, must 
be actively cultivated in discourses and practices that comprise the everyday 
experiences of elites. Ideas and interests are thus intimately intertwined, and 
clubs, forums and media are instrumental in shaping how elites come together 
behind certain policies in the name of the collective good. In this study, I have 
concentrated specifically on this aspect of transnational elite formation, 
observing how the FT as an elite medium establishes certain conceptions of 
the global economy, transnational elites as actors and liberalisation as a 
universal policy ideal. Accordingly, I have suggested that international 
business journalism should be regarded as a significant discursive practice in 
the public sphere that contributes to the articulation of the epistemic 
preconditions of elite integration both nationally and on a transnational scale. 
With regard to the relationships of elites and their agency in the global 
political economy, there are other aspects to the international elite media that 
should be explored in further studies. First, the notion of TEC highlights the 
importance of discursive or argumentative action in hegemony-building: in 
order to turn their preferred ideas into material practices, liberal-
internationalist elites must persuade other elite groups to embrace some of 
their values, ideals and concrete policies. Second, shifts in economic policy and 
 
                                                   
Staples 2012; Stephen 2014). In contrast, the perspective on TEC points out that transnational 
elite interaction and integration takes place through other venues. While the TCC may be a 
myth, at least when measured as global capitalist integration through corporate boardrooms, 
transnational networking among western and non-western corporate and policy-making elites 
is real and increasing with the globalisation of business. As argued in this study, transnational 
elites can be seen as forms of integration and collective agency which connect the spheres of 
state power and global capital. 
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political ideology assume the form of elite communicative agency. Ideological 
shifts are closely tied to changes in the global political economy and epistemic 
work on those changes: in order for major changes in global economic 
governance to take place, elites in commanding institutions must be convinced 
about the need to reconsider what is feasible and desirable. Research on 
intergovernmental organisations, central banks and intergovernmental 
negotiations have demonstrated that argumentative action or epistemic work 
of this kind takes place both within and between major institutions of global 
governance and can hence result in policy shifts (Ban 2014; Grabel 2011; Risse 
2000; Rosenhek 2013). However, the importance of the media and the public 
sphere has been scarcely addressed so far in this work.  
Therefore, if argumentative action or epistemic work is an elementary 
factor in both hegemony-building and ideological or policy shifts in world 
politics, further research is needed on the role of the elite media and the 
transnational public sphere in shaping these processes. Studies of this kind 
could draw on a wealth of research that has been conducted on the role of the 
media in national political processes, which suggest that elite media often 
contribute to the public legitimation or marginalisation of contested policy 
ideas (e.g., Castells 2009; Cook 1998; Louw 2010). My own study corroborates 
and substantiates earlier studies on the international business media which 
have suggested that these publications have contributed to the hegemony of 
liberal internationalism in the transnational public sphere (e.g., Durham 
2007; Kantola 2007; Merrill 2012; Starr 2004). Yet the elite media may also 
be important in accommodating shifts in the global policy agenda, especially 
during periods of inter-elite contestation. Whether the interventions of 
journalists in elite publications have impact on elite opinion and sense making 
in the context of the global economy remains highly uncertain. Yet the power 
of the media to either bury certain policy ideas, or keep them in the minds of 
decision-makers in international business and politics, should not be 
underestimated. Accordingly, further studies should regard financial media as 
actors in the global political economy and explore their role in the diffusion of 
economic ideas and in directing international debates on key policy issues. 
(3) Concentrating on the transnational interaction between corporate 
and policy-making elites, the study has aimed at contributing to elite studies 
both theoretically and empirically. As argued in Chapter 1, elites should no 
longer be understood as existing and operating only in national contexts, and 
there is increasing need to study and theorise the nature of today’s 
transnational elites (cf. Kauppi and Madsen 2013; Krysmanski 2004). 
Drawing specifically on Mills’ (1956) sociological analysis of the US power 
elite, I also posited that elite formation should be examined in the context of 
historical transformations in the political economy and the accompanying 
concentration of power in society. Accordingly, in Chapter 3 I traced major 
processes in the global political economy after World War 2 in terms of 
globalisation and financialization, how they have been driven by the active 
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agency of policymakers and TNCs, and how practices and institutions of global 
economic governance have spawned to ensure the functioning of global 
markets. By empowering major states and large market-dominating TNCs 
both economically and politically these processes have arguably contributed 
to the concentration of ownership and power in the global political economy 
(Barnet and Müller 1974; Brennan, 2016; Roach 2005; Vitali et al. 2011).  
Today, both giant TNCs and major states exercise power in various ways 
in both markets and international politics, applying their financial, productive 
and coercive resources to shape the global political economy according to their 
interests (e.g., Crouch 2011, 49, 67–8, 165; Dicken 2011, 297, 315; Freeland 
2012, 226–8; Gowan 1999; Hall 2014; Kaufmann and Vicente 2011; Kowalski 
et al. 2013; Rothkopf 2012, 295–317; Wood 2003, 16–7, 141). In this light, the 
processes of global economic governance represents a particular form of 
power through collective action, aiming at policy-coordination and 
international rule-making to shape the structural context that regulates all 
actors in the global economy. Global economic governance can be seen 
simultaneously as a form of policy-planning that brings elites together over 
national and sectoral boundaries to act collectively, and as a contested domain 
where elites struggle over political power. In this respect, the perspective of 
TEC outlined in this study draws attention to the power of communication as 
a means to affect people’s conceptions of the world at large and the situations 
at hand and hence to influence the way they operate (see Alasuutari and Qadir 
2014, 71; cf. Castells 2009). It is, at the same time, both an actor-centred and 
structure-centred perspective. In concentrating on transnational elites, the 
study highlights the importance and influence of those exercising top decision-
making power in world society. Yet the adopted perspective on TEC as a form 
and locus of power also draws attention to the ways in which ideological and 
discursive factors operate partly autonomously of any individual agency, not 
only enabling but also limiting the power of elites as individuals and as a 
collective agent.  
As I pointed out in Chapter 1.3, the notion of the elite as a theoretical 
concept presumes the existence of a degree of group consciousness and a sense 
of shared interests between powerful individuals, and in this way it implies 
that communicative practices are key in the formation of elites. Accordingly, 
the study has outlined a communication and media studies perspective on 
transnational elites by emphasising the significance of the discursive practices 
and institutions of the public sphere for elite integration, collective agency and 
identity formation (see Chapter 3.5). The empirical findings concerning FT-
mediated TEC suggest that international elite media facilitate elite integration 
and collective agency by disseminating discourses in which shared 
conceptions of reality and of the transnational elite as an actor and a 
community are established. In this sense, the mediated, international public 
sphere can indeed facilitate the self-organisation of transnational elites. These 
findings, however, may be influenced by the analytical and interpretive 
methodology of studying newspapers and analysing them as a form of 
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epistemic work. The perspective of epistemic work encourages the analyst to 
observe how the interests of political actors are established and shaped in the 
processes of communication and argumentation through the discursive 
construction of ontological understandings, actor identities and values and 
ideals that guide agency (see Alasuutari and Qadir 2014). In this way, it can 
make sense of the processes of communication through which elites can come 
together and find common causes despite the conflicts of interest that their 
institutional positions might anticipate. Yet while TEC and its institutional 
spaces have the effect of bringing elites together in common discourse and 
cultural exchange, TEC should also be seen as a contradictory process in which 
differences are articulated as much as commonalities. Other methodologies 
with a stronger focus on the political and hegemonic struggles in the public 
sphere and the agonistic and even antagonistic dimensions of competing 
discourses in journalism might have led to partly divergent conclusions (cf. 
Macgilchrist 2011). 
The way epistemic work was operationalised in this study suffers from 
another notable weakness. As described in Chapter 4.3, I mostly approached 
the material as a collective effort in which FT journalists and their sources 
engaged in collaborative epistemic work. While this approach is arguably valid 
when approaching journalistic material, in which the utterances of various 
actors are eventually mediated and reconstructed by a reporter, it effectively 
hides the potential of epistemic work to transform actors and their 
perceptions. Analysing negotiations or live arguments between elites at the 
Davos forum, for instance, would have given me greater insight into the 
various positions of elites concerning the issues debated and allowed me to 
analyse the processes of transaction and dialogue between two or more 
negotiators. As a result, it might have been possible to observe actual shifts in 
positions as a result of such epistemic work. Accordingly, the framework of 
epistemic work may be more suitable to studying inter-personal 
communication than media material. 
Overall, the study at hand on the epistemic dimensions of TEC should be 
regarded only as an exploratory step towards understanding on how 
communicative practices and institutions in the public sphere may facilitate 
elite formation on a transnational level. Further research on “the making of a 
global elite” in communication should take into consideration a broader 
spectrum of media or study inter-elite communication in live settings. 
Alternatively, communication and media studies could contribute to elite 
theory by investigating the elites’ communicative practices. Determining how 
elites use the media, how this affects their sense of belonging in the world, and 
how it shapes their sense-making on the political alternatives in global 
economic governance would be among the preliminary steps into this 
direction. 
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8.5 The making and unmaking of a global elite 
In his recent essay on the historical and contemporary indications of social 
progress, Göran Therborn (2016, 29–31) proposes that humanity has potential 
for collective action as a species. The argument of this study has been of a 
slightly more modest scope: that elites in the fields of business and politics are 
capable of coming together across societal domains and national boundaries 
to formulate common political objectives.122 But the way in which Therborn 
outlines his understanding of “species agency” bears many similarities with 
the approach of this study to the making of a global elite as a collective agent. 
He refers not only to the unprecedented global connectivity of peoples and 
cultures in the present era and the vast consciousness around the world of 
common concerns, such as human equality and climate change, but also to 
intentional efforts to mobilise collective action to address global problems. 
These elements – interaction, shared concerns and attempts to coordinate 
action – are at the heart of the efforts to integrate transnational elites and 
mobilise their collective agency around shared goals. 
The present study has been based on the assumption that the everyday 
activities of international policymakers and business leaders are informed by 
and reflected in transnational elite communication. It is this intra-elite and 
inter-elite exchange of ideas that gives meaning to, and rationalises, the 
actions of those involved. Ideas, beliefs and values that are formed and shared 
in TEC are thus key to understanding how elites exercise power in the global 
political economy. TEC sets the agenda, limits policy alternatives, defines 
roles, produces rationales for action and naturalises power relations in the 
global political economy. Accordingly, outlining new policies and discourses 
and promoting them in TEC is an important practice in the way of effecting 
change in the world.  
Yet there is a world beyond TEC and the discursive elite public that is 
formed in the process. Transnational elites do not act simply as members of a 
“transnational elite” but also as CEOs of their banks and companies, as 
political leaders of their governments, as representatives of industry, as 
officials of financial organisations and so on. They are, in other words, 
“private” persons as much as they are members of a transnational elite public. 
Ideas and values articulated in TEC cannot dictate how they act, and there are 
other relevant reference groups and spaces of communication into which 
transnational elites are embedded. In this sense, the potential new ideas 
 
                                                   
122 In fact, many of the examples outlined by Therborn of what he sees as emerging forms of 
“species agency” – the UN Declaration of Human Rights, the Millennium Goals, the 
establishment of the International Criminal Court and international summits to agree on 
measures to combat climate change – may be more accurately perceived as instances of 
transnational elite agency, albeit they simultaneously express broader cultural concerns, or 
what Therborn (2016, 37) names “species consciousness”. 
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articulated in TEC will always need to find ways to be implemented in the 
individual business and policy processes involving actors who operate in an 
environment of multiple pressures and influences.  
In historical terms, we may certainly speak of the emergence, in the past 
few decades, of an integrated transnational elite, which has found a common 
purpose in the endless quest for profit and growth, as well as in the extension 
of capitalist market relations around the world. Yet, in the present conjuncture 
of global capitalism, more agency is needed in order to address its social, 
political and ecological crisis tendencies. In this light, while setting out as an 
exploration into the processes of transnational elite integration and the 
communicative conditions of “the making of a global elite” as a collective 
agent, this study should also be read as an account of the advancing 
disintegration of elites in the increasingly contentious environment of 
contemporary global capitalism. From this perspective, resulting from long-
term accumulation of trade and savings imbalances, inflation of household 
credit markets fuelled by stagnating wages and financial speculation (e.g., 
Streeck 2011; Varoufakis 2013), the global financial crisis revealed not so much 
the ungovernability of the global economy but the failure of the transnational 
elite as an actor identity. It demonstrated the incapacity of elites to act 
collectively to stabilise the global political economy, associated with their 
inability to transcend beyond narrow sectoral and national interests and to 
move towards a more multilateral order which would be needed to facilitate 
elite cooperation in the post-hegemonic world order. 
Whether or not this is good news for the rest of us, or world society as a 
whole, depends on the point-of-view one takes. Returning to what were 
outlined in the opening words of this study as the interlinked problems of 
today’s global economy and society, including the global slowdown in growth, 
a highly unstable financial system, climate change, the rise of anti-liberal 
populism and increasing geopolitical tensions, the question of elite agency 
remains central to all of them. Is it possible to solve common problems in the 
world, and if so, who are the primary agents that are responsible for designing 
and implementing the necessary shifts in policy, institutions and practices?  
One critical perspective posits that contemporary elites are the very 
foundation of these problems: the multiple crises of capitalism result directly 
from the actions of transnational elites and, as both the expression of and the 
principal actors in a global class struggle, they are, by definition, incapable of 
solving the problems. What is needed is a political revolution to replace them 
with leaders following an entirely different set of values and ideas, potentially 
consisting of a mix of global social democracy, Green New Deal perspectives 
and Keynesian economic thought (see, e.g., Davidson 2009; Patomäki 2013). 
Alternatively, a comprehensive social revolution must take place in which the 
capitalist structures that have given rise to the global power hierarchies in the 
first place will be replaced by something more sustainable.  
However, there is also a more moderate view that outlines the potential 
for policy struggles here and now while acknowledging the near-term reality 
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of existing power hierarchies and the need to deal with today’s elites in their 
present composition. Even as it calls for greater civil society mobilisation 
around global problems to challenge and put pressure on the world’s power 
elites, this perspective simultaneously posits that we need greater agency or 
“leadership” in the world (see, e.g., Gill 2012). This is not only an academic 
argument, but a relatively common-sense view of how the world works. In 
popular political commentary concerning international conflicts and what are 
considered to be common problems of humanity, there is often a tendency to 
call for “the international community” to come together and address these 
issues in a multilateral fashion. As the reference point of such calls is typically 
intergovernmental negotiations or the broader system of global governance, 
this latter view necessarily subscribes to the perception of a high concentration 
of power in world society, and to the existence of elites capable of acting in the 
name of entire societies. It also relies heavily on the capacity for transnational 
elites to act collectively.  
Far from a conspiracy theory, the notion of transnational elite agency is 
thus key when we try to address some of the major questions of the present 
era. To successfully act in an interdependent global political economy 
characterised by not a single but a number of important centres of institutional 
power, elites directing these power centres must come together, both in a 
concrete sense of creating spaces and networks, and particularly in the sense 
of finding a common ground on the relevant issues. Their apparent failure to 
do that in the post-crisis condition has implications for us all. Even as the 
tenets of finance-led globalisation are increasingly discredited as they can no 
longer be associated with real growth, stability and universal benefit, they have 
not been replaced by new concepts that would articulate a policy-shift towards 
a more sustainable global economy. Yet, considering that the transnational 
elites themselves have been direct beneficiaries of post-crisis policy mix of 
monetary expansion and fiscal contraction (see Oxfam 2016; Tcherneva 2014), 
there is a sense of certain inevitability to this continuing epistemic confusion. 
Against the global interest, the transnational elite have been pursuing, perhaps 
more forcefully than ever before, their particular interest. Insofar as 
international elite forums and the media fail to address this basic 
contradiction in the debates on economic policy and global economic 
governance, they truly serve the ideological function of transnational elite 
communication. 
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